A human right to freedom of religion is not equivalent to a right to tolerance. Human rights and tolerance-rules serve for different purposes and are based on different justifications. Tolerance-rules serve to protect a peaceful living together with strangers who share no common values. Human rights serve to protect every individual’s personhood. Religion can only be a matter of human rights, if and so far as it is a condition of development and maintenance of personhood. Discussion about a human right (...) to freedom of religion makes sense only if we can identify a particular scope of protection which concerns only religion and if the freedom of religion is not embraced by wider-framed freedoms. The freedom of religious thoughts and the freedom of religious speech are embraced by the general human rights to freedom of thoughts and freedom of speech. Here, there is no need for a special human right to freedom of religion. The right not to be forced to act contrary to religiously founded moral rules is embraced by the general human right to freedom of conscience. And again, there is no need for a special human right. The target of religious practices in a narrower sense is to become flexible and porous and not to resist the threats of the sacral in order to avoid the destruction of personhood. Therefore, we have to recognize a human right to freedom of religious rites. It protects only the actions of accommodation to the overwhelming power of the sacral. It does not protect, however, any action with which it is intended to rule the world or to rule over others, to organize certain practical challenges, or to discover or to maintain scientific theories or technical means. (shrink)

During the last decades, two major and interrelated themes have dominated the study of religion: (a) the theme claiming that the long taken-for-granted so-called secularization thesis was all wrong, and (b) the theme of the so-called “return” or “resurgence of religion”. This global revival of religion — on micro, meso and macro levels — has been chronicled in a number of important books lately. As even a quick glance in some of the many textbooks about religious studies reveal that there (...) are many various ways of studying religion — theologically, sociologically, psychologically, anthropologically, philosophically, etc. — and they can be tackled from many different ideological or theoretical “slants” or perspectives – gender, postcolonial, orientalism, postmodernism, inside/outside, hermeneutical, etc. And it seems to be a general rule within science that the more important, complex and controversial a subject area is perceived to be, the more heated the debate about theory, method and definitions of concepts seems to be within it. Comparative religion can, very broadly, be carried out from two types of data: texts or actual living human beings. During the last thirty or so years, and in tandem with the initially mentioned two themes, the latter – what many scholars now call “lived religion” (Hall, 1997; Orsi, 2005; Ammerman, 2007; Mcguire, 2008) – have more and more come to the fore in departments of religious studies. This can be seen as a “rejuvenation” of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s opinions that the only way to study religion adequately was in and through the religious beliefs and practices of actually living human beings and that the heart of religion was to be found, not in rules and regulations, hierarchies and hymnbooks, but in the individual’s experience of dependence upon a power infinitely greater than his own. The student of religion must, in other words, concentrate, not on what people might do, ought to do, or what the textbooks say they are supposed to do, but on what they actually do, and the ways in which they actually behave, and why they do what they do — their motives, reasons or inducements for doing what they do. (shrink)

Proceeding from a philosophical interpretation of negative theology as performatively undermining our seeming understanding of the absolute and thereby evoking a transformative experience, this paper emphasises the philosophical significance of negative theology by linking it to Karl Jaspers’ notion of the universal limit situation of existence. Against this background, an analysis of mystical and psychotic experiences shows how certain similarities between the two can be understood as constituting a particular mental state in which the universal limit situation is experienced personally. (...) Moreover, experiencing the limit situation, be it through this mental state or through certain moods or feelings, can be transformative and may lead to an attitude of groundless trust that acknowledges the incomprehensibility of the human condition. The paper argues that this reading of negative theology provides a better understanding of the parallels between mysticism and psychosis and may be fruitfully applied in therapy. (shrink)

Anthropology of Consciousness, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 112-142, Spring 2022.

De moderne filosofie lijdt aan muziekvergetelheid. Opvallend is echter dat filosofen, wanneer ze toch aandacht schenken aan muziek, hun aandacht bij voorkeur op één bepaald genre richten, namelijk de opera. Filosofen zoals Søren Kierkegaard en Friedrich Nietzsche lieten hun gedachten over Don Giovanni, Parsifal en Carmen gaan, terwijl omgekeerd de filosofie van Arthur Schopenhauer de opera heeft beïnvloed via Wagner. Diens werk lijkt zich op het snijpunt van het grensverkeer tussen moderne filosofie en moderne muziek te bevinden. Het was zijn (...) ambitie de menselijke existentie en de menselijke geschiedenis in één panoramisch oeuvre te vatten, vanaf het primordiale begin tot en met de dramatische finale die ophanden leek: een catastrofale apotheose die een geheel nieuwe toekomst mogelijk zou maken. Dat is althans de verhaallijn van zijn meesterwerk Der Ring des Nibelungen. Aan het slot van Götterdämmerung lijkt zich een algehele verwoesting te hebben voltrokken: ‘Everything is destroyed and there is an enigmatic kind of hovering over the scene of destruction’ (Badiou 2010, p. 106), een ambivalente stemming van hoop en destructie zette Wagner op muziek. Voor Wagner is dan ook een hoofdrol in deze studie weggelegd: voor zijn muziektheoretische geschriften (waarin hij over een ‘muziek van de toekomst’ filosofeerde), maar meer nog voor de muzikale totaalkunstwerken die hij daadwerkelijk componeerde. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAusgehend von der Feststellung, dass „Atmosphären“ einerseits ein empirischer Sachverhalt im religionswissenschaftlichen Feld sind und andererseits in verschiedenen Disziplinen seit gut 40 Jahren auch als analytisches Konzept gehandelt werden, verfolgt dieser Literaturüberblick das Ziel, den Stand der Forschung zum Atmosphärenkonzept zusammenzufassen und das Potenzial des Konzepts für religionswissenschaftliche Forschung zu diskutieren. Der Beitrag stellt wesentliche Positionen zum Atmosphärenkonzept aus Philosophie, Phänomenologie, Psychologie, Ästhetik und Kunstwissenschaft sowie Architekturgeschichte, Städtebau, Soziologie, Humangeographie und Theologie vor und konstatiert ein religionswissenschaftliches Forschungsdesiderat. Auch die Religionsästhetik (...) und einige der sogenannten turns werden thematisiert, da sie sich bereits mit Aspekten dessen befassen, was den Atmosphärenbegriff und seine Operationalisierung ausmacht. Der Artikel beinhaltet zudem einige Hypothesen, wie ein religionswissenschaftlich fruchtbares Atmosphärenkonzept auszuarbeiten wäre. (shrink)

