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  1. Aboutness and negative truths: a modest strategy for truthmaker theorists.Arthur Schipper - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3685-3722.
    A central problem for any truthmaker theory is the problem of negative truths. In this paper, I develop a novel, piecemeal strategy for solving this problem. The strategy puts central focus on a truth-relevant notion of aboutness within a metaphysically modest version of truthmaker theory and uses key conceptual tools gained by taking a deeper look at the best attempts to solve the problem of intentionality. I begin this task by critically discussing past proposed solutions to P-NEG in light of (...)
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  • David Armstrong on the Metaphysics of Mathematics.Thomas Donaldson - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (4):113-136.
    This paper has two components. The first, longer component (sec. 1-6) is a critical exposition of Armstrong’s views about the metaphysics of mathematics, as they are presented in Truth and Truthmakers and Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. In particular, I discuss Armstrong’s views about the nature of the cardinal numbers, and his account of how modal truths are made true. In the second component of the paper (sec. 7), which is shorter and more tentative, I sketch an alternative account of (...)
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  • Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox.Elke Brendel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1647-1660.
    According to truthmaker maximalism, each truth has a truthmaker. Peter Milne has attempted to refute truthmaker maximalism on mere logical grounds via the construction of a self-referential truthmaker sentence M “saying” of itself that it doesn’t have a truthmaker. Milne argues that M turns out to be a true sentence without a truthmaker and thus provides a counterexample to truthmaker maximalism. In this paper, I show that Milne’s refutation of truthmaker maximalism does not succeed. In particular, I argue that the (...)
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  • Necessity, a Leibnizian Thesis, and a Dialogical Semantics.Mohammad Shafiei - 2017 - South American Journal of Logic 3 (1):1-23.
    In this paper, an interpretation of "necessity", inspired by a Leibnizian idea and based on the method of dialogical logic, is introduced. The semantic rules corresponding to such an account of necessity are developed, and then some peculiarities, and some potential advantages, of the introduced dialogical explanation, in comparison with the customary explanation offered by the possible worlds semantics, are briefly discussed.
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