Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Are the Questions of Metaphysics More Fundamental Than Those of Science?Alyssa Ney - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):695-715.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Feminist Philosophy of Science.Lynn Hankinson Nelson - 2002 - In Peter Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312–331.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Highlights of Past Literature Current Work Future Work.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Unificatory Explanation.Marco J. Nathan - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1).
    Philosophers have traditionally addressed the issue of scientific unification in terms of theoretical reduction. Reductive models, however, cannot explain the occurrence of unification in areas of science where successful reductions are hard to find. The goal of this essay is to analyse a concrete example of integration in biology—the developmental synthesis—and to generalize it into a model of scientific unification, according to which two fields are in the process of being unified when they become explanatorily relevant to each other. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Can psychiatry refurnish the mind?Dominic Murphy - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):160-174.
    In this paper, I will argue that the NIMH’s new Research Domain of Criteria is a useful test of the philosophical hypothesis of eliminative materialism and demonstrates the superiority of a moderate eliminativism over integrationism, which is a rival philosophical framework for the cognitive sciences. I begin by going over the motivation for RDOC, which rests on the problems with the existing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders framework in psychiatry. Then, I introduce the main tenets of RDoC before (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Scientific Reduction and the Mind-Body Problem.L. F. Mucciolo - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (sup2):185-204.
    IntroductionThe identity thesis asserts that for every psychological state P there is a neural state N such that P=N. In the hope of rendering IT clear and plausible many identity theorists have compared psycho-neural identity claims to such theoretical identities as temperature is identical with molecular mean kinetic energy. However such a comparison admits a weak and a strong interpretation. According to the weak interpretation, psycho-neural identities are said to be like theoretical identities in the sense that the former are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Thinking Crossroads: from Scientific Pluralism to Pluralist History of Science: Introduction.Ivan Moya-Diez, Laurent Loison & Matteo Vagelli - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1):87-95.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The one and the many: The search for unity in a world of diversity.Margaret Morrison - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33 (2):345-355.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument.Alex Moran - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):269-289.
    Standard responses to the knowledge argument grant that Mary could know all of the physical facts even while trapped inside her black‐and‐white room. What they deny is that upon leaving her black‐and‐white room and experiencing red for the first time, Mary learns a genuinely new fact. This paper develops an alternate response in a grounding physicalist framework, on which Mary does not know all of the physical facts while trapped inside the room. The main thesis is that Mary does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. Part II: The philosophy of physics.Matteo Morganti - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (10):e12703.
    This is the second part of an overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. Here, the notion of fundamentality is looked at from the viewpoint of the philosophical analysis of physics and physical theories. The questions are considered (1) whether physics can be regarded as fundamental with respect to other sciences, and in what sense; (2) what the label ‘fundamental physics’ should exactly be taken to mean; (3) on what grounds a particular physical theory should be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Of Chimeras, Harmony, and Kintsugi: Towards a Historicist Epistemology of Paleontological Reconstruction, Theory-Change, and Exploring Heuristics.Ali Mirza - 2022 - Perspectives on Science 30 (4):657-695.
    I analyze the epistemic strategies used by paleontologists (between 1830–1930) to reconstruct features of ancient organisms from fossilized bodies and footprints by presenting two heuristics: (1) a “claim of harmony” which posits the harmonious interaction of natural objects in order for complex systems to be simplified and (2) the “kintsugi heuristic” which is used inter-theoretically to explore new claims of harmony. I apply these to three successive historical cases: Georges Cuvier’s laws of correlation, the panpsychist paleontology of Edward Drinker Cope, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Disciplinary Fields in the Life Sciences: Evolving Divides and Anchor Concepts.Alessandro Minelli - 2020 - Philosophies 5 (4):34.
    Recent and ongoing debates in biology and in the philosophy of biology reveal widespread dissatisfaction with the current definitions or circumscriptions, which are often vague or controversial, of key concepts such as the gene, individual, species, and homology, and even of whole disciplinary fields within the life sciences. To some extent, the long growing awareness of these conceptual issues and the contrasting views defended in their regard can be construed as a symptom of the need to revisit traditional unchallenged partitions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Book Forum.Michael E. Miller - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 97 (C):126-127.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Methods and Metaphors in Community Ecology: The Problem of Defining Stability.Gregory M. Mikkelson - 1997 - Perspectives on Science 5 (4):481-498.
