One important limitation of the current renditions of interpretivism is that its emphasis on the moral dimension of sport has overlooked the aesthetic dimension lying at the core of this account of sport. The interpretivist’s failure to acknowledge and consider the aesthetic implicitly distances this realm from the moral. Marcia Muelder Eaton calls this distancing the separatist mistake. This paper argues that interpretivism presupposes not only moral but also aesthetic principles and values. What it sets out to demonstrate is that (...) interpretivism is an integralist, or nonseparatist, account of sport, one in which ethical and aesthetic values are not exclusive. Making explicit and specifying interpretivism’s combined moral-aesthetic approach to sport not only helps to better distinguish the whole range of values that make up sport as well as their interconnection but also encourages sportspeople to pursue more coherent sport and, thus, more enriching lives. (shrink)

The voluntary suspension of play is a putative fair play norm that has emerged in the last 20 years in association football, though there is no reason in principle why it is limited to that sport. It occurs in football when an injury appears to have been sustained and another player deliberately puts the ball out of play so that the injury can receive rapid attention. It is widely understood as a positive development within the sport and philosophers have added (...) their support on the basis that VSP is a way of players exercising autonomous moral responsibility. It is represented as a case of athletes putting care for their competitors before care for the contest. In this paper, however, it is argued that moral praise for VSP is misplaced. Attempts to induce a VSP almost always occur when a team is seeking to hold a position within a game. As a delaying tactic, it encourages the faking of injuries, which is all the more reprehensible because it exploits someone else's concern for that apparent injury. Conditions for the possibility of VSP within a sport are analysed as well as conditions for the abuse of VSP. VSP occurs because of a loophole, and ways in which this can be closed are presented. In an appendix, some initial empirical evidence is presented that backs the evaluative claims of the paper. (shrink)

In recent years it has become increasingly the norm in football1 to kick the ball out of play when a player is, or appears to be, inadvertently injured. Kicking the ball out of play in football represents a particular instantiation of a generally understood fair play norm, the voluntary suspension of play (VSP). In the philosophical literature, support for the VSP norm is provided by John Russell (2007) who claims that his interpretivist account of sport is helpful for evaluating complex (...) moral issues in sport in general and issues related to injury in football in particular. This paper examines whether Russell's interpretivist-backed account of autonomy can adequately inform football players as to the nuanced and ambiguous moral considerations that arise in relation to the VSP norm. The paper goes on to identify the highly complex dynamic circumstances football players need to consider in order to better discharge their moral responsibilities when faced with inadvertent injuries. (shrink)

When people argue, they are vulnerable to unwanted and costly changes in their beliefs. This vulnerability motivates the position that belief involuntarism makes argument inherently adversarial, as well as the development of alternatives to adversarial argumentation such as “invitational rhetoric”. The emphasis on involuntary belief change in such accounts, in our perspective, neglects three dimensions of arguing: the diversity of arguer intentions, audience agency, and the benefits of belief change. The complex impact of arguments on both audiences and arguers involves (...) vulnerabilities related to various forces of argument, not just the intellectual force of premise-conclusion complexes. Shifting emphasis from adversariality to vulnerability, we propose a more holistic understanding of argument, in which vulnerability reveals various sources of strength and opportunity in addition to risk. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper explores the dynamics of extrinsic pressure in sport and its relation to athletic excellence. We argue that psychological pressure exerted by activities extrinsic to sport can be relevant to success or failure in it, such that how one manages extrinsic pressures can transmit to failure to perform in sport and thus be a determinant to victory, with no reason to think failure mitigated by the non-sporting nature of one’s other behaviour. To make this argument we offer a (...) series of examples to test intuitions about what constitutes sporting excellence and what constitutes sporting failure. On the basis of these examples, we offer a categorization of pressures in sport and argue that psychological pressure from almost any area of life may be relevant to competition, whether intrinsic or extrinsic to the sporting contest. We substantiate this claim by proposing a framework for adjudicating the relevance of extrinsic pressures to sporting performance by appealing to the internal goods of each sport and their contribution to flourishing. (shrink)

The question of acceptability in respect to the strategic foul in sport has provoked a rich and seemingly irreconcilable dispute with normative theorists currently divided amongst three schools of thought including formalism, conventionalism and interpretivism. In this paper, I seek to transcend the three-way intellectual stalemate portrayed in the literature via a consideration as to whether or not the strategic foul qualifies as ‘Utopian’. More specifically, after demonstrating that Bernard Suits’ theory of game-playing is fully capable of embracing all three (...) rival accounts, I seek to end the normative debate altogether via a conceptual analysis of the strategic foul as unacceptable via the higher-order point of view afforded by essentialism. (shrink)

This essay argues that defences of strategic fouling in sport are enriched and supported by better recognizing the role of play in sport. A common characteristic of play is its disengagement from the everyday, in particular its moral disengagement. If sport in its best manifestations is a species of play, then we should expect to find some moral disengagement there. And indeed we do in a variety of ways. Strategic fouling affords a useful example to illustrate and support this claim (...) and to examine the limits of that sort of disengagement. It is argued that while strategic fouling is morally problematic, it can be a sort of playful ‘competitive shenanigan’ that should be tolerated at times for the way it adds to the challenge and drama of sport. This allows us to better recognize the complexity and depth of sport and the way it reflects fundamental human values. Like everyday life, sport challenges us to weigh morality, perfection, and play against each other in ways that give each sphere of value its due and that contribute to rewarding and meaningful activities and lives. (shrink)

Some philosophers of sport have suggested that strategic fouling is acceptable if you pay full compensation. In this paper I will argue that the idea of ‘compensation’ is conceptually inadequate to deal with strategic fouling. Compensation is a legal remedy designed to make the victim of a wrong whole again, i.e. make good the loss or harm they have suffered. But compensation as the analogon between law and games is ill-conceived when applied to strategic fouling. I will suggest another analogon (...) from the law of obligations – restitution – which is more apt to deal with strategic fouling and which shows more clearly why the ‘compensation’ prescribed by the rules often fails to restore the fouled side. (shrink)

Although a large number of theories justify the presence of games in school, all of them converge in two of the educational functions described by Biesta, socialization and qualification. In contra...

Deep ethical interpretivism has been the standard view of the nature of sport in the philosophy of sport for the past seventeen years or so. On this account excellence assumes the role of the foundational, ethical goal that justice assumes in Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivist model of law. However, since excellence in sports is not an ethical value, and since it should not be regarded as an ultimate goal, the case for the traditional account fails. It should be replaced by the (...) shallow interpretivist model that I begin to sketch out and defend here. (shrink)

The notion of competition depicted in sport literature appears to be inconsistent with the goals of current European soccer competitions. This paper examines two misconceptions of fair competition which are prevalent in these competitions. First, it aims at refuting the view that professional soccer only requires some basic equality of chances beyond the differences in players’ skills and managers’ knowledge of game strategy. In other words, it refutes the view that professional soccer only demands a notion of fair competition understood (...) as fair play. Second, the paper also aims at refuting the view that fair competition, in professional soccer, is simply a matter of financial viability. Hence, it calls for both genuine legal and ethical reforms, since professional soccer competition requires a notion of equality as both a goal and a right. Such a notion, we argue, must conceive of the differences in players’ skills and managers’ knowledge of game strategy as one of the primary factors in establishing a platform founded in fair competition. Therefore, this paper calls for a radical change of attitude toward or a radical approach to fair competition among European sport fans, policy-makers, and administrators. (shrink)

Two recent articles in this journal – one by Morris, the other by Pfleegor & Rosenberg – have revived the philosophical discussion of the ethics of deception in sport which had largely laid dormant since the 1973 publication of Pearson’s ‘Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics’. Morris and Pfleegor & Rosenberg both share with Pearson the view that ethical deceptive sport acts are those that relate to sport-specific skills. However, whereas Pearson ultimately grounds this view in the agreement she takes to obtain (...) amongst sport participants, both recent treatments overlook this fundamental aspect of her account and offer alternative justifications for that view. I argue, though, that in both cases the arguments offered are incomplete precisely because they require an appeal to the agreement amongst participants that lies at the foundation of Pearson’s account. On all three treatments, I argue, what ultimately determines an action’s ethical status is not its relation to sport-specific skills, but its conformit... (shrink)

ABSTRACTWilliam Morgan presents two diametrically opposed normative conceptions of sport and athletic excellence from late nineteenth/early twentieth-century British and American athletes. He claims that this example shows that the normative theory of sport presented by broad internalism is false or at least inadequate. As an alternative, he presents the concept of deep conventions, which, he claims, can successfully adjudicate such normative disputes. I argue that Morgan’s counterexample is not nearly so decisive against broad internalism as it might seem and that (...) his own solution, deep conventionalism does no better in solving the dispute and suffers from further issues of its own. (shrink)

My argument will proceed as follows. I will first sketch out the broad internalist case for pitching its normative account of sport in the abstract manner that following Dworkin’s lead in the philosophy of law its adherents insist upon. I will next show that the normative deficiencies in social conventions broad internalists uncover are indeed telling but misplaced since they hold only for what David Lewis famously called ‘coordinating’ conventions. I will then distinguish coordinating conventions from deep ones and make (...) my case not only for the normative salience of deep conventions but for their normative superiority over the abstract normative principles broad internalists champion. (shrink)

This paper argues that for the purposes of any sort of serious discussion about immoral conduct in sport very little is illuminated by claiming that the conduct in question is cheating. In fact, describing some behavior as cheating is typically little more than expressing strong, but thoroughly vague and imprecise, moral disapproval or condemnation of another person or institution about a wide and ill-defined range of improper advantage-seeking behavior. Such expressions of disapproval fail to distinguish cheating from many other types (...) of immoral conduct. The discussion shows that we should set the concept aside and assess the moral disapproval implied by claims of cheating by reference to the moral and other principles that underlie the practice of sport. This allows us to consider carefully the complexity of the issues that are raised when allegations of cheating are made and not be distracted by the emotionally loaded, conversation-stopping tendency of the concept. This means that some types of disputes in sport will be messy and demand more effort to resolve, but the payoff will be better informed and more thoughtful discussions and greater awareness of the moral complexity of sport and of its principled underpinnings. (shrink)

This is a book symposium on Steffen Borge’s The Philosophy of Football. It has contributions from William Morgan, Murray Smith and Brian Weatherson with replies from Borge.

This essay delineates and analyzes two kinds of questions that sport ethicists tend to ask: questions about athletic excellence and questions about justice. To pass ethical judgements when delving into questions concerning athletic excellence, sportspeople rely largely on a sport’s internal values, primary skills, or sport-specific athletic excellences. In contrast, questions about justice do not and should not include the reference or application of principles derived from the nature of a sport. Instead, sportspeople must refer to general theories, most often (...) based on the rights and obligations of fellow citizens. There are multiple benefits to pointing out this distinction. First, it can help sportspeople and sport philosophers recognize the normative standards most appropriate within specific debates. Second, the distinction may explain why some disputes in sport philosophy remained unresolved. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, an awareness of the differences between these types... (shrink)

Der Unterschied zwischen einem Spitzensportler früher und heute tritt an den Berührungspunkten zwischen der Kyborg-Theorie und verschiedenen Sportstudien am deutlichsten zutage. Eine Rekonzeptualisierung des Begriffs ,Sportler’ erweist sich demnach als eine Sinnerweiterung von ,natürlich’ zu ,künstlich’. Im Laufe der Geschichte wurden Spitzensportler stets als irgendwie ,un-natürlich’ empfunden und als Helden gefeiert, die die Beschränkungen ihres natürlichen Körpers überwanden. Sportveranstaltungen ziehen heute mehr Zuschauer in ihren Bann, als dies früher jemals der Fall war, und durch die scharfe Konkurrenz werden auch die (...) Standards und Kriterien von Sportwettkämpfen angehoben. Vor einem Massenpublikum stattfindende Sportveranstaltungen haben sich schon längst zu Freak Shows gewandelt, bei denen den Zuschauern in den Stadien oder vor den Bildschirmen zu Hause unvorstellbar ist, dass sie je selbst einen so muskulösen Körper mit superschnellen Reflexen besitzen könnten. Das alte Schlagwort von „Blut, Schweiß und Tränen” besteht auch weiterhin, wenn auch eingebunden in die zukunftsträchtigen Errungenschaften der modernen Techno-Kultur. Die vielzähligen Fragen, die sich aus einer solchen Perspektive ergeben, haben in einem relativ neuen Zugang zu den Herausforderungen des biotechnologischen Zeitalters ihre Plattform gefunden – in der Bioethik. Die Bioethik bietet ein Diskussionsforum für die wichtigsten uns heute bewegenden Fragen, für einen Dialog, der über disziplin- und fachgebundene, historische und kulturologische Positionen hinausgeht. Ein solcher Diskurs sieht sich jedoch sowohl in den unterschiedlichen Ansätzen als auch in den methodologischen Barrieren mit einem Pluralismus konfrontiert und erfordert als Voraussetzung eine entsprechende theoretische Grundlage. In diesem Artikel werden nur einige Problempunkte hervorgehoben, die sich im Bereich des Sports infolge der Unzulänglichkeiten der bestehenden monoperspektivisch orientierten Konzeptionen auf eine plastische Weise abzeichnen. In diesem Sinne verweist die Verfasserin auf einige wenige Symptome, die auf eigentümliche Weise im Sport zum Vorschein kommen und die Desorientiertheit im Alltag sichtbar machen: Gemeint ist die Fragilität ethischer Positionen, die in den Konzepten von „Sportsgeist” und Fairplay enthalten sind und sich gegen den wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritt, die Verobjektierung des Körpers und ein gesteigertes Interesse an risikoreichen Aktivitäten behaupten müssen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden die angeführten Merkmale als Zeichen des Bedürfnisses verstanden, die bis vor kurzem noch vorherrschenden, reduktionistischen und monoperspektivischen Ansätze zu überwinden, zumal mithilfe der Bioethik, der diesbezüglich besonders gute Chancen nachgesagt werden. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a general theory of competition and contrast it with a corresponding general theory of cooperation. I then use this analysis to critique mutualism. Building on the work of Arthur Applbaum and Joseph Heath I develop an alternative adversarial model of competitive sport, one that helps explain and is partly justified by shallow interpretivism, and argue that this model helps shows that the claim that mutualism provides us with the most defensible ethical ideal of sport is (...) false. By replacing that view with an understanding of sporting adversarial ethics we can appreciate that the ethics of sport are more complex than has been commonly recognized. (shrink)

The differences between the image of top athletes in history and those today could meet at the intersection between cyborg theory and sport studies. The reconceptualisation of athletes could at first be viewed as a shift from the “natural” to the “artificial”. Throughout history top athletes have always been considered to be somehow unnatural, and have always been celebrated as heroes who have overcome the boundaries of their natural bodies. Today’s sports events have been attracting more viewers than ever before, (...) and tough competition has been raising the very standards of competition. High attendance sports are already freak shows; whether from the comfort of their homes or from the grandstands, it is difficult for sport supporters to imagine themselves sculpting such a super-muscular body with super-fast reflexes. Old-fashioned blood, sweat and tears are still present somewhere, although they are incorporated into the advanced achievements of the modern techno-culture. A number of the issues raised from this perspective have found room for discussion in the relatively new pluri-perspectival approach to the challenges of the biotechnological era – in bioethics. Bioethics offers a platform for a dialogue on the key questions of today’s world, a dialogue that surpasses disciplinary, expert, historical and cultural positions. However, any such discourse is facing a pluralism of approaches and methodological barriers, and presupposes the existence of adequate theoretical grounds. This paper highlights only some of the problem points that plastically outline the insufficiencies of the existing mono-perspectively guided conceptions in the field of sport. Accordingly, the authoress emphasises only some of the symptoms that point to the disorientedness of everyday life, which is portrayed in sport in a rather peculiar way: the fragility of the ethical positions contained in the concepts of the “spirit of sport” and fair play in facing the developments of science and technology, the objectification of the body, and an increase in the people’s interest in high-risk activities. The authoress views these traits as signs of the need to transcend the until recently prevalent reductionistic and mono-perspectival approaches, which the distinctive bioethical approach can indeed do. (shrink)

This paper argues that recent treatments of ethics in sport have accorded too much importance to the promotion and portrayal of a sport’s excellences, and too little to the consent of participants First, I consider and reject a fundamental challenge to the idea that consent should play a central role in determining the morality of action in sport – namely, Sean McAleer’s argument to the effect that consent is incapable of rendering normally impermissible actions permissible in sport. I then offer (...) a preliminary examination of the proper relation in the moral evaluation of action in sport between considerations of consent and ‘internalist’ considerations regarding the nature and purpose of sport. Taking as my starting point J.S. Russell’s treatment of this topic, I argue that consent is the more weighty, and in many cases the more fundamental, value and that when it conflicts with internalist considerations, it is consent that takes moral priority. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn a recent article in this Journal, Eric Moore criticized an earlier essay of mine published in this same Journal on two fronts. On the first, he criticized my criticisms of broad internalism for relying on abstract moral principles too far removed from the practice of sport to adjudicate normative conflicts in which disputants cannot agree on what is the purpose of sport. On the second front, he criticized my reliance on what he called Rorty’s “controversial” views of truth and (...) rationality to back up my criticisms of broad internalism. I find both criticisms forceful but not persuasive. In my reply, therefore, I defend both use of Rorty’s and other similar historicist takes on rational justification and my criticisms of broad internalism principles-based approach to normative inquiry in sport. (shrink)