- Towards a logic for ‘because’.Eric Raidl & Hans Rott - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (9):2247-2277.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Mark Walker & Sanford Goldberg (eds.), Philosophy with Attitude. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (26):58-98.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Accuracy and epistemic conservatism.Florian Steinberger - 2018 - Analysis 79 (4):658-669.details
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Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.details
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.details
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Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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How to Assess the Epistemic Wrongness of Sponsorship Bias? The Case of Manufactured Certainty.Jon Leefmann - 2021 - Frontiers In 6 (Article 599909):1-13.details
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Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscriptdetails
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Probabilistic stability, agm revision operators and maximum entropy.Krzysztof Mierzewski - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-38.details
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Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 217–231.details
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The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability, by Hannes Leitgeb.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):1006-1017.details
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From McGee's puzzle to the Lottery Paradox.Lina Maria Lissia - manuscriptdetails
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The Logic of Conditional Belief.Benjamin Eva - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):759-779.details
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A Basis for AGM Revision in Bayesian Probability Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (6):1535-1559.details
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Learning from Conditionals.Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):461-508.details
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The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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