Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Black Hole Paradoxes: A Unified Framework for Information Loss.Saakshi Dulani - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Geneva
    The black hole information loss paradox is a catch-all term for a family of puzzles related to black hole evaporation. For almost 50 years, the quest to elucidate the implications of black hole evaporation has not only sustained momentum, but has also become increasingly populated with proposals that seem to generate more questions than they purport to answer. Scholars often neglect to acknowledge ongoing discussions within black hole thermodynamics and statistical mechanics when analyzing the paradox, including the interpretation of Bekenstein-Hawking (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • From Paradoxicality to Paradox.Ming Hsiung - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    In various theories of truth, people have set forth many definitions to clarify in what sense a set of sentences is paradoxical. But what, exactly, is _a_ paradox per se? It has not yet been realized that there is a gap between ‘being paradoxical’ and ‘being a paradox’. This paper proposes that a paradox is a minimally paradoxical set meeting some closure property. Along this line of thought, we give five tentative definitions based upon the folk notion of paradoxicality implied (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox.Sergi Oms - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):211-228.
    This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • In Search of Modal Hypodoxes using Paradox Hypodox Duality.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (5):2457-2476.
    The concept of hypodox is dual to the concept of paradox. Whereas a paradox is incompatibly overdetermined, a hypodox is underdetermined. Indeed, many particular paradoxes have dual hypodoxes. So, naively the dual of Russell’s Paradox is whether the set of all sets that are members of themselves is self-membered. The dual of the Liar Paradox is the Truth-teller, and a hypodoxical dual of the Heterological paradox is whether ‘autological’ is autological. I provide some analysis of the duality and I search (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Problemas Filosóficos: Uma Introdução à Filosofia / Philosophical Problems: An Introduction to Philosophy.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / UFPel Publisher.
    De um modo geral, queríamos mostrar que a filosofia tem suas próprias áreas, mas tem também subáreas em interdisciplinaridade com as ciências. As ciências e as disciplinas acadêmicas em geral têm problemas, cuja a solução pode ser encontrada empiricamente, por meio de experimentos, entrevistas, documentos, ou formalmente, por meio de cálculos etc, porém os problemas das filosofias dessas disciplinas são justamente os problemas mais fundamentais dessas disciplinas, que fundam o quadro conceitual e de pesquisa das mesmas, e que só poderiam (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Truth and Gradability.Jared Henderson - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):755-779.
    I argue for two claims: that the ordinary English truth predicate is a gradable adjective and that truth is a property that comes in degrees. The first is a semantic claim, motivated by the linguistic evidence and the similarity of the truth predicate’s behavior to other gradable terms. The second is a claim in natural language metaphysics, motivated by interpreting the best semantic analysis of gradable terms as applied to the truth predicate. In addition to providing arguments for these two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)Russell’s Paradox and Free Zig Zag Solutions.Ludovica Conti - 2020 - Foundations of Science 28 (1):1-19.
    I present the traditional debate about the so called explanation of Russell’s paradox and propose a new way to solve the contradiction that arises in Frege’s system. I briefly examine two alternative explanatory proposals—the Predicativist explanation and the Cantorian one—presupposed by almost all the proposed solutions of Russell’s Paradox. From the discussion about these proposals a controversial conclusion emerges. Then, I examine some particular zig zag solutions and I propose a third explanation, presupposed by them, in which I emphasise the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Paradox of an Absolute Ineffable God of Islam.Abbas Ahsan - 2019 - Philotheos 19 (2):227-259.
    The laws of logic and two of the broader theories of truth are fundamental components that are responsible for espousing an ontology and meaningfulness in matters of analytic philosophy. In this respect they have persisted as conventional attitudes or modes of thought which most, if not all, of analytic philosophy uses to philosophize. However, despite the conceptual productivity of these components they are unable to account for matters that are beyond them. These matters would include certain theological beliefs, for instance, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Liar Hypodox: A Truth-Teller’s Guide to Defusing Proofs of the Liar Paradox.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2019 - Open Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):152-171.
