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  1. Practical Know‐Wh.Katalin Farkas - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):855-870.
    The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; (...)
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  • Neuroethics and the problem of other minds: Implications of neuroscience for the moral status of brain-damaged patients and nonhuman animals. [REVIEW]Martha J. Farah - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (1):9-18.
    Our ethical obligations to another being depend at least in part on that being’s capacity for a mental life. Our usual approach to inferring the mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If another being behaves as I do in a circumstance that engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that it has engendered the same mental state in him or her. Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this analogy is fallible because behavior and mental states (...)
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  • Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.
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  • The future is uncertain: Eat dessert first.Edmund Fantino - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1):125-126.
    There may be evolutionary as well as economic reasons why organisms generally act impulsively. I discuss this possibility and suggest some follow-up experiments that may clarify the exciting empirical and theoretical contributions made by the experiments discussed in the target article.
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  • Ryle’s regress defended.Jeremy Fantl - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):121-130.
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  • Knowing-how and knowing-that.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
    You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that something is the case requires a prior (...)
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  • How and why we reason from is to ought.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Shira Elqayam - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1429-1446.
    Originally identified by Hume, the validity of is–ought inference is much debated in the meta-ethics literature. Our work shows that inference from is to ought typically proceeds from contextualised, value-laden causal utility conditional, bridging into a deontic conclusion. Such conditional statements tell us what actions are needed to achieve or avoid consequences that are good or bad. Psychological research has established that people generally reason fluently and easily with utility conditionals. Our own research also has shown that people’s reasoning from (...)
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  • Reflection and Perception in Professional Practice.Peter Erlandson - 2014 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 14 (1):1-11.
    For the last decade, reflection has been a major theme in discussions about professional skillfulness and the development of the competence of practitioners such as nurses and teachers. The intellectual pattern that has structured ambitions in relation to reflection is found mainly in Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner and the epistemological turn suggested there. In this text, however, I focus on a dimension that is often forgotten when professional practitioners are conceived of as being reflective, namely, perception. From the framework of (...)
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  • Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.
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  • Unifying Agency. Reconsidering Hans Reiner’s Phenomenology of Activity.Christopher Erhard - 2019 - Husserl Studies 35 (1):1-25.
    In this paper I argue that the almost forgotten early dissertation of the phenomenologist Hans Reiner Freiheit, Wollen und Aktivität. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen in Richtung auf das Problem der Willensfreiheit engages with what I call the unity problem of activity. This problem concerns the question whether there is a structure in virtue of which all instances of human activity—and not only “full-blown” intentional actions—can be unified. After a brief systematic elucidation of this problem, which is closely related to the contemporary “problem (...)
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  • The Idealist View of Divine Action in Nature.Edward Epsen - 2020 - Zygon 55 (4):924-947.
    Theologies of divine action in nature have sought to maximize traction with the sciences to secure their credibility. While varying in significant ways, all extant proposals share a commitment to physical realism, the claim that (at least some) physical entities and facts are both mind‐independent and ontologically basic within creation. However, I will argue that this metaphysical commitment undermines the body of scientific knowledge to which theologians wish to be responsive. Is there an alternative? Building on the work of Howard (...)
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  • Gestalt psychology and the philosophy of mind.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181.
    The Gestalt psychologists adopted a set of positions on mind-body issues that seem like an odd mix. They sought to combine a version of naturalism and physiological reductionism with an insistence on the reality of the phenomenal and the attribution of meanings to objects as natural characteristics. After reviewing basic positions in contemporary philosophy of mind, we examine the Gestalt position, characterizing it m terms of phenomenal realism and programmatic reductionism. We then distinguish Gestalt philosophy of mind from instrumentalism and (...)
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  • Implicit practical learning.Elizabeth Ennen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):404-405.
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  • Self-ascriptions of Belief and Transparency.Pascal Engel - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
    Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.
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  • O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?Doraci Engel - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):540-565.
    Neste artigo examino a possibilidade de agência no domínio epistêmico – a visão compartilhada por muitos filósofos de que possamos ser ativos, ao invés de passivos, em relação às nossas crenças e manifestações de conhecimento. Concluo que a noção de agência epistêmica é plausível apenas em sentido indireto, referindo-se as diferentes ações que realizamos com intuito de melhorar nossos compromissos epistêmicos. Trata-se de um tipo de agência prática, como qualquer agência, mas que não nos autoriza a pensar que possamos estar (...)
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  • Response: Science and religion—the state of the art.Alister E. McGrath - 2022 - Zygon 57 (1):267-286.
    Zygon®, Volume 57, Issue 1, Page 267-286, March 2022.
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  • Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1987-2001.
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  • Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5.Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.) - 2019 - Springer.
    This open access book provides an exploration of the consequences of the ontological differences between natural and social objects (sometimes described as objects of nature and objects of thought) in the workings of causal and agency relationships. One of its important and possibly original conclusions is that causal and agency relationships do not encompass all of the dependent relationships encountered in social life. The idea that social reality is contingent has been known (and largely undisputed) at least since Wittgenstein’s “On (...)
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  • Sorge, Heideggerian Ethic of Care: Creating More Caring Organizations.Margie J. Elley-Brown & Judith K. Pringle - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 168 (1):23-35.
    Recently ethical implications of human resource management have intensified the focus on care perspectives in management and organization studies. Appeals have also been made for the concept of organizational care to be grounded in philosophies of care rather than business theories. Care perspectives see individuals, especially women, as primarily relational and view work as a means by which people can increase in self-esteem, self-develop and be fulfilled. The ethic of care has received attention in feminist ethics and is often socially (...)
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  • Conceptual Engineering or Revisionary Conceptual Analysis? The Case of Russell's Metaphilosophy Based on Principia Mathematica's Logic.Landon Elkind - 2021 - Dialogue 60 (3):447-474.
    Conceptual engineers have made hay over the differences of their metaphilosophy from those of conceptual analysts. In this article, I argue that the differences are not as great as conceptual engineers have, perhaps rhetorically, made them seem. That is, conceptual analysts asking ‘What is X?’ questions can do much the same work that conceptual engineers can do with ‘What is X for?’ questions, at least if conceptual analysts self-understand their activity as a revisionary enterprise. I show this with a study (...)
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  • Technical rationality in Schön’s reflective practice: dichotomous or non‐dualistic epistemological position.Elizabeth Anne Kinsella - 2007 - Nursing Philosophy 8 (2):102-113.
    Donald Schön’s theory of reflective practice has received unprecedented attention as an approach to professional development in nursing and other health and social care professions. This paper examines technical rationality in Schön’s theory of reflective practice and argues that its critique is a broad and often overlooked epistemological underpinning in this work. This paper suggests that the popularity of Schön’s theory is tied in part to his critique of technical rationality, and to his acknowledgement of the significance of practitioner experience (...)
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  • Does behaviorism explain self-control?Robert Eisenberger - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1):125-125.
    Rachlin's hyperbolic-discounting model captures basic features of the subtlety of human impulsiveness and self-control and has received convincing experimental support. His distinction between self-control patterns and impulsive acts expands his earlier work to a greater range of self-control behaviors. Possible mechanisms that may weaken or strengthen patterns of self-control are considered.
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  • Do Motives Matter?Robert E. Goodin - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):405-419.
    Among moralists and social critics of several stripes, it is not enough that the right thing be done: they also insist that it be done, and be seen to be done, for the right reasons. They are anxious to know whether we are sending food to starving Africans out of genuinely altruistic concern, or merely to clear domestic commodity markets, for one particularly topical example. Or, for another example, critics of the Brandt Commission’s plea for increased foreign aid more generally (...)
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  • Getting off the Inwagen: A Critique of Quinean Metaontology.Karl Egerton - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (6).
    Much contemporary ontological inquiry takes place within the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ but, given that some aspects of Quine’s project have been widely abandoned even by those who consider themselves Quineans, it is unclear what this amounts to. Fortunately recent work in metaontology has produced two relevant results here: a clearer characterisation of the metaontology uniting the aforementioned Quineans, most notably undertaken by Peter van Inwagen, and a raft of criticisms of that metaontology. In this paper I critique van Inwagen’s Quinean (...)
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  • Scientific knowledge in the age of computation: Explicated, computable and manageable?Sophia Efstathiou, Rune Nydal, Astrid Laegreid & Martin Kuiper - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):213.
    We have two theses about scientific knowledge in the age of computation. Our general claim is that scientific Knowledge Management practices emerge as second-order practices whose aim is to systematically collect, take care of and mobilise first-hand disciplinary knowledge and data. Our specific thesis is that knowledge management practices are transforming biological research in at least three ways. We argue that scientific Knowledge Management a. operates with founded concepts of biological knowledge as explicated and computable, b. enables new outputs and (...)
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  • Discourse, cognition and social practices: the rich surface of language and social interaction.Derek Edwards - 2006 - Discourse Studies 8 (1):41-49.
    Discursive psychology approaches discourse not as the product or expression of thoughts or mental states lying behind or beneath it, but as a domain of public accountability in which psychological states are made relevant. DP draws heavily on conversation analysis in examining in close empirical detail how ostensibly psychological themes are handled and managed as part of talk’s everyday interactional business. A brief worked example is offered, in which the intentionality of a person’s actions is handled in the course of (...)
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  • Physics of brain-mind interaction.John C. Eccles - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):662-663.
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  • On the Perimeter: Sense Perception and Mind-Matter Entanglement.Dennis E. Boyle - 2020 - Philosophical Investigations 44 (3):254-269.
    Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.
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  • Privileged Access and the Status of Self-Knowledge in Cartesian and Freudian Conceptions of the Mental.Morris Eagle - 1982 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12 (4):349-373.
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  • Computations over abstract categories of representation.Roy Eagleson - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):661-662.
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  • To Say the Least: Where Deceptively Withholding Information Ends and Lying Begins.Marta Dynel - 2018 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (2):555-582.
    This paper aims to distil the essence of deception performed by means of withholding information, a topic hitherto largely neglected in the psychological, linguistic, and philosophical research on deception. First, the key conditions for deceptively withholding information are specified. Second, several notions related to deceptively withholding information are critically addressed with a view to teasing out the main forms of withholding information. Third, it is argued that deceptively withholding information can be conceptualized in pragmatic-philosophical terms as being based on the (...)
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  • We are acquainted with ourselves.Matt Duncan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2531-2549.
    I am aware of the rain outside, but only in virtue of looking at a weather report. I am aware of my friend, but only because I hear her voice through my phone. Thus, there are some things that I’m aware of, but only indirectly. Many philosophers believe that there are also some things of which I am directly aware. The most plausible candidates are experiences such as pains, tickles, visual sensations, etc. In fact, the philosophical consensus seems to be (...)
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  • The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
    I can be aware of myself, and thereby come to know things about myself, in a variety of different ways. But is there some special way in which I—and only I—can learn about myself? Can I become aware of myself by introspecting? Do I somehow show up in my own conscious experiences? David Hume and most contemporary philosophers say no. They deny that the self shows up in experience. However, in this paper I appeal to research on schizophrenia—on thought insertion, (...)
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  • Acquiring Practical Knowledge: A Justification for Physical Education.Sheryle Bergmann Drewe - 1999 - Paideusis: Journal of the Canadian Philosophy of Education Society 12 (2):33-44.
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  • The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  • The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.
    Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's (...)
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  • Particularism for Generalists: A Rossian Business Ethic.J. Drake - 2021 - Business Ethics Quarterly 31 (4):600-622.
    A standard framework for business ethics views the inquiry as an application of major ethical theories to specific issues in business. As these theories are largely presented as being principled, the exercise therefore becomes one of applying general principles to business situations. Many adopting this standard approach have thus resisted the implementation of the most prominent development in ethical theory in recent history: that of particularism. In this article, I argue that particularist thinking has much to offer to business ethics (...)
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  • Groups Can Know How.Chris Dragos - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):265-276.
    One can know how to ride a bicycle, play the cello, or collect experimental data. But who can know how to properly ride a tandem bicycle, perform a symphony, or run a high-energy physics experiment? Reductionist analyses fail to account for these cases strictly in terms of the individual know-how involved. Nevertheless, it doesn't follow from non-reductionism that groups possess this know-how. One must first show that epistemic extension cannot obtain. This is the idea that individuals can possess knowledge even (...)
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  • The Sense of Agency and the Epistemology of Thinking.Casey Doyle - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2589-2608.
    This paper motivates a constraint on how to explain the “sense of agency” for conscious thinking. It argues that a prominent model fails to satisfy the constraint before sketching an alternative that does. On the alternative, punctate acts of conscious thinking, such as episodes of inner speech, are recognizable as our deeds because they are recognizable as parts of complex cognitive activities, which we know non-observationally in virtue of holding intentions to perform them.
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  • Perceptive questions about computation and cognition.Jon Doyle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):661-661.
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  • Agency and observation in knowledge of one's own thinking.Casey Doyle - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):148-161.
    This essay addresses the question how we know our conscious thinking. Conscious thinking typically takes the form of a series of discrete episodes that constitute a complex cognitive activity. We must distinguish the discrete episodes of thinking in which a particular content is represented in phenomenal consciousness and is present “before the mind’s eye” from the extended activities of which these episodes form a part. The extended activities are themselves contentful and we have first-person access to them. But because their (...)
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  • It Just Doesn’t Feel Right: OCD and the ‘Scaling Up’ Problem.Adrian Downey - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):705-727.
    The ‘scaling up’ objection says non-representational ecological-enactive accounts will be unable to explain ‘representation hungry’ cognition. Obsessive-compulsive disorder presents a paradigmatic instance of this objection, marked as it is by ‘representation hungry’ obsessive thoughts and compulsive behavior organized around them. In this paper I provide an ecological-enactive account of OCD, thereby demonstrating non-representational frameworks can ‘scale up’ to explain ‘representation hungry’ cognition. First, I outline a non-representational account of mind— a predictive processing operationalization of Sean Kelly’s theory of perception. This (...)
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  • The spontaneousness of skill and the impulsivity of habit.Christos Douskos - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4305-4328.
    The objective of this paper is to articulate a distinction between habit and bodily skill as different ways of acting without deliberation. I start by elaborating on a distinction between habit and skill as different kinds of dispositions. Then I argue that this distinction has direct implications for the varieties of automaticity exhibited in habitual and skilful bodily acts. The argument suggests that paying close attention to the metaphysics of agency can help to articulate more precisely questions regarding the varieties (...)
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  • The varieties of agential powers.Christos Douskos - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):982-1001.
    The domain of agential powers is marked by a contrast that does not arise in the case of dispositions of inanimate objects: the contrast between propensities or tendencies on the one hand, and capacities or abilities on the other. According to Ryle (1949), this contrast plays an important role in the ‘logical geography’ of the dispositional concepts used in the explanation and assessment of action. However, most subsequent philosophers use the terms of art ‘power’ or ‘disposition’ indiscriminately in formulating central (...)
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  • Locke and Mind-Body Dualism.Douglas Odegard - 1970 - Philosophy 45 (172):87 - 105.
    The word ‘dualism’ can be used to pick out at least four different theories concerning the relationship between mind and body. A mind and a body are two different entities and each is “had” by a man. A man is thus a composite being with two components, one “inner”, the other “outer”. You, for example, are a man and your mind is “inner” in the sense that you alone can reflectively experience yourself thinking, or feeling pain, or seeing colours . (...)
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  • Habit and Intention.Christos Douskos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1129-1148.
    Several authors have argued that the things one does in the course of skilled and habitual activity present a difficult case for the ‘standard story’ of action. They are things intentionally done, but they do not seem to be suitably related to mental states. I suggest that once manifestations of habit are properly distinguished from exercises of skills and other kinds of spontaneous acts, we can see that habit raises a distinctive sort of problem. I examine certain responses that have (...)
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  • Habit, Omission and Responsibility.Christos Douskos - 2020 - Topoi 40 (3):695-705.
    Given the pervasiveness of habit in human life, the distinctive problems posed by habitual acts for accounts of moral responsibility deserve more attention than they have hitherto received. But whereas it is hard to find a systematic treatment habitual acts within current accounts of moral responsibility, proponents of such accounts have turned their attention to a topic which, I suggest, is a closely related one: unwitting omissions. Habitual acts and unwitting omissions raise similar issues for a theory of responsibility because (...)
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  • Idealism and the philosophy of mind.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2005 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):395-412.
    This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that (...)
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  • Philosophical and Linguistic Sources of Herbert L. A. Hart’s Theory of Law.Katarzyna Doliwa - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):231-254.
    The paper presents H. L. A. Hart as a leading exponent of the analytic orientation in legal philosophy. Hart showed that the principles and methods of analytic philosophy yield fruitful implications to law, where they may foster fresh ideas and innovative solutions. The text emphasizes the linguistic aspect of Hart’s works; his achievements in legal theory are discussed in the context of the principles of ordinary language philosophy.
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  • Theories of perception as experimental epistemology.P. C. Dodwell - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (2):291-293.
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