Öz: Frege özel adların (ve diğer dilsel simgelerin) anlamları ve gönderimleri arasında ünlü ayrımını yaptığı “Anlam ve Gönderim Üzerine” (1948) adlı makalesinde, bu ayrımın önemi, gerekliliği ve sonuçları üzerine uzun değerlendirmeler yapar ancak özel adın anlamından tam olarak ne anlaşılması gerektiğinden yalnızca bir dipnotta kısaca söz eder. Örneğin “Aristoteles” özel adının anlamının Platon’un öğrencisi ve Büyük İskender’in öğretmeni ya da Stagira’da doğan Büyük İskender’in öğretmeni olarak alınabileceğini söyler. Burada dikkat çeken nokta örnekteki özel adın olası anlamları olarak gösterilen belirli betimlemelerin (...) de özel ad içeriyor olması. Anlamın Frege için bileşimsel olduğu, bir başka deyişle bir dilsel simgenin anlamının (varsa) parçalarının anlamlarınca belirlendiği düşünülürse, örnekteki belirli betimlemelerin anlamlarının saptanabilmesi için içerdikleri özel adların da anlamları saptanıp betimleme içinde geçtikleri yere konmalıdır. Bu işlem hiçbir özel ad kalmayana kadar sürdürülmelidir. Ancak biraz düşünülünce bir özel adın nesnesini tekil olarak betimleyecek ve içinde özel ad geçmeyecek bir betimleme bulmanın kolay olmadığı görülür. Örneğin yukarıdaki betimlemelerde geçen “Platon”, “Büyük İskender” ve “Stagira” gibi özel adların anlamları olabilecek ancak özel ad içermeyen betimlemeler bulmak pek kolay görünmüyor. Ortaya bir sonsuz gerileme sorunu çıkmış gibi duruyor. Frege’nin anlam-gönderim ayrımını için ciddi sonuçları olabilecek bu sorunu Frege çözebilir mi? Bu yazıda bu sorunun yanıtını arayacağım. Sorunu betimledikten sonra Frege’nin önündeki seçenekleri (örneğin bağlama duyarlı terimlerden (gösterme adılları veya belirteçler) yararlanma veya bağlamı sınırlama gibi) değerlendireceğim. -/- Abstract: In his “Sense and Reference” (1948), Frege makes his famous distinction between the sense and the reference of a proper name (and other signs) and discusses at length the significance, necessity and consequences of the distinction, but he explains how the sense of a proper name should be understood very briefly in a footnote. According to him, for example, the sense of the proper name “Aristotle” can be taken as the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great or the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. What is interesting here is that the definite descriptions given as the possible senses of this proper name do themselves contain proper names too. Since the sense is something compositional for Frege, which means the sense of a linguistic sign is determined by its constituents (if there are any), in order to determine the sense of definite descriptions in question, we should first determine the senses of proper names they contain and substitute these senses with the proper names themselves. This process should continue until no proper name remains. However, it does not seem easy to find a definite description which describes the object of a proper name uniquely but contains no proper name itself. For instance, could we find appropriate senses that contain no proper name for “Plato”, “Alexander the Great” and “Stagira”? It does not seem likely. A problem of infinite regress appears to arise. Can Frege solve this problem, which poses a serious threat for his sensereference distinction? I will explore this problem in this paper. After explaining the problem, I will discuss the options (e.g. turning to indexicals or context restriction) Frege can take to deal with it. (shrink)

Each thinker, according to Heidegger, essentially thinks one thought. Plato thinks the idea. Descartes thinks the cogito . Spinoza thinks substance. Nietzsche thinks the will to power. If a thinker does not think a thought, then he or she is not a thinker. He or she may be a scholar or a professor, a producer or a consumer, a fan or a fake, but he or she would not be a thinker. Thus, if Heidegger is a thinker, he essentially thinks (...) one thought. What is Heidegger’s one thought? It is neither life nor death, neither me nor you. It is neither technology nor art. It is neither spirit nor language. Heidegger’s one thought is being—or more precisely, the question of the meaning of being. And what is being? Neither presence nor absence--but rather, an ambiguous uncertainty. (shrink)

