According to deterrence justifications of legal punishment, legal punishment is justified at least in part because it deters offenses. These justifications rely on important empirical assumptions, e.g., that non-punitive enforcement can't deter or that it can't deter enough. I’ll challenge these assumptions and argue that extant deterrence justifications of legal punishment fail. In the process, I examine contemporary deterrence research and argue that it provides no support for these justifications.

Recently, David Boonin has put forward several objections to Carlos S. Nino's 'Consensual Theory of Punishment'. In this paper I will defend Nino against the 'explicit denial objection'. I will discuss whether Boonin's interpretation of Nino as a tacit consent theorist is right. I will argue that the offender's consent is neither tacit nor express, but a special category of implicit consent. Further, for Nino the legal-normative consequences of an act (of crime) are 'irrevocable', i.e. one cannot (expressly and successfully) (...) deny liability to them. I will suggest an explanation for Nino's irrevocability claim. (shrink)

Brian Calvert has offered us a clear and careful analysis of Locke's views on punishment and capital punishment. The primary goal of his paper - that of correcting the misperception of Locke as a wholehearted proponent of capital punishment for a wide range of offenses - must be allowed to be both laudable and largely achieved in his discussion. But Calvert's analysis also encourages, I think, a number of serious misunderstandings of Locke's true position.

This paper examines the practice of using predictive systems to lengthen the prison sentences of convicted persons when the systems forecast a higher likelihood of re-offense or re-arrest. There has been much critical discussion of technologies used for sentencing, including questions of bias and opacity. However, there hasn’t been a discussion of whether this use of predictive systems makes sense in the first place. We argue that it does not by showing that there is no plausible theory of punishment that (...) supports it. (shrink)

It appears at least intuitively appropriate to claim that we owe it to victims to punish those who have wronged them. It also seems plausible to state that we owe it to society to punish those who have violated its norms. However, do we also owe punishment to perpetrators themselves? In other words, do those who commit crimes have a moral right to be punished? This work examines the sustainability of the right to be punished from the standpoint of the (...) two main theories of rights—the will and the interest conceptions. The right to be punished is shown to be largely indefensible on both accounts: on the will theory, the right to be punished conflicts with autonomy, and it can neither be claimed nor waived by a perpetrator; on the interest theory, a perpetrator’s interest in punishment, inasmuch as it exists, is not sufficient to ground a duty on the part of the state. (shrink)

In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then (...) turn to a different line of criticism, which I find more promising. I argue that the moral power of effecting normative changes by consenting reflects the power holder’s value as a person, and show how this idea makes sense of how refusal to recognize that power wrongs a person. I then argue that the “power” of consenting to punishability does not fit that model, and is better explained as reflecting the value of other people, whom the offender has wronged. Hence the power of consenting is not involved in typical cases of wrongdoing. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss two aspects of ignorance of the law: ignorance of illegality (including mistaking the law) and ignorance of the penalty; and I will look at the implications for natives, for tourists and for immigrants. I will argue that Carlos Nino's consensual theory of punishment need to rely on two premises in order to justify that (claiming) ignorance of the law is no excuse. The first premise explains why individuals are presumed to 'know' current laws. The (...) second premise explains why individuals are presumed to 'know' new legislation. (shrink)

There are attempts to define torture which say that a person is only being tortured if the pain inflicted upon them is pain that they have not consented to. In this very brief paper, I recommend that we define torture without this condition.

O objetivo desse artigo é investigar o problema da justificação da punição, a saber, como é possível justificar normativamente o dano intencional retributivo reprobatório infligido pelo Estado aos ofensores? Nossa estratégia será tentar conectar a função corretiva e os eventos de remorso, arrependimento e perdão do âmbito privado da punição com o domínio público, de forma a questionar a correção normativa da punição legal. Posteriormente, veremos como o contratualismo pode justificar a instituição da punição de uma forma mais eficiente e (...) como a ética das virtudes pode ser um atrativo modelo quando pensamos em quem punir e o quanto. Por fim, defenderemos que uma teoria moral mista seria desejável para melhor resolver os complexos problemas da justificação da punição. (shrink)

This paper will in good part concern six arguments taken as making up what is called the New Retributivism. It will also have to do with a seventh retributivist argument, and with the unexamined idea that reflection on punishment can lead a life of its own, independently of political philosophy. Both that idea and the arguments bear on the main question of whether punishment in our societies is right or wrong. It is a question not worn to a frazzle, as (...) is the one of how it is that punishment is right, which piously presupposes that it is. My answer to the impious question gets very little wear in this reactionary and, as it sometimes seems, vengeful time. For a particular reason, it will have to go undefended here. (shrink)

