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Alethic Openness and the Growing Block Theory of Time

Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham, Jordan Lee-Tory & Kristie Miller

The Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):532-556 (2022)

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(1 other version)Temporal dynamism and the persisting stable self.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such reports about their experiences. Several philosophers have suggested the stable-self explanation, according to which (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The moving open future, temporal phenomenology, and temporal passage.Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-20.details Empirical evidence suggests that people naïvely represent time as dynamical (i.e. as containing robust temporal passage). Yet many contemporary B-theorists deny that it seems to us, in perceptual experience, as though time robustly passes. The question then arises as to why we represent time as dynamical if we do not have perceptual experiences which represent time as dynamical. We consider two hypotheses about why this might be: the temporally aperspectival replacement hypothesis and the moving open future hypothesis. We then empirically (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Episodic Imagining, Temporal Experience, and Beliefs about Time.Anthony Bigg, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):528-547.details We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
On Explaining Temporally Asymmetric Experiences.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - 1807–1829 - Australasian Philosophical Review.details Ismael aims for an understanding of the nature of an embedded perspective of agents in a world. If successful, this would explain a cluster of ways in which from an embedded perspective, we experience the world in an array of temporally asymmetric ways. Moreover, these are ways that have led many philosophers to rather metaphysically inflationary views about the nature of time, according to which time itself really is dynamical, and is characterized by the movement of an objectively (i.e., non-perspectival) (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future.Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1717-1742.details Deflationists hold that it does not seem to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes. There is some recent empirical evidence that appears to support this contention. Equally, empirical evidence suggests that we naïvely represent time as dynamical. Thus deflationists are faced with an explanatory burden. If, as they maintain, the world seems to us in experience as though it is non-dynamical, then why do we represent time as dynamical? This paper takes up the challenge of investigating, on the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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