Limitless is a movie (released in 2011) as well as a novel (published in 2001) about a tormented author who (plagued by a writer’s block) becomes an early user of an experimental designer drug. The wonder drug makes him highly productive overnight and even allows him to make a fortune on the stock market. At the height of his career, however, the detrimental side-effects become increasingly noticeable. In this article, Limitless is analysed from two perspectives. First of all, building on (...) the views of the French novelist Emile Zola, the novel is seen as the report of a closely monitored experiment. Subsequently, building on the phenomenology of Ludwig Binswanger, I will show how the cognitive enhancement drug not only boosts the protagonist’s information processing capacities, but also modifies his experience of space and time, his sense of spatiality, his way of being-in-the-world. On the basis of these (complementary) analyses I will indicate how genres of the imagination (such as movies and novels) may play a significant role in assessing the societal implications of emerging technological developments such as neuro-enhancement, especially during the preparatory or anticipatory stage. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: In parallel with public and philosophical discussions, there is an ongoing debate about euthanasia in theological ethics. In this situation it is helpful to provide a systematic overview of the different arguments and judgements. Arguments: A short introduction is followed by a first part dealing with the definition of terms. The second and major part concerning normative arguments is subdivided into three steps: the level of principles, the more concrete level of actions and finally the level (...) of social consequences. The third part presents some reflections following the eudaimonistic ethical tradition (the ethics of a good life and death) focusing on the central question: how to find meaning in life when faced with suffering. Conclusion: It would be fruitful to intensify the ethical reflection both on the problems concerning the foundations of social life, especially the meaning of dignity, autonomy and inviolability of human life, and social consequences of a liberal practice of euthanasia. In this context ethicists are challenged to reflect on the different approaches to what is or can be a good life and a human death. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Deleuze’s treatment of the Nietzschean problem of nihilism. Of all the major figures in contemporary continental thought, Deleuze is at once one of the most luminous, and practically a lone voice in suggesting that nihilism may successfully be overcome. Whether or not he is correct on this point is thus a commanding question in relation to our understanding of the issue. Many commentators on Nietzsche have argued that his project of overcoming nihilism is destined to failure (...) because of the affinity between the problem of nihilism and the logic of negation. While Nietzsche wants an absolute affirmation of life, Spinoza’s principle that “all determination is negation,” as well as Hegel’s dialectical conception of negation, suggest that affirmation free of negation is not possible. However, some commentators indicate that Deleuze successfully shows how overcoming nihilism is possible because his “logic of difference” allows for an affirmation which is not dialectically reappropriated by negation. This paper argues that beyond such logical considerations, there are metaphysical and existential reasons why Deleuze’s interpretation of nihilism fails to show that it can be overcome. For Deleuze, the overcoming of nihilism hinges not just on a logic of difference, but on a radical interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return as “selective being.” Drawing on recent scholarship and on Nietzsche’s own writings I argue that this is not a tenable interpretation, and also, more importantly, that the metaphysical and existential implications of this understanding of eternal return reinstate nihilism at the very point where it is supposedly overcome. Moreover, I argue that there are attendant ethical and political dangers to Deleuze’s position on nihilism. (shrink)

The argument claims the vital importance of the idea of the fundamental unity of humankind for any intercultural philosophy, and succinctly traces the trajectory of this idea – and its denials – in the Western and the African traditions of philosophical and empirical research. The conclusion considers the present-day challenges towards this idea’s implementation – timely as it is, yet apparently impotent in the face of mounting global violence.

Naturalism is the current orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the conjunction of the (ontological) claim that all that truly exists are the entities countenanced by the natural sciences and the (epistemological) claim that the only true knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge. Drawing on some recent work in Critical Theory, this article argues that naturalism qualifies as an ideology. This is the case because naturalism meets three key aspects shared by paradigmatic cases of ideology: (i) naturalism has practical consequences and implications (...) of a specific kind, (ii) those endorsing naturalism fall prey to a dual deception: having false meta-level beliefs about naturalism as being without alternative, and (iii) naturalism has a tendency towards self-immunisation. The article ends by suggesting we pull naturalism out of our collective cognitive backgrounds onto the main stage of critical discourse, making it a proper topic for philosophical critique again. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article discusses the turn to polytheism in postmodern theory. In postmodernism, there is a strong interest in polytheism as an alternative to the much-criticized dominance of onto-theology in the philosophical tradition. The article argues that the new polytheism cannot be unequivocally understood as an alternative for an onto-theological way of thinking, or as a ‘liberation’ from monotheism. Already in Romanticism, the engagement with polytheism and paganism was ambiguous. There was the familiar superiority of Christian monotheism over polytheism. But there (...) was also an appropriation of polytheism that served a new self-perception of the West. This article focuses on this second line of interpretation and argues that postmodern theory inherits the theo-political concerns central to eighteenth- and nineteenth- century Romanticism. The article sets out to sketch the role of polytheism in a post-secular paradigm. Subsequently, it sketches the engagement with polytheism in British and German Romanticism. It will be argued that in Romanticism, polytheism was always embedded in more substantial cultural and political narratives. The remainder of the article will scrutinize the function of polytheism in the writings of Richard Rorty and John Milbank and how their respective forms of polytheism give way to different political theologies. (shrink)

This paper argues that there exists a Heideggerian antonomology and this not only in the broad sense of a simple study, but also in the strict sense of a full doctrine of personal pronouns. Traversing the whole of Heidegger’s work, I reconstitute the framework of this antonomology, from the connection of mineness and ipseity, to the difference between the I and the Self within the precedence of the latter over the former. I then rehearse its drama, from the They who (...) answers the question of the who of Dasein to the We who asks the question of the who of man. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs Nietzsche’s conception of spiritual illness, especially as exhibited in various forms of the bad conscience, and asks what positive, ennobling potential Nietzsche finds in it. The relevant concept of spirit is arrived at by reconstructing Nietzsche’s conception of life and then considering what reflexive life – life turned back against itself – would look like. It distinguishes four independent features of spiritual illness: the measureless drive to make oneself suffer, self-opacity (or mendaciousness), life-denial, and a self-undermining dynamic (...) in which life exhausts the sources of its own vitality. The paper ends by considering various suggestions as to how these features of spiritual illness might also be preconditions of great spiritual health, including the preconditions for erecting new “ideals.”. (shrink)

Philosophers of music, like Charles Swann in Proust’s novel (Proust 1913/1992, p. 360), have traditionally found it difficult to utter the word ‘profound’ unironically. But this changed with Peter Kivy’s 1990 paper ‘The profundity of music’ The problem Kivy draws our attention to is this: we do call some musical works profound. However, Kivy argues, given that a work is profound only if it is about something profound and given that music (or ‘music alone’) is not about anything, this leads (...) to something of a paradox: how can music be profound if it is not about something profound. My aim in this paper is to argue that what makes a work profound is not that it is about something profound, but that it actively challenges any straightforward interpretative activity (while at the same time nudges you to keep on trying to interpret it). I argue that this line of argument is very much in tune with Kivy’s general theoretical commitment that “music alone isn’t about anything” (Kivy 1990, p. 245). (shrink)

This paper aims at explicating the role of the connections and interactions between health, well being and beauty. The primary goal of all medical approaches, including the classic biomedical and humanistic or humane approaches, is to restore or create health, whereby medical approaches that include prevention go beyond the mere restoration of health to include the preservation of health. Equating well-being and thus health with a largely self-determined and joyful life, then not only does a healthy life become a beautiful (...) life, a beautiful life also becomes a healthy life! By bringing Beauty into the health discourse, we are entering the field of aesthetics in general and social aesthetics in particular. As the beautiful is not just a decorative element of life but a genuine source of human strength, it gives us the strength and power we need to implement and achieve all that we then experience as “well-being” and that is called a healthy life. Therefore a further development of a human-based medicine is needed, a medicine that focuses not on a disease construct but which places a human being as a whole, with all his potential and limitations at the heart of diagnostic and therapeutic efforts. The noblest therapeutic goal of this kind of medicine can only be the restoration or preservation of a comprehensive state of health in the sense of complete physical, mental and social well-being, in the sense of opening up the possibility for a mostly autonomous and joyful life. (shrink)

Based on the assumption that “philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process,” Georg Hegel compared it with the ancient symbol of wisdom: the owl of Minerva. This analogy is well known and has not caused many debates. Much less known is the comparison of philosophy with another bird, the rooster, proposed by Henry Thoreau. The main purpose of the article is to show that the latter analogy also has a deep (...) meaning and can serve as a good addition to Hegel’s one. Both comparisons can co-exist as the symbols of two different ways of philosophizing. The comparison of philosophy with the owl is an accurate symbol of Hegel’s type of philosophizing: impersonal, academic, strictly theoretical, and quite conservative. At the same time, the comparison with the rooster is more in line with the type of philosophizing that Thoreau practiced: deeply personalized, extraacademic, practical, and future-oriented. It has been shown that Thoreau’s “morning-rooster” philosophy became the basis for many innovative ideas and practices, the relevance of which only grows over the time: the fight against racism, civil disobedience, wildlife conservation, animal protection, vegetarianism, and even downshifting. To clarify the specifics of this type of philosophizing, the author recontextualizes the famous episode from Plato’s “Phaedo”, in which Socrates not only sacrifices his own life by drinking a poisonous beverage but also asks to sacrifice a rooster. It has been shown that, to a certain level, Thoreau was like Socrates; however, his philosophy does not require such sacrifices. Thoreau’s philosophy is like the crowing of a cheerful rooster, which wakes up and notices the first rays of a new dawn, even in the twilight of the end of history.Manuscript received 10.08.2020. (shrink)

John Perceval (1803-1876), who suffered from schizophrenia, published two books on his experience, in 1836 and 1840. More than a century later, the anthropologist Gregory Bateson discovered in Perceval's memoirs a lucid anticipation of his own theories on schizophrenia. To Bateson, Perceval describes the interactive patterns between himself, his family, and the hospital psychiatrists, as examples of "double bind" interactions, in which he played the role of a "sacrificial victim." The article underlines the strong convergence between Bateson's theory of schizophrenia (...) and René Girard's theory of the scapegoat. In the anthropological theory of Girard, the sacrificial ceremonies are the main way of constructing social order. In that perspective, the schizophenic can be considered as a particular example of a scapegoat, that is, as an important figure in social life, and not as a mere phenomenon of psychopathology. This theoretical convergence is remarkable, in particular, because both anthropologists explain the sacrificial processes through a theory of social life based on the idea that the main unit of analysis is not the individual, but the interactive dynamic as a whole: patterns of relationships, to Bateson; reciprocal imitation (mymesis), to Girard. (shrink)