The author deals with one aspect of the justification of governmental action and its product (the law). He focuses on the authoritative character of legal rule, analyzing the apparent capacity of governments to produce reasons for action not grounded on substantive moral considerations. The assumption of that capacity seems necessary in order to establish a general moral obligation to obey a government irrespective of the actions required. This question is faced in connection with the thesis that only a particular form (...) of government, democracy, is morally justified insofar as it rests on legal rules issued by a legitimate source. (shrink)

A person deserves a punishment if and only if he did a culpable wrongdoing and in virtue of this it is other-things-being intrinsically good that he receive punishment and if he were to receive that punishment then it would be through a non-deviant causal chain that includes the culpable wrongdoing. The wrongdoing may be institutional or pre-institutional depending on whether the moral right that the wrongdoer trespasses upon is dependent on a political institution’s goal. Desert in general, and punitive desert (...) in particular, has a ground for which the agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy and it does not itself general a duty on anyone’s behalf. Both features make desert a different type of moral entity than a moral right. In addition, the two stand in a different relation to autonomy: rights protect a sphere in which autonomy may be exercises whereas desert, including punitive desert, provides a guide to the exercise of autonomy. They thus have different connections to one of the most important value-creating features of a person. This difference between desert and moral rights indicates the need for a separate analysis of each in the context of punishment. (shrink)

The present paper constitutes a critique of David Alm’s article “Punishment, Consent and Value”, in which it is argued that the consensual theory of punishment defended by C. S. Nino is false. Whilst Alm believes that this theory is grounded on an inadequate model of normative relations, here I will defend the hypothesis that such an assessment derives from an insufficient conception of human value and respect.

La pregunta que exploro en este trabajo es si la injusticia social puede socavar la autoridad moral de la sociedad para castigar al que delinque. La respuesta a esta pregunta depende esencialmente de cuál sea la teoría justificatoria del castigo penal de la que se parte. Analizo diversas teorías de la pena, entre ellas la teoría consensual de Carlos Nino. Mi objetivo es explorar de qué modo las diferentes teorías de la pena enfrentan el desafío que plantea la pregunta y (...) extraer algunas conclusiones tentativas de ese recorrido. The question I address in this paper is whether social injustice can undermine the moral authority of society to punish criminals. The answer to this question crucially depends on the underlying justificatory theory of punishment. I consider several theories, among them the consensual theory proposed by Carlos Nino. My aim is to explore how different theories of punishment address the challenge and to draw some tentative conclusions. (shrink)

Imagine a citizen (call her Ellen) engages in conduct the state says is a crime, for example, money laundering. Imagine too that the state of which Ellen is a citizen has decided to make money laundering a crime. Does the state wrong Ellen when it punishes her for money laundering? It depends on what you think about the authority of the criminal law. Most criminal law scholars would probably say that the criminal law as such has no authority. Whatever authority (...) is has depends on how well it adheres to the demands of morality inasmuch as morality is the only authority we have. Thus if morality says that money laundering should not be a crime then the state wrongs Ellen when it punishes her. But if the criminal law as such does have authority, and if in the exercise of its authority the state has decided to make money laundering a crime, then the state does Ellen no wrong when it punishes her. (shrink)

Intento criticar en el presente trabajo el enfoque sobre el poder del consentimiento defendido por David Owens. Según este enfoque, la capacidad de consentir responde a un interés normativo característico, el cual consistiría en permitir que ciertas obligaciones personales sean incumplidas, sin importar lo que materialmente se siga de ello, como la transgresión de nuestros intereses no normativos. Aquí sostendré que el enfoque de Owens confundiría dos planos de consideraciones: el plano relativo a la capacidad general de consentir y el (...) plano relativo al ejercicio de dicha capacidad en casos concretos. Para comprender el primer plano, el enfoque puede ser provechoso. No obstante, para comprender el segundo, lo más razonable sería apelar a la idea de razones personales para actuar, una idea que no parece haber recibido suficiente atención en la literatura habitual sobre el consentimiento. (shrink)

The benefit-fairness theory of punishment, which is one of the most prominent retributive justifications of punishment, appeals to some benefits received by an offender in explaining why it is fair to impose punitive burdens on him. However, many see the two traditional versions of the theory, found in the works by writers such as Herbert Morris, Jeffrie Murphy, and George Sher, as being susceptible to fatal objections. In a recent paper, “Fairness, Political Obligation, and Punishment,” Zachary Hoskins offers a new (...) version of the benefit-fairness theory of punishment. I will highlight his original contribution by showing how his version of the benefit-fairness theory of punishment is different from the traditional versions in such a way that the main objections applying to the traditional versions do not apply to his account. Nonetheless, despite its many virtues, I will argue that Hoskins’s theory fails because it would entail disproportionate punishment. (shrink)