    Scientists must sometimes choose between competing definitions of key terms. The degree to which different definitions facilitate important discoveries should ultimately guide decisions about which terms to accept. In the short run, rules of thumb can help. One such rule is to regard with suspicion any definition that turns a seemingly important empirical matter into an a priori exercise. Several prominent definitions of ecological “stability” are suspect, according to this rule. After evaluating alternatives, I suggest that the faulty definitions resulted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Explanations in cognitive science: unification versus pluralism.Marcin Miłkowski & Mateusz Hohol - 2020 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 1):1-17.
    The debate between the defenders of explanatory unification and explanatory pluralism has been ongoing from the beginning of cognitive science and is one of the central themes of its philosophy. Does cognitive science need a grand unifying theory? Should explanatory pluralism be embraced instead? Or maybe local integrative efforts are needed? What are the advantages of explanatory unification as compared to the benefits of explanatory pluralism? These questions, among others, are addressed in this Synthese’s special issue. In the introductory paper, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A review: The large, the small, the real and the natural. [REVIEW]Gregory M. Mikkelson - 1996 - Biology and Philosophy 11 (1):127-132.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Micro-composition.D. H. Mellor - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:65-80.
    Entities of many kinds, not just material things, have been credited with parts. Armstrong , for example, has taken propositions and properties to be parts of their conjunctions, sets to be parts of sets that include them, and geographical regions and events to be parts of regions and events that contain them. The justification for bringing all these diverse relations under a single ‘part–whole’ concept is that they share all or most of the formal features articulated in mereology . But (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Formulating physicalism: Two suggestions.Andrew Melnyk - 1995 - Synthese 105 (3):381-407.
    Two ways are considered of formulating a version of retentive physicalism, the view that in some important sense everything is physical, even though there do exist properties, e.g. higher-level scientific ones, which cannot be type-identified with physical properties. The first way makes use of disjunction, but is rejected on the grounds that the results yield claims that are either false or insufficiently materialist. The second way, realisation physicalism, appeals to the correlative notions of a functional property and its realisation, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why.Andrew Melnyk - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (2):221-241.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Arguing against fundamentality.Kerry McKenzie - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):244-255.
    This paper aims to open up discussion on the relationship between fundamentality and naturalism, and in particular on the question of whether fundamentality may be denied on naturalistic grounds. A historico-inductive argument for an anti-fundamentalist conclusion, prominent within contemporary metaphysical literature, is examined; finding it wanting, an alternative ‘internal’ strategy is proposed. By means of an example from the history of modern physics - namely S-matrix theory - it is demonstrated that this strategy can generate similar anti-fundamentalist conclusions on more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Reductive levels and multi-scale structure.Patrick McGivern - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):53 - 75.
    I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based” properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Unifying Science Without Reduction.Nancy L. Maull - 1977 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 8 (2):143.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • The critical Margolis.Joseph Margolis - 2021 - Albany: State University of New York Press. Edited by Russell Pryba.
    This critical reader covers Joseph Margolis's controversial views of mind, truth, science, and reality, along with his revolutionary theories about culture, art, language, personhood, and morality.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Reduccionismo, leyes naturales y complejidad: diferentes estrategias de investigación y explicación científica.Maximiliano Martínez, Eduardo García & Catherine Bernal - 2017 - Scientiae Studia 15 (2):243.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Evaluation of Research(ers) and its Threat to Epistemic Pluralisms.Marco Viola - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (2):55-78.
    While some form of evaluation has always been employed in science (e.g. peer review, hiring), formal systems of evaluation of research and researchers have recently come to play a more prominent role in many countries because of the adoption of new models of governance. According to such models, the quality of the output of both researchers and their institutions is measured, and issues such as eligibility for tenure or the allocation of public funding to research institutions crucially depends on the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Against ontological fundamentalism.Ned Markosian - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):69-83.
    Suppose you are asked to be the substitute teacher for a high school physics class. Suppose part of your assignment is to explain to the students all about the subatomic structure of a typical macroscopic object, such as a wooden table. Here is a speech that you are likely to find yourself making at some point during your lesson.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Internal realism and the problem of ontological autonomy: a critical note on Lombardi and Labarca.Alexandru Manafu - 2012 - Foundations of Chemistry 15 (2):225-228.
