Switch to: References

Citations of:

Hume's reason

New York: Oxford University Press (1999)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Necessity of “Necessity”: Hume’s Psychology of Sophisticated Causal Inference.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):263-287.
    Much of what Hume calls probable reasoning is deliberate and reflective. Since there are aspects to Hume’s psychology that tempt some commentators to think, on the contrary, that for Hume all such reasoning is simple and immediate, I will be concerned to emphasize Hume’s recognition of the sophisticated sort of probable reasoning (section I). Though some of the details of my case may be new, the overall point of this section should not be news to recent scholarship. But once we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.
    What motivates the benevolent or charitable agent is regard for another’s good or well-being, but talk about regard for others’ good or well- being is simply talk about benevolence or charity in different terms. Yet Hume clearly holds that the regard for another’s good is a motive to produce benevolent acts that is distinct from a sense of their benevolence. So what is the difference? ‘Well’, one might say, ‘intuitively, rights are very different from wellbeing.’ Yes indeed. And that, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume on causation : the projectivist interpretation.Helen Beebee - 2007 - In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • The history of philosophy as philosophy.Gary Hatfield - 2005 - In Tom Sorell & Graham Alan John Rogers (eds.), Analytic philosophy and history of philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 82-128.
    The chapter begins with an initial survey of ups and downs of contextualist history of philosophy during the twentieth century in Britain and America, which finds that historically serious history of philosophy has been on the rise. It then considers ways in which the study of past philosophy has been used and is used in philosophy, and makes a case for the philosophical value and necessity of a contextually oriented approach. It examines some uses of past texts and of history (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • The rise of empiricism: William James, Thomas hill green, and the struggle over psychology.Alexander Klein - 2007 - Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington
    The concept of empiricism evokes both a historical tradition and a set of philosophical theses. The theses are usually understood to have been developed by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. But these figures did not use the term “empiricism,” and they did not see themselves as united by a shared epistemology into one school of thought. My dissertation analyzes the debate that elevated the concept of empiricism (and of an empiricist tradition) to prominence in English-language philosophy. -/- In the 1870s and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Hume on knowledge, certainty and probability: Anticipating the disintegration of the analytic/synthetic divide?Kevin Meeker - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):226–242.
    This paper contends that the first argument of Hume's "Of scepticism with regard to reason" entails that humans have no knowledge as Hume understands knowledge. In defending this claim, we also see how Hume's argument anticipates an important aspect of an extremely influential 20th century development: the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • (1 other version)Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume’s argument about induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.
    Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Sense-data and the philosophy of mind: Russell, James, and Mach.Gary Hatfield - 2002 - Principia 6 (2):203-230.
    The theory of knowledge in early twentieth-century Anglo American philosophy was oriented toward phenomenally described cognition. There was a healthy respect for the mind-body problem, which meant that phenomena in both the mental and physical domains were taken seriously. Bertrand Russell's developing position on sense-data and momentary particulars drew upon, and ultimately became like, the neutral monism of Ernst Mach and William James. Due to a more recent behaviorist and physicalist inspired "fear of the mental", this development has been down-played (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Hume's "General Rules".James Chamberlain - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    In this paper, I examine Hume’s account of an important class of causal belief which he calls “general rules”. I argue that he understands general rules, like all causal beliefs, as lively ideas which are habitually associated with our impressions or memories. However, I argue, he believes that they are unlike any reflectively produced causal beliefs in that they are produced quickly and automatically, such that they occur independently of any other processes of reasoning. Given this, I argue, Hume appears (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Morality and Relations before Hume.Stewart Duncan - manuscript
    In his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals David Hume said that a group of earlier modern philosophers, beginning with Malebranche, held that morality was founded on relations. In this paper I follow up on that suggestion by investigating pre-Humean views in moral philosophy according to which morality is founded on relations. I do that by looking at the work of Nicolas Malebranche, John Locke, and Samuel Clarke. Each of them talked prominently about relations in their accounts of basic aspects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hacia una interpretación conectada de la experiencia en la filosofía de David Hume.Sofía Calvente - 2022 - Tópicos 43:47-75.
    En este trabajo nos proponemos hacer un aporte para esclarecer el sentido y la función de la experiencia en el marco de la teoría del conocimiento de Hume. Para ello examinaremos dos interpretaciones que pueden reconstruirse en la literatura secundaria: la que la entiende como impresiones simples de sensación y la que la concibe como patrones de percepciones conectadas. Consideramos que la primera perspectiva no es adecuada para comprender el rol epistémico de la experiencia, lo que nos inclina hacia la (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • FILÓSOFAS Y FILÓSOFOS DE LA MODERNIDAD NUEVAS PERSPECTIVAS Y MATERIALES PARA EL ESTUDIO.Manzo Silvia (ed.) - 2022 - La Plata: EdULP.
