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  1. Zombies are people, too.Drew McDermott - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):617-618.
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  • Constituent causation and the reality of mind.Georges Rey - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):620-621.
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  • Aspects and algorithms.Andy Clark - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):601-602.
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  • Unconscious mental processes.Clark Glymour - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):606-607.
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  • “Consciousness” is the name of a nonentity.Deborah Hodgkin & Alasdair I. Houston - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):611-612.
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  • Consciousness and accessibility.Ned Block - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):596-598.
    This is my first publication of the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though not using quite those terms. It ends with this: "The upshot is this: If Searle is using the access sense of "consciousness," his argument doesn't get to first base. If, as is more likely, he intends the what-it-is-like sense, his argument depends on assumptions about issues that the cognitivist is bound to regard as deeply unsettled empirical questions." Searle replies: "He refers to what he calls (...)
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  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • Is the mind conscious, functional, or both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
    What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to (...)
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  • Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
    Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is (...)
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
    Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that (...)
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  • How AI Systems Can Be Blameworthy.Hannah Altehenger, Leonhard Menges & Peter Schulte - 2024 - Philosophia (4):1-24.
    AI systems, like self-driving cars, healthcare robots, or Autonomous Weapon Systems, already play an increasingly important role in our lives and will do so to an even greater extent in the near future. This raises a fundamental philosophical question: who is morally responsible when such systems cause unjustified harm? In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising claim that some of these systems can themselves be morally responsible for their conduct in an important and everyday sense of the term—the (...)
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  • The Problem of Pancomputationalism: Focusing on Three Related Arguments.SeongSoo Park - 2020 - Journal of Cognitive Science 21 (2):349-369.
    Pancomputationalism is the view that everything is a computer. This, if true, poses some difficulties to the computational theory of cognition. In particular, the strongest version of it suggested by John Searle seems enough to trivialize computational cognitivists’ core idea on which our cognitive system is a computing system. The aim of this paper is to argue against Searle’s pancomputationalism. To achieve this, I will draw a line between realized computers and unrealized computers. Through this distinction, I expect that it (...)
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  • Do Computers "Have Syntax, But No Semantics"?Jaroslav Peregrin - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (2):305-321.
    The heyday of discussions initiated by Searle's claim that computers have syntax, but no semantics has now past, yet philosophers and scientists still tend to frame their views on artificial intelligence in terms of syntax and semantics. In this paper I do not intend to take part in these discussions; my aim is more fundamental, viz. to ask what claims about syntax and semantics in this context can mean in the first place. And I argue that their sense is so (...)
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  • (1 other version)Turingův test: filozofické aspekty umělé inteligence.Filip Tvrdý - 2011 - Dissertation, Palacky University
    Disertační práce se zabývá problematikou připisování myšlení jiným entitám, a to pomocí imitační hry navržené v roce 1950 britským filosofem Alanem Turingem. Jeho kritérium, známé v dějinách filosofie jako Turingův test, je podrobeno detailní analýze. Práce popisuje nejen původní námitky samotného Turinga, ale především pozdější diskuse v druhé polovině 20. století. Největší pozornost je věnována těmto kritikám: Lucasova matematická námitka využívající Gödelovu větu o neúplnosti, Searlův argument čínského pokoje konstatující nedostatečnost syntaxe pro sémantiku, Blockův návrh na použití brutální síly pro (...)
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  • Minds, Brains and Programs: An Information-theoretic Approach.Reza Maleeh - 2015 - Mind and Matter 13 (1):71-103.
    Adopting the notion of “pragmatic information” as interpreted by Roederer and granted that understanding arises from genuine information processing, I show that Searle’s “Chinese Room Argument” in rejecting the thesis of Strong Artificial Intelligence and his responses to critics are sound and acceptable. The paper is a safe and secure translation of Searle’s argument into a language of information. According to the notion of information that I adopt, information and information processing are exclusive attributes of biological and artificial systems. However, (...)
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  • Animal Automatism and Machine Intelligence.Deborah Brown - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (1):93-115.
    Descartes’s uncompromising rejection of the possibility of animal intelligence was among his most controversial theses. That rejection is based on (1) his commitment to the doctrine of animal automatism and (2) two tests that he takes to be sufficient indicators of thought (the action and language tests). Of these two tests, only the language test is truly definitive, and Descartes is firmly of the view that no animal could demonstrate the capacity to use signs to convey meaning in “all the (...)
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  • Conscious mental episodes and skill acquisition.Richard A. Carlson - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):599-599.
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  • Somebody flew over Searle's ontological prison.Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):618-619.
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  • Unconscious mental states do have an aspectual shape.Howard Shevrin - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):624-625.