    This paper discusses the proposal made by Lombardi and Labarca (Found Chem 7:125–148, 2005) that internal realism can secure the ontological autonomy of chemistry. I argue that internal realism is not, by itself, sufficient to accomplish this task. The fact that conceptual schemes may differ with respect to their theoretical virtues, and the possibility that the relations between them may be reductive undermine the premise that each conceptual scheme has an equal right to define its own ontology, which is a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • How Much Philosophy in the Philosophy of Chemistry?Alexandru Manafu - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):33-44.
    This paper aims to show that there is a lot of philosophy in the philosophy of chemistry—not only in the problems and questions specific to chemistry, which this science brings up in philosophical discussions, but also in the topics of wider interest like reductionism and emergence, for which chemistry proves to be an ideal case study. The fact that chemical entities and properties are amenable to a quantitative understanding, to measurement and experiment to a greater extent than those in psychology (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Liberal naturalism and the scientific image of the world.David Macarthur - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (5):565-585.
    ABSTRACTThis paper distinguishes between the theoretical scientific image and the practical scientific image. The popular idea that there is a conceptual clash between the scientific and manifest images of the world is revealed as largely illusory. From the perspective of a liberal naturalism, the placement problem for ‘problematic’ entities or truths is not solved but dissolved. Persons, say, are not posits of any explanatory science, but beings acknowledged as rational agencies in second-personal space. Core elements of the manifest image are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Against reduction: A critical notice of Molecular models: philosophical papers on molecular biology by Sahotra Sarkar.James Maclaurin - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):151-158.
    In Molecular Models: Philosophical Papers on Molecular Biology, Sahotra Sarkar presents a historical and philosophical analysis of four important themes in philosophy of science that have been influenced by discoveries in molecular biology. These are: reduction, function, information and directed mutation. I argue that there is an important difference between the cases of function and information and the more complex case of scientific reduction. In the former cases it makes sense to taxonomise important variations in scientific and philosophical usage of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • ¿Convergen las diferentes disciplinas de conocimiento? evidencia cuantitativa.Sara Lumbreras, Penny Mealy, Christopher Verzijl & Samuel F. Way - 2015 - Pensamiento 71 (269):1383-1399.
    Los modelos epistemológicos tradicionales clasifican el conocimiento en disciplinas separadas con objetos de estudio distintos y técnicas específicas, incluso proponiendo esquemas jerárquicos. Según pensadores como John Holland o Teilhard de Chardin, el avance de la ciencia implica una convergencia entre sus disciplinas. Esta convergencia puede estudiarse de maneras distintas, como el impacto de diferentes autores fuera de su equipo o la manera en la que colaboran. Aunque estos estudios están generando ideas interesantes, no son capaces de mostrar la convergencia de (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Beyond Supervenience and Construction.David-Hillel Ruben - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):121-141.
    If reduction of the social to the physical fail, what options remain for understanding their relationship? Two such options are supervenience and constructivism. Both are vitiated by a similar fault. So the choices are limited: reduction after all, or emergence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Grounding the Unreal.Louis deRosset - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):535-563.
    The scientific successes of the last 400 years strongly suggest a picture on which our scientific theories exhibit a layered structure of dependence and determination. Economics is dependent on and determined by psychology; psychology in its turn is, plausibly, dependent on and determined by biology; and so it goes. It is tempting to explain this layered structure of dependence and determination among our theories by appeal to a corresponding layered structure of dependence and determination among the entities putatively treated by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Levels: Descriptive, Explanatory, and Ontological.Christian List - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):852-883.
    Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. In this paper, I propose a unified framework for modelling levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and show that it can accommodate descriptive, explanatory, and ontological notions of levels. I further illustrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some salient philosophical questions: (1) Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the bottom? And (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.
    Science depends on judgments of the bearing of evidence on theory. Scientists must judge whether an observation or the result of an experiment supports, disconfirms, or is simply irrelevant to a given hypothesis. Similarly, scientists may judge that, given all the available evidence, a hypothesis ought to be accepted as correct or nearly so, rejected as false, or neither. Occasionally, these evidential judgments can be made on deductive grounds. If an experimental result strictly contradicts a hypothesis, then the truth of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   298 citations  
  • The unity of neuroscience: a flat view.Arnon Levy - 2016 - Synthese 193 (12):3843-3863.
