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  1. Wouldn't It Be Nice: Enticing Reasons for Love.N. L. Engel-Hawbecker - forthcoming - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave Macmillan.
    A central debate in the philosophy of love is whether people can love one another for good reasons. Reasons for love seem to help us sympathetically understand and evaluate love or even to count as loving at all. But it can seem that if reasons for love existed, they could require forms of love (like rampant infidelity) presumably illicit. It might seem that only some form of wishful thinking would lead us to believe reasons for love could never do this. (...)
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  • Respect and Membership in the Moral Community.Carla Bagnoli - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):113 - 128.
    Some philosophers object that Kant's respect cannot express mutual recognition because it is an attitude owed to persons in virtue of an abstract notion of autonomy and invite us to integrate the vocabulary of respect with other persons-concepts or to replace it with a social conception of recognition. This paper argues for a dialogical interpretation of respect as the key-mode of recognition of membership in the moral community. This interpretation highlights the relational and practical nature of respect, and accounts for (...)
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  • Self-Comprehension and Personhood: An Examination of the Normative Basis of Hegel’s Political Philosophy.Timothy Robert Carter - unknown
    This thesis defends a novel interpretation of the normative foundations of Hegel’s mature social and political philosophy. It argues that autonomous agency is grounded in a drive to comprehend ourselves, which gives us an aim to which we are inescapably committed as agents. It argues that this aim ultimately makes it rational to cultivate and act out of a feeling of “ethical love”, which is a positive evaluative attitude towards the goods of other individuals that, in turn, implies a commitment (...)
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  • The Reasons of the Unreasonable: Is Political Liberalism Still an Option?Benedetta Giovanola & Roberta Sala - forthcoming - Sage Publications Ltd: Philosophy and Social Criticism.
    Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, we unpack the concept of (...)
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  • Respect and Loving Attention.Carla Bagnoli - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):483-515.
    On Kant’s view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent’s subjective perspective, (...)
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  • The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons.Uriah Kriegel & Mark Timmons - 2021 - In R. Dean & O. Sensen (eds.), Respect: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Oxford University Press. pp. 77-98.
    Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective quality of experiencing them. One emotion that is of central importance in many ethical systems is respect (in the sense of respect for persons or so-called recognition-respect). However, discussions of respect in analytic moral philosophy have tended to focus almost entirely on (...)
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  • Respect for Persons and the Moral Force of Socially Constructed Norms.Laura Valentini - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):385-408.
    When and why do socially constructed norms—including the laws of the land, norms of etiquette, and informal customs—generate moral obligations? I argue that the answer lies in the duty to respect others, specifically to give them what I call “agency respect.” This is the kind of respect that people are owed in light of how they exercise their agency. My central thesis is this: To the extent that (i) existing norms are underpinned by people’s commitments as agents and (ii) they (...)
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  • Kant-Bibliographie 1999.M. Ruffing - 2001 - Kant-Studien 92 (4):474-517.
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  • Moral Responsibility and Foundationalism.Stephen Kershnar - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):381-402.
    If an individual is morally responsible, then there is a responsibility-foundation that makes him morally responsible, but there is no responsibility-foundation that makes him responsible. This rested on the notion that if there were a responsibility-foundation, it would be either an ungrounded choice or an ungrounded character state and that neither can serve as the foundation. The paper then considered three types of objections. First, moral responsibility does not require a responsibility-foundation. Second, a character state can serve as the foundation. (...)
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  • Three Accounts of Respect for Persons in Kant's Ethics.Dennis Klimchuk - 2004 - Kantian Review 8:38-61.
    The idea that respect for persons comprises the core of morality has long been associated with Kant and the ethics of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In particular, the second formulation of the categorical imperative , the Formula of Humanity as an End-in-itself – ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ – is often glossed (...)
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