- (1 other version)Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Imagination Box.Shen-yi Liao & Tyler Doggett - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):259-275.details
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Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.details
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(1 other version)Imagination.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
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Imagination and Belief.Neil Sinhababu - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. New York: Routledge. pp. 111-123.details
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Biased by our imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.details
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Imaginative contagion.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.details
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Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief.José L. Zalabardo - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21.details
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Faith, fictionalism and bullshit.Michael Scott - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):94-104.details
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(1 other version)No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):337-352.details
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Is Self-Deception Pretense?José Eduardo Porcher - 2014 - Manuscrito 37 (2):291-332.details
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Motivation, counterfactual predictions and constraints: normativity of predictive mechanisms.Michał Piekarski - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-31.details
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(1 other version)No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Debunking Doxastic Transparency.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A3)5-24.details
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Conceptual evidentialism.Inga Nayding - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.details
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Enquiry and the Value of Knowledge.Barnaby Walker - forthcoming - Philosophy.details
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Normatywne mechanizmy reprezentacyjne a koherencyjna koncepcja błędu reprezentacyjnego.Michał Piekarski - 2020 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 11 (3).details
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