    This paper offers a novel view of unity in neuroscience. I set out by discussing problems with the classical account of unity-by-reduction, due to Oppenheim and Putnam. That view relies on a strong notion of levels, which has substantial problems. A more recent alternative, the mechanistic “mosaic” view due to Craver, does not have such problems. But I argue that the mosaic ideal of unity is too minimal, and we should, if possible, aspire for more. Relying on a number of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Structural problems for reductionism.Stephan Leuenberger - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3571-3593.
    Universal reductionism—the sort of project pursued by Carnap in the Aufbau, Lewis in his campaign on behalf of Humean supervenience, Jackson in From Metaphysics to Ethics, and Chalmers in Constructing the World—aims to reduce everything to some specified base, more or less austere as it may be. In this paper, I identify two constraints that a promising strategy to argue for universal reductionism needs to satisfy: the exhaustion constraint and the chaining constraint. As a case study, I then consider Chalmers’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The mechanistic stance.Jonny Lee & Joe Dewhurst - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-21.
    It is generally acknowledged by proponents of ‘new mechanism’ that mechanistic explanation involves adopting a perspective, but there is less agreement on how we should understand this perspective-taking or what its implications are for practising science. This paper examines the perspectival nature of mechanistic explanation through the lens of the ‘mechanistic stance’, which falls somewhere between Dennett’s more familiar physical and design stance. We argue this approach implies three distinct and significant ways in which mechanistic explanation can be interpreted as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Enactivism Meets Mechanism: Tensions & Congruities in Cognitive Science.Jonny Lee - 2023 - Minds and Machines 33 (1):153-184.
    Enactivism advances an understanding of cognition rooted in the dynamic interaction between an embodied agent and their environment, whilst new mechanism suggests that cognition is explained by uncovering the organised components underlying cognitive capacities. On the face of it, the mechanistic model’s emphasis on localisable and decomposable mechanisms, often neural in nature, runs contrary to the enactivist ethos. Despite appearances, this paper argues that mechanistic explanations of cognition, being neither narrow nor reductive, and compatible with plausible iterations of ideas like (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Are bio-ontologies metaphysical theories?Oliver M. Lean - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11587-11608.
    Bio-ontologies are digital frameworks for handling biological and biomedical data. They consist of theoretical entities and relations with explicitly defined logical structures and precise definitions, whose purpose is to provide a shared language for representing information to be distributed and integrated across diverse scientific contexts. It is tempting to view bio-ontologies as clear and formal expressions of a scientific community’s ontological commitments about their domain of inquiry, and to view their integration as tantamount to the metaphysical unification of science that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Reductionism as a Research Directive.Fabian Lausen - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (2):263-279.
    In this paper, I explore the possibilities for arriving at a useful conception of methodological reductionism. Some participants in the debate talk about methodological reductionism as a research program. I argue that the concept of a research program, at least in Lakatos’ sense, cannot account for the diverse nature of methodological reductionism. I then present my own concept of a research directive as a useful alternative and elaborate on this by drawing on Hasok Chang’s theory of ontological principles and epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Reductive Identities: An Empirical Fundamentalist Approach.Douglas Kutach - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):67-101.
    I sketch a philosophical program called ‘Empirical Fundamentalism,’ whose signature feature is the extensive use of a distinction between fundamental and derivative reality. Within the framework of Empirical Fundamentalism, derivative reality is treated as an abstraction from fundamental reality. I show how one can understand reduction and supervenience in terms of abstraction, and then I apply the introduced machinery to understand the relation between water and H2O, mental states and brain states, and so on. The conclusion is that such relations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Vertical-horizontal distinction in resolving the abstraction, hierarchy, and generality problems of the mechanistic account of physical computation.Jesse Kuokkanen - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.
    Descriptive abstraction means omission of information from descriptions of phenomena. In this paper, I introduce a distinction between vertical and horizontal descriptive abstraction. Vertical abstracts away levels of mechanism or organization, while horizontal abstracts away details within one level of organization. The distinction is implicit in parts of the literature, but it has received insufficient attention and gone mainly unnoticed. I suggest that the distinction can be used to clarify how computational descriptions are formed in some variants of the mechanistic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Theory, Locality, and Methodology in Archaeology: Just add water?William H. Krieger - 2012 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (2):243-257.
