This paper seeks to show that Charles Sanders Peirce's interest in an evolutionary account of the laws of nature is motivated both by his desire to extend the scope of the application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and by his attempt to explain the success of our deployment of the PSR, which presupposes the existence of determinate causal structures. One can situate Peirce's concern with the explanation of the laws of nature in relation to the influences of Naturphilosophie (...) on Peirce. I then show that some strands of contemporary physics can be understood as resurrections of Peirce's evolutionary cosmology. I show that we can understand Lee Smolin's theory of "cosmological natural selection" as a version of Peirce's evolutionary cosmology that is characterized by greater refinement and determinacy. However I argue that, contrary to Smolin's claim, an evolutionary account of the laws of nature need not require the abandonment of the relativity of simultaneity as established by the special theory of relativity. I also argue that Lee Smolin and Roberto Unger's characterization of the "original state" in their account of evolutionary cosmology raises philosophical problems of individuation that are best approached from the perspective of Chinese process metaphysics. Finally I turn to the wider consequences of evolutionary cosmology in relation to how we traditionally "rank" fields of knowledge that deal with atemporal structures as "more rigorous" than fields that deal with historical phenomena. (shrink)

A systematic theory of naturalism, bridging metaphysics and the science of complexity and emergence.

In this paper, I elaborate affinities between Peirce, Spinoza and Royce, in order to illuminate the division between Peirce's and James's expressions of idealism. James contrasted Spinoza's and Royce's absolute idealism with his and Peirce's pluralistic idealism. I triangulate among Peirce, Spinoza and Royce to show that, contra James's view, Peirce himself was more at home in the absolutistic camp. In Section 2, I survey Peirce's discussions of Spinoza's pragmatism and of the divide within pragmatism Peirce perceived to obtain. In (...) Section 3, I elaborate two early twentieth-century accounts of the idealistic division within pragmatism, and James's criticisms of absolute idealism in Spinoza and Royce. In Section 4, we turn our attention to Peirce's discussions of the absolute, and to the role of the absolute and the infinite in the thought of Spinoza, Royce and James. In the classification of pragmatist idealisms, I argue, James stands on one side; Peirce stands on the other with Roy.. (shrink)

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric (...) subsumption, we obtain the means to track at which level of complexity semiosis finds itself, in a given case. Since the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing uninterpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies are largely misplaced. (shrink)

The question about divine action remains contested in the discussion between theology and science. This issue is further exacerbated with the entry of pentecostals and charismatics into the conversation, especially with their emphases on divine intervention and miracles. I explore what happens at the intersection of these discourses, identifying first how the concept of "laws of nature" has developed in theology and science and then probing what pentecostal-charismatic insights might add into the mix. Drawing from the triadic and evolutionary metaphysics (...) of Charles Sanders Peirce, I propose a reconsideration of the "laws of nature" as habitual, dynamic, and general but nevertheless real tendencies through which the Holy Spirit invites the world to inhabit the coming kingdom of God. This proposal contributes to the articulation of an authentic Pentecostal-charismatic witness at the theology-and-science table while also enabling a more plausible and coherent account of divine action for pentecostal-charismatic piety and Christian practice in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

I examine the current state of the debate on the metaphysics of science. In 1, I identify some of the main questions belonging to the MS, looking into the relationship between science and metaphysics. In 2, I expound the rise of the old wave in the MS, which endorses the belief that metaphysics is a guide to, or a heuristic for, science and outlines the stronger idea that metaphysics makes science possible. In 3, I examine the maximalist MS. This is (...) a contemporary revival of the old wave, reformulating the claim that metaphysics makes science possible. In 4, I look into the new wave in the MS, which argues that science is a guide to metaphysics and, more radically, that metaphysics is to be motivated by, and restricted to, science. In 5, I briefly introduce my own minimalist MS, which contends that science sets the epistemic, methodological and ontological criteria which should work as desiderata of the MS. I close this chapter in 6 with some concluding remarks. (shrink)

У статті розглядаються основні ідеї метафізики видатного американського логіка та філософа Чарльза Пірса. Показано, що значну частину його «наукової метафізики» становить еволюційна космологія, що характеризується, зокрема, істотною роллю випадковості у світі. Серед інноваційних ідей еволюційної космології вирізняється ідея хаотичного початку Універсуму. У статті показано, що ця ідея перегукується з деякими сучасними проблемами квантово-релятивістської космології, і насамперед із проблемами, як і раніше, популярної «інфляційної моделі», в якій ідея хаотичного початку еволюції Всесвіту є однією з центральних.Метою цієї статті є визначення низки паралелей (...) між «науковою метафізикою» Пірса та інфляційними космологічними моделями.Методом дослідження є проведення порівняльного аналізу сценарію еволюції Всесвіту з еволюційної космології Пірса – з одного боку, та сценарію еволюції Всесвіту в інфляційній моделі – з іншого боку, на основі виявлення загального елемента обох сценаріїв хаотичного початку еволюції Всесвіту. В результаті були виявлені зазначені вище паралелі.У першому підрозділі «Детермінізм та «наукова метафізика» Ч. Пірса» коротко відзначені ті філософські течії, які найбільше вплинули на формування та еволюцію поглядів Пірса. Розглянуто деякі загальні питання детермінізму як філософської течії про впорядкованість у світі. Зокрема, також розглянуто питання про співвідношення необхідності та випадковості у детермінізмі, а також трактування Пірса про співвідношення цих категорій. Докладно описано задум Пірса побудувати «наукову метафізику» як альтернативу її традиційним версіям.У другому підрозділі «Еволюційна космологія в «науковій метафізиці» Пірса» обговорюється зміст його еволюційної космології як найважливішої складової його «наукової метафізики». Акцент робиться на процесі еволюції Всесвіту від її початкового хаотичного стану. Ставиться питання про нетрадиційний стосовно механістичної картині світу підхід до природи випадковості. Суть нетрадиційного немеханістичного розуміння випадковості у процесі еволюції пов’язана з конструктивним її розумінням.Третій підрозділ «Тихізм Пірса та сучасна космологія» присвячений опису зв’язку «наукової метафізики» Пірса та сучасної квантово-релятивістської космології. Дається короткий опис еволюції сучасної квантово-релятивістської космології та становлення в її рамках інфляційних моделей. Також коротко дається її зміст та аналіз сценарію еволюції Всесвіту, починаючи з хаотичного стану.Знайдені паралелі сприятимуть поглибленню наукової картини світу, зокрема – прогресивному впливу конструктивного розуміння випадковості, особливо в еволюційних процесах.У такому контексті представлені паралелі здійснені, наскільки нам відомо, вперше як у вітчизняній, так і в зарубіжній літературі. (shrink)