    Este libro, por un lado, propone nuevas perspectivas y materiales de estudio sobre algunos de los temas, autores y textos clásicos de la filosofía moderna; por otro lado, invita a descubrir rarezas, temas, autores y textos poco conocidos o ignorados, que lleven a renovar el canon de la filosofía moderna. Realiza una revisión crítica de las categorías empirismo y del racionalismo modernos y dedica artículos a una serie de filósofas modernas con el fin de renovar el canon filosófico moderno.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume's Incredible Demonstrations.Graham Clay - 2022 - Hume Studies 47 (1):55-77.
    Commentators have rightly focused on the reasons why Hume maintains that the conclusions of skeptical arguments cannot be believed, as well as on the role these arguments play in Hume’s justification of his account of the mind. Nevertheless, Hume’s interpreters should take more seriously the question of whether Hume holds that these arguments are demonstrations. Only if the arguments are demonstrations do they have the requisite status to prove Hume’s point—and justify his confidence—about the nature of the mind’s belief-generating faculties. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction.Hsueh Qu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7131-7157.
    This paper will make the case that we can find in Kant’s Second Analogy a substantive response to Hume’s argument on induction. This response is substantive insofar as it does not merely consist in independently arguing for the opposite conclusion, but rather, it identifies and exploits a gap in this argument. More specifically, Hume misses the possibility of justifying the uniformity of nature as a synthetic a priori proposition, which Kant looks to establish in the Second Analogy. Note that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
    Disputants in the debate regarding whether Hume's argument on induction is descriptive or normative have by and large ignored Hume’s positive argument (that custom is what determines inferences to the unobserved), largely confining themselves to intricate debates within the negative argument (that inferences to the unobserved are not founded on reason). I believe that this is a mistake, for I think Hume’s positive argument to have significant implications for the interpretation of his negative argument. In this paper, I will argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Adam Smith's Sentimentalist Conception of Self-Control.Lauren Kopajtic - 2020 - The Adam Smith Review 12:7-27.
    A recent wave of scholarship has challenged the traditional way of understanding of self-command in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments as ‘Stoic’ self-command. But the two most thorough alternative interpretations maintain a strong connection between self-command and rationalism, and thus apparently stand opposed to Smith’s overt allegiance to sentimentalism. In this paper I argue that we can and should interpret self-command in the context of Smith’s larger sentimentalist framework, and that when we do, we can see that self-command is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Regularity and certainty in Hume’s treatise: a Humean response to Husserl.Stefanie Rocknak - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):579-600.
    According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowledge and Sensory Knowledge in Hume's Treatise.Graham Clay - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 10:195-229.
    I argue that the Hume of the Treatise maintains an account of knowledge according to which (i) every instance of knowledge must be an immediately present perception (i.e., an impression or an idea); (ii) an object of this perception must be a token of a knowable relation; (iii) this token knowable relation must have parts of the instance of knowledge as relata (i.e., the same perception that has it as an object); and any perception that satisfies (i)-(iii) is an instance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error.Anna Vaughn - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):670-688.
    Molyneux’s question asks whether someone born blind, who could distinguish cubes from spheres using his tactile sensation, could recognize those objects if he received his sight. Locke says no: the newly sighted person would fail to point to the cube and call it a cube. Locke never provided a complete explanation for his negative response, and there are concerns of inconsistency with other important aspects of his theory of ideas. These charges of inconsistency rest upon an unrecognized and unfounded assumption (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):637-650.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)“Till at last there remain nothing”: Hume’s Treatise 1.4.1 in contemporary perspective.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3305-3323.
    In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume presents an argument according to which all knowledge reduces to probability, and all probability reduces to nothing. Many have criticized this argument, while others find nothing wrong with it. In this paper we explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto acknowledged. Once the argument is repaired, it becomes clear that there is indeed something that reduces to nothing, but it is something other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)“Till at last there remain nothing”: Hume’s Treatise 1.4.1 in contemporary perspective.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3305-3323.
    In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume presents an argument according to which all knowledge reduces to probability, and all probability reduces to nothing. Many have criticized this argument, while others find nothing wrong with it. In this paper we explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto acknowledged. Once the argument is repaired, it becomes clear that there is indeed something that reduces to nothing, but it is something other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume on External Existence: A Sceptical Predicament.Dominic K. Dimech - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
    This thesis investigates Hume’s philosophy of external existence in relation to, and within the context of, his philosophy of scepticism. In his two main works on metaphysics – A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and the first Enquiry (first ed. 1748) – Hume encounters a predicament pertaining to the unreflective, ‘vulgar’ attribution of external existence to mental perceptions and the ‘philosophical’ distinction between perceptions and objects. I argue that we should understand this predicament as follows: the vulgar opinion is our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume’s Fork and Mixed Mathematics.Matias Slavov - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (1):102-119.
