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Identity theories.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.details
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Holism, conceptual role, and conceptual similarity.Joey Pollock - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):396-420.details
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Are sensations still brain processes.Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.details
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The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.details
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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):283-311.details
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Computation without representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.details
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Computing mechanisms.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.details
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How to defend the phenomenology of attitudes.Jared Peterson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2609-2629.details
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Mental Causation via Neuroprosthetics? A Critical Analysis.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2018 - Synthese (12):5159-5174.details
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Elimination, not Reduction: Lessons from the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) and Multiple Realisation.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e22.details
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Misplacing memories? An enactive approach to the virtual memory palace.Anco Peeters & Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 76 (C):102834.details
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The semantic view of computation and the argument from the cognitive science practice.Alfredo Paternoster & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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Representation and explanation.David Papineau - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (December):550-72.details
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On Two Different Kinds of Computational Indeterminacy.Philippos Papayannopoulos, Nir Fresco & Oron Shagrir - 2022 - The Monist 105 (2):229-246.details
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Aristotelian Causation and Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Matthew Owen - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1-12.details
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Medicine’s metaphysical morass: how confusion about dualism threatens public health.Diane O’Leary - 2020 - Synthese 2020 (December):1977-2005.details
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Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties.Luis R. G. Oliveira & Timothy Perrine - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):1021-1038.details
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On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects.Alyssa Ney - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (55):399-410.details
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Neural mechanisms and functional realization: A reply to Hohwy.Joseph Neisser - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):693-694.details
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Mapping the mind: bridge laws and the psycho-neural interface.Marco J. Nathan & Guillermo Del Pinal - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2):637-657.details
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Physicalism, Truthmaking, and Levels of Reality: Prospects and Problems.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):473-482.details
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Multiple realization and compositional variation.Kevin Morris - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2593-2611.details
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Does functional reduction need bridge laws? A response to Marras.Kevin Morris - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):647-657.details
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Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism.Dwayne Moore - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.details
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Mental Causation, Autonomy and Action Theory.Dwayne Moore - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):53-73.details
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Causal Exclusion and Dependent Overdetermination.Dwayne Moore - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):319-335.details
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Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017.Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: Springer.details
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Emergence: logical, functional and dynamical. [REVIEW]Sandra D. Mitchell - 2012 - Synthese 185 (2):171-186.details
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Humean scientific explanation.Elizabeth Miller - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1311-1332.details
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Explanations in cognitive science: unification versus pluralism.Marcin Miłkowski & Mateusz Hohol - 2020 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 1):1-17.details
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Temporal Mental Qualities and Selective Attention.Michał Klincewicz - 2016 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 7 (2):11-24.details
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Physicalism and downward causation in psychology and the special sciences.Theo C. Meyering - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):181-202.details
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A Defense of Emergence.Jason Megill - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (4):597-615.details
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Evolving Concepts of Functional Localization.Joseph B. McCaffrey - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (5):e12914.details
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Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism.Ausonio Marras - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):275-304.details
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Materialism, functionalism, and supervenient qualia.Ausonio Marras - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):475-92.details
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How could you tell how grammars are represented?John C. Marshall - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):411-412.details
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Multiple Routes to Animal Consciousness: Constrained Multiple Realizability Rather Than Modest Identity Theory.Jon Mallatt & Todd E. Feinberg - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12:732336.details
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A Multiple Realization Thesis for Natural Kinds.Kevin Lynch - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):389-406.details
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The mind-body problem: An overview.Kirk Ludwig - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell. pp. 1-46.details
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On speculating across opaque barriers.Abe Lockman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):410-410.details
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Levels: Descriptive, Explanatory, and Ontological.Christian List - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):852-883.details
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Levels of grammatic representation: A tempest in a teapot.Michael R. Lipton - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):409-410.details
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What is cognitive about ‘plant cognition’?Jonny Lee - 2023 - Biology and Philosophy 38 (3):1-21.details
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Concepts are a functional kind. Comment on Machery's Doing Without Concepts.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):217-18.details
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On Quine’s Philosophy of Mind.Prashant Kumar - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):97-107.details
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Multiple Realization and Evolutionary Dynamics: A Fitness-Based Account.Graciela Kuechle & Diego Ríos - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):149-164.details
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Concrete consciousness: A Sartrean critique of functionalist accounts of mind.Joel W. Krueger - 2006 - Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.details
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Structure and Coherence of Two-Model-Descriptions of Technical Artefacts.Ulrich Krohs - 2009 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 13 (2):150-161.details
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