This paper discusses the fallacies of combination and division as they are presented by Aristotle in chapter 4 of his Sophistici Elenchi. Aristotle's examples are concise, their discussion is unclear, and it is difficult to distinguish the cases of combination from those of division. I analyse the Aristotelian examples and the interpretations offered so far. I show that these interpretations suffer from a major defect: they fail to identify a common characteristic whereby the Aristotelian examples can be classified as instances (...) of combination or division. In my reconstruction of the examples, I repair this deficiency: I give a single pattern of explanation for the fallacy of combination and another (similar) pattern for the fallacy of division. Thus, it is possible to free Aristotle from the following charges: (i) he did not clearly distinguish between combination and division, and (ii) he reduced combination and division to a single fallacy. My explanation of the fallacies uses the notion of scope of an expression: in modern terminology, the fallacy of combination can be described as ?fallacy of the wide scope?, the fallacy of division as ?fallacy of the narrow scope? (shrink)

Väitetään, että nykypäivän populismi vetoaa tosiasioiden sijasta ”kokemukseen”. Mutta mitä on kokemus? Se ei ole vain ennakkoluuloihin nojautuvaa mutua eikä myöskään pelkkää empiirisen datan rekisteröintiä mutta liittyy molempiin. Artikkelin luoma tiivis katsaus kokemuksen käsitehistorian pääpiirteisiin osoittaa, että länsimaisen filosofian perinteessä kokemus on ymmärretty ohittamattomana vaiheena tiedon hankkimisessa ja koettelemisessa. Toisaalta kokemukseen on liitetty tiettyjä tiedollisia heikkouksia – kontingenssi, tilannesidonnaisuus ja ennakoimattomuus – jotka tieteellinen metodi on eri tavoin pyrkinyt voittamaan. Artikkeli esittää, että 1900-luvun filosofinen hermeneutiikka irrottautuu tästä perinteisestä kokemuksen välineellistämisestä (...) ja alistamisesta korkeammille päämäärille ja keskittyy uudella ja hedelmällisellä tavalla juuri mainittuihin kokemuksen ”vaaroihin”. Hermeneuttisesti ymmärretty kokemus muodostuu äärellisen ihmisen ainutkertaisista kohtaamisista todellisuuden muuttuvan ja ehtymättömän mielekkyyden kanssa – omalle ymmärrykselle vieraan toiseuden ja samalla oman ymmärryksen äärellisyyden ja inhimillisen äärellisyyden kohtaamisesta. (shrink)

This paper aims to single out and to highlight the fundamental tenets of Agricola’s De inuentione dialectica. After the structure of the volume, its theoretical perspective and its educational concern are illustrated, Agricola’s understanding of the fundamental notion of locus is expounded. In this relation his particular use of the medieval term habitudo and the exclusion of maxims, which had been the main concern of the Medieval doctrine of loci, show a certain distance from the Medieval tradition. Several innovative and (...) constructive contributions of Agricola’s work are stressed, in particular the elaboration of a new taxonomy of loci and the discovery of the relevant role played by loci not only in argumentation but also in exposition and in explanation. In this way, loci acquire the status of intentiones secundae, i.e. of meta-categorical concepts which govern the connections ensuring textual congruity. A reading of this text in the light of contemporary argumentation theory reveals a surprising topicality and richness of concrete contributions in some dialectical and rhetorical domains, like argument schemes, topical potential, and presentational techniques. (shrink)

I claim that, in the Topics, Aristotle advises dialectical questioners to intentionally argue fallaciously in order to escape from some dialectically awkward positions, and I work through the consequences of that claim. It will turn out that, although there are important exceptions, the techniques for finding arguments described in Topics I–VII are, by and large, locations that Aristotle thought of as appropriate for use in philosophical inquiry. The text that grounds this claim, however, raises a further problem: it highlights the (...) solitary nature of philosophical inquiry, which puts into question the philosophical relevance of Topics VIII. I find that the Topics provides inadequate grounds for thinking that Aristotle saw Topics VIII as describing standards or techniques of argument that were appropriate for philosophy, and so these texts cannot be used by contemporary commentators to shed light on Aristotle's philosophical practice. Finally, although Aristotle saw philosophy as a solitary activity, he th.. (shrink)

In chapter 8 of the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle claims that his theory of fallacy is complete in the sense that there cannot be more fallacies than the ones he lists. In this article I try to explain how Aristotle could have justified this completeness claim by analysing how he conceptualizes fallacies (dialectical mistakes which do not appear so) and what conceptual ingredients play a role in his discussion of fallacies. If we take the format of dialectical discussions into account, we (...) will see that there are only so many mistakes one can make which still do not appear to be mistakes. Aristotle’s actual list is almost identical to these apparent mistakes. (shrink)

Antiphasis is a case of core-dependent homonymy, and has three significations in Aristotle's philosophy: antiphasis as an opposition between propositions ; antiphasis as the opposition between ‘subject’ and ‘not a subject’ in coming-to-be and perishing ; and antiphasis as the opposition between possession and privation . Argument based on the fifth type of priority described in Cat. 12 shows that, for Aristotle, the ontological significations are prior to the propositional.

This article is intended to examine the structure and scope of the argumentation drawn in Metaphysics Γ 4, 1006a18-b34. As we shall see, though this passage does not bring a complete proof of the Principle of Non-Contradiction, it corresponds to its first step, which consists in determining the conditions of meaning necessary for discourse. That passage encloses in nuce the reasons which underlie Aristotelian conviction con- cerning the conventional nature of names and also brings to light the way this conven- (...) tional nature of names must be understood according to Aristotle. (shrink)