Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Other Contenders

In Fabrice Correia & Sven Rosenkranz (eds.), Nothing to Come: A Defence of the Growing Block Theory of Time. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag (2018)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The moving open future, temporal phenomenology, and temporal passage.Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-20.
    Empirical evidence suggests that people naïvely represent time as dynamical (i.e. as containing robust temporal passage). Yet many contemporary B-theorists deny that it seems to us, in perceptual experience, as though time robustly passes. The question then arises as to why we represent time as dynamical if we do not have perceptual experiences which represent time as dynamical. We consider two hypotheses about why this might be: the temporally aperspectival replacement hypothesis and the moving open future hypothesis. We then empirically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Alethic Openness and the Growing Block Theory of Time.Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham, Jordan Lee-Tory & Kristie Miller - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):532-556.
    Whatever its ultimate philosophical merits, it is often thought that the growing block theory presents an intuitive picture of reality that accords well with our pre-reflective or folk view of time, and of the past, present, and future. This is partly motivated by the idea that we find it intuitive that, in some sense, the future is open and the past closed, and that the growing block theory is particularly well suited to accommodate this being so. In this paper, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Experimental philosophy on time.James Norton - 2021 - Philosophy Compass (11).
    Appeals to the ‘common sense’, or ‘naïve’, or ‘folk’ concept of time, and the purported phenomenology as of time passing, play a substantial role in philosophical theorising about time. When making these appeals, philosophers have been content to draw upon their own assumptions about how non-philosophers think about time. This paper reviews a series of recent experiments bringing these assumptions into question. The results suggest that the way non-philosophers think about time is far less metaphysically demanding than philosophers have assumed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Tensed Facts and the Fittingness of our Attitudes 1.Kristie Miller - 2022 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):216-232.
    We direct different attitudes towards states of affairs depending on where in time those states of affairs are located. Call this the type asymmetry. The type asymmetry appears fitting. For instance, it seems fitting to feel guilt or regret only about states of affairs that are past, and anticipation only of states of affairs that are future. It has been argued that the type asymmetry could only be fitting if there are tensed facts, and hence that since it is fitting, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Freedom and the open future.Yishai Cohen - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):228-255.
    I draw upon Helen Steward's concept of agential settling to argue that freedom requires an ability to change the truth‐value of tenseless future contingents over time from false to true and that this ability requires a metaphysically open future.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism.Dan Marshall - 2022 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):182-215.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark