In recent years, online “involuntary celibate” or “incel” communities have been linked to various deadly attacks targeting women. Why do these men react to romantic rejection with not just disappointment, but murderous rage? Feminists have claimed this is because incels desire women as objects or, alternatively, because they feel entitled to women’s attention. I argue that both of these explanatory models are insufficient. They fail to account for incels’ distinctive ambivalence toward women—for their oscillation between obsessive desire and violent hatred. (...) I propose instead that what incels want is a Beauvoirian “Other.” For Beauvoir, when men conceive of women as Others, they represent them as simultaneously human subjects and embodiments of the natural world. Women function then as sui generis entities through which men can experience themselves as praiseworthy heroes, regardless of the quality of their actions. I go on to give an illustrative analysis of Elliot Rodger’s autobiographical manifesto, “My Twisted World.” I show how this Beauvoirian model sheds light on Rodger’s racist and classist attitudes and gives us a better understanding of his ambivalence toward women. It therefore constitutes a powerful and overlooked theoretical alternative to accounts centered on objectification and entitlement. (shrink)

At the end of 2017, Kristen Roupenian’s short story, Cat Person, went viral. Published at the height of the #MeToo movement, it depicted a ‘toxic date’ and a disturbing sexual encounter between Margot, a college student, and Robert, an older man she meets at work. The story was widely viewed as a relatable denunciation of women’s powerlessness and routine victimization. In this paper, I push against this common reading. I propose an alternative feminist interpretation through the lens of Simone de (...) Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism: a form of alienation that consists in making oneself both the subject and the ultimate project of one’s life. Framing Margot as a narcissist casts her as engaging, not in subtly coerced, undesired sex, but rather in sex that is desired in a tragically alienated way. I argue that Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism is an important tool for feminists today – well beyond the interpretation of Cat Person. It presses us to see systematic subordination not just as something done to women, but also as something women do to themselves. This in turn highlights the neglected role of self-transformation as a key aspect of feminist political resistance. (shrink)

Hume once argued the basic science to be not physics but “the science of man” and the foundation of this science to be the empiricist mechanism of association governed by the law of similarity in appearance—now more popular than ever in the form of artificial neural networks. I update Hume’s picture by showing phenomenology to be centrally concerned with providing a unifying basis for all the sciences (including physics) by going beyond the psychology of associationism (passive synthesis) to reveal phenomena (...) that are irreducibly syntactic (not associative) in structure. I therefore argue that the language of thought (LOT) is the necessary mechanism at the basis of these descriptive phenomena. I conclude by sketching a new picture of all the sciences unified by LOT based on Husserl’s opposition to Galilean “physicomathematical” science vis-à-vis the life-world (Lebenswelt). (shrink)

The idea that women qua women can be dehumanized has been dismissed by feminist philosophers, like Kate Manne, and by philosophers of dehumanization, like David Livingstone Smith. Against these skeptics, I argue that we can and should use dehumanization to explain an important strand of misogyny. When they are dehumanized, women are represented simultaneously as human and as inhuman embodiments of the natural world. They therefore appear as magical, contaminating, sexualized threats towards whom violence is acceptable or even necessary. Misogynistic (...) dehumanization is important to understanding atrocities like the early modern European witch-hunts, but also contemporary phenomena like incel violence. (shrink)

Aesthetic hedonism is the view that to be aesthetically good is to please. For most aesthetic hedonists, aesthetic normativity is hedonic normativity. This paper argues that Kant’s third Critique contains resources for a nonhedonic account of aesthetic normativity as sourced in autonomy as self-legislation. A case is made that the account is also Kant’s because it ties his aesthetics into a key theme of his larger philosophy.

One of the key insights of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is the idea that gender-based subordination is not just something done to women, but also something women do to themselves. This raises a question about ethical responsibility: if women are complicit, or actively implicated in their own oppression, are they at fault? Recent Beauvoir scholarship remains divided on this point. Here, I argue that Beauvoir did, in fact, ethically criticize many women for their complicity, as a sign of (...) what she called “bad faith”. I challenge recent accounts by Nancy Bauer and Manon Garcia, who both read Beauvoir as exonerating complicit women. According to this reading, women emerge as human “freedoms” within a social world where a “destiny” of inferiority is already prepared for them. Their self-subordination is then an inevitable product of acting in a patriarchal world. I argue, however, that this interpretation generates a crucial tension, leading Bauer and Garcia to call on women to stop being complicit, while also claiming they cannot avoid complicity. I propose instead a different interpretation, on which feminine complicity is often fueled by criticizable ethical attitudes that are far from inevitable. By revisiting Beauvoir’s notion of “bad faith”, I show that this account is compatible with recognizing the limitations imposed on women’s agency and I show that this feminist ethical criticism is itself an important part of a collective project of social transformation. (shrink)

This essay examines the possibility that phenomenological laws might be implemented by a computational mechanism by carefully analyzing key passages from the Prolegomena to Pure Logic. Part I examines the famous Denkmaschine passage as evidence for the view that intuitions of evidence are causally produced by computational means. Part II connects the less famous criticism of Avenarius & Mach on thought-economy with Husserl's 1891 essay 'On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic).' Husserl is shown to reaffirm his earlier opposition to associationist (...) (Humean) and adaptationist (Darwinian) explanations of our thought-machine on the ground that they cannot reconstruct the notion of truth and its syntactic mental preservation in symbolic thought-trains. Part III reveals Husserl's interesting commitment to the idea that descriptive sciences necessarily transform into explanatory sciences on pain of contradicting the essence of science as a rational ideal. Since explanation in relation to phenomenology means causal explanation, and causal explanation in the form of the Denkmaschine accounts for phenomenological intuition, it is inferred that the rationally compelling ideal of explanatory science requires a computationalist reading of the subsequent logical investigations. (shrink)

One question that leads us into aesthetics is: why does beauty matter? Or, what do aesthetic goods bring to my life, to make it a life that goes well? Or, how does beauty deserve the place we have evidently made for it in our lives? A theory of aesthetic value states what beauty is so as to equip us to answer this question. According to aesthetic hedonism, aesthetic values are properties of items that stand in constitutive relation to pleasure. Contemporary (...) versions of aesthetic hedonism don’t explain what makes aesthetic values aesthetic, but they do explain what makes them normative, stating what makes it the case that aesthetic value facts lend weight to what an agent should do, for the fact that acting yields pleasure is always a reason to act. This book introduces and defends an alternative to aesthetic hedonism. According to the network theory, aesthetic value facts lend weight to its being an achievement for an agent to act. Since agents achieve by acting in coordination with one another, the theory takes seriously the sociality of aesthetic activity. The main argument for the network theory is that it better explains six facts about aesthetic activity than does aesthetic hedonism. The book also discusses the relationship between aesthetic value and pleasure, the point and distinctive character of aesthetic discourse, and the metaphysics of aesthetic value. Two final chapters use the network theory to shed light on how aesthetic value matters to us as individuals and as members of collectives. (shrink)

This paper addresses the following problem: to what extent do ontological considerations about musical works affect our evaluation of performances of those works? I argue for the claim that at least some important grounds on which performances are evaluated are specific to them, in that these grounds are either independent from, or related but not fully determined by, the properties of the works they are of. In the first part of the paper, I explore the relations between good-making features of (...) works and of performances of them. The second and third parts develop two kinds of example in favour of the claim above. In the last part, I discuss the significance of those examples in relation to the ways in which performances are assessed, and explore some further ramifications of them. (shrink)

De uma perspectiva comportamentalista radical, o eu é um repertório verbal complexo, que, como tal, tem uma gênese social. O reconhecimento da origem social do “eu” abre caminho para uma análise política, incluindo uma discussão do pa- pel das relações de poder na constituição do eu. Entretanto, uma concepção radicalmente social do “eu”, como a proposta pelo comportamentalismo, suscita um problema político: se o eu é integralmente produto do ambiente social, de onde viria uma eventual “vontade” de romper com esse (...) sistema? Parece que para reconhecer a possibilidade de ação política transformadora seria preciso preservar uma noção descontextualizada de “eu”. Considerando essa dificuldade, o objetivo deste artigo é propor uma interpretação política da constituição do “eu” no âmbito do comportamentalismo radical, mantendo no horizonte a possibilidade de uma ação política transformadora. Para tanto, destacamos como “eus” oprimidos são tornados submissos, mas também como de certas contingências podem emergir “eus” subversivos, que se opõem a um sistema social opressivo. Esse “eu” subversivo é caracterizado por um repertório de autoconhecimento mais amplo, que inclui a discriminação do papel das relações de poder e do controle promovido por instituições. Concluímos, com isso, que um “eu” socialmente constituído pode ser politicamente ativo. (shrink)

Este artigo aborda as principais teorias sobre a natureza metafísica das obras de arte, cobrindo as propostas eliminativistas, monistas e pluralistas. Entre estas últimas, é dado destaque ao trabalho sobre a ontologia das artes performativas, e em particular, da música. Termina-se com uma referência à recente viragem da discussão para o campo da meta-ontologia e a polémica sobre a plausibilidade do revisionismo ontológico no caso de artefactos ou objectos sociais.

The aim of this paper is, firstly, to present some reasons why source criticism is a particularly promising methodological approach when applied to Nietzsche’s work. Starting from a first taxonomy, devoted to the various methodological approaches in the history of philosophy, I argue that source criticism is particularly well suited to dealing with Nietzsche’s work, due to the enthymematic nature of the ways he presents his arguments as well as to the nature of some of his substantive philosophical commitments (such (...) as ethical perfectionism and descriptive fictionalism). Next, I propose a second taxonomy, which classifies the variety of connections Nietzsche establishes with his philosophical sources: spiritual affinity, programmatic commitment and instrumental appropriation. (shrink)

O artigo parte do consenso sobre a facto de que a arte tem valor para a exploração dos vários problemas sobre esse valor cujas soluções dividem os filósofos da arte. O enfoque é especialmente sobre a dimensão mais actual do debate em torno do tema, que se debruça não tanto sobre questões como o realismo quanto aos valores estéticos e a objectividade e justificação dos juízos de valor estético, mas acima de tudo sobre a natureza do valor artístico – que (...) tipo de valor é e em que propriedades da arte (se nalguma) reside. (shrink)

Nietzsche on the Banishment of Supererogation by Luther and its Influence on Modern Ethical Life and Moral Theorizing. Much attention has been paid to Nietzsche’s refusal of obligation-centred moral theories (such as Kantian deontology and Utilitarian consequentialism), but little or no attention to the historical roots of such conceptions. The aim of this paper is to explore the ways Nietzsche connects the Kantian version of legal moral theory to the Lutheran Reformation, taking as its leitmotif the exclusion by Luther of (...) the so-called supererogation (the ideal of a Christian perfect life of sainthood being the most evident case) from the horizon of our ethical life (see D 88; GS 355; NL 1884, 25[271]). After establishing this historical connection, we are better positioned to understand the motivation behind his rejection of legal moral theories, particularly the Kantian version. This also allows us to shed new light on the contemporary attempts to characterize Nietzsche’s much-discussed perfectionist normative commitments. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo é uma homenagem à trajetória de André Itaparica na pesquisa Nietzsche brasileira. Feita de um ponto de vista sobretudo pessoal, esta homenagem não poderia deixar de mencionar algumas das virtudes que se sobressaem em seu trabalho e que no meu entendimento conferem exemplaridade às suas contribuições para os estudos Nietzsche no Brasil. Entre essas virtudes destaco por fim a gentileza, que curiosamente não costuma figurar no catálogo das virtudes intelectuais. O trabalho de André Itaparica é um convite (...) para que essa negligência seja revista.: This paper pays tribute to André Itaparica’s career in the Brazilian Nietzsche research. Written mostly from a personal point of view, this homage couldn’t fail to mention the many virtues embodied by his scholarly work, which in my view place it in an outstanding position in the Brazilian Nietzsche studies. Among his many virtues I finally emphasize courtesy, which remains largely unnoticed as an intellectual virtue. Itaparica’s work invites us, I submit, to compensate this undeserved neglect. (shrink)

