- Agent causation in a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics.Jonathan D. Jacobs & Timothy O'Connor - 2013 - In Sophie Gibb, E. J. Lowe & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.details
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(1 other version)Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions: An essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):202-213.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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Agent-Causal Theories.Timothy O'Connor - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition. Oup Usa. pp. 309-328.details
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A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.details
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Power and moral responsibility.Thomas Pink - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):127 – 149.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.details
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The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.details
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(1 other version)Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Philosophy of AI: A structured overview.Vincent C. Müller - 2024 - In Nathalie A. Smuha (ed.), Cambridge handbook on the law, ethics and policy of Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-25.details
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The Conceptual Foundation of Morality.Gal Yehezkel - 2021 - Springer.details
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Mental Illness and Moral Discernment: A Clinical Psychiatric Perspective.Duncan A. P. Angus & Marion L. S. Carson - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (4):191-211.details
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On Libertarianism as an Explanatory Hypothesis.Andrew Kissel - 2019 - Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (2):91-110.details
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The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.details
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Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydneydetails
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Taking Responsibility for Ourselves: A Kierkegaardian Account of the Freedom-Relevant Conditions Necessary for the Cultivation of Character.Paul E. Carron - 2011 - Dissertation, Baylor Universitydetails
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Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):617-631.details
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La fiabilidad teórica del determinismo. Un examen desde la propuesta de Mariano Artigas.Martín Montoya - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (2):245-262.details
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The Relevance of Folk Intuitions to Philosophical Debates.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Dissertation, Florida State Universitydetails
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Contradictions in the Concept of Professional Culpability.Rosemary Bryant - 2007 - Health Care Analysis 15 (2):137-152.details
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Physics and the Real World.George F. R. Ellis - 2006 - Foundations of Physics 36 (2):227-262.details
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Reasons Explanation and Agent Control.John Ross Churchill - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):241-253.details
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Libertarianism and agentive experience.Justin A. Capes - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):33-44.details
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Freedom and chance.Mark Wulff Carstensen - unknowndetails
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Experimentální filosofie o otázce kompatibility svobodné vůle s determinismem.Kateřina Šimáčková - 2014 - Pro-Fil 2014 (S1):36-49.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Indeterministic intuitions and the Spinozan strategy.Andrew Kissel - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (3):280-298.details
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Preventive diplomacy: the role of the individual in attempts to prevent war.Daryl Morini - unknowndetails
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An error theory for compatibilist intuitions.Adam Feltz & Melissa Millan - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):529-555.details
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The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.details
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Responsibility Ascriptions in Technology Development and Engineering: Three Perspectives. [REVIEW]Neelke Doorn - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):69-90.details
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Moral psychology: Empirical approaches.John Doris & Stephen Stich - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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Agents, objects, and their powers in Suarez and Hobbes.Thomas Pink - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):3-24.details
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On incompatibilist free will.Mr Blake Winter - 2009details
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What If? The Farther Shores of Neuroethics: Commentary on “Neuroscience May Supersede Ethics and Law”.Henry T. Greely - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):439-446.details
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Hume sobre a volição e a faculdade da vontade/Hume on volition and the faculty of the will.Franco Nero Antunes Soares - 2013 - Natureza Humana 15 (1).details
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It wasn’t up to Jones: unavoidable actions and intensional contexts in Frankfurt examples.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.details
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