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  1. The ‘Good Form’ of Film: The Aesthetics of Continuity from Gestalt Psychology to Cognitive Film Theory.Maria Poulaki - 2018 - Gestalt Theory 40 (1):29-43.
    Summary This article questions certain assumptions concerning film form made by the recent psychological film research and compares them to those of precursors of film psychology like Hugo Münsterberg and Rudolf Arnheim, as well as the principles of Gestalt psychology. It is argued that principles of Gestalt psychology such as those of ‘good form’ and good continuation are still underlying the psychological research of film, becoming particularly apparent in its approach to continuity editing. Following an alternative Gestalt genealogy that links (...)
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  • Implicit processing of tactile information: Evidence from the tactile change detection paradigm.David Pritchett, Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):534-546.
    People can maintain accurate representations of visual changes without necessarily being aware of them. Here, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon also exists in touch. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants detected the presence of a change between two consecutively-presented tactile displays. Tactile change blindness was observed, with participants failing to report the presence of tactile change. Critically, however, when participants had to make a forced choice response regarding the number of stimuli presented in the two displays, their performance was (...)
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  • Perceptual presence.Jason Leddington - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.
    Plausibly, any adequate theory of perception must (a) solve what Alva Noë calls 'the problem of perceptual presence,' and (b) do justice to the direct realist idea that what is given in perception are garden-variety spatiotemporal particulars. This paper shows that, while Noë's sensorimotor view arguably satisfies the first of these conditions, it does not satisfy the second. Moreover, Noë is wrong to think that a naïve realist approach to perception cannot handle the problem of perceptual presence. Section three of (...)
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  • A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  • Using illusory line motion to differentiate misrepresentation (stalinesque) and misremembering (orwellian) accounts of consciousness.John Barresi & John R. Christie - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):347-365.
    It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten; whereas, by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A (...)
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  • Distracted drivers and unattended experience.Wayne Wright - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):41-68.
    Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists happily accept, but (...)
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  • (1 other version)Precis of Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    The main idea of this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person tap-tapping his or her way around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to (...)
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  • Flexible visual processing of spatial relationships.Steven L. Franconeri, Jason M. Scimeca, Jessica C. Roth, Sarah A. Helseth & Lauren E. Kahn - 2012 - Cognition 122 (2):210-227.
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  • Statistical regularities reduce perceived numerosity.Jiaying Zhao & Ru Qi Yu - 2016 - Cognition 146:217-222.
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  • Asymmetric Coding of Categorical Spatial Relations in Both Language and Vision.J. C. Roth & S. L. Franconeri - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.
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  • Neural plasticity and consciousness.Susan Hurley & Alva Noë - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):131-168.
    and apply it to various examples of neural plasticity in which input is rerouted intermodally or intramodally to nonstandard cortical targets. In some cases but not others, cortical activity ‘defers’ to the nonstandard sources of input. We ask why, consider some possible explanations, and propose a dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis. We believe that this distinction is important and worthy of further study, both philosophical and empirical, whether or not our hypothesis turns out to be correct. In particular, the question of how (...)
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  • Visual awareness of properties.Matthew J. Kennedy - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.
    I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners ofpresentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. (...)
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  • Does Attention Exist?Keith Wilson - 2007 - British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy 2 (2):153-168.
    In the introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty states that ‘Attention, [...] as a general and formal activity, does not exist’. This paper examines the meaning and truth of this difficult and surprising statement, along with its implications for the account of perception given by theorists such as Dretske and Peacocke. In order to elucidate Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of human perception, I will present two alternative models1 of how attention might be thought to operate. The first is derived from (...)
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  • Measuring the Fringes of Experience.Mark Price - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
    Mangan's concept of fringe consciousness is too heavily based on informal introspection, and too all-embracing to constitute a coherent family. It lacks the tight operationalisation needed to identify individual examples of fringe consciousness, and to test Mangan's theoretical account against detailed findings from empirical research. I propose a more focused two-component operationalisation of the fringe. The first component addresses how we can operationalise the consciousness of the fringe; here I draw lessons from research in implicit cognition, and suggest implications for (...)
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