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  • Consciousness, historical inversion, and cognitive science.Andrew W. Young - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):630-631.
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  • Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.
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  • Who is computing with the brain?John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):632-642.
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  • Does cognitive science need “real” intentionality?Robert J. Matthews - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):616-617.
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  • When functions are causes.Jonathan Schull - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):622-624.
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  • (Even Higher-Order) Intentionality Without Consciousness.Georges Rey - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1 (1):51-78.
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  • Intention itself will disappear when its mechanisms are known.Bruce Bridgeman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):598-599.
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  • Language and the deep unconscious mind: Aspectualities of the theory of syntax.B. Elan Dresher & Norbert Hornstein - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):602-603.
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  • Searle's vision of psychology.James Higginbotham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):608-610.
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  • Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room.Jason Ford - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):57-72.
    William Rapaport, in “How Helen Keller used syntactic semantics to escape from a Chinese Room,” (Rapaport 2006), argues that Helen Keller was in a sort of Chinese Room, and that her subsequent development of natural language fluency illustrates the flaws in Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument and provides a method for developing computers that have genuine semantics (and intentionality). I contend that his argument fails. In setting the problem, Rapaport uses his own preferred definitions of semantics and syntax, but he (...)
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  • Chinese Rooms and Program Portability.Mark D. Sprevak - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):755-776.
    I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle's Chinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention. The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church-Turing thesis. Searle assumes that the Church-Turing thesis licences the assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. I argue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. A number of possible objections are considered and rejected. My conclusion is that it is consistent with Searle's argument to hold (...)
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  • Searle's Freudian slip.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):603-604.
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  • Accessibility “in principle”.Noam Chomsky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):600-601.
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  • Are machines radically contextualist?Ryan M. Nefdt - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):750-771.
    In this article, I describe a novel position on the semantics of artificial intelligence. I present a problem for the current artificial neural networks used in machine learning, specifically with relation to natural language tasks. I then propose that from a metasemantic level, meaning in machines can best be interpreted as radically contextualist. Finally, I consider what this might mean for human‐level semantic competence from a comparative perspective.
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  • Artificial intelligence and personal identity.David Cole - 1991 - Synthese 88 (3):399-417.
    Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that (...)
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  • Loose connections: Four problems in Searie's argument for the “Connection Principle”.Dan Lloyd - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):615-616.
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  • Fear and loathing (and other intentional states) in Searle's chinese room.Dale Jacquette - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):287-304.
    John R. Searle's problem of the Chinese Room poses an important philosophical challenge to the foundations of strong artificial intelligence, and functionalist, cognitivist, and computationalist theories of mind. Searle has recently responded to three categories of criticisms of the Chinese Room and the consequences he attempts to conclude from it, redescribing the essential features of the problem, and offering new arguments about the syntax-semantics gap it is intended to demonstrate. Despite Searle's defense, the Chinese Room remains ineffective as a counterexample, (...)
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  • Conscious and unconscious representation of aspectual shape in cognitive science.Geoffrey Underwood - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):628-629.
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  • Is The Connectionist-Logicist Debate One of AI's Wonderful Red Herrings?Selmer Bringsjord - 1991 - Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 3:319-49.
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  • Intentionality: Some distinctions.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):607-608.
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  • Is Searle conscious?John C. Kulli - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-614.
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  • Unintended thought and nonconscious inferences exist.James S. Uleman & Jennifer K. Uleman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):627-628.
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  • Searle's abstract argument against strong AI.Andrew Melnyk - 1996 - Synthese 108 (3):391-419.
    Discussion of Searle's case against strong AI has usually focused upon his Chinese Room thought-experiment. In this paper, however, I expound and then try to refute what I call his abstract argument against strong AI, an argument which turns upon quite general considerations concerning programs, syntax, and semantics, and which seems not to depend on intuitions about the Chinese Room. I claim that this argument fails, since it assumes one particular account of what a program is. I suggest an alternative (...)
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  • On being accessible to consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):621-621.
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  • Ontogeny and intentionality.Philip David Zelazo & J. Steven Reznick - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):631-632.
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  • Consciousness as physiological self-organizing process.Walter J. Freeman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):604-605.
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  • Matter, levels, and consciousness.Jerry R. Hobbs - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):610-611.
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  • On doing research on consciousness without being aware of it.Daniel Holender - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):612-614.
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  • The ability versus intentionality aspects of unconscious mental processes.Maria Czyzewska, Thomas Hill & Pawel Lewicki - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):602-602.
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  • The causal capacities of linguistic rules.Alice ter Meulen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):626-627.
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  • The neurophysiology of consicousness and the unconscious.Christine A. Skarda - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):625-626.
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