    It seems that the Truth-teller is either true or false, but there is no accepted principle determining which it is. From this point of view, the Truth-teller is a hypodox. A hypodox is a conundrum like a paradox, but consistent. Sometimes, accepting an additional principle will convert a hypodox into a paradox. Conversely, in some cases, retracting or restricting a principle will convert a paradox to a hypodox. This last point suggests a new method of avoiding inconsistency. This article provides (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Once you think you’re wrong, you must be right: new versions of the preface paradox.John N. Williams - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1801-1825.
    I argue that there are living and everyday case in which rationality requires you, as a non-idealized human thinker, to have inconsistent beliefs while recognizing the inconsistency. I defend my argument against classical and insightful objections by Doris Olin, as well as others. I consider three versions of the preface paradox as candidate cases, including Makinson’s original version. None is free from objection. However, there is a fourth version, Modesty, that supposes that you believe that at least one of your (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the rationality of positive mysterianism.James N. Anderson - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (3):291-307.
    In Paradox in Christian Theology I argued that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are paradoxical—that is, they appear to involve implicit contradictions—yet Christians can still be rational in affirming and believing those doctrines. Dale Tuggy has characterized my theory of theological paradox as a form of “positive mysterianism” and argues that the theory “faces steep epistemic problems, and is at best a temporarily reasonable but ultimately unsustainable stance.” After summarizing my proposed model for the rational affirmation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Liar-type paradoxes and intuitionistic natural deduction systems.Seungrak Choi - 2018 - Korean Journal of Logic 21 (1):59-96.
    It is often said that in a purely formal perspective, intuitionistic logic has no obvious advantage to deal with the liar-type paradoxes. In this paper, we will argue that the standard intuitionistic natural deduction systems are vulnerable to the liar-type paradoxes in the sense that the acceptance of the liar-type sentences results in inference to absurdity (⊥). The result shows that the restriction of the Double Negation Elimination (DNE) fails to block the inference to ⊥. It is, however, not the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Paradoxical hypodoxes.Alexandre Billon - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5205-5229.
    Most paradoxes of self-reference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the Truth-Teller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’). Russell’s paradox, which involves the set of sets that are not self-membered, has a dual involving the set of sets which are self-membered, etc. It is widely believed that these duals are not paradoxical or at least not as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals. In this paper, I argue that some paradox’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Code Words in Political Discourse.Justin Khoo - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):33-64.
    I argue that code words like “inner city” do not semantically encode hidden or implicit meanings, and offer an account of how they nonetheless manage to bring about the surprising effects discussed in Mendelberg 2001, White 2007, and Stanley 2015 (among others).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Fragmented Truth.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    This thesis comprises three main chapters—each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate “true” either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. -/- In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truth-characterizing principles. On behalf of pluralists, I propose an account of logic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic and modern relevance logic.Philipp Steinkrüger - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1413-1444.
    This paper sets out to evaluate the claim that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic is a relevance logic or shows significant similarities with it. I prepare the grounds for a meaningful comparison by extracting the notion of relevance employed in the most influential work on modern relevance logic, Anderson and Belnap’s Entailment. This notion is characterized by two conditions imposed on the concept of validity: first, that some meaning content is shared between the premises and the conclusion, and second, that the premises (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Six Groups of Paradoxes in Ancient China From the Perspective of Comparative Philosophy.Chen Bo - 2014 - Asian Philosophy 24 (4):363-392.
    This paper divides the sophisms and paradoxes put forth by Chinese thinkers of the pre-Qin period of China into six groups: paradoxes of motion and infinity, paradoxes of class membership, semantic paradoxes, epistemic paradoxes, paradoxes of relativization, other logical contradictions. It focuses on the comparison between the Chinese items and the counterparts of ancient Greek and even of contemporary Western philosophy, and concludes that there turn out to be many similar elements of philosophy and logic at the beginnings of Chinese (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Liar-Like Paradoxes and Metalanguage Features.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):61-70.
