- Analyticity.Tom Donaldson - 2020 - In Michael J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. New York: Routledge. pp. 288-299.details
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(1 other version)The Moral Parody Argument Against Panpsychism.Zach Blaesi - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):1821–1852.details
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Measuring the mental.Michael Pauen & John-Dylan Haynes - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 90:103106.details
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Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment.Alva Stråge - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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Befuddling the mind: radical Enactivism (Hutto-Myin style) and the metaphysics of experience.Itay Shani - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):39-56.details
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Modal rationalism and the demonstrative reply to the scrutability argument against physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2107-2134.details
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Neo-Thomistic hylomorphism applied to mental causation and neural correlates of consciousness.Matthew Keith Owen - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2013 - Dissertation, University of California Los Angelesdetails
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Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-222.details
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Mind–brain identity and evidential insulation.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):377-395.details
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Phenomenological constraints: a problem for radical enactivism.Michael Roberts - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):375-399.details
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Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.details
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Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism, and the Grounding Relation.Philip Goff - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.details
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Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion.Sophie C. Gibb - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (2):205-221.details
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The Causal Closure Principle.Sophie Gibb - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):626-647.details
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Type‐Identity Statements and the Explanatory Gap: An Argument for Compatibility.Itay Shani & Sungho Choi - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):485-502.details
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Non-eliminative reductionism: the basis of a science of conscious experience?Dennis Nicholson - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Second-Person Perspective.Michael Pauen - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):33 - 49.details
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Non-eliminative Reductionism: Reconciling Qualia and Physicalism.Dennis Nicholson - manuscriptdetails
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"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknowndetails
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Towards a scientific account of experience.Dennis Nicholson - manuscriptdetails
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The mind-body problem: An overview.Kirk Ludwig - 2003 - In Stephen Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1-46.details
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Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness.Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):161-196.details
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The search for neural correlates of consciousness.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):461–474.details
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Causal closure principles and emergentism.E. J. Lowe - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (294):571-586.details
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I, zombie.Paul Skokowski - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):1-9.details
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Why do qualia and the mind seem nonphysical?José M. Musacchio - 2005 - Synthese 147 (3):425-460.details
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Dissolving the explanatory gap: Neurobiological differences between phenomenal and propositional knowledge. [REVIEW]J. M. Musacchio - 2002 - Brain and Mind 3 (3):331-365.details
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The neurophilosophy of subjectivity.Pete Mandik - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Physicalism, Closure, and the Structure of Causal Arguments for Physicalism: A Naturalistic Formulation of the Physical.Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (4):1081-1096.details
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The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.Matthew Owen - 2020 - Entropy 22 (8).details
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Reincarnating the Identity Theory.Erik Myin & Farid Zahnoun - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9 (3):1--9.details
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Functionalism, superduperfunctionalism, and physicalism: lessons from supervenience.Ronald Endicott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2205-2235.details
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Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (1):73-89.details
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Theoretical Identities as Explanantia and Explananda.Kevin Morris - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):373-385.details
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Closing in on Causal Closure.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.details
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Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.details
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Personal agency: the metaphysics of mind and action.E. J. Lowe - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Meditation, enactivism and introspective training.Michael David Roberts - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Mental Causation.Sophie Gibb - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):327-338.details
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A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia.John O'dea - 2007 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):81-93.details
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Anti-individualism and Phenomenal Content.Darragh Byrne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1733-1755.details
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Ontology, Mind and Free Will. A Workshop in Memory of E.J. Lowe.Matteo Grasso & Mattia Sorgon - 2014 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 5 (2):128-136.details
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