In this paper, we argue that lesbian couples who wish to have children who are genetically related to both of them should be allowed access to mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs). First, we provide a brief explanation of mitochondrial diseases and MRTs. We then present the reasons why MRTs are not, by nature, therapeutic. The upshot of the view that MRTs are non-therapeutic techniques is that their therapeutic potential cannot be invoked for restricting their use only to those cases where a (...) mitochondrial DNA disease could be ‘cured’. We then argue that a positive case for MRTs is justified by an appeal to reproductive freedom, and that the criteria to access these techniques should hence be extended to include lesbian couples who wish to share genetic parenthood. Finally, we consider a potential objection to our argument: that the desire to have genetically related kin is not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian couples to access MRTs. (shrink)

Emerging reprogenetic technologies may radically change how humans reproduce in the not-so-distant future. One foreseeable consequence of disruptive innovations in the procreative domain is an increase in the reproductive autonomy of intended parents. Regarding the prospective parental liberty of enhancing non-health–related traits of the offspring, one controversy has particularly dominated the literature. Does parents' choice of genetically enhancing the traits of their descendants compromise children's future personal autonomy? In this article, I will analyse the main arguments which posit that reprogenetic (...) enhancement could be at odds with the child's future autonomy. I will argue that these objections are ill-founded. Moreover, I will present other arguments that show that reprogenetic technologies can enhance the autonomy of future children. Autonomy enhancement is a plausible and pro tanto desirable application of emerging reprogenetic technologies. (shrink)

In this paper, we will discuss the prospect of human reproduction achieved with gametes originating from only one person. According to statements by a minority of scientists working on the generation of gametes in vitro, it may become possible to create eggs from men’s non-reproductive cells and sperm from women’s. This would enable, at least in principle, the creation of an embryo from cells obtained from only one individual: ‘solo reproduction’. We will consider what might motivate people to reproduce in (...) this way, and the implications that solo reproduction might have for ethics and policy. We suggest that such an innovation is unlikely to revolutionise reproduction and parenting. Indeed, in some respects it is less revolutionary than in vitro fertilisation as a whole. Furthermore, we show that solo reproduction with in vitro created gametes is not necessarily any more ethically problematic than gamete donation—and probably less so. Where appropriate, we draw parallels with the debate surrounding reproductive cloning. We note that solo reproduction may serve to perpetuate reductive geneticised accounts of reproduction, and that this may indeed be ethically questionable. However, in this it is not unique among other technologies of assisted reproduction, many of which focus on genetic transmission. It is for this reason that a ban on solo reproduction might be inconsistent with continuing to permit other kinds of reproduction that also bear the potential to strengthen attachment to a geneticised account of reproduction. Our claim is that there are at least as good reasons to pursue research towards enabling solo reproduction, and eventually to introduce solo reproduction as an option for fertility treatment, as there are to do so for other infertility related purposes. (shrink)

Several objections against the morality of researching or employing mitochondrial replacement techniques have been advanced recently. In this paper, I examine three of these objections and show that they are found wanting. First I examine whether mitochondrial replacement techniques, research and clinical practice, should not be carried out because of possible harms to egg donors. Next I assess whether mitochondrial replacement techniques should be banned because they could affect the study of genealogical ancestry. Finally, I examine the claim that mitochondrial (...) replacement techniques are not transferring mitochondrial DNA but nuclear DNA, and that this should be prohibited on ethical grounds. (shrink)

Advances in medicine in the latter half of the twentieth century have dramatically altered human bodies, expanding choices around what we do with them and how they connect to other bodies. Nowhere is this more so than in the area of reproductive technologies. Reproductive medicine and the laws surrounding it in the UK have reconfigured traditional boundaries surrounding parenthood and the family. Yet culture and regulation surrounding RTs have combined to try to ensure that while traditional boundaries may be pushed, (...) they are reconstructed in similar ways. This paper looks at the most recent RT to be permitted in the UK, mitochondria replacement therapy. Despite controversial media headlines surrounding the technique, MRT is in fact an example of how science and regulation seek to expand models of traditional relatedness in a way that doesn’t challenge the existing order. Yet, like other RTs, while attempts are made to ensure it doesn’t push traditional boundaries too far, fissures and inconsistencies appear in law and culture, which give interesting insights into how genetics, parentage and identity are being mediated in new but familiar ways. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the ethical concerns that may arise from the synthesis of human DNA. To date, only small stretches of DNA have been constructed, but the prospect of generating human genomes is becoming feasible. At the same time, the significance of genes for identity, health and reproduction is coming under increased scrutiny. We examine the implications of DNA synthesis and its impact on debates over the relationship with our DNA and the ownership of our genes, its potential (...) to disrupt common understandings of reproduction and privacy, and the way in which synthetic DNA challenges traditional associations between genes and identity. We explore the degree to which synthetic DNA may further undermine overgeneticised accounts of identity, health, reproduction, parenthood and privacy that are prevalent in the public domain and in some areas of policy-making. While avoiding making normative claims of our own, we conclude that there is a need for reflection on the ethical implications of these developing technologies before they are on us. (shrink)

Some Comments on de Melo-Martin and Harris.

Artificial gametes, derived from stem cells, have the potential to enable in vitro fertilization of embryos. Currently, artificial gametes are only being generated in laboratory animals; however, considerable efforts are underway to develop artificial gametes using human cell sources. These artificial gametes are being proposed as a means to address infertility through assisted reproductive technologies. Nonetheless, the availability of artificial gametes obtained from adult organisms can potentially expand the possibilities of reproduction. Various groups, such as same-sex couples, post-menopausal women, and (...) deceased donors, could potentially utilize artificial gametes to conceive genetically related offspring. The advent of artificial gametes raises significant bioethical questions. Should all these reproductive scenarios be accepted? How can we delineate the range of future reproductive choices? A normative bioethical framework may be necessary to establish a consensus regarding the use of human artificial gametes. This review aims to present the current state of research on the biological roadmap for generating artificial gametes, while also summarizing proposed approaches to establish a normative framework that delineates ethically acceptable paths for reproduction. (shrink)

In this article, I challenge the widespread presumption that a child should have exactly two parents. I consider the pros and cons of various numbers of parents for the people most directly affected – the children themselves and their parents. The number of parents, as well as the ratio of parents to children, may have an impact on what resources are available, what relationships can develop between parents and children, what level of conflict can be expected in the family, as (...) well as the costs involved in parenting and the experience of parenting a child. Indirectly, there is also an effect on who will have the opportunity to be a parent, as well as on wider social issues that I mention but do not discuss. Having considered all these factors, I conclude that there is some reason to believe that three or more parents is usually better than one or two, especially if children are to have siblings, which is typically beneficial. However, these reasons are not strong enough to support a general presumption in favor of any particular number. We should therefore jettison the two‐parent presumption and make different numbers of parents more socially accepted as well as legally possible. (shrink)

Recent research with human embryos, in different parts of the world, has sparked a new debate on the ethics of genetic human enhancement. This debate, however, has mainly focused on gene-editing technologies, especially CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats). Less attention has been given to the prospect of pursuing genetic human enhancement by means of IVF (In Vitro Fertilisation) in conjunction with in vitro gametogenesis, genome-wide association studies, and embryo selection. This article examines the different ethical implications of the (...) quest for cognitive enhancement by means of gene-editing on the one hand, and embryo selection on the other. The article focuses on the ethics of cognitive enhancement by means of embryo selection, as this technology is more likely to become commercially available before cognitive enhancement by means of gene-editing. This article argues that the philosophical debate on the ethics of enhancement should take into consideration public attitudes to research on human genomics and human enhancement technologies. The article discusses, then, some of the recent findings of the SIENNA Project, which in 2019 conducted a survey on public attitudes to human genomics and human enhancement technologies in 11 countries (France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and United States). (shrink)

It has been suggested that future application of stem-cell derived gametes might lead to the possibility for same-sex couples to have genetically related children. Still, for this to become possible, the technique of gamete derivation and techniques of reprogramming somatic cells to a pluripotent state would have to be perfected. Moreover, egg cells would have to be derived from male cells and sperm cells from female cells, which is believed to be particularly difficult, if not impossible. We suggest a more (...) plausible scenario to provide same-sex couples with the possibility to parent a child who is genetically related to both parents. Although technical feasibility is an advantage, disadvantages are that cooperation of a donor of the opposite sex is still required and that the partners are genetically linked to the resulting child in a different degree. However, since in our scenario the donor's genetic contribution would not outweigh any of the parents' genetic contribution, this alternative route may ease the fear for a possible parental claim by the donor. Like many other applications in the field of infertility treatment, the goal to create SCD-gametes for reproductive purposes is largely based on the high value attributed to genetic parenthood. Although we believe that genetic relatedness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for ‘good’ parenthood, we do believe that many people may consider our scenario a welcome alternative. (shrink)

In this paper I explore some of the moral issues that could emerge from the creation of human–nonhuman chimeras capable of human gamete production and human pregnancy. First I explore whether there is a cogent argument against the creation of HNH-chimeras that could produce human gametes. I conclude that so far there is none, and that in fact there is at least one good moral reason for producing such types of creatures. Afterwards I explore some of the moral problems that (...) could emerge from the fact that a HNH-chimera could become pregnant with a human conceptus. I focus on two sets of problems: problems that would arise by virtue of the fact that a human is gestated by a nonhuman creature, and problems that would emerge from the fact that such pregnancies could affect the health of the HNH-chimera. (shrink)

This paper gives an introduction to the interdisciplinary special section. Against the historical and ethical background of reproductive technologies, it explores future scenarios of human reproduction and analyzes ways of mutual engagement between fictional and academic endeavors. The underlying idea is that we can make use of human reproduction scenarios in at least two ways: we can use them to critique technologies by imagining terrible consequences for humanity but also to defend positions that favor scientific and technological development.

Que sont les droits de l’homme? Existent-ils? Je me propose de répondre à ces questions en proposant un compte-rendu contractuel des droits de l’homme. Je me concentre sur le droit de fonder une famille et d’avoir des enfants. Je montre également comment l’approche contractuelle des droits de l’homme peut expliquer la pertinence actuelle des droits reproductifs dans le discours sur les droits de l’homme, et comment l’émergence des TRA (technologies de reproduction assistée) a contribué à ce changement. Le compte rendu (...) contractuel des droits de l’homme pose, en premier lieu, la question suivante : quels besoins et désirs fondamentaux peuvent être attribués à tout être humain indépendamment de son sexe, de sa nationalité, de son orientation sexuelle, de son âge, de son appartenance ethnique, etc. Le fait d’avoir un intérêt, par exemple, à préserver sa propre intégrité corporelle, sa liberté et sa propriété privée est considéré comme un besoin fondamental ou un désir fondamental de l’être humain. Mais un besoin ou un désir humain fondamental ne constitue pas en soi un droit de l’homme. Deuxièmement, le compte rendu contractuel des droits de l’homme demande donc quels besoins ou désirs fondamentaux de l’homme les individus et les représentants des États considéreraient comme si importants qu’ils accepteraient de créer des cadres institutionnels, tant au niveau national qu’international, de manière à permettre aux individus de poursuivre la satisfaction de leurs besoins ou désirs fondamentaux sans interférence de l’État. Les droits de l’homme existent et ne peuvent être revendiqués que dans le contexte de ces cadres normatifs. (shrink)

With the development of new procedures in the production of synthetic human gametes it has become important to re-examine the manner in which reproductive cells, taking part in the generation of children, can be understood. Though this can be attempted from many different perspectives, the present study will examine the possibility of considering gametes as representing the persons from whom they originated. From this perspective, it is possible to suggest that, in procreation, the entirety of each human sperm cell may (...) represent and reveal the man from whom it was produced and the entirety of each human egg cell may represent and reveal the woman from whom it was produced.The possible ethical consequences of using synthetic gametes for those who hold this perspective together with their understanding of relational identity will also be examined. (shrink)

The year 2015 has been a decisive year for the future of mitochondrial replacement therapy – at least in the Western world. Currently, the UK and the US governments are undergoing a process of ethical and scientific evaluation of the technique to decide whether to allow its implementation or not. MRT requires the fusion of the DNA of three parents into an embryo – and this creates a number of worries as to what this scientific innovation will lead to. These (...) worries might be well placed and worthy of consideration, but not on the grounds presented by some opponents. In this paper, we will analyse a recent European Union petition that urged the UK government to refrain from legalising MRT, stressing that other techniques, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis, already have a more direct eugenic potential than MRT. Although the UK Parliament recently voted in favour of MRT, an analysis of the EU petition can nonetheless still contribute to understanding some of the key aspects of the debate. Our conclusion is that what seems to be really at stake, instead, is whether or not we are willing to reconceptualise our notion of parenthood as something not necessarily binominal and genetically related. (shrink)