Starting from Santner’s essay “Freud’s ‘Moses’ and the Ethics of Nomotropic Desire,” the article explores a remarkably intriguing and simultaneously debatable statement made by Sigmund Freud regarding the accusation of the murder of God as a central Christian source of anti-Semitism. This investigation leads into the differentiation between two bodies of the King of the Jews: Jesus Christ and Jesus Barabbas, through which early Christians not only distanced themselves from political messianism (“Barabbas”), but also assumed a political culpability, acknowledging their (...) own responsibility for Jesus’ crucifixion. In doing so, they distanced themselves from those who neither acknowledged nor confessed a shared culpability, thereby designating them as the “Jews.” This demarcation from political guilt serves as the foundation for a “politics of guilt” in the form of a demarcation from “Judaism.” This gave rise to Christian anti-Judaism, which Freud ultimately traced back to the distinction between acknowledgment and non-acknowledgment of guilt in his book Moses and Monotheism. Drawing on the dimension of preserving communal unity through the confession of guilt, this article proposes that the Christian model of collective guilt confession should not be simply understood as a desire to liberate oneself from the superego pressures, as, according to Santner, a “spiriting away of spirits and specters.” Instead, it can be comprehended as a novel means of preserving a community through the exclusion of those who do not join in the declaration of guilt. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung In begrifflicher Hinsicht hat die Demut nicht nur in der Öffentlichkeit, sondern auch innerhalb der Theologie und Philosophie an Aufmerksamkeit gewonnen. Auf phänomenologischer Grundlage untersucht der Beitrag einschlägige Erfahrungen des Menschseins, die eine Definition erlauben und nahelegen, was mit „Demut“ gegenwärtig gemeint sein könnte. Der analysierte Zusammenhang von Gefühl und Normativität möchte verdeutlichen, inwiefern die Betroffenen auch über die ausschlaggebenden Erlebnisse hinaus die Demut langfristig in ihre Lebensführung einfließen lassen. Die Ausführungen berühren dabei ein ähnliches Begriffsverständnis, wie es zum (...) Beispiel Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Herrmann oder Otto vorgetragen haben, aber möchten zugleich zeigen, inwiefern man die Demut auch anders als im traditionell christlichen Sinne verstehen könnte. Die Untersuchung legt eine alternative phänomenologische Lesart vor, die dem fruchtbaren theologischen Diskurs eine fundierte Analyse von Erfahrungen zur Unterstützung anbieten möchte. (shrink)

At a time in which religion is breaking away from the normative power of its traditions and new forms of spiritual experience are emerging, religious philosophy must find criteria for what a religious experience is and how to judge its truth. In their empirical critique of religion L. Wittgenstein and R. Carnap accepted two forms of religious experience, which they described with an optical and acoustic metaphor. They denied their cognitive truth value, but not their value for life. However, an (...) extended concept of truth, which encompasses every correspondence between experience and reality, can also find truth in religious experiences of “transparency” and “resonance”. They differ from aesthetic experience not only by the depth of transparency and resonance, but also by their cognitive interpretation. What is experienced is cognitively referred to a final reality: either to a “summum ens” in this world, or to the whole of this world or something unknown beyond of this world. This final point of reference is a unity of “being” and “value”. Religion makes experiences of the everyday transparent for both aspects of an ultimate reality und motivates to a life full of resonance with this reality. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to differentiate between religion and spirituality more strictly, or, specifically, between the religious and spiritual aspects of sport. The text is written in an autoethnographic genre from an ‘outsider’ position, by an author who is not Christian. Religion, including Christianity, represents a connectedness between the natural world and an ontologically different reality and its transcendence towards the sacrum. But spirituality is the centre of the human way of being and a manifestation of personality. So (...) spirituality and spiritual values can and should be an integral part of human movement, including sport, while any religion is not an inherent quality of sport but an external factor that is only accidentally associated with the area of human physical activity. Despite this fact, the argumentation leads toward a conclusion that sport can serve as a tool and means for the realization of Christian values. If the instrumentality of sport means the realization of love as a basic Christian attitude to all people, then this should be a positive outcome not only for religious people, but also for agnostics and even atheists. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 26 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-51.

For the larger part of modern western intellectual history, it has been assumed that the study of morality and religion requires special methodology, insulated from, and in some important aspects incongruent with, the scientific method commonly used in the realm of natural sciences. Furthermore, even if it would be granted that moral and religious behavior is amendable to scientific analysis, the prospects of using evolutionary theory in particular to do the heavy lifting in explanation of these phenomena have been bleak, (...) since many scholars doubted that a biological theory could possibly offer any valuable contribution. Recent advances in the fields of Evolutionary Ethics and Cognitive Science of Religion disprove both claims, emphasizing empirically founded explanations, demonstrating extraordinarily high degree of methodological consilience, and revealing utmost importance of the application of evolutionary theory in fields of study once deemed to be exclusive domains of social sciences and philosophy. (shrink)