The paper addresses the issue of ethical obligations in the performance of musical works in the Western classical tradition, arguing that there are indeed such obligations, although they are not categorical. -/- PT: Na tradição clássica ocidental, as obras de arte musicais, teatrais e, até certo ponto, as coreografias, são criadas por artistas-autores, mas necessitam de ser executadas por intérpretes (instrumentistas, cantores e maestros, actores e encenadores, bailarinos, etc.). Estes são assim chamados porque existe sempre uma dose de descricionariedade, não (...) só nas suas decisões sobre o que as instruções inscritas na notação por parte do autor querem "realmente" dizer, como ainda acerca dos muitos aspectos necessária ou voluntariamente deixados em aberto por ele. Limitando-nos aos casos em que é evidente ou relativamente claro que o autor favorece, directamente ou por via das convenções artísticas por si tacitamente aceites, uma forma de interpretação da sua obra entre outras, debruço-me sobre a questão de saber se, para além das considerações estéticas integrantes da decisão de respeitar total ou parcialmente essa forma, há também considerações especificamente morais que sejam relevantes para tal decisão. Os tratamentos filosóficos desta questão tiveram alguma expressão nos anos 80 e 90, sobretudo a propósito do movimento da interpretação musical historicamente correcta ou informada de obras de épocas com as quais se estava a recuperar o contacto perdido em termos de modos de execução e instrumentos específicos dessas épocas. Curiosamente, contrastando com o debate entre a crítica de arte, o debate filosófico é muito menos vivo numa actualidade marcada pelo ecletismo pós-moderno que, sobretudo no teatro e na ópera, trata mesmo os aspectos mais estruturantes das obras como completamente opcionais, ou as obras elas as próprias como materiais para fusão, reconstrução ou improvisação. Revisitando os argumentos em torno do tópico, defenderei a prevalência da posição segundo a qual há uma dimensão moral nas artes performativas, mas que as obrigações daí resultantes não são todas categóricas, tendo diferentes graus de força, e devem ser entendidas como uma variável que tem de ser, em cada caso, ponderada lado a lado com as considerações estéticas. (shrink)

This paper is divided into three sections. The purpose of the first section is to show how the search for an alternative conception of practical normativity by contemporary moral philosophers keeps affinities with Nietzsche's attempt to overcome morality in the nineteenth century. In the second section, I assess the merits and limitations of Brobjer's attempt to affiliate Nietzsche with the ancient Greek tradition of virtue ethics. In the third section, I present the different motivations behind Nietzsche's critique of the moral (...) conception of practical normativity. I claim that this diversity of motivations makes his position unstable and helps us to explain why he oscillates between the consequentialist and the non-consequentialist view of perfectionism. Although I do not discuss it exhaustively in this paper, I point out some reasons why Nietzsche should have advocated a non-consequentialist view of perfectionism. (shrink)

For a long time philosophers have struggled to reach a definition of knowledge that is fully satisfactory from an intuitive standard. However, what could be so fuzzy about the concept of knowledge that it makes our intuitions to not obviously support a single analysis? One particular approach from a naturalistic perspective treats this question from the point of view of the psychology of concepts. According to it, this failure is explained by the structure of our folk concept of knowledge, which (...) organizes its constitutive information in a much looser way than we assume when we rely on intuitive knowledge ascriptions. I will adopt the same starting point here, but argue against the proposed answer and defend the view that this difficulty is explained not by something related to the specific structure of our concept of knowledge but, on the contrary, by its lack of structure. I claim that our folk concept of knowledge should be understood as a primitive mental state concept. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to identify the kind of Amoralism Nietzsche is arguing for in his writings of the middle period. In the first part of the paper, I focus on the presuppositions as well as on the motivation underlying this version of the amoralist position. Nietzsche diagnoses a normative conflict between intellectual integrity and the metaphysical presuppositions of our moral vocabulary and practices. This diagnosis leads him to the conclusion that we should reform a substantive part of our (...) moral intuitions. However, this first critique of morality, one that we could label an internal critique, is not all that Nietzsche has to say about normativity, even if we consider only the works of the middle period. According to my interpretation, Nietzsche is committed to a position that could be described as normative Minimalism. By developing this position, Nietzsche was clearly influenced by Montaigne´s reception of both Epicureanism and Pyrrhonism. The kind of human life Nietzsche associated with this position is identified by him with the life of the free spirits, conceived as both a genuine heir and an emulator of the ascetic types made possible by the Christian culture, paradigmatically exemplified by Pascal and the French Jansenists. In the second part of this paper, I contrast this kind of normative Minimalism with Nietzsche´s defence of Perfectionism in his later works. I conclude my paper by calling attention to some argumentative advantages of normative Minimalism and to some argumentative difficulties that Perfectionism cannot preclude (from a genuine Nietzschean perspective). (shrink)

The representations of deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are formed from generalizing similarities and abstracting from differences in the manner of the empiricist theory of abstraction (Buckner, Synthese 195:5339–5372, 2018). The empiricist theory of abstraction is well understood to entail infinite regress and circularity in content constitution (Husserl, Logical Investigations. Routledge, 2001). This paper argues these entailments hold a fortiori for deep CNNs. Two theses result: deep CNNs require supplementation by Quine’s “apparatus of identity and quantification” in order to (1) (...) achieve concepts, and (2) represent objects, as opposed to “half-entities” corresponding to similarity amalgams (Quine, Quintessence, Cambridge, 2004, p. 107). Similarity amalgams are also called “approximate meaning[s]” (Marcus & Davis, Rebooting AI, Pantheon, 2019, p. 132). Although Husserl inferred the “complete abandonment of the empiricist theory of abstraction” (a fortiori deep CNNs) due to the infinite regress and circularity arguments examined in this paper, I argue that the statistical learning of deep CNNs may be incorporated into a Fodorian hybrid account that supports Quine’s “sortal predicates, negation, plurals, identity, pronouns, and quantifiers” which are representationally necessary to overcome the regress/circularity in content constitution and achieve objective (as opposed to similarity-subjective) representation (Burge, Origins of Objectivity. Oxford, 2010, p. 238). I base myself initially on Yoshimi’s (New Frontiers in Psychology, 2011) attempt to explain Husserlian phenomenology with neural networks but depart from him due to the arguments and consequently propose a two-system view which converges with Weiskopf’s proposal (“Observational Concepts.” The Conceptual Mind. MIT, 2015. 223–248). (shrink)

