What determines the meaning of a context-sensitive expression in a context? It is standardly assumed that, for a given expression type, there will be a unitary answer to this question; most of the literature on the subject involves arguments designed to show that one particular metasemantic proposal is superior to a specific set of alternatives. The task of the present essay will be to explore whether this is a warranted assumption, or whether the quest for the one true metasemantics might (...) be a Quixotic one. We argue that there are good reasons—much better than are commonly appreciated—for thinking the latter, but that there nevertheless remains significant scope for metasemantic theorizing. We conclude by outlining our preferred option, metasemantic pluralism. (shrink)

This Open Access book addresses the age-old problem of infinite regresses in epistemology. How can we ever come to know something if knowing requires having good reasons, and reasons can only be good if they are backed by good reasons in turn? The problem has puzzled philosophers ever since antiquity, giving rise to what is often called Agrippa's Trilemma. The current volume approaches the old problem in a provocative and thoroughly contemporary way. Taking seriously the idea that good reasons are (...) typically probabilistic in character, it develops and defends a new solution that challenges venerable philosophical intuitions and explains why they were mistakenly held. Key to the new solution is the phenomenon of fading foundations, according to which distant reasons are less important than those that are nearby. The phenomenon takes the sting out of Agrippa's Trilemma; moreover, since the theory that describes it is general and abstract, it is readily applicable outside epistemology, notably to debates on infinite regresses in metaphysics. (shrink)

Assertions are speech acts by means of which we express beliefs. As such they are at the heart of our linguistic and social practices. Recent research has focused extensively on the question whether the speech act of assertion is governed by norms, and if so, under what conditions it is acceptable to make an assertion. Standard theories propose, for instance, that one should only assert that p if one knows that p (the knowledge account), or that one should only assert (...) that p if p is true (the truth account). In a series of four experiments, this question is addressed empirically. Contrary to previous findings, knowledge turns out to be a poor predictor of assertability, and the norm of assertion is not factive either. The studies here presented provide empirical evidence in favour of the view that a speaker is warranted to assert that p only if her belief that p is justified. (shrink)

This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori ; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with the (...) naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position. (shrink)

Some aspects of transcendental phenomenology as principal for social investigations are considered in this article. It is demonstrated that on the basis of the objective hermeneutics of Ulrich Overman can be solved some fundamental tasks of constitutive phenomenology of naturality of Alfred Schьtz. Any action is actually a subjective process, i.e. a process that has his own agent. Accordingly to this, there is no reason at all to attribute constructed action in this sense of objective significance. Recognition of this leads (...) to relativism, and in consequence to the epistemological pessimism. Only when intersubjectivity is viewed as a universal opportunity to experience we have some hopes to be free from the risk of such relativism. (shrink)

Although culturally prominent modernist influences account for much of Skinner's early behaviorism, the subsequent changes in his views are appropriately considered as postmodern and are indebted to other sources. These changes are strikingly apparent in his 1945 publication. "The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms." In that publication. Skinner introduced a probabilistic three-term contingency for verbal behavior with an expanded contextualism and an increased emphasis on consequence with a clear alignment to pragmatism. Instead of reaffirming the mechanistic and necessitarian values of (...) modernism that he had previously embraced, Skinner was aligning himself with the postmodern values of pragmatism and selectionism. (shrink)

The article compared the two hermeneutic understanding of Leo Tolstoy’s Destiny. Both of them have identical vision of the subject, apply the same hermeneutic method for reproduction of new meanings, use common lexical-semantic and logical categorical fields and both refer to the same standard interpretative texts. Both approaches are based on the recognition that Tolstoy had a negative attitude towards his own Destiny, which, for all human estimated, was very happy. He hated his good Fortune and did everything to his (...) fate became unhappy. By such statement the similarity of these two approaches comes to end. M. Voloshin believes that the Tolstoy’s fighting against his Destiny manifested itself as a meaningful efforts to destroy his «fatal» well-being by creating a threat to own life. Bunin thought that Tolstoy’s rejection of his benevolent Destiny was realized by his escapism and transcendence. Actually, both Voloshin and Bunin give identical worldview interpretation of L. Tolstoy’s Fate – he sought immortality and by these reason denied his lucky Fate, because he recognized that all the blessings of earth life means nothing. (shrink)