    Continuing the work of the ‘Vienna Circle’, philosopher Carl Hempel created explanatory models to ground scientific inquiry in logic and empirical truth. Beginning with the physical sciences, he explored the application of these models to the social sciences as well. Terrestrial archaeologists incorporated Hempelian concepts by calling for global changes in archaeological methodology. These changes, explicitly designed to maximize data collection, were developed using particular idiosyncratic geographical cues that would undermine archaeology if implemented in other contexts. In this article, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Conscious Semiotic Mind.Piotr Konderak - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne 31 (1):67-89.
    The paper discusses possible roles of consciousness in a semiotic activity of a cognitive agent. The discussion, we claim, is based on two related approaches to consciousness: on Chalmers’ theory of phenomenal and psychological consciousness and on Damasio’s neural theory, which draws a distinction between core and extended consciousness. Two stages of cognitive-semiotic processing are discussed: the moment of perception of a sign as a meaningful entity and the metasemiotic processes understood as the human capacity to reflect on signs and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Shaping up location: Against the Humean argument for the extrinsicality of shape.Shieva Kleinschmidt - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1973-1983.
    Recently, we have been presented with an argument against the intrinsicality of shape that appeals to a plausible Humean principle. According to the argument, if shape is intrinsic and the location relation is fundamental, then we cannot explain the necessary correlation between an object’s shape and the shape of its location. And, it is claimed, the Humean principle tells us that an unexplained necessary correlation like this one is unacceptable. In this paper I respond to this argument by rejecting the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Mechanisms, resources, and background conditions.Colin Klein - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (5-6):36.
    Distinguishing mechanistic components from mere causally relevant background conditions remains a difficulty for mechanistic accounts of explanation. By distinguishing resources from mechanical parts, I argue that we can more effectively draw this boundary. Further, the distinction makes obvious that there are distinctive resource explanations which are not captured by a traditional part-based mechanistic account. While this suggests a straightforward extension of the mechanistic model, I argue that incorporating resources and resource explanations requires moving beyond the purely local account of levels (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Mind–Body Problem after Fifty Years.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:3-21.
    It was about half a century ago that the mind–body problem, which like much else in serious metaphysics had been moribund for several decades, was resurrected as a mainstream philosophical problem. The first impetus came from Gilbert Ryle'sThe Concept of Mind, published in 1948, and Wittgenstein's well-known, if not well-understood, reflections on the nature of mentality and mental language, especially in hisPhilosophical Investigationswhich appeared in 1953. The primary concerns of Ryle and Wittgenstein, however, focused on the logic of mental discourse (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The layered model: Metaphysical considerations.Jaegwon Kim - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):2 – 20.
    This paper examines the idea, commonly presupposed but seldom explicitly stated in discussions of certain philosophical problems, that the objects and phenomena of the world are structured in a hierarchy of "levels", from the bottom level of microparticles to the levels of cells and biological organisms and then to the levels of creatures with mentality and social groups of such creatures. Parallel to this "layered model" of the natural world is an ordering of the sciences, with physics as our "basic" (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • El fisicalismo no reduccionista Y su problema con la causalidad mental.Jaegwon Kim - 2014 - Ideas Y Valores 63 (155):235-259.
    Se propone un examen crítico de la última obra de J.-L. Marion titulada, dedicada a la unión de alma y cuerpo, y cuya tesis principal es: los problemas que esta unión suscita confunden dos términos, cuerpo y mi cuerpo. Esta confusión lleva a que se apliquen al primero categorías propias del segundo. Se examinan las "paradojas ónticas" que mi cuerpo (la carne) inaugura (a); se despeja la tesis de dos interpretaciones de las meditaciones primera y sexta (b); se discute la (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Methodological Individualism and Marxism.Julius Sensat - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):189.
    Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of attempts to reconstruct Marxian theory in forms that can be assessed by reference to currently received standards in various disciplines. The work has even been said to establish a new paradigm: “analytical Marxism.” One doesn't have to endorse this claim to recognize a good deal of merit in the work. Through creative application of state-of-the-art methods to traditional Marxian issues, researchers have promoted productive cross-fertilization with non-Marxian programs and have revealed many problems (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations