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  1. Jurisprudential Theories and First‐Order Legal Judgments.Kevin Toh - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):457-471.
    The nature of the relation between jurisprudential theories and first-order legal judgments is a strangely uncontroversial matter in contemporary legal philosophy. There is one dominant conception of the relation according to which jurisprudential theories are second-order or meta-legal theories that specify the ultimate grounds of first-order legal judgments. According to this conception, difficult first-order legal disputes are to be resolved by jurisprudential theorizing. According to an alternative conception that Ronald Dworkin has influentially advocated, jurisprudential theories are not second-order theories about (...)
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  • Methods and principles in biomedical ethics.T. L. Beauchamp - 2003 - Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (5):269-274.
    The four principles approach to medical ethics plus specification is used in this paper. Specification is defined as a process of reducing the indeterminateness of general norms to give them increased action guiding capacity, while retaining the moral commitments in the original norm. Since questions of method are central to the symposium, the paper begins with four observations about method in moral reasoning and case analysis. Three of the four scenarios are dealt with. It is concluded in the “standard” Jehovah’s (...)
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  • (1 other version)On the epistemic status of considered moral judgments.Mark Timmons - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):97-129.
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  • (1 other version)On the Epistemic Status of Considered Moral Judgments.Mark Timmons - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):97-129.
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  • Contractualism and the Significance of Perspective-Taking.Peter Timmerman - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):909-925.
    Many of us think that perspective-taking is relevant to moral judgment. In this paper I claim that Scanlon’s contractualism provides an appealing and distinctive account of why this is so. Contractualism interprets our moral judgments as making claims about the reasons of individuals in various situations, reasons that we can only recognise by considering their perspectives. Contractualism thereby commits itself to the view that our capacity for moral judgment depends on our capacity for perspective-taking. I show that neither utilitarianism nor (...)
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  • The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity and Stability.John Thrasher & Kevin Vallier - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):933-954.
    John Rawls's transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was driven by his rejection of Theory's account of stability. The key to his later account of stability is the idea of public reason. We see Rawls's account of stability as an attempt to solve a mutual assurance problem. We maintain that Rawls's solution fails because his primary assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, is fragile. His conception of public reason relies on a condition of consensus that (...)
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  • Constructivism, representation, and stability: path-dependence in public reason theories of justice.John Thrasher - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):429-450.
    Public reason theories are characterized by three conditions: constructivism, representation, and stability. Constructivism holds that justification does not rely on any antecedent moral or political values outside of the procedure of agreement. Representation holds that the reasons for the choice in the model must be rationally explicable to real agents outside the model. Stability holds that the principles chosen in the procedure should be stable upon reflection, especially in the face of diversity in a pluralistic society. Choice procedures that involve (...)
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  • Basic equality: A Hegelian resolution.Jonny Thakkar - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):507-531.
    Contemporary political philosophers often take for granted that for political purposes all humans are to be considered of equal worth. The difficulty, as Bernard Williams observed, is to find an interpretation of this claim that does not collapse into absurdity or triviality. I show that the principal attempts to solve this problem all beg the question against an Aristotelian proponent of natural hierarchy. I then explore existing proposals for dissolving the problem of basic equality, whether by denying the need for (...)
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  • The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience.Folke Tersman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.
    A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in certain (...)
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  • Recent work on reflective equilibrium and method in ethics.Folke Tersman - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12493.
    The idea of reflective equilibrium remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms or rather to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent objections are related to general arguments against the (...)
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  • The Role Played by the Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Moral Epistemology.Christine Swanton - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (4):575-.
    The method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium has been defended by Kai Nielsen as an exciting new development in the search for a device for increasing our ability to choose between competing moral conceptions. Nonetheless, this confidence will be seen as misplaced unless serious issues are resolved. Lack of clarity surrounds the questions: What is the claimed epistemological role for WRE? What version of WRE is to be employed? In this paper I resolve these ambiguities in a way which supports Kai (...)
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  • Theoretical and practical problems with wide reflective equilibrium in bioethics.Carson Strong - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (2):123-140.
    Various theories have been put forward in an attempt to explain what makes moral judgments justifiable. One of the main theories currently advocated in bioethics is a form of coherentism known as wide reflective equilibrium. In this paper, I argue that wide reflective equilibrium is not a satisfactory approach for justifying moral beliefs and propositions. A long-standing theoretical problem for reflective equilibrium has not been adequately resolved, and, as a result, the main arguments for wide reflective equilibrium are unsuccessful. Moreover, (...)
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  • Reflective equilibrium, analytic epistemology and the problem of cognitive diversity.Stephen Stich - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):391-413.
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  • Rationality and reflective equilibrium.Edward Stein - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):137-72.
    Cohen (1981) and others have made an interesting argument for the thesis that humans are rational: normative principles of reasoning and actual human reasoning ability cannot diverge because both are determined by the same process involving our intuitions about what constitutes good reasoning as a starting point. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this argument sees reflective equilibrium as the process that determines both what the norms of reasoning are and what actual cognitive competence is. In this essay, I will (...)
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  • Counterexamples in ethics.Steven Sverdlik - 1985 - Metaphilosophy 16 (2‐3):130-145.
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  • (2 other versions)Respecting Human Dignity: Contract versus Capabilities.Cynthia A. Stark - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):366-381.
    There appears to be a tension between two commitments in liberalism. The first is that citizens, as rational agents possessing dignity, are owed a justification for principles of justice. The second is that members of society who do not meet the requirements of rational agency are owed justice. These notions conflict because the first commitment is often expressed through the device of the social contract, which seems to confine the scope of justice to rational agents. So, contractarianism seems to ignore (...)
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  • Complex Justice for Complex Problems: Comments on Johannsen’s A Conceptual Investigation of Justice.Phil Smolenski - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (4):751-761.
    L’enquête conceptuelle sur la justice de Kyle Johannsen nous incite à considérer la justice comme une simple valeur, indépendante des exigences de la pratique. Dans ce qui suit, je soulève deux questions méthodologiques afin de déterminer si Johannsen fonctionne avec la compréhension ‘correcte’ de la justice et de le convaincre que des problèmes complexes, tels que ceux concernant la justice sociale, nécessitent que la justice soit comprise comme une valeur complexe. Ainsi, les contextualistes de la justice devraient embrasser la distinction (...)
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  • Digitising reflective equilibrium.Charlie Harry Smith - 2023 - Ethics and Information Technology 25 (3):1-12.
    Reflective equilibrium is overdue a twenty-first century update. Despite its apparent popularity, there is scant evidence that theorists ever thoroughly implement the method, and fewer still openly and transparently publish their attempts to do so in print—stymying its supposed justificatory value. This paper proposes digitising reflective equilibrium as a solution. Inspired by the global open science movement, it advocates for coupling a novel, digital implementation of the equilibrating process with new publication norms that can capitalise on the inherent reproducibility of (...)
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  • Should Doctors Offer Biomarker Testing to Those Afraid to Develop Alzheimer’s Dementia?: Applying the Method of Reflective Equilibrium for a Clinical Dilemma.Marthe Smedinga, Eline M. Bunnik, Edo Richard & Maartje H. N. Schermer - 2022 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 19 (2):287-297.
    An increasing number of people seek medical attention for mild cognitive symptoms at older age, worried that they might develop Alzheimer’s disease. Some clinical practice guidelines suggest offering biomarker testing in such cases, using a brain scan or a lumbar puncture, to improve diagnostic certainty about Alzheimer’s disease and enable an earlier diagnosis. Critics, on the other hand, point out that there is no effective Alzheimer treatment available and argue that biomarker tests lack clinical validity. The debate on the ethical (...)
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  • Henry Sidgwick’s Moral Epistemology.Anthony Skelton - 2010 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):491-519.
    In this essay I defend the view that Henry Sidgwick’s moral epistemology is a form of intuitionist foundationalism that grants common-sense morality no evidentiary role. In §1, I outline both the problematic of The Methods of Ethics and the main elements of its argument for utilitarianism. In §§2-4 I provide my interpretation of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology. In §§ 5-8 I refute rival interpretations, including the Rawlsian view that Sidgwick endorses some version of reflective equilibrium and the view that he is (...)
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  • (1 other version)20 Years of Moral Epistemology: A Bibliography.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):217-229.
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  • (1 other version)Além da Dicotomia Fato/Valor: Justificação e Legitimação.Denis Coitinho Silveira - 2013 - Trans/Form/Ação 36 (1):165-186.
    Meu principal objetivo, neste artigo, é analisar o problema da justificação moral para JohnRawls, caracterizando a teoria da justiça como equidade como um sistema coerentista de justificaçãoque conta com uma epistemologia coerentista holística, uma teoria do contrato social que introduzuma ontologia social e uma estratégia pragmatista de justificação na teoria contratualista. No escopodeste trabalho, examinarei o pressuposto pragmatista de justificação na teoria do contrato social, o qual faz uso do argumento da estabilidade social e legitimidade política para garantir a validade (...)
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  • Valuing ideal theory: Reflections on Virginia held's critique of Rawls.Sibyl Schwarzenbach - 1990 - Metaphilosophy 21 (1-2):162-178.
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  • A theory of probability should tutor our intuitions.Glenn Shafer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):508.
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  • Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?Kieran Setiya - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (1):205-222.
    Argues that the answer is yes. The epistemic assumptions of moral theory deprive us of resources needed to resist the challenge of moral disagreement, which its practice at the same time makes vivid. The paper ends by sketching a kind of epistemology that can respond to disagreement without skepticism: one in which the fundamental standards of justification for moral belief are biased toward the truth.
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  • Doing Moral Philosophy Without ‘Normativity’.Jorah Dannenberg - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-19.
    This essay challenges widespread talk about morality's ‘normativity’. My principal target is not any specific claim or thesis in the burgeoning literature on ‘normativity’, however. Rather, I aim to discourage the use of the word among moral philosophers altogether and to reject a claim to intradisciplinary authority that is both reflected in and reinforced by the role the word has come to play in the discipline. My hope is to persuade other philosophers who, like me, persist in being interested in (...)
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  • Moral facts and the problem of justification in ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):368 – 388.
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  • Moral intuitions and justification in ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):77 - 95.
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  • Against Metasemantics-First Moral Epistemology.Jesse Hambly & Shang Long Yeo - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-21.
    Moral metasemantic theories explain how our moral thought and talk are about certain properties. Given the connection between what our moral terms are about and which moral claims are true, it might be thought that metasemantic theorising can justify first-order ethical conclusions, thus providing a novel way of doing moral epistemology. In this paper, we spell out one kind of argument from metasemantic theories to normative ethical conclusions, and argue that it fails to transmit justification from premises to conclusion. We (...)
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  • The significance of skepticism.Taylor Madigan - 2024 - Ratio (1):26-37.
    There is a recurrent sort of skeptical character in philosophical debates who believes that some social practice must be abolished because it involves a false presupposition about how things ‘really’ are. I examine this style of skeptical argument, using the moral responsibility skeptic as my main illustration. I excavate two unstated and un-argued for premises that it requires (which I call Undistorted Truth and Privileged Conception). This exposes the full extent of the argumentative burdens that such a skeptic must discharge. (...)
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  • AI Language Models Cannot Replace Human Research Participants.Jacqueline Harding, William D’Alessandro, N. G. Laskowski & Robert Long - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-3.
    In a recent letter, Dillion et. al (2023) make various suggestions regarding the idea of artificially intelligent systems, such as large language models, replacing human subjects in empirical moral psychology. We argue that human subjects are in various ways indispensable.
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  • Reflective equilibrium and antitheory.François Schroeter - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):110–134.
    The paper clarifies what is at stake in the theory/antitheory debate in ethics and articulates the distinctive core of the method of reflective equilibrium which distinguishes it from a generic coherence constraint. I call this distinctive core 'maieutic reflection'. The paper then argues that if she accepts constructivist views in metaethics, a proponent of the method of reflective equilibrium will be committed to the existence of a moral theory.
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  • Observation and Intuition.Justin Clarke-Doane & Avner Ash - 2023 - In Carolin Antos, Neil Barton & Giorgio Venturi (eds.), The Palgrave Companion to the Philosophy of Set Theory. Palgrave.
    The motivating question of this paper is: ‘How are our beliefs in the theorems of mathematics justified?’ This is distinguished from the question ‘How are our mathematical beliefs reliably true?’ We examine an influential answer, outlined by Russell, championed by Gödel, and developed by those searching for new axioms to settle undecidables, that our mathematical beliefs are justified by ‘intuitions’, as our scientific beliefs are justified by observations. On this view, axioms are analogous to laws of nature. They are postulated (...)
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  • Can Social Reflective Equilibrium Delineate Cornell Realist Epistemology?Sushruth Ravish & Vikram Singh Sirola - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2015-2033.
    Cornell realism (CR), a prominent meta-ethical position that has emerged since the last decades of the twentieth century, proposes a non-reductionist naturalistic account of moral properties and facts. This paper argues that the best version of CR’s chosen methodology for arriving at justified moral beliefs must be seen as a variant of reflective equilibrium. In comparison to the traditional versions, our proposal offers a ‘social’ reinterpretation of reflective equilibrium in delineating CR’s epistemology. We argue that it satisfactorily accounts for objectivity (...)
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  • A New Interpretivist Metasemantics for Fundamental Legal Disagreements.François Schroeter, Laura Schroeter & Kevin Toh - 2020 - Legal Theory 26 (1):62-99.
    What does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what would best serve the core purposes of (...)
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  • Modern Moral Philosophy Before and After.Constantine Sandis - 2020 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 64:0039-62.
    This paper argues that there was considerably more philosophy of action in moral theory before 1958 (when Anscombe complained of its lack under the banner 'philosophy of psychology') than there has been since. This is in part because Anscombe influenced the formation of 'virtue theory' as yet another position within normative ethics, and her work contributed to the fashioning of 'moral psychology' as an altogether distinct (and now increasingly empirical) branch of moral philosophy.
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  • Dos propuestas para discutir sobre los derechos subjetivos.Juan Samuel Santos-Castro - 2022 - Las Torres de Lucca: Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política 11 (2):335-345.
    Es corriente invocar el lenguaje de los derechos para demandar justicia. Sin embargo, el uso irreflexivo de este lenguaje puede ser perjudicial. En este trabajo, presento dos argumentos en favor de una más atenta reflexión sobre el concepto de derecho subjetivo. Primero, uso la distinción entre el concepto y la concepción de una noción normativa para precisar cuál es la clase de investigación que la reflexión sobre el concepto de derecho implica y los problemas que trae ignorarla para las prácticas (...)
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  • A Transcendental Argument for the Concept of Personhood in Neuroscience.Mark Sagoff - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):72-73.
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  • Intuitions in 21st-Century Ethics: Why Ethical Intuitionism and Reflective Equilibrium Need Each Other.Ernesto V. Garcia - 2021 - In Discipline filosofiche XXXI 2 2021 ( L’intuizione e le sue forme. Prospettive e problemi dell’intuizionismo). pp. 275-296.
    In this paper, I attempt to synthesize the two most influential contemporary ethical approaches that appeal to moral intuitions, viz., Rawlsian reflective equilibrium and Audi’s moderate intuitionism. This paper has two parts. First, building upon the work of Audi and Gaut, I provide a more detailed and nuanced account of how these two approaches are compatible. Second, I show how this novel synthesis can both (1) fully address the main objections to reflective equilibrium, viz., that it provides neither necessary nor (...)
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  • The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.
    This paper is about how moral disagreement matters for metaethics. It has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the (...)
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  • The epistemology of moral disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
    This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement for our moral beliefs. Many have endorsed a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement according to which if we find ourselves in a disagreement about some matter with another whom we should judge to be our epistemic peer on that matter, we must revise our judgment about that matter. This article focuses on three issues about the implications of conciliationism for our moral (...)
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  • Political Philosophy's Methodological Moment and the Rise of Public Political Philosophy.Jonathan Floyd - 2022 - Society 59 (2):129-139.
    Political philosophy is having a methodological moment. Driven by long-standing frustrations at the fragmentation of our field, as well as recent urges to become more engaged with the ‘real’ world, there is now a boom in debates concerning the ‘true’ nature of our vocation. Yet how can this new work avoid simply recycling old rivalries under new labels? The key is to turn all this so-called methodological interest into a genuinely new programme of ‘methodology’, defined here as the careful identification (...)
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  • Some Question-Begging Objections to Rule Consequentialism.Caleb Perl - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):904-919.
    This paper defends views like rule consequentialism by distinguishing between two sorts of ideal world objections. It aims to show that one of those sorts of objections is question-begging. Its success would open up a path forward for such views.
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  • Being a World Unto One’s Self: A Phenomenal Consciousness Account of Full and Equal Moral Status.Rainer Ebert - 2022 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 5:179-202.
    According to a diverse and widely popular family of moral theories, there is a class of individuals – typically humans or persons – who have the very same, full moral status. Individuals not falling into that class count for less, or not at all, morally speaking. In this article, I identify two problems for such theories, the mapping problem and the problem of misgrounded value, and argue that they are serious enough to be decisive. I will then propose an alternative (...)
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  • Questioning moral theories.Amelie Rorty - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (1):29-46.
    Not a day passes but we find ourselves indignant about something or other. When is our indignation justified, and when does it count as moral indignation rather than a legitimate but non-moral gripe? You might think that we should turn to moral theories – to the varieties of utilitarian, Kantian, virtue theories, etc – to answer this question. I shall try to convince you that this is a mistake, that moral theory – as it is ordinarily presently conceived and studied (...)
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  • On public happiness.Vasti Roodt - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):455–467.
    Theories of happiness usually consider happiness as something that matters to us from a first-person perspective. In this paper, I defend a conception of public happiness that is distinct from private or first-person happiness. Public happiness is presented as a feature of the system of right that defines the political relationship between citizens, as opposed to their personal mental states, desires or well-being. I begin by outlining the main features of public happiness as an Enlightenment ideal. Next, I relate the (...)
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  • On the meta-ethical status of constructivism: Reflections on G.A. Cohen's `facts and principles'.Miriam Ronzoni & Laura Valentini - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (4):403-422.
    The Queen's College, Oxford, UK In his article `Facts and Principles', G.A. Cohen attempts to refute constructivist approaches to justification by showing that, contrary to what their proponents claim, fundamental normative principles are fact- in sensitive. We argue that Cohen's `fact-insensitivity thesis' does not provide a successful refutation of constructivism because it pertains to an area of meta-ethics which differs from the one tackled by constructivists. While Cohen's thesis concerns the logical structure of normative principles, constructivists ask how normative principles (...)
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  • Viewpoint Convergence as a Philosophical Defect.Grace Helton - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    What can we know? How should we live? What is there? Philosophers famously diverge in the answers they give to these and other philosophical questions. It is widely presumed that a lack of convergence on these questions suggests that philosophy is not progressing at all, is not progressing fast enough, or is not progressing as fast as other disciplines, such as the natural sciences. Call the view that ideal philosophical progress is marked by at least some degree of convergence on (...)
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  • Mathematics and Metaphilosophy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This book discusses the problem of mathematical knowledge, and its broader philosophical ramifications. It argues that the problem of explaining the (defeasible) justification of our mathematical beliefs (‘the justificatory challenge’), arises insofar as disagreement over axioms bottoms out in disagreement over intuitions. And it argues that the problem of explaining their reliability (‘the reliability challenge’), arises to the extent that we could have easily had different beliefs. The book shows that mathematical facts are not, in general, empirically accessible, contra Quine, (...)
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  • Beyond the Soul and Virtue: Benefit in Stoic Ethics.Yunlong Cao - 2021 - Undergraduate Philosophy Journal of Australasia 3:57-72.
    Readers of Stoic ethics may find ‘benefit’ (ōpheleia) an essential but enigmatic concept. It directly connects to some critical terms of Stoic ethics, such as ‘good’ and ‘virtue,’ but there is no extant discussion of a definition. Beyond the superficial connections, what makes ‘benefit’ beneficial? Why is benefit a good thing? I argue that these essential questions remain unanswerable for a good reason: Stobaeus committed to a specious claim about benefit in his Anthology, which has misguided later commentaries. Either the (...)
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