    In their (2008) article Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features C.S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan (henceforth, JN) argue that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage even though its object language is not semantically closed. I do not take issue with this claim. I find fault though with the following points contained in JN’s article: First, that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage, even though this metalanguage is not semantically closed. Second, that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox.John N. Williams - 2013 - Theoria 81 (1):27-47.
    John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Semantic objects and paradox: a study of Yablo's omega-liar.Benjamin John Hassman - unknown
    To borrow a colorful phrase from Kant, this dissertation offers a prolegomenon to any future semantic theory. The dissertation investigates Yablo's omega-liar paradox and draws the following consequence. Any semantic theory that accepts the existence of semantic objects must face Yablo's paradox. The dissertation endeavors to position Yablo's omega-liar in a role analogous to that which Russell's paradox has for the foundations of mathematics. Russell's paradox showed that if we wed mathematics to sets, then because of the many different possible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2011 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    In this thesis I seek to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that intuitions are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character. -/- In Chapter 1 I identify our target and provide some important reliminaries. Intuitions are mental states, but which ones? Giving examples helps: a person has an intuition when it seems to her that torturing the innocent is wrong, or that if something is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Vaghezza: confini, cumuli e paradossi.Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2012 - Roma: Laterza.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A New–old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge.Ivor Grattan-Guinness - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):245 - 290.
    We seek means of distinguishing logical knowledge from other kinds of knowledge, especially mathematics. The attempt is restricted to classical two-valued logic and assumes that the basic notion in logic is the proposition. First, we explain the distinction between the parts and the moments of a whole, and theories of ?sortal terms?, two theories that will feature prominently. Second, we propose that logic comprises four ?momental sectors?: the propositional and the functional calculi, the calculus of asserted propositions, and rules for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can I kill my younger self? Time travel and the retrosuicide paradox.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):520-534.
    If time travel is possible, presumably so is my shooting my younger self ; then apparently I can kill him – I can commit retrosuicide. But if I were to kill him I would not exist to shoot him, so how can I kill him? The standard solution to this paradox understands ability as compossibility with the relevant facts and points to an equivocation about which facts are relevant: my killing YS is compossible with his proximity but not with his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.
    According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians. Introduction Hempel's (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • The indeterminacy paradox: Character evaluations and human psychology.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):1–42.
    You may not know me well enough to evaluate me in terms of my moral character, but I take it you believe I can be evaluated: it sounds strange to say that I am indeterminate, neither good nor bad nor intermediate. Yet I argue that the claim that most people are indeterminate is the conclusion of a sound argument—the indeterminacy paradox—with two premises: (1) most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations); (2) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Heaps of gluts and Hyde-ing the sorites.JC Beall & Mark Colyvan - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):401--408.
    JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Explanation as a guide to induction.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.
    It is notoriously difficult to spell out the norms of inductive reasoning in a neat set of rules. I explore the idea that explanatory considerations are the key to sorting out the good inductive inferences from the bad. After defending the crucial explanatory virtue of stability, I apply this approach to a range of inductive inferences, puzzles, and principles such as the Raven and Grue problems, and the significance of varied data and random sampling.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • (1 other version)Platitudes against paradox.Sven Rosenkranz & Arash Sarkohi - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):319 - 341.
    We present a strategy to dissolve semantic paradoxes which proceeds from an explanation of why paradoxical sentences or their definitions are semantically defective. This explanation is compatible with the acceptability of impredicative definitions, self-referential sentences and semantically closed languages and leaves the status of the so-called truth-teller sentence unaffected. It is based on platitudes which encode innocuous constraints on successful definition and successful expression of propositional content. We show that the construction of liar paradoxes and of certain versions of Curry’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Politics of Orientation: Deleuze Meets Luhmann.Hannah Richter - 2023 - SUNY Press.
    The Politics of Orientation provides the first substantial exploration of a surprising theoretical kinship and its rich political implications, between Gilles Deleuze's philosophy and the sociological systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. Through their shared theories of sense, Hannah Richter draws out how the works of Luhmann and Deleuze complement each other in creating worlds where chaos is the norm and order the unlikely and yet remarkably stable exception. From the encounter between Deleuze and Luhmann, Richter develops a novel take on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • VI—Paradoxes as Philosophical Method and Their Zenonian Origins.Barbara M. Sattler - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (2):153-181.
