- Toolmaking and the Evolution of Normative Cognition.Jonathan Birch - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (1):1-26.details
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Self-expression: a deep self theory of moral responsibility.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1203-1232.details
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Which moral exemplars inspire prosociality?Hyemin han, Clifford Ian Workman, Joshua May, Payton Scholtens, Kelsie J. Dawson, Andrea L. Glenn & Peter Meindl - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (7):943-970.details
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Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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When Reasons Run Out.Jason Kay - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Moral Experience: Perception or Emotion?James Hutton - 2022 - Ethics 132 (3):570-597.details
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Future-Bias and Practical Reason.Tom Dougherty - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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Twenty years of experimental philosophy research.Jincai Li & Xiaozhen Zhu - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):29-53.details
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Debunking (the) Retribution (Gap).Steven R. Kraaijeveld - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (3):1315-1328.details
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(1 other version)Experimental moral philosophy.Mark Alfano, Don Loeb & Alex Plakias - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-32.details
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Moral perception.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1):e12640.details
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Reproducing Social Hierarchy.Sally Haslanger - 2021 - Philosophy of Education 77 (2):185-222.details
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How to Debunk Moral Beliefs.Victor Kumar & Joshua May - 2018 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 25-48.details
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Moral Reasoning and Moral Progress.Victor Kumar & Joshua May - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Moral Reasoning and Emotion.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 139-156.details
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The rat-a-gorical imperative: Moral intuition and the limits of affective learning.Joshua D. Greene - 2017 - Cognition 167 (C):66-77.details
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At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2707-2730.details
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Trusting Moral Intuitions.John Bengson, Terence Cuneo & Russ Shafer-Landau - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):956-984.details
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Morality as an Evolutionary Exaptation.Marcus Arvan - 2021 - In Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz (eds.), Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics. Synthese Library. Springer - Synthese Library. pp. 89-109.details
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(1 other version)Intellectualizing know how.Benjamin Elzinga - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-20.details
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Do Emotions Play a Constitutive Role in Moral Cognition?Bryce Huebner - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):427-440.details
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Self-Regulation and Knowledge How.Elzinga Benjamin - 2016 - Episteme 15 (1):119-140.details
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Emotion, deliberation, and the skill model of virtuous agency.Charlie Kurth - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (3):299-317.details
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Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition.Dario Cecchini - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):4-28.details
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(1 other version)Experimental Moral Philosophy.Mark Alfano & Don Loeb - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Tracking Eudaimonia.Paul Bloomfield - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (2).details
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Morality and Evolutionary Biology.William Fitzpatrick - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Psychopathy and internalism.Victor Kumar - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):318-345.details
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Are Intuitions Treated as Evidence? Cases from Political Philosophy.Sebastian J. Conte - 2022 - Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (4):411-433.details
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The Valuationist Model of Human Agent Architecture: What Is It, and Why Does It Matter for Philosophy?Chandra Sripada - manuscriptdetails
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Rationalization in Philosophical and Moral Thought.Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Ellis - 2017 - In Jean-François Bonnefon & Bastien Trémolière (eds.), Moral Inferences. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Cognitive Behavioural Virtue – how to Acquire Virtues.Jakob Ohlhorst - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.details
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Moral Sentimentalism.Antti Kauppinen - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment.Joshua May - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press. pp. 286-306.details
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Nietzschean Constructivism: Ethics and Metaethics for All and None.Alex Silk - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):244-280.details
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Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods.Francisco Gallegos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1497-1513.details
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In Search of Greene's Argument.Norbert Paulo - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (1):38-58.details
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Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology.Peter Königs - 2023 - Utilitas 35 (1):70-87.details
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Motor Skill and Moral Virtue.Ellen Fridland - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:139-170.details
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On the normative insignificance of neuroscience and dual-process theory.Peter Königs - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (2):195-209.details
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Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydneydetails
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Learning from moral inconsistency.Richmond Campbell - 2017 - Cognition 167:46-57.details
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Confabulating the Truth: In Defense of “Defensive” Moral Reasoning.Patricia Greenspan - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (2):105-123.details
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(1 other version)Intellectualizing know how.Benjamin Elzinga - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1741-1760.details
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Moral vindications.Victor Kumar - 2017 - Cognition 167 (C):124-134.details
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The mark of the moral: Beyond the sentimentalist turn.Frank Hindriks & Hanno Sauer - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):569-591.details
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Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize?Michael Zhao - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):693-709.details
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Rational intuitions: How reason underlies deontological moral judgments.Arjan S. Heir - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Sharing Values.Marcus Hedahl & Bryce Huebner - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (2):240-272.details
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