This paper examines the metaphysical status of the fact-value entanglement. According to Hilary Putnam, among others, this is a major theme in both classical and recent pragmatism, but its relevance obviously extends beyond pragmatism scholarship. The pragmatic naturalist must make sense of the entanglement thesis within a broadly non-reductively naturalist account of reality. Two rival options for such metaphysics are discussed: values may be claimed to emerge from facts (or normativity from factuality), or fact and value may be considered continuous. (...) Thus, pragmatic naturalism about fact and value may be based on either emergentism or Peircean synechism. This is a crucial tension not only in pragmatist philosophy of value but in pragmatically naturalist metaphysics generally. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to explain why Charles Sanders Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics would not have seemed strange to its original 1890s audience. Building on the pioneering work of Andrew Reynolds, I will excavate the scientific context of Peirce’s Monist articles—in particular “The Law of Mind” and “Man’s Glassy Essence,” both published in 1892—focusing on the relationship between protoplasm, evolution, and consciousness. I argue that Peirce’s discussions should be understood in the context of contemporary evolutionary and physiological speculations, many of (...) which were featured in late- 1880s issues of Open Court, sister journal to the Monist. (shrink)

The first part of this essay provides an analysis of the text “The Law of Mind”, in which Peirce theorizes about the power of growth and spreading of ideas and also presents his response to the classic question about how mind can influence matter. We intended to show, from an analysis focused on the dual semantic meaning of the word “ affect ”, how the author’s rupture with the Cartesian dualism between mind and matter implies in a substantial identity between (...) ideality and reality by means of a metaphysical merging of realism and idealism, where matter is taken to be only a special case of mind . The second part shows how the forms of evolutionism are drawn from the three categories, highlighting the agapism, the doctrine of cosmic and creative love. Finally, we shall argue on how the association between realism and idealism, as well as the considerations of the author’s evolutionism, constitute vital aspects for the justification of the historical success of our human capacity for conjecturing, viz., for proposing successful hypothesis to explain the facts. (shrink)

Peircean Truth is the view that truth is in some sense epistemically constrained, constrained that is by what we would, if we inquired long enough and well enough, eventually come to believe. Contemporary Peirceans offer various different formulations of the view, which can make it difficult, particularly for critics, to see exactly how PT differs from popular alternatives such as correspondence theories or deflationism. This article, therefore, considers four possible formulations of PT, and sets out the different objections and challenges (...) they each face and their relationships with one another. I focus upon the question of what, if anything, PT has to say about the property of truth. (shrink)

Much recent philosophy of physics has investigated the process of symmetry breaking. Here, I critically assess the alleged symmetry restoration at the fundamental scale. I draw attention to the contingency that gauge symmetries exhibit, that is, the fact that they have been chosen from an infinite space of possibilities. I appeal to this feature of group theory to argue that any metaphysical account of fundamental laws that expects symmetry restoration up to the fundamental level is not fully satisfactory. This is (...) a symmetry argument in line with Curie’s first principle. Further, I argue that this same feature of group theory helps to explain the ‘unreasonable’ effectiveness of mathematics in physics, and that it reduces the philosophical significance that has been attributed to the objectivity of gauge symmetries. (shrink)

The problem of unifying knowledge represents the frontier between science and philosophy. Science approaches the problem analytically bottom-up whereas, prior to the end of the nineteenth century, philosophy approached the problem synthetically top-down. In the late nineteenth century, the approach of speculative metaphysics was rejected outright by science. Unfortunately, in the rush for science to break with speculative metaphysics, synthetic or top-down philosophy as a whole was rejected. This meant not only the rejection of speculative metaphysics, but also the implicit (...) rejection of empirically-led synthetic philosophy and the philosophy of nature. Since a change in the paradigm of science requires a change in the philosophy of nature underpinning science, the rejection of the philosophy of nature closes science to the possibility of a paradigm change. Given the foundational problems faced by science, there is a need for empirically-led synthetic philosophy in order to discover a new empirically-based philosophy of nature. Such a philosophy of nature may open science to the possibility of a paradigm change. (shrink)