- Knowledge-driven profile dynamics.Eduardo Fermé, Marco Garapa, Maurício D. L. Reis, Yuri Almeida, Teresa Paulino & Mariana Rodrigues - 2024 - Artificial Intelligence 331 (C):104117.details
|
|
Suspension of judgment, non-additivity, and additivity of possibilities.Aldo Filomeno - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.details
|
|
Difference-Making Conditionals and Connexivity.Hans Rott - 2024 - Studia Logica 112 (1):405-458.details
|
|
Ramsey’s conditionals.Mario Günther & Caterina Sisti - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-31.details
|
|
Neighborhood Semantics for Modal Logic.Eric Pacuit - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.details
|
|
David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems.Sven Ove Hansson (ed.) - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
|
|
Dynamic Formal Epistemology.Patrick Girard, Olivier Roy & Mathieu Marion (eds.) - 2010 - Berlin, Germany: Springer.details
|
|
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
|
|
A Characterization of Probability-based Dichotomous Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2021 - Studia Logica 110 (2):511-543.details
|
|
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.details
|
|
Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (26):58-98.details
|
|
Dynamic Tractable Reasoning: A Modular Approach to Belief Revision.Holger Andreas - 2020 - Cham, Schweiz: Springer.details
|
|
Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 397-436.details
|
|
Belief Revision Theory.Hanti Lin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 349-396.details
|
|
The Ethics of Nudge.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Mats J. Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. Springer, Theory and Decision Library A. pp. 207-20.details
|
|
Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
|
|
Extending the Harper Identity to Iterated Belief Change.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2016 - In Subbarao Kambhampati (ed.), Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI). Palo Alto, USA: AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence.details
|
|
Preservation and Postulation: Lessons from the New Debate on the Ramsey Test.Hans Rott - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):609–626.details
|
|
Epistemology and artificial intelligence.Gregory R. Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira - 2004 - Journal of Applied Logic 2 (4):469-493.details
|
|
Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change.Hans Rott - 2014 - In Punčochář Vít & Dančák Michal (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2013. College Publications. pp. 187–205.details
|
|
Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695–2720.details
|
|
Blockage Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2016 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 25 (1):37-50.details
|
|
Arguments as Belief Structures: Towards a Toulmin Layout of Doxastic Dynamics?Fabio Paglieri & Cristiano Castelfranchi - unknowndetails
|
|
Philosophy of Science in Germany, 1992–2012: Survey-Based Overview and Quantitative Analysis.Matthias Unterhuber, Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):71-160.details
|
|
Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Implicit and Explicit Beliefs.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):107-140.details
|
|
Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
|
|
Knowability as potential knowledge.André Fuhrmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.details
|
|
A General Family of Preferential Belief Removal Operators.Richard Booth, Thomas Meyer & Chattrakul Sombattheera - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (4):711 - 733.details
|
|
Changing minds about climate change: Belief revision, coherence, and emotion.Paul Thagard & Scott Findlay - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 329--345.details
|
|
Approaching the truth via belief change in propositional languages.Gustavo Cevolani & Francesco Calandra - 2009 - In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 47--62.details
|
|
A model of path-dependence in decisions over multiple propositions.Christian List - 2004 - American Political Science Review 98 (3):495-513.details
|
|
Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Degrees of belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2009 - London: Springer.details
|
|
A Survey of Ranking Theory.Wolfgang Spohn - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
|
|
New surprises for the Ramsey Test.Malte Willer - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.details
|
|
On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change.Erik J. Olsson & David Westlund - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):165 - 183.details
|
|
The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions.Franz Huber - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):299-329.details
|
|
Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology.Amalia Amaya - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):429-447.details
|
|
Frameworks, models, and case studies: a new methodology for studying conceptual change in science and philosophy.Matteo De Benedetto - 2022 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Münchendetails
|
|
Taking Up Thagard’s Challenge: A Formal Model of Conceptual Revision.Sena Bozdag & Matteo De Benedetto - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):791-824.details
|
|
Revising Probabilities and Full Beliefs.Sven Ove Hansson - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1005-1039.details
|
|
Defeasible normative reasoning.Wolfgang Spohn - 2019 - Synthese:1-38.details
|
|
Descriptor Revision: Belief Change Through Direct Choice.Sven Ove Hansson - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
|
|
Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
|
|
Safe Contraction Revisited.Hans Rott & Sven Ove Hansson - 2014 - In Sven Ove Hansson (ed.), David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems (Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 3). Springer. pp. 35–70.details
|
|
Iterated Belief Revision.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):189-209.details
|
|
Iterated Descriptor Revision and the Logic of Ramsey Test Conditionals.Sven Ove Hansson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (4):429-450.details
|
|
Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning.Hans Rott - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1219–1252.details
|
|
A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.details
|
|
Repertoire Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 2013 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (1):1-21.details
|
|