Nietzsche mobiliza recursos retóricos de natureza heterogênea em sua obra, que podem ser distribuídos em pelo menos quatro grandes rubricas: elementos que (1) incidem sobre a materialidade sonora e rítmica da linguagem (dimensão expressiva associada à prova ética); (2) orientam a adoção de um conjunto de estratégias argumentativas que variam conforme as necessidades filosóficas do momento (dimensão argumentativa ou dialética); (3) dizem respeito a escolhas relativas à forma de apresentação dos argumentos, ou à sua inserção no interior de diferentes gêneros (...) literários (aqui vale a tese do pluralismo defendida por Nehamas, pois Nietzsche explora as potencialidades de diferentes formas de apresentação para as suas ideias, sendo a principal delas um gênero híbrido que incorpora elementos do aforismo e do ensaio); finalmente, (4) retomam aspectos relativos à invenção (dimensão heurística do paradigma indiciário, com a valorização da inferência abdutiva). Neste artigo pretendo mostrar, através de uma caracterização sumária da prática discursiva de Nietzsche, assim como de uma rápida retomada de sua tematização da retórica, como essas diversas dimensões (expressiva, inventiva, argumentativa e expositiva) se integram em seu projeto filosófico, tornando-se uma parte constitutiva do mesmo. Essa leitura se contrapõe a uma tradição que nega relevância filosófica à dimensão retórica da obra de Nietzsche, relegando-a a uma suposta dimensão exotérica de seus escritos. Há formas implícitas e explícitas pelas quais um intérprete pode chegar a esse resultado. Dentre as formas implícitas de contornar o desafio retórico posto pela filosofia de Nietzsche, a mais célebre é a de Heidegger. Ela se funda em sua decisão filologicamente controversa, no limite indefensável, de conferir primazia aos póstumos em detrimento dos livros publicados pelo filósofo, que deveriam, segundo ele, ser tomados como fachada. Paul de Man representa a forma explícita dessa recusa, mas com resultados curiosamente próximos aos de Heidegger, ainda que movido por intenções filosóficas distintas. No presente ensaio recuso ambas as estratégias de evasão e procuro mostrar que os diversos aspectos retóricos presentes na obra de Nietzsche se integram de forma relativamente harmônica ao seu projeto filosófico de cunho perfeccionista. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the way in which Pascal reacts to Montaigne’s attempt of recovering the ancient conception of philosophy as a way of life by reworking certain elements he borrowed from the sceptical tradition will have a considerable impact on the similar philosophical project Nietzsche tries to develop in his so-called middle period works (section III of this paper). Nietzsche’s starting point is the diagnosis that the crisis of Christianity in Early Modern Europe did (...) not make room for the development of a contemplative life emancipated from religious illusions. Instead of that, it was followed by the degradation, not to say the complete suppression of contemplative life and the immersion in modern activism (see CS 359, BGE 58). The trilogy Nietzsche dedicated to the Free Spirits is an attempt to directly counteract this tendency and regain a non-religious sense of contemplative life in the most unlikely context of the bourgeois society of the second half of the Nineteenth Century. I intend to show that by the time of publishing Daybreak, Pascal becomes his most stimulating opponent. Before doing it, I reconstruct the way Montaigne receives and transforms the heritage of ancient scepticism (section I) and, thereafter, I proceed to investigate how Pascal reacts to the revival of ancient scepticism, putting special emphasis on the way he tries to undermine the ideal of a contemplative life freed from the tutelage of Christianity, a philosophical project which had in Montagne its most consequent representative (section II). (shrink)

This article aims to investigate the extent to which Abel’s insertion in the debate on scepticism and naturalism in the Anglophone philosophical tradition, especially in the historical Strawson-Stroud debate on the success of transcendental arguments in response to the sceptical challenge, allows the creation of a conceptual scheme which refuses both the conventionalist and the naturalist position in regard to our conceptual schemas, while at the same time seeking to differentiate itself from the apriorism of the Kantian tradition. Although I (...) acknowledge that interpretationism offers a new solution to the issues involved in this debate, I argue that this solution is unable to deliver everything it promises. This new conceptual space is not determined enough to pacify scepticism. I conclude by suggesting that the attempt to reconcile Nietzsche and Wittgenstein introduces instability in Abel’s interpretation. The reformist impulse of Nietzsche’s philosophy rests on the results of a preliminary naturalistic stage (genealogical inquiry) which neither Wittgenstein nor Abel seems willing to incorporate into their philosophies. (shrink)

This is the first of a series of papers in which I present a defense of moderate objectivism about the evaluation of performances of musical works in the Western classical tradition.

An approach to the semantics of fiction that uses the tools of truth relativism provides an alternative to Meinongian and pretence-based approaches. The approach is consistent with the deep motivations of John Wood's Truth in Fiction.

This paper compares Nietzsche ́s views on the relationship between philosophical reflection and empirical sciences against the background of some of the debates in the so-called transcendental tradition, in order to characterize his position in terms of a liberal kind of methodological naturalism. Initially, it will be shown that there are some similarities between the debates in the German academic philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century and the Postquinean contemporary debates on naturalism. I discuss subsequently F. A. (...) Lange ́s historical views concerning the emergence of methodical discipline within the materialistic tradition, as well as Nietzsche ́s reception of them. Next, I present Spir ́s arguments against the naturalizing programs of his time, as well as Nietzsche ́s response to him. In the last section, I discuss the meaning of Nietzsche ́s orientation to a speculative philosophy of the will to power in his late works and whether it is compatible or not with his more liberal conception of naturalism mainly supported in his middle period works. (shrink)

Os projetos de psicologia científica enfrentam pelo menos duas ameaças. A primeira delas surge quando uma proposta de psicologia tenta seguir os cânones da ciência moderna. Nesse caso, torna-se necessário "objetivar o fenômeno psicológico", o que, geralmente, é feito por meio da sua tradução em termos fisiológicos. Mas, nesse ponto, a especificidade da psicologia é ameaçada pelo reducionismo fisiológico. A segunda ameaça aparece quando um projeto de psicologia tenta evitar o reducionismo fisiológico defendendo a natureza subjetiva irredutível do fenômeno psicológico. (...) No entanto, isso coloca uma série de dificuldades metodológicas. Dessa maneira, a segunda ameaça às propostas de psicologia científica é o mentalismo, que impõe limitações ao emprego do método científico. O presente ensaio tem o objetivo de mostrar como o projeto de psicologia científica de Tolman pode ser visto como uma alternativa a essas duas ameaças. Em primeiro lugar, examinamos em que medida a concepção de comportamento como fenômeno molar afasta Tolman do reducionismo fisiológico. Em seguida, analisamos algumas dificuldades decorrentes dessa proposta, em especial, as limitações inerentes à epistemologia realista - adotada inicialmente por Tolman. Por fim, apresentamos a proposta tolmaniana de superação dessas dificuldades: trata-se da analogia entre teorias científicas e mapas, que revela a adoção de uma epistemologia instrumentalista por Tolman. (shrink)

Ziel meines Aufsatzes ist es, die Frage zu stellen, ob die Art und Weise, wie Nietzsche sich auf das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft bezieht, mithilfe des zeitgenössischen methodologischen Naturalismus beschrieben werden kann. Leiter (2009) hat diese Frage mit einem entschiedenen Ja beantwortet, ohne jedoch die Spannungen, die eine solche Antwort mit sich bringen, ausführlich zu diskutieren. Zumindest aus zwei Gründen scheint die Philosophie Nietzsches sich mit der stärkeren Version des methodologischen Naturalismus nicht so leicht in Einklang bringen zu lassen: (...) Erstens aufgrund des Prinzips des Willens zur Macht, das die These impliziert, dass das Intentionalitätsvokabular primitiver bzw. gründlicher als das physikalistische Vokabular sei, als einer Konsequenz aus der Verwendung des pragmatischen Prinzips der Sparsamkeit auf die ontologische Debatte (JGB 36, KSA 5, 54 f.); zweitens aufgrund Nietzsches Auffassung der spezifischen Aufgabe der Philosophie als einer normativen Aufgabe (JGB 211, KSA 5, 144 f.; GM I Anmerkung, KSA 5, 289). Gegen die starke Interpretation Leiters werden hier die folgenden Thesen vertreten: Nietzsche kann nur insofern als ein Vertreter des methodologischen Naturalismus betrachtet werden, als er der Auffassung ist, dass der Philosoph epistemische Tugenden erst dann gewinnt, wenn er sich mit einer wissenschaftlichen Methode vertraut macht (MA I 256, KSA 2, 212). Das bedeutet, dass er sich zumindest vorläufig den Regeln unterwirft, die innerhalb einer bestimmten wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft gelten (MA I 635, KSA 2, 360 f.; JGB 188, KSA 5, 108 ff.). Der Philosoph soll dies tun, um die epistemischen Tugenden zu erlangen, die für die normative Aufgabe der Philosophie unentbehrlich sind. Diese epistemischen Tugenden sind wesentlich skeptischer Natur. Sie zu kultivieren, bedeutet sicherlich, epistemische Werte zu fördern, nicht aber unbedingt für sie (AC 54, KSA 6, 236 f.), geschweige denn für ein kausales, bzw. monokausales Erklärungsmodell Exklusivität beanspruchen zu müssen (JGB 21, KSA 5, 35 f.). (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to display and debate the main interpretive and philosophical claims defended by Simon Robertson in his Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics. Robertson presents innovative and stimulating arguments that might interest primarily readers willing to better understand the Nietzschean moral theory and researchers interested in broader issues of contemporary moral theory, particularly in the analytic tradition. The author covers the main debates in the area, taking sides in disputes going on in normative theory, metaethics, moral (...) psychology and Nietzschean studies. Robertson mobilizes a set of interpretive and (purely) philosophical arguments, which deliver to the reader a final picture of Nietzsche’s perfectionist ideal. It is a theoretically consistent ideal that can be endorsed as a relevant alternative in the contemporary landscape of ethical theories. This alternative involves a powerful critique of the normative authority of morality, a sentimentalist moral psychology, a conception of the good life that combines the goods of excellence and flourishing, a modest conception of normativity that brings together internalist and externalist elements, and, finally, an irrealist metaethics that differs both from realism (which presupposes ontologically robust normative properties)and from reformist views (such as fictionalism and non-cognitivism). The article reconstructs Robertson's main arguments in favour of this set of claims, seeking to assess (1) to what extent they are convincing, both in their philosophical and interpretive ambitions and (2) how capable his methodological choices are to address critical challenges. (shrink)

Yoshimi has attempted to defuse my argument concerning the identification of network abstraction with empiricist abstraction - thus entailing psychologism - by claiming that the argument does not generalize from the example of simple feed-forward networks. I show that the particular details of networks are logically irrelevant to the nature of the abstractive process they employ. This is ultimately because deep artificial neural networks (ANNs) and dynamical systems theory applied to the mind (DST) are both associationisms - that is, empiricist (...) theories that derive the principles of thought from the causal history of the organism/system. On this basis, I put forward a new aspect of the old argument by noting that ANNs & DST are the causal bases of the phenomena of passive synthesis, whereas the language of thought hypothesis (LOT) and the symbolic computational theory of mind (CTM) are the causal bases of the phenomena of active synthesis. If the phenomena of active synthesis are not distinct in kind from and are thus reducible to those of passive synthesis, psychologism results. Yoshimi’s program, insofar as it denies this fundamental phenomenological distinction, is revealed to be the true anti-pluralist program, by essentially denying the causal efficacy of the mechanistic foundations of active synthesis by referring phenomenology exclusively to associationism for its causal foundation. (shrink)

Aesthetic preferences and practices vary widely between individuals and between cultures. How should aesthetics proceed if we take this fact of aesthetic diversity, rather than the presumption of aesthetic universality, as our starting point? How should we theorize the cultural origins and cultural basis of aesthetic diversity? How should we think about the value and normativity of aesthetic diversity? In an effort to model what the turn toward diversity might look like in aesthetic inquiry, each author defends a different account (...) of aesthetic diversity, and they engage in a collective dialogue about these issues. (shrink)

This paper discusses two theses about Plato that Nietzsche defends in his lectures on the Athenian philosopher offered by him at the University of Basel during the 1870s. Nietzsche’s first claim concerns Plato’s philosophy: relying on Aristotle, Nietzsche holds that Plato was initially brought to a metaphysically motivated version of scepticism as a result of his affiliation to the Cratilian interpretation of Heraclitus. Although the Socratic method of defining and testing concepts as well as its metaphysical complement, the theory of (...) Forms, has allowed Plato to overcome this kind of metaphysically motivated scepticism, Nietzsche argues that such an overcoming is only provisional if one needs to accept the authenticity of Parmenides, then the arguments displayed in this later dialogue lead to a sceptical conclusion regarding the theory of Forms. The second claim advanced by Nietzsche in his lectures concerns Plato’s philosophical character, which is identified with the figures of the legislator and the political reformer. According to Nietzsche, all of Plato’s philosophical commitments must ultimately be interpreted in the light of his political project, for here there is no place for scepticism anymore. (shrink)

O presente texto tem por simples objectivo o comentário sistemático ao capítulo 2 do Livro V da Metafísica de Aristóteles, onde o autor apresenta uma sistematização sobre o chamado modelo das quatro causas. Teremos também no horizonte de análise o famoso capítulo 3 do Livro I do mesmo tratado, onde Aristóteles inicia a crítica à tradição precedente justamente à luz deste modelo de causalidade. O objectivo é apenas comentar e esclarecer o texto original, cujas hesitantes formulações podem levantar alguns obstáculos (...) de interpretação. (shrink)

Embora não o desenvolva na exposição que se segue, o argumento subjacente à minha contribuição para este volume é bastante simples: há duas vias pelas quais a filosofia de Nietzsche pode contribuir positivamente para uma revisão do modo como os seres humanos no ocidente definiram sua relação com o não humano: (1) a primeira via é a agonística – a tese agonística pode ser mobilizada para combater o viés especista que caracteriza boa parte da reflexão normativa do ocidente sem que (...) isso nos comprometa com a suposição de que é possível abandonar o perspectivismo em sua versão forte (a tese segundo a qual nossos esquemas conceituais e perceptuais, ou o fato de pertencermos a uma mesma história natural, nos aprisionam na perspectiva da espécie humana). O agonismo é uma posição filosófica que recusa a supremacia absoluta de uma formação de domínio como um arranjo prejudicial à própria formação de domínio; (2) a segunda via é a da filosofia da afirmação incondicional do acaso ou da necessidade, como Nietzsche se expressa alternativamente. Esta via comporta uma dimensão religiosa, por mais chocante que isso possa parecer a ouvidos nietzschianos. Nesta perspectiva da afirmação incondicional, todas as forças atuantes são igualmente afirmadas e a perspectiva normativa preservada minimamente na abordagem agonística é como que suprimida e toda tensão dissolvida. Segundo minha interpretação, a filosofia afirmativa defendida por Nietzsche exige uma política da reconciliação que vai além da perspectiva agonística. Ela representa a superação da visão moral de mundo na sua forma mais drástica: com um dizer sim até mesmo à perspectiva do último homem. Mas é justamente aí que as coisas começam a assumir ares dramáticos, pois Nietzsche reconhece que esta perspectiva não pode ser facilmente aceita em suas diversas implicações. Embora as duas vias que acabamos de mencionar possam inspirar legitimamente o projeto de uma revisão do antropocentrismo que caracterizou a reflexão normativa no ocidente, é necessário reconhecer que alguns traços do pensamento nietzschiano tornam esta tarefa de revisão altamente improvável. Uma vez assumida, a segunda via exigiria, por exemplo, a supressão de um dos traços centrais da personalidade filosófica de Nietzsche. Refiro-me a seu incansável ativismo em prol da autossuperação dos tipos mais elevados da humanidade. Esta dificuldade revela uma das facetas mais importantes da filosofia de Nietzsche, que consiste em seu compromisso com uma forma depurada de humanismo; um compromisso radical, que não pode ser ignorado por seus leitores. Esta forma depurada de humanismo fornece a autorização teórica para o lado sombrio da utopia nietzschiana: seu flerte com a noção de uma história planificada e de uma administração global da terra, como forma de promover o cultivo dos homens de exceção. Este lado sombrio da utopia nietzschiana pode ser descrito como um desdobramento consequencialista de sua ética perfeccionista, e está na origem das derivações políticas que o filósofo alemão extrai deste compromisso ético. Penso que isso justifique a expressão hiperbólica utilizada no título de minha contribuição: “A catástrofe do humanismo”. Sempre que esta modalidade de humanismo depurado prevalece na reflexão de Nietzsche, a única voz perceptível nesta que é a mais polifônica das escritas filosóficas é a voz do ativista militando em prol dos homens de exceção. Quando esse tipo de engajamento prevalece, não é possível discernir nenhuma contribuição especificamente nietzschiana ao tema em torno do qual nos propusemos a refletir nesta coletânea: nestas ocasiões Nietzsche permanece indubitavelmente no interior de uma tradição que confere exclusividade ao humano em sua reflexão normativa. (shrink)

This article considers two alternative responses to the question of the motivation behind the suspensive argumentation developed by the Pyrrhonic version of the ancient scepticism and also shows their respective difficulties: a) the therapeutic motivation, that takes the suspension of assent for the condition to reach not only a state of mental tranquillity concerning matters of opinion but also a moderate attitude towards passions; b) the epistemic motivation, which states that the suspension corresponds to the unique possibility to preserve philosophical (...) life in the absence of rational criteria to decide among competing philosophical theories. The latter kind of motivation, which consists in creating propitious conditions for the search for the truth, has nothing to do with the methodic motivation characterizing the modern reception of ancient scepticism. Although this motivation was not present in the Pyrrhonic scepticism, it could not be unknown to the academic sceptics because of their Socratic origins. (shrink)

Images are double agents. They receive information from the world, while also projecting visual imagination onto the world. As a result, mind and world tug our thinking about images, or particular kinds of images, in contrary directions. On one common division, world traces itself mechanically in photographs, whereas mind expresses itself through painting.1 Scholars of photography disavow such crude distinctions: much recent writing attends in detail to the materials and processes of photography, the agency of photographic artists, and the social (...) determinants of the production and reception of photographs. As such writing makes plain, photographs cannot be reduced to mechanical traces.2 Yet background conceptions of photography as trace or index persist almost by default, as no framework of comparable explanatory power has yet emerged to replace them. A conception of photography adequate to developments in recent scholarship is long overdue. Rather than constructing such a conception top-down, as philosophers are wont to do, this paper articulates it by examining selected works by James Welling.3 There are several reasons for this: Welling’s practice persistently explores the resources and possibilities of photography, the effect of these explorations is to express a particular metaphysics of the mind’s relation to its world, and appreciating why this metaphysics is aptly expressed by exploring photography requires a revised conception of what photography is. In as much as it provides a framework for a richer interpretation of Welling, the new conception is also capable of underwriting a wide range of critical and historical approaches to photography. (shrink)

This essay is a thorough critique of Regieoper and related contemporary modes of opera production that make radical deviations from the intended plot, setting, etc. of the work as conceived by its author(s).

Nota do tradutor: O escopo da psicologia é o primeiro capítulo do tratado The principles of psychology (Os princípios de psicologia) de William James (1842-1910), publicado originalmente em 1890. Nesse capítulo inaugural, James enfrenta uma questão central e perene na psicologia: a necessidade (e dificuldade) da demarcação do campo psicológico. Como representante de uma tradição que ainda falava da psicologia no singular, James vê na multiplicidade de assuntos, métodos e problemas da psicologia um desafio para uma disciplina que se pretendia (...) científica. De um lado, era necessário assumir o caráter plural dos assuntos que merecem ser agrupados pela palavra psicologia, negando um reducionismo grosseiro, que, em favor de uma integração teórica, alijasse a “vida mental” de sua riqueza imanente. De outro lado, havia ainda a esperança de uma sistematização que pudesse evitar a completa fragmentação do campo psicológico. A história parece ter mostrado que a preocupação de James era, de fato, legítima, pois o que se viu a partir do século XX foi o fracasso de diferentes sistemas de psicologia, levando a um círculo vicioso no qual a dificuldade de demarcação do campo psicológico fragmenta cada vez mais a psicologia, o que, por sua vez, torna ainda mais distante a possibilidade de se encontrar critérios que possam sistematizar toda essa diversidade. Nesse sentido, O escopo da psicologia não é apenas uma introdução ao livro Os princípios de psicologia, mas uma introdução à psicologia moderna. (shrink)

Ziel meines Beitrages ist die These zu vertreten, dass das Triebmodell Nietzsches durch eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem schopenhauerianischen Prinzip des Willens zum Leben entwickelt wurde. Dieses Modell lässt sich als einen durchgehenden Versuch interpretieren, mit den begrifflichen Schwierigkeiten der Willensmetaphysik Schopenhauers umzugehen, die Nietzsche bereits im Jahre 1868 in der Leipziger Aufzeichnungen identifiziert hat. Was Nietzsche für besonderes verwerflich an dem Projekt Schopenhauers einer post-Kantischen Metaphysik hält, das ist im Wesentliche die Tatsache, dass er bei Durchführung dieses Projektes den alten (...) Dualismus von Leib und Seele durch einen neuen Dualismus, der Dualismus von Willen und Vorstellung, bzw. Willen und Verstand ersetzt hat. Der neue Dualismus Schopenhauers resultiert aus einer Reform unseres vorreflexiven Willensbegriffes. Bei dieser Reform habe Schopenhauer, so Nietzsche, die intentionale Qualität des Wollens „heraus subtrahirt“, so dass was „er ‚Wille‘ nennt“ „ein blosses leeres Wort“ sei (KSA, 13, 14[121], S. 301). Noch wichtiger als die Pluralität ist in Nietzsches Augen die Intentionalität, die als ein wesentliches Merkmal des Willensbegriffes gilt. Wollen und Vorstellen sind nicht ‚losgetrennt zu denken‘; von Wollen zu reden „ohne von vornherein einen Intellekt anzunehmen, der sich vorstellen konnte was man will“ macht keinen Sinn, weil „einen solchen Willen in’s Blaue (oder in’s Dasein!) giebt es nicht“ (KSA, 9, 4[310], S. 178). Das Triebmodell Nietzsches ist eine begriffliche Entfaltung dieser prinzipiellen Nicht-Übereinstimmung. Während Schopenhauer seine Willensmetaphysik aus dem Modell des Begehrens konzipiert, dem zufolge „wir werden durch unsere Begierden gelenkt: nicht durch unsere nützlichen und vernünftigen Interessen, geschweige durch unsere Tugend und Weisheit“ (KSA, 9, 5[27], S. 187), hat Nietzsche sich entschieden, „sich der Analogie des Menschen zu Ende [zu] bedienen“ (KSA, 11, 36[31], S. 563), d. h., bei seiner theoretischen Philosophie eine Anthropomorphisierungsstrategie zu verfolgen. Diese Strategie kann insoweit legitimiert werden, als man fähig ist, unser menschliches Bild von moralischen Vorstellungen und Gefühle zu befreien und „den Menschen nämlich zurück[zu]übersetzen in die Natur; über die vielen eitlen und schwärmerischen Deutungen und Nebensinne Herr [zu]werden, welche bisher über jenen ewigen Grundtext homo natura gekritzelt und gemalt wurden [...]“ (JGB, 230). Ein realistisch konzipiertes politisches Modell, wobei die Macht als Hauptbegriff auftritt, erlaubt Nietzsche unser triebhaftes Leben zu beschreiben, ohne unsere nützlichen und vernünftigen Interessen, unsere Tugend, Weisheit und Dummheit, unsere kompromiss- und vertragsfähige Natur ausklammern zu müssen. Zum Schluss unseres Beitrages wird die Frage gestellt, inwieweit das aus dem politischen Bereich konzipierte Triebmodell zu dem sogenannten Homunkulus-Fehlschluss führt und inwieweit diese Art von Fehlschluss zu vermeiden ist. (shrink)

The first part of my paper offers a brief characterization of what I call the non-hegemonic tradition of interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphilosophical program. In the second part, I suggest some small adjustments in the main argument of this tradition of interpretation. In general terms, the non-hegemonic tradition can be characterised by the claim that Nietzsche is a legitimate heir of the metaphilosophical programme first formulated by Friedrich Albert Lange in his ˜History of Materialism and Critique of its Significance for the (...) Present". None of the main interpreters of Nietzsche that I affiliate with this tradition of interpretation has formulated this claim quite explicitly, but I do not think that this characterization is inappropriate and I submit they could all accept it in the terms put forward in the present article. The main thesis states that Lange provides Nietzsche not so much with substantive theses as with the formal aspects of a philosophical programme whose content is drawn from other sources. This is the case, for example, in the attempt (in his early works) to mobilise Schopenhauer's metaphysics without committing himself to his epistemic claims. The attempt to execute this programme is surrounded by tensions that result not so much from Lange's sceptical theses as from what ultimately motivates them: the imperative of intellectual consciousness. This conflict remains unresolved as long as Nietzsche remains committed to the thesis of practical idealism according to which it is up to philosophy to satisfy certain metaphysical needs that are anthropologically unavoidable. The commitment to this anthropological thesis is what effectively places the young Nietzsche in the company of Kant, Schopenhauer and Lange. As soon as Nietzsche has abandoned this youthful commitment, he is prepared to revise his metaphilosophical convictions. (shrink)

A hipótese que procuro defender neste ensaio é a seguinte: a famosa expressão " Am Leitfaden des Leibes", que surge nos póstumos de 1884 e desaparece um ano depois, contabilizando pouco mais de dez ocorrências no conjunto dos fragmentos póstumos e nenhuma na obra publicada, é uma expressão cujo sentido e intenção devem ser desvendados tendo como pano de fundo o crescente interesse de Nietzsche, na virada da primeira para a segunda metade dos anos oitenta, na reabilitação da atividade especulativa. (...) Minha segunda hipótese é que, ao cunhar esta expressão, Nietzsche se inspira na reivindicação metodológica de Schopenhauer, segundo a qual o corpo é o único fio condutor que nos resta se queremos nos mover com alguma segurança pelo labirinto da especulação. Por "corpo próprio‘" (Leib), Schopenhauer designa um tipo específico de experiência intuitiva que teria sido negligenciada por Kant: a experiência do conjunto de nossa vida afetiva. Segundo a minha hipótese, a partir da segunda metade dos anos oitenta Nietzsche estaria disposto a reconhecer que a intuição metodológica de Schopenhauer estava correta. O erro de Schopenhauer teria consistido simplesmente em partir de uma concepção equivocada do corpo e do tipo de acesso que temos a ele. A divergência, portanto, não incidiria sobre o método próprio à especulação, mas sobre o conteúdo ao qual o método se aplicaria, ou seja, sobre a representação do corpo próprio e dos traços que lhe seriam essenciais. Persistem as divergências quanto ao que implica seguir este preceito metódico (por exemplo, sobre o que deve e o que não deve ser evitado no antropomorfismo subjacente ao método de projeção analógica), ou quanto ao meio mais apropriado de se obter uma representação do corpo próprio. Segundo Schopenhauer, nós teríamos uma intuição do que é essencial no corpo mediante a experiência imediata do querer. Segundo Nietzsche, somente após um longo e penoso processo que envolve tanto a investigação empírica quanto a reflexão conceitual chegamos a alguns resultados tímidos. Portanto, mesmo a especulação que se serve do corpo como fio condutor representa uma extrapolação em relação ao que estaríamos autorizados a inferir em um ambiente epistemicamente mais rigoroso. E isso não apenas pela razão de que a inferência analógica é por si mesma uma inferência logicamente abusiva (mas tolerável, na ausência de outro recurso), mas também pelo fato de que aquilo que serve de base para a inferência analógica é uma imagem seletiva e arbitrariamente construída, cuja legitimidade epistêmica, mesmo quando restrita ao domínio da fisiologia humana, é apenas relativa. Estas considerações fornecem parte das razões (as de ordem epistêmica) de porque Nietzsche nunca conseguiu se persuadir inteiramente de que o seu projeto de reabilitação da filosofia especulativa era legítimo. Esta indecisão o levou a postergar e, segundo alguns intérpretes, a finalmente abandonar a sua execução, ou pelo menos a sua tradução em uma obra literária sistemática. (shrink)

Cooperation among arts scholars is thought to be hampered by the division of research on the arts into two cultures, one scientific, one humanistic. This paper proposes an alternative model for research into the arts wherein multiple levels of explanation focussed on well-bounded phenomena integrate research across academic disciplines. Two case studies of research that fits the model are presented.

A detailed discussion of Corbanezi's book, entitled "Perspectivismo e Relativismo na Filosofia de Nietzsc he," published in 2021 by the Collection Sendas & Veredas [Ensaios] in a partnership between the Unifesp Publisher and GEN (Grup de Estudos Nietzsche). The book aims to answer a very specific question: to what extent does Nietzsche's perspectivism incur in relativism? To answer this main question, Corbanezi mobilizes some of the main concepts of Nietzsche's theoretical philosophy, competently displaying their internal articulations (world conception, will to (...) power, forces, perspective, interpretation, relation, impulses, values). In making this choice, he goes against a certain current preference for exploring more peripheral themes of the German philosopher's work. The main and extended argument of the book consists in showing, against the hegemonic reading in the secondary literature, that the question does not bear a univocal negative answer, and this means: if on the one hand, Nietzsche's perspectivism refuses and combats relativism, on the other hand, he actually admits it and even radicalizes it. How is it possible to defend such a conclusion? To some extent, we can say that Corbanezi arrives at this seemingly counterintuitive result by mobilising the resources of Nietzschean philosophy itself, that is, by perspectivising the question. The present discussion reconstructs the author's main arguments in defence of his nuanced position and assesses to what extent such arguments are convincing and supported by defensible methodological choices. (shrink)

Este artigo oferece alguns argumentos a favor da tese de que o método de reconstrução do contexto intelectual é mais adequado ao entendimento da obra de Nietzsche do que o método de leitura imanente. Independentemente dos méritos e limitações das respectivas metodologias, duas características gerais da obra de Nietzsche tornam a abordagem contextual mais promissora: a concepção nietzscheana da tarefa filosófica, na medida em que esta o leva a tratar de forma instrumental entidades abstratas ; e sua preferência pela forma (...) de exposição aforismática, na medida em que esta o obriga a ocultar parte importante de suas premissas. O limite para a instrumentalização de argumentos filosóficos será examinado na última seção do artigo. (shrink)