- Hard incompatibilism and its rivals.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.details
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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
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From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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Frankfurt examples, derivative responsibility, and the timing objection1.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.details
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A Defense of Free Will Skepticism: Replies to Commentaries by Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):617-636.details
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Principles of Criminal Liability from the Semiotic Point of View.Michał Peno & Olgierd Bogucki - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 34 (2):561-578.details
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Against Deliberation Restrictions.Garrett Pendergraft - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (3):341-357.details
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The Timing Objection to the Frankfurt Cases.David Palmer - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1011-1023.details
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Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.details
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Free will and control: a noncausal approach.David Palmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10043-10062.details
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Deterministic Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3847-3864.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases and Moral Responsibility: A Methodological Reflection.Koji Ota - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3):295-319.details
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What is chaos and how is it relevant for philosophy of mind?John M. Ostrowick - 2015 - South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):323-335.details
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Coercion and libertarianism: a reply to Gordon Barnes.S. Olsaretti - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):295-299.details
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Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):617-631.details
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After incompatibilism: A naturalistic defense of the reactive attitudes.Shaun Nichols - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):405-428.details
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Replies to Critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):476-491.details
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Replies to critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):123-131.details
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Irrelevant alternatives and Frankfurt counterfactuals.Dana K. Nelkin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):1-25.details
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Desert, fairness, and resentment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):117-132.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics.Thomas Nadelhoffer, David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (8):e12873.details
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Intuitions About Free Will and the Failure to Comprehend Determinism.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Samuel Murray & Elise Dykhuis - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2515-2536.details
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Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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‘Animals run about the world in all sorts of paths’: varieties of indeterminism.Jesse M. Mulder - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-17.details
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Introduction: Responsibility for action and belief.Carlos J. Moya & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):81 – 86.details
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Lemos on the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1459-1477.details
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Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.details
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Manipulation and Degrees of Blameworthiness.Martin Montminy & Daniel Tinney - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):265-281.details
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A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism.Thomas Müller & Hans J. Briegel - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):219-252.details
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Reactive attitudes and personal relationships.Per-Erik Milam - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):102-122.details
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In defense of non-reactive attitudes.Per-Erik Milam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):294-307.details
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The Zygote Argument Is Still Invalid: So What?Kristin M. Mickelson - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):705-722.details
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Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.details
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A critique of Vihvelin’s Three-fold Classification.Kristin Mickelson - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):85-99.details
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Free will and mental disorder: Exploring the relationship.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.details
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Free will and psychiatric assessments of criminal responsibility: a parallel with informed consent. [REVIEW]Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (4):313-320.details
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Truth and freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.details
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Nonreductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.details
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Moral responsibility and agents' histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.details
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Moral responsibility and the continuation problem.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.details
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Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.details
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Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.details
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Direct control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.details
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The metaphysical importance of the compatibility question: comments on Mark Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-12.details
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Source compatibilism and that pesky ability to do otherwise: comments on Dana Nelkin’s making sense of freedom and responsibility. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):105-116.details
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Saying good-bye to the direct argument the right way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.details
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Resisting Todd’s Moral-Standing Zygote Argument.Michael McKenna - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):657-678.details
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Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174.details
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