Recent work has defended “Euclidean” theories of set size, in which Cantor’s Principle (two sets have equally many elements if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between them) is abandoned in favor of the Part-Whole Principle (if A is a proper subset of B then A is smaller than B). It has also been suggested that Gödel’s argument for the unique correctness of Cantor’s Principle is inadequate. Here we see from simple examples, not that Euclidean theories of set (...) size are wrong, but that they must be either very weak and narrow or largely arbitrary and misleading. (shrink)

Within the traditional Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics, it is not possible to describe a particle as possessing, simultaneously, a sharp position value and a sharp momentum value. Is it possible, though, to describe a particle as possessing just a sharp position value (or just a sharp momentum value)? Some, such as Teller, have thought that the answer to this question is No - that the status of individual continuous quantities is very different in quantum mechanics than in classical (...) mechanics. On the contrary, I shall show that the same subtle issues arise with respect to continuous quantities in classical and quantum mechanics; and that it is, after all, possible to describe a particle as possessing a sharp position value without altering the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have attempted to solve the problem of null-probability possible events in Bayesian epistemology by proposing that there are infinitesimal probabilities. Hájek and Easwaran have argued that because there is no way to specify a particular hyperreal extension of the real numbers, solutions to the regularity problem involving infinitesimals, or at least hyperreal infinitesimals, involve an unsatisfactory ineffability or arbitrariness. The arguments depend on the alleged impossibility of picking out a particular hyperreal extension of the real numbers (...) and/or of a particular value within such an extension due to the use of the Axiom of Choice. However, it is false that the Axiom of Choice precludes a specification of a hyperreal extension—such an extension can indeed be specified. Moreover, for all we know, it is possible to explicitly specify particular infinitesimals within such an extension. Nonetheless, I prove that because any regular probability measure that has infinitesimal values can be replaced by one that has all the same intuitive features but other infinitesimal values, the heart of the arbitrariness objection remains. (shrink)

In set theory without the axiom of choice math formula, three-space type results for the Hahn-Banach property are provided. We deduce that for every Hausdorff compact scattered space K, the Banach space C of real continuous functions on K satisfies the continuous Hahn-Banach property in math formula. We also prove in math formula Rudin's theorem: “Radon measures on Hausdorff compact scattered spaces are discrete”.

In traditional semantics for classical logic and its extensions, such as modal logic, propositions are interpreted as subsets of a set, as in discrete duality, or as clopen sets of a Stone space, as in topological duality. A point in such a set can be viewed as a "possible world," with the key property of a world being primeness—a world makes a disjunction true only if it makes one of the disjuncts true—which classically implies totality—for each proposition, a world either (...) makes the proposition true or makes its negation true. This chapter surveys a more general approach to logical semantics, known as possibility semantics, which replaces possible worlds with possibly partial "possibilities." In classical possibility semantics, propositions are interpreted as regular open sets of a poset, as in set-theoretic forcing, or as compact regular open sets of an upper Vietoris space, as in the recent theory of "choice-free Stone duality." The elements of these sets, viewed as possibilities, may be partial in the sense of making a disjunction true without settling which disjunct is true. We explain how possibilities may be used in semantics for classical logic and modal logics and generalized to semantics for intuitionistic logics. The goals are to overcome or deepen incompleteness results for traditional semantics, to avoid the nonconstructivity of traditional semantics, and to provide richer structures for the interpretation of new languages. (shrink)

The principal result of this paper answers a long-standing question in the model theory of arithmetic [R. Kossak, J. Schmerl, The Structure of Models of Peano Arithmetic, Oxford University Press, 2006, Question 7] by showing that there exists an uncountable arithmetically closed family of subsets of the set ω of natural numbers such that the expansion of the standard model of Peano arithmetic has no conservative elementary extension, i.e., for any elementary extension of , there is a subset of ω* (...) that is parametrically definable in but whose intersection with ω is not a member of . We also establish other results that highlight the role of countability in the model theory of arithmetic. Inspired by a recent question of Gitman and Hamkins, we furthermore show that the aforementioned family can be arranged to further satisfy the curious property that forcing with the quotient Boolean algebra collapses 1 when viewed as a notion of forcing. (shrink)

We work in set theory without the Axiom of Choice ZF. We prove that the Principle of Dependent Choices (DC) implies that the closed unit ball of a uniformly convex Banach space is weakly compact and, in particular, that the closed unit ball of a Hilbert space is weakly compact. These statements are not provable in ZF and the latter statement does not imply DC. Furthermore, DC does not imply that the closed unit ball of a reflexive space is weakly (...) compact. (shrink)

We prove James's sequential characterization of reflexivity in set-theory ZF + DC, where DC is the axiom of Dependent Choices. In turn, James's criterion implies that every infinite set is Dedekind-infinite, whence it is not provable in ZF. Our proof in ZF + DC of James' criterion leads us to various notions of reflexivity which are equivalent in ZFC but are not equivalent in ZF. We also show that the weak compactness of the closed unit ball of a reflexive space (...) does not imply the Boolean Prime Ideal theorem : this solves a question raised in [6]. (shrink)

We prove in set theory without the Axiom of Choice, that Rado’s selection lemma (\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf{RL}}$$\end{document}) implies the Hahn-Banach axiom. We also prove that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf{RL}}$$\end{document} is equivalent to several consequences of the Tychonov theorem for compact Hausdorff spaces: in particular, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf{RL}}$$\end{document} implies that every filter on a well orderable set is included in a ultrafilter. (...) In set theory with atoms, the “Multiple Choice” axiom implies \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf{RL}}$$\end{document}. (shrink)

Sureson, C., Symmetric submodels of a Cohen generic extension, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 58 247–261. We study some symmetric submodels of a Cohen generic extension and the satisfaction of several properties ) which strongly violate the axiom of choice.