    Given the sharp distinction that follows from Hume’s Fork, the proper epistemic status of propositions of mixed mathematics seems to be a mystery. On the one hand, mathematical propositions concern the relation of ideas. They are intuitive and demonstratively certain. On the other hand, propositions of mixed mathematics, such as in Hume’s own example, the law of conservation of momentum, are also matter of fact propositions. They concern causal relations between species of objects, and, in this sense, they are not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):53-92.
    In this paper, I examine three mutually inconsistent claims that are commonly attributed to Hume: all beliefs are involuntary; some beliefs are subject to normative appraisal; and that ‘Ought implies Can’. I examine the textual support for such ascription, and the options for dealing with the puzzle posed by their inconsistency. In what follows I will put forward some evidence that Hume maintains each of the three positions outlined above. I then examine what I call the ‘prior voluntary action’ solution. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Certainty and Explanation in Descartes’s Philosophy of Science.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (2):302-327.
    This paper presents a new approach to resolving an apparent tension in Descartes’ discussion of scientific theories and explanations in the Principles of Philosophy. On the one hand, Descartes repeatedly claims that any theories presented in science must be certain and indubitable. On the other hand, Descartes himself presents an astonishing number of speculative explanations of various scientific phenomena. In response to this tension, commentators have suggested that Descartes changed his mind about scientific theories having to be certain and indubitable, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas.Shelley Weinberg - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):347-370.
    Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Hume on the Imagination.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Rero Doc Digital Library:1-28.
    This is the original, longer draft for my entry on Hume in the 'The Routledge Hand- book of Philosophy of Imagination', edited by Amy Kind and published by Routledge in 2016 (see the separate entry). — Please always cite the Routledge version, unless there are passages concerned that did not make it into the Handbook for reasons of length. — -/- This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and the role of imagining, with an almost exclusive focus on the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Note on the Quantum Mechanical Measurement Process.Michael Drieschner - 2013 - Philosophia Naturalis 50 (2):201-213.
    Traditionally one main emphasis of the quantum mechanical measurement theory is on the question how the pure state of the compound system 'measured system + measuring apparatus' is transformed into the 'mixture' of all possible results of that measurement, weighted with their probability: the so-called “disappearance of the interference terms”. It is argued in this note that in reality there is no such transformation, so that there is no need to account for such a transformation theoretically. _German_ Gewöhnlich liegt ein (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Excuses for Hume's Skepticism.Yuval Avnur - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):264-306.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Hume and human error.Mark Hooper - unknown
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation and Hume's Conception of Causality.Matias Slavov - 2013 - Philosophia Naturalis 50 (2):277-305.
    This article investigates the relationship between Hume’s causal philosophy and Newton ’s philosophy of nature. I claim that Newton ’s experimentalist methodology in gravity research is an important background for understanding Hume’s conception of causality: Hume sees the relation of cause and effect as not being founded on a priori reasoning, similar to the way that Newton criticized non - empirical hypotheses about the properties of gravity. However, according to Hume’s criteria of causal inference, the law of universal gravitation is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Kant on the Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts.John J. Callanan - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (5-6):580-604.
    It is often maintained that one insight of Kant's Critical philosophy is its recognition of the need to distinguish accounts of knowledge acquisition from knowledge justification. In particular, it is claimed that Kant held that the detailing of a concept's acquisition conditions is insufficient to determine its legitimacy. I argue that this is not the case at least with regard to geometrical concepts. Considered in the light of his pre-Critical writings on the mathematical method, construction in the Critique can be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Hume’s practically epistemic conclusions?Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):501-524.
    The inoffensive title of Section 1.4.7 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ‘Conclusion of this Book’, belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume’s considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one. In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The ‘usefulness and agreeableness reading’ (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified via (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • What the Wise Ought Believe: A Voluntarist Interpretation of Hume's General Rules.Ryan Hickerson - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1133-1153.
    This paper advances an interpretation of what Hume called ‘the general rules’: natural principles of belief-formation that nevertheless can be augmented via reflection. According to Hume, reflection is, in part, what separates the wise from the vulgar. In this paper, I argue that for Hume being wise must therefore be, to some degree, voluntary. Hume faced a significant problem in attempting to reconcile his epistemic normativity, i.e. his claims about what we ought to believe, with his largely involuntarist theory of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Hume's Unified Theory of Mental Representation.Karl Schafer - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):978-1005.
    On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • A Pyrrhonian Interpretation of Hume on Assent.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 380-394.
