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  1. Moore’s Paradox for God.John N. Williams - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):265-270.
    I argue that ‘Moore’s paradox for God’. I do not believe this proposition shows that nobody can be both omniscient and rational in all her beliefs. I then anticipate and rebut three objections to my argument.
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  • The Being That Knew Too Much.Patrick Grim - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):141-154.
    John Abbruzzese has recently attempted a defense of omniscience against a series of my attacks. This affords me a welcome occasion to clarify some of the arguments, to pursue some neglected subtleties, and to re-think some important complications. In the end, however, I must insist that at least three of four crucial arguments really do show an omniscient being to be impossible. Abbruzzese sometimes misunderstands the forms of the argument themselves, and quite generally misunderstands their force.
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  • In Defense of Linguistic Ersatzism.Tony Roy - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (3):217 - 242.
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  • Theism and Dialetheism.A. J. Cotnoir - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):592-609.
    The divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence have faced objections to their very consistency. Such objections rely on reasoning parallel to semantic paradoxes such as the Liar or to set-theoretic paradoxes like Russell's paradox. With the advent of paraconsistent logics, dialetheism—the view that some contradictions are true—became a major player in the search for a solution to such paradoxes. This paper explores whether dialetheism, armed with the tools of paraconsistent logics, has the resources to respond to the objections levelled against (...)
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  • Foreknowledge, Evil, and Compatibility Arguments.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (3):269-293.
    Most arguments against God’s existence aim to show that it is incompatible with various apparent features of the world, such as the existence of evil or of human free will. In response, theists have sought to show that God’s existence is compatible with these features of the world. However, the fact that the proposition that God exists is necessary if possible introduces some underappreciated difficulties for these arguments.
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  • The Coherence of Omniscience: A Defense. [REVIEW]John E. Abbruzzese - 1997 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 41 (1):25-34.
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  • Presentism and the Grounding Objection.Thomas M. Crisp - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):90–109.
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  • Permissible Tinkering with the Concept of God.Jeff Speaks - 2017 - Topoi 36 (4):587-597.
    In response to arguments against the existence of God, and in response to perceived conflicts between divine attributes, theists often face pressure to give up some pretheoretically attractive thesis about the divine attributes. One wonders: when does this unacceptably water down our concept of God, and when is it, as van Inwagen says, ‘permissible tinkering’ with the concept of God? A natural and widely deployed answer is that it is permissible tinkering iff it is does not violate the claim that (...)
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  • Worlds by Supervenience: Some Further Problems.P. Grim - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):146-151.
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  • How Many Possible Worlds Are There?Y. Stephanou - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):223-228.
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  • A Neglected Response to the Grim Result.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):38-41.
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  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1947–2016: A Retrospective Using Citation and Social Network Analyses.Martin Davies & Angelito Calma - forthcoming - Global Intellectual History.
    In anticipation of the journal’s centenary in 2027 this paper provides a citation network analysis of all available citation and publication data of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1923–2017). A total of 2,353 academic articles containing 21,772 references were collated and analyzed. This includes 175 articles that contained author-submitted keywords, 415 publisher-tagged keywords and 519 articles that had abstracts. Results initially focused on finding the most published authors, most cited articles and most cited authors within the journal, followed by most (...)
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  • Building Thoughts From Dust: A Cantorian Puzzle.Joshua Rasmussen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):393-404.
    I bring to light a set-theoretic reason to think that there are more mental properties than shapes, sizes, masses, and other characteristically “physical” properties. I make use of a couple counting principles. One principle, backed by a Cantorian-style argument, is that pluralities outnumber particulars: that is, there is a distinct plurality of particulars for each particular, but not vice versa. The other is a principle by which we may coherently identify distinct mental properties in terms of arbitrary pluralities of physical (...)
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  • Grim’s Arguments Against Omniscience and Indefinite Extensibility.Laureano Luna - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):89-101.
    Patrick Grim has put forward a set theoretical argument purporting to prove that omniscience is an inconsistent concept and a model theoretical argument for the claim that we cannot even consistently define omniscience. The former relies on the fact that the class of all truths seems to be an inconsistent multiplicity (or a proper class, a class that is not a set); the latter is based on the difficulty of quantifying over classes that are not sets. We first address the (...)
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  • The Divine Attributes.Nicholas Everitt - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):78-90.
    Focusing on God's essential attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, being eternal and omnipresent, being a creator and sustainer, and being a person, I examine how far recent discussion has been able to provide for each of these divine attributes a consistent interpretation. I also consider briefly whether the attributes are compatible with each other.
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