The theism-atheism debate is foreign to many Mahāyāna Buddhist thinkers such as the Japanese Zen Master Dōgen. Nevertheless, his philosophy of ‘expression’ is able to shine a new light on the various incarnations of this debate throughout history. This paper will explore a/theism from Dōgen’s philosophical standpoint. Dōgen introduces the notion of ‘expression’ to describe the concomitant vertical and horizontal relationships of the religious project, namely the relationship between the individual and the divine as well as the relationship among a (...) multiplicity of individuals, each of which Dōgen conceives of as an expression of the divine and/or the oneness of the cosmos. Dōgen’s philosophy presupposes the ‘way of emptiness’ and Chengguan’s ‘four dharma worlds’. To Dōgen, the former indicates the conventional nature of predication and signification, while the latter denotes the existential interwovenness of numerous individuals and the divine oneness of the cosmos. Such a philosophy implies that all truth claims and philosophical positions are mere intellectual and discursive constructions that are formulated against a perceived other. Therefore, Dōgen observes laconically that ‘when one side is expressed, the other is obscured’ or, as Dōgen says elsewhere, ‘when expression is expressed, non-expression is not expressed.’ Dōgen’s philosophical framework provides some interesting insights about one or more discourses on atheism: Again, the basic assumption is that all philosophical paradigms, systems, and positions are devoid of an absolute truth value, framed in a specific cultural and historical context which they express, and formulated vis-à-vis a perceived other. In this paper, I will look at Friedrich Nietzsche’s atheism from the perspective of Dōgen’s philosophical standpoint. Concretely, I will present Nietzsche’s position on his own terms, translate his philosophy into Dōgen’s terminology, interpret his philosophy from the standpoint of Dōgen’s philosophical approach, and assess the utility of such an exercise. I believe that such a project enables us to read theism through the eyes of atheism, atheism through the eyes of theism, both through the eyes of Dōgen, and Dōgen through the eyes of the a/theism debate. In this last section, I will introduce the language of Nishida Kitarō who attempted a similar project in his The Logic of Basho and the Religious Worldview. The goal of this project is to determine what atheism denies, what atheism contributes, and why a multi-faceted and multi-cultural engagement of atheism is important today. (shrink)

Spiritlessness. Reflections on the topicality of Søren Kierkegaard’s construction of the self in the field of tension between immanence and transcendence: One of the most suggestive and provocative concepts developed by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is the concept of “spiritlessness”. Spiritlessness is conceived of as a state of mind which cuts out transcendent possibilities at the benefice of reduced immanent probabilities and thus hinders the individual to become a true Self. The present paper asks for the topicality of Kierkegaard’s (...) dialectics of “spirit” and “spiritlessness” for the constitution of the Self in the 21st cntury. (shrink)

David Benatar and Thomas Nagel are both claiming that life is meaningless if judged from a cosmic perspective and both are claiming that our life is absurd. However, they understand ‘the absurdity of life’ in different ways. Benatar’s understanding of absurdity refers to the impossibility to transcend our limits from the cosmic perspective. This is strictly tied to a negative evaluation of our life. According to Benatar we have therefore a reason to regret our existence. Again, Nagel’s absurdity arises from (...) a clash of attitudes we have when we evaluate our life from the subjective and the objective perspective. Absurdity results from the incompatibility of our attitudes regarding our own life. We should therefore approach our lives with irony.I argue that neither regret nor irony are rationally recommended attitudes we should have to our life. I show that Benatar’s transcending-ones-limits approach to life’s meaning does not necessarily go hand in hand with a negative evaluation of our life. Although a transcending-ones-limits-approach of life’s meaning implies that our life is admittedly meaningless from a cosmic perspective it does not imply that it is to be judged as good or bad. However, the irony that Nagel advises is not recommended either, as subjective and objective attitude do not necessarily collide. As I read Nagel’s position the attitudes must collide because of a difference in evaluative certainty. I think this is not true because the evaluation of life is beset by doubts subjectively as well as objectively. (shrink)

The ancient theme of the metaphysical-theological extremes of being-human is revisited by asking about the condition for the readiness to engage in the form of violence which is nuclear war. Sartre’s analysis of the extreme form of anger which crosses a threshold resulting in a self-legitimating righteous indignation which admits of no superior mollifying standpoint is appropriated to account for the complacency with the institution of nuclear weapons. The god-like anti-God characteristics of extreme rage are put on ice but ready (...) to be thawed quickly in the three-quarter of a century old disposition to destroy the world in which all life that we know is lived. The parallels with the myth of Lucifer invite themselves. This raises the question of what there is in being-human which is the condition for the possibility of such Luciferian impulses. Features of being human explicated by Husserlian transcendental phenomenology serve as lures to the unique form of pride that here is called Luciferian. Here it is argued that these features can also be lures to a sense of pride, analogous to the ancient magnanimitas, as developed by Aquinas. (shrink)

In the discourse of the knowledge-based economy, the link between creativity and innovation is usually taken for granted. However, not only is this link of recent date, it joins together two diametrically opposed concepts: the economic concept of innovation and the humanistic concept of creativity. In research too, there is a lack of enquiry into the nature of the processes of creativity and innovation and into how these processes are similar yet different. Building on the original insights of Henri Poincaré (...) and Joseph Schumpeter, I present the hypothesis that creativity and innovation are similar in nature, not in regard to knowledge or skills, but in that both are ways of relating to the novel. My findings suggest, meanwhile, that creativity and innovation differ in that creativity is about experiencing the novel in the creative process, whereas innovation is about willing the novel as a strategy for the innovative process. Furthermore, my findings suggest that there exists a structural similarity between creativity and innovation and Aristotle’s concepts of practical and philosophical wisdom, in that innovation is a form of practical wisdom in regard to the novel, whereas creativity is a form of philosophical wisdom in regard to the novel. (shrink)

One of the very few matters of nearly universal agreement with respect to Nietzsche interpretation, one that bridges the great analytic/continental divide, is that Nietzsche was offering some sort of account of freedom, in contradistinction to the ‘ascetic’ or ‘slavish’ ways of the past. What remains in dispute is the character of this account. In this paper I present Nietzsche’s account of freedom and his arguments for the superior cogency of that account relative to other accounts of freedom, including irony (...) about the possibility of freedom. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to analyse the experience of embodiment in illness. Drawing upon Heidegger' sphenomenology and the suggestion that illness can be understood as unhomelike being-in-the-world, I try to show how the way we live our own bodies in illness is experienced precisely as unhomelike. The body is alien, yet, at the same time, myself. It involves biological processes beyond my control, but these processes still belong to me as lived by me. This a priori otherness of the (...) body presents itself in illness in an uncanny and merciless way. The unhomelike breakdown of our everyday being-in-the-world suffered in illness is explored through Heidegger's notion of the world being a “totality of relevance”, a pattern of meaning played out between different “tools”. The lived body is compared to a broken tool that alters and obstruct sour way of being “thrown” and “projecting” ourselves in the meaning patterns of the world through feelings,thoughts and actions. The similarities and differences between this unhomelikeness of illness and the specific unhomelikeness of authentic understanding,reached according to Heidegger in existential anxiety,are discussed. In order to illustrate how the lived body can present itself as “broken” and “other” to its owner, and in what way this unhomelike experience calls for help from health-care professionals, I make use of a clinical example of a severe and common disease: stroke. (shrink)

O objetivo do texto é fazer uma análise das menções de Theodor Adorno à obra de Dostoiévski, enfatizando as relações entre a concepção do filósofo sobre a “vida danificada” e a obra literária do autor russo. Está em jogo demonstrar o quanto a “epopeia negativa” vista por Adorno em Dostoiévski se corporifica no delineamento de uma subjetividade subterrânea a partir da ideia de um excesso subjetivo fragmentado, que desemboca na ideia de má-consciência e, por fim, na falência psíquica. Tais elementos (...) serão investigados na interpretação do romance “O duplo. Poema petersburguense”, de Dostoiévski. (shrink)

In the ‘Rectoral Address’, of 1933, Martin Heidegger indicates that the crisis of the West, articulated by Nietzsche as the ‘death of God’, was a central concern in his attempt to rethink and reform higher education in 1933–1934. While Heidegger soon thereafter appears to have abandoned serious efforts at any practical transformation of the modern university, his reflection on Nietzsche, the ‘death of God’, and ‘European nihilism’ becomes deeper and more urgent throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The question then arises: (...) What are the consequences of this confrontation with Nietzsche and the problem of nihilism for our thinking about the current state and task of education? The following article takes up this question through a consideration of Heidegger’s essay, ‘Nietzsche’s Word: “God is Dead”’. (shrink)

This essay examines the complex topic of illusion and art in Nietzsche’s philosophy. It focuses on two topics in particular: Nietzsche’s practice of self-transformation; and the question of how to differentiate through the analysis of style those practices that are deluded from those that are transformative.

This paper aims to analyse how literary fiction deals with two real cases of philistine violence on cultural objects, one artistic and the other scientific. In this way, we will analyse Mishima's novel, The Temple of the Golden Pavilion, which narrates the destruction of one of the “jewels of Kyoto,” as well as Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent, which novelised the attack against the meridian of Greenwich. In both cases, we are confronted with the same attitude, namely, the insane resentment (...) against the reality principle. (shrink)

Desde un futuro anterior el pensamiento de la deconstrucción _asedia_ a la filosofía del martillo nietzscheana, ya que nos permite re-escribirla a partir de la nueva perspectiva que inaugura. En este trabajo nos proponemos abordar principalmente los trabajos de Nietzsche _Sobre verdad y mentira en sentido extramoral_ y _Sobre la utilidad y el perjuicio de la historia para la vida_, para analizar el modo en que, en estos textos tempranos, la escritura derridiana reconfigura el entramado filosófico nietzscheano.

Die Bezeichnung „alt“ hat sich zu einem Wertbegriff negativer Konnotation gewandelt, so dass er synonym für alle möglichen Defizienzen bzw. als Chiffre für Defizienz schlechthin steht. Alt zu sein ist nun nicht länger eine Sache der Jahre, sondern von (verloren gegangenen) Qualitäten. Positiv ist daran, dass (fast wieder alles) möglich ist, negativ ist, dass gerade deshalb auch (fast) wieder alles ermöglicht werden muss. Denn der Alte ist selber schuld und will er es nicht bleiben, muss er etwas daran ändern. Die (...) Krankschreibung des Alters ruft seine Behandlung hervor, was nichts anders bedeutet als dass das Alter, das als Krankheit begriffen wird, kuriert werden muss, wobei die Kur nicht in seiner Heilung, sondern in seiner Überwindung, d.h. seiner Abschaffung besteht. Das Anti-Aging verfolgt eine radikale Abkehr vom Menschen, wie wir ihn kennen. Gerade am Alter lässt sich aber zeigen, dass der Mensch mit Mängeln leben kann, häufig trotz seiner Mängel glücklich wird und mit ihnen sogar seinen Frieden macht. (shrink)

Dialogo filosofijos mąstytojų Rosenzweig‘o ir Levino darbų esmė – mirties bedugnės ir asmens tapatumo santykis. Rosenzweig‘as niekį laiko galutiniu kantiškojo mąstymo tašku. Mirtis, kaip egzistencinis niekio patyrimas, buvo laikoma kiekvieno žmogaus realybe sudėtingu amžių sandūros laikotarpiu. Rosenzweig‘ui niekis buvo atspirties taškas, permąstant ir siekiant išsaugoti asmens tapatumą. Asmens tapatumas apsaugo nuo niekio, tačiau jis taip pat yra atviras pokyčiams. Savo ankstyvuosiuose tekstuose Levinas daro panašias prielaidas, laikydamas Buvimą asmens tapatumo pradžia. Levinas plėtojo dialektinę fenomenologiją pradėdamas nuo mirties. Asmens tapatumas traktuojamas (...) kaip hipostazė, tačiau Levino darbe „Totalité et Infini“ įvyksta svarbus lūžis – jame asmens tapatumo šaltiniu laikomas troškimas. Buvimas tampa dėmesio centru kaip antroji elementale pusė, o asmens tapatumas suvokiamas kaip atsiskyrimas. (shrink)

Introduction - From the Illiad to the Studies on Hysteria: A chronology of the discovery of the unconscious mind - Freud's theories of the unconscious mind - Jung's collective unconscious - Lacan's linguistic paradigm.

In normative ethics there has been a long-standing debate between consequentialists and deontologists. To settle this dispute moral theorists have often used a selective approach. They have focused on particular aspects of our moral practice and have teased out what consequentialists and deontologists have to say about it. One of the focal points of this debate has been the morality of promising. In this paper I review arguments on both sides and examine whether consequentialists or deontologists offer us a more (...) plausible account of promissory obligation. My conclusion is negative. Given the arguments on the table, I argue, we should conclude that the debate is in a stalemate. It is, therefore, hard to see how the issue of promissory obligation could help us choose between consequentialism and deontology. (shrink)

The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than (...) a symmetric ubiquitous or context- independent mechanism, I propose that these neurons are part of broader sensorimotor circuits, which help us navigate and predict the social affordance space that we meet others in. To develop both the critical and positive project I analyze the interpretive choices and the debate surrounding the mirror neuron research and show how the field is marred by highly questionable assumptions about respectively motor and social cognition. The discovery of mirror neurons - and the sensorimotor circuits of which these neurons are a part – actually empirically challenge many of these tacit assumptions. Findings of sensorimotor goal representations at levels of abstraction well beyond actual sensory information and kinetic movements challenge the idea of motor cognition as primarily output production. Additionally, the focus on 3rd person mindreading of hidden mental states is misguiding the field of social cognition. Much ‘mind-reading’ seems rooted in sensorimotor representations and a developmentally primary 2nd person understanding of actions and the mental lives of others, which precisely breaks the assumed dichotomy between mind and behavior. I propose a Social Affordance model where parallel fronto-parietal sensorimotor circuits support representations not just of other people’s actions but of the overall social affordance space. It is a process that monitors concrete goals and teleological possibilities that the environment affords respectively oneself and other present agents. With this model I hypothesize that the complex spectrum of sensorimotor integrations are indeed essential not only to normal action choice calibration but also to social cognitive abilities, as the sensorimotor teleological representations let us relate to others and understand their action choices in a shared pragmatic and intentional context. (shrink)

The so-called ‘central problem’ of internalism has been formulated like this: one cannot concurrently maintain the following three philosophical positions without inconsistency: internalism about practical reason, moral rationalism, and moral absolutism. Since internalism about practical reason is the most controversial of these, the suggestion is that it is the one that is best abandoned. In this paper, I point towards a response to this problem by sketching a deontic logic of internal reasons that deflates moral normativity to the normativity of (...) instrumental rationality, and provides support for the assertion that one can hold fast simultaneously to internalism and at least many of the intuitive commitments of liberal moral thinking. Crucial to the proposal is an account of the enkratic principle – I ought to attempt to realise what I ultimately desire – as the source of obligations we owe to ourselves. I attempt to show how from this, in conjunction with some plausible assumptions, obligations to others might be derived. (shrink)

Finding truth is an art that was learned and unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for independent confirmation of our beliefs, by reality. This methodology is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. A completely different social order is implied and the one keeps running the other into the ground like a tectonic plate. Philosophical Modernism showed us how dualism works, before Post-Modernism challenged it, regressing (...) to monism. (shrink)

Nicht Stabilität, sondern Instabilität sei der Grundcharakter der Natur, so hören wir von Jan Schmidt als Auftakt zu seinem Buch „Das Andere der Natur“ (Hirzel-Verlag, 2015). „Das Eine der Natur“, welches reduktionistisch zu erfassen ist, soll durch ein „Anderes“ ergänzt werden. Von dieser anderen Seite her zeigt sich „Natur ... auch (als) instabil, komplex, chaotisch, zufällig, emergent...“, und aus dieser Sicht des Naturgeschehens heraus will der Autor eine Philosophie der Instabilität entwerfen. Der gelernte Physiker und Philosoph lehrt an der Hochschule (...) Darmstadt (hda) Wissenschafts- und Technikphilosophie. Sein Buch beleuchtet das Thema „Instabilitäten“ aus vielen Blickwinkeln. Was sind Instabilitäten, was Selbstorganisation, was ist Zeit, was Zufall, was Kausalität? Diese Erkenntnisse bezieht der Autor dann auf den Kosmos, auf die Evolution bis hin zum menschlichen Gehirn und seinen Leistungen. Mit dieser Rezension gehe ich ausführlich auf dieses lesenswerte Buch ein. (shrink)