    How is it possible for David Hume to be both withering skeptic and constructive theorist? I recommend an answer like the Pyrrhonian answer to the question how it is possible to suspend all judgment yet engage in active daily life. Sextus Empiricus distinguishes two kinds of assent: one suspended across the board and one involved with daily living. The first is an act of will based on appreciation of reasons; the second is a causal effect of appearances. Hume makes the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • (4 other versions)Humes old and new: Four fashionable falsehoods, and one unfashionable truth.Peter Millican - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):163-199.
    Hume has traditionally been understood as an inductive sceptic with positivist tendencies, reducing causation to regular succession and anticipating the modern distinctions between analytic and synthetic, deduction and induction. The dominant fashion in recent Hume scholarship is to reject all this, replacing the ‘Old Hume’ with various New alternatives. Here I aim to counter four of these revisionist readings, presenting instead a broadly traditional interpretation but with important nuances, based especially on Hume’s later works. He asked that we should treat (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Separability and concept-empiricism: Hume vs. Locke.Ruth Weintraub - 2007 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (4):729 – 743.
    Hume invokes the separability of perceptions to derive some of his most contentious pronouncements. To assess the cogency of the arguments, the notion must first be clarified. The clarification reveals that sic different separability claims must be distinguished. Of these, I consider the three that are rarely discussed. They turn out to be unacceptable. Locke espouses none of them.This Article does not have an abstract.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification.Louis E. Loeb - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):279-303.
    Hume’s claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined---though without his remarking on this fact---with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume’s view, are steady dispositions , nature’s provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume’s epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief’s influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Revisionism Gone Awry: Since When Hasn't Hume Been a Sceptic?Adam Andreotta & Michael Levine - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (2):133-155.
    In this paper, we argue that revisionary theories about the nature and extent of Hume's scepticism are mistaken. We claim that the source of Hume's pervasive scepticism is his empiricism. As earlier readings of Hume's Treatise claim, Hume was a sceptic – and a radical one. Our position faces one enormous problem. How is it possible to square Hume's claims about normative reasoning with his radical scepticism? Despite the fact that Hume thinks that causal (inductive) reasoning is irrational, he explicitly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What makes Hume an External World Skeptic?Graham Clay - manuscript
    What would it take for Hume to be an external world skeptic? Is Hume's position on knowledge sufficient to force him to deny that we can acquire knowledge of propositions about the external world? After all, Hume is extremely restrictive about what can be known because he requires knowledge to be immune to error. In this paper, I will argue that if Hume were a skeptic, then he must also deny a particular kind of view about what is immediately present (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • O velho e o novo problema da indução.Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Neste texto inrodutório, apresento brevemente o que normalmente se entende pelo velho problema da indução e, em seguida, apresento um pouco mais detidamente, acentuando as diferenças e semelhanças, o novo enigma da indução.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Descartes's critique of the syllogistic.Alexander Xavier Douglas - 2017 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (4).
    This article presents a novel reading of Descartes’s critique of the traditional syllogistic. The reading differs from those previously presented by scholars who regard Descartes’s critique as a version of a well-known argument: that syllogisms are circular or non-ampliative and thus trivial. It is argued that Descartes did not see syllogisms as defective in themselves. For him the problem was rather that anyone considering a valid and informative syllogism must already know, by an intuition wholly independent of the syllogism, that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Locke, Hume, and Reid on the Objects of Belief.Lewis Powell - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (1):21-38.
    The goal of this paper is show how an initially appealing objection to David Hume's account of judgment can only be put forward by philosophers who accept an account of judgment that has its own sizable share of problems. To demonstrate this, I situate the views of John Locke, David Hume, and Thomas Reid with respect to each other, so as to illustrate how the appealing objection is linked to unappealing features of Locke's account of judgment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Imagination and Experimentalism in Hume’s Philosophy.Andrew Ward - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):165-175.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A sabedoria humana de Pierre Charron: a ciência e o exercício cético do espírito forte.Estéfano Luís de Sá Winter - 2013 - Filosofia Do Renascimento E Moderna (Encontro Nacional Anpof).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is Logic all in our Heads? From Naturalism to Psychologism.Francis J. Pelletier, Renée Elio & Philip Hanson - 2008 - Studia Logica 88 (1):3-66.
    Psychologism in logic is the doctrine that the semantic content of logical terms is in some way a feature of human psychology. We consider the historically influential version of the doctrine, Psychological Individualism, and the many counter-arguments to it. We then propose and assess various modifications to the doctrine that might allow it to avoid the classical objections. We call these Psychological Descriptivism, Teleological Cognitive Architecture, and Ideal Cognizers. These characterizations give some order to the wide range of modern views (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • (1 other version)Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume’s argument about induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321-338.
    Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume's central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout "Treatise" Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations