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  1. How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem.Nicholas Humphrey - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):5-20.
    The identity of conscious states and brain states must remain a mystery until we find a way of characterising both sides of the equation in terms that have the same ‘dimensions’. In this paper I stress the need for ‘dual currency concepts’ that not only are but can be seen to be as appropriate for talking about, say, the experience of pain as for talking about the corresponding working of the brain. In the light of evolutionary theory I make a (...)
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  • The Imperfect Observer: Mind, Machines, and Materialism in the 21st Century.Judith Donath - unknown
    The dualist / materialist debates about the nature of consciousness are based on the assumption that an entirely physical universe must ultimately be observable by humans (with infinitely advanced tools). Thus the dualists claim that anything unobservable must be non-physical, while the materialists argue that in theory nothing is unobservable. However, there may be fundamental limitations in the power of human observation, no matter how well aided, that greatly curtail our ability to know and observe even a fully physical universe. (...)
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  • The Co-Consciousness Hypothesis.F. de Vignemont - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):97-114.
    Self-knowledge seems to be radically different from the knowledge of other people. However, rather than focusing on the gap between self and others, we should emphasize their commonality. Indeed, different mirror matching mechanisms have been found in monkeys as well as in humans showing that one uses the same representations for oneself and for the others. But do these shared representations allow one to report the mental states of others as if they were one''s own? I intend in this essay (...)
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  • Framework of Consciousness From Semblance of Activity at Functionally LINKed Postsynaptic Membranes.Kunjumon I. Vadakkan - 2010 - Frontiers in Psychology 1.
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  • Synaesthesia: A Window Into Perception, Thought and Language.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Edward M. Hubbard - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (12):3-34.
    (1) The induced colours led to perceptual grouping and pop-out, (2) a grapheme rendered invisible through ‘crowding’ or lateral masking induced synaesthetic colours — a form of blindsight — and (3) peripherally presented graphemes did not induce colours even when they were clearly visible. Taken collectively, these and other experiments prove conclusively that synaesthesia is a genuine percep- tual phenomenon, not an effect based on memory associations from childhood or on vague metaphorical speech. We identify different subtypes of number–colour synaesthesia (...)
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  • Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.
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  • The Self and the SESMET.Galen Strawson - 2002 - In Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 99-135.
    Response to commentaries on keynote article.
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  • Is Consciousness a Spandrel?Zack Robinson, Corey J. Maley & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):365--383.
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  • Tactile Expectations and the Perception of Self-Touch: An Investigation Using the Rubber Hand Paradigm.Rebekah C. White, Anne M. Aimola Davies, Terri J. Halleen & Martin Davies - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):505-519.
    The rubber hand paradigm is used to create the illusion of self-touch, by having the participant administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner, with an identical stimulus , administers stimulation to the participant’s hand. With synchronous stimulation, participants experience the compelling illusion that they are touching their own hand. In the current study, the robustness of this illusion was assessed using incongruent stimuli. The participant used the index finger of the right hand to administer stimulation to a prosthetic (...)
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  • Speculations on the Emergence of Self-Awareness in Big-Brained Organisms: The Roles of Associative Memory and Learning, Existential and Religious Questions, and the Emergence of Tautologies.Emmanuel Tannenbaum - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):414-427.
    This paper argues that self-awareness emerges in organisms whose brains have a sufficiently integrated, complex ability for associative learning and memory. Continual sensory input of information related to the organism leads to the formation of a set of associations that may be termed an organismal “self-image”. After providing the basic mechanistic basis for the emergence of an organismal self-image, this paper proceeds to go through a representative list of behaviors associated with self-awareness, and shows how associative memory and learning, combined (...)
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  • Phenomenal and Access Consciousness in Olfaction.Richard J. Stevenson - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1004-1017.
    Contemporary literature on consciousness, with some exceptions, rarely considers the olfactory system. In this article the characteristics of olfactory consciousness, viewed from the standpoint of the phenomenal /access distinction, are examined relative to the major senses. The review details several qualitative differences in both olfactory P consciousness and A consciousness . The basis for these differences is argued to arise from the functions that the olfactory system performs and from the unique neural architecture needed to instantiate them. These data suggest, (...)
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