    In this paper I show that one of the most fruitful ways of employing paradoxes has been as a philosophical method that forces us to reconsider basic assumptions. After a brief discussion of recent understandings of the notion of paradoxes, I show that Zeno of Elea was the inventor of paradoxes in this sense, against the background of Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’ way of argumentation: in contrast to Heraclitus, Zeno’s paradoxes do not ask us to embrace a paradoxical reality; and in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Solutions to the Knower Paradox in the Light of Haack’s Criteria.Mirjam de Vos, Rineke Verbrugge & Barteld Kooi - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (4):1101-1132.
    The knower paradox states that the statement ‘We know that this statement is false’ leads to inconsistency. This article presents a fresh look at this paradox and some well-known solutions from the literature. Paul Égré discusses three possible solutions that modal provability logic provides for the paradox by surveying and comparing three different provability interpretations of modality, originally described by Skyrms, Anderson, and Solovay. In this article, some background is explained to clarify Égré’s solutions, all three of which hinge on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Beyond the Categories of Truth.Abbas Ahsan - 2021 - Axiomathes 32 (6):1297-1329.
    In the course of this paper, I shall argue that an absolute ineffable God of Islam is contradictory beyond the ordinary categories (substantive or insubstantive) of truth. In order to demonstrate my thesis, I shall refer to a metaphysical and epistemological inquiry. In virtue of both of these inquires, I shall establish that the contradictory assumption ‘the God of Islam is absolutely ineffable’ cannot be false in a substantive or an insubstantive sense. The metaphysical inquiry shall comprise of two related (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Grave Resolution to the Gamer’s Dilemma: an Argument for a Moral Distinction Between Virtual Murder and Virtual Child Molestation.Morgan Luck - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1287-1308.
    In this paper a new resolution to the gamer’s dilemma is presented. The first part of the paper is devoted to strictly formulating the dilemma, and the second to establishing its resolution. The proposed resolution, the grave resolution, aims to resolve not only the gamer’s dilemma, but also a wider set of analogous paradoxes – which together make up the paradox of treating wrongdoing lightly.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox.Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1269-1288.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution to the radical sceptical paradox. A sceptical paradox purports to indicate the inconsistency within our fundamental epistemological commitments that are all seemingly plausible. Typically, sceptics employ an intuitively appealing epistemic principle (e.g., the closure principle, the underdetermination principle) to derive the sceptical conclusion. This paper will reveal a dilemma intrinsic to the sceptical paradox, which I refer to as the self-hollowing problem of radical scepticism. That is, on the one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Non‐Classical Knowledge.Ethan Jerzak - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):190-220.
    The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • (1 other version)Moore’s Paradox and Moral Motivation.Michael Cholbi - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.
    Assertions of statements such as 'it's raining, but I don't believe it' are standard examples of what is known as Moore's paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments. I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be traced to a form of epistemic self-defeat that also explains the paradoxicality of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • “The Ravens Paradox” is a misnomer.Roger Clarke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):427-440.
    I argue that the standard Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox— generally accepted as the most successful solution to the paradox—is insufficiently general. I give an instance of the paradox which is not solved by the standard Bayesian solution. I defend a new, more general solution, which is compatible with the Bayesian account of confirmation. As a solution to the paradox, I argue that the ravens hypothesis ought not to be held equivalent to its contrapositive; more interestingly, I argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • La conoscibilità e i suoi limiti.Davide Fassio - unknown
    The thesis includes six essays, each corresponding to a chapter, which have the target of widening the discussion on the limits of knowability through the consideration of some general problematics and the discussion of specific topics. The work is composed of two parts, each of three chapters. In the first part, the discussion is focused on a perspective proper of the philosophy of language. In particular, I consider the discussion on the limits of knowability from the point of view of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Wittgensteinian solution to the sorites.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 33 (3):229-244.
    I develop a solution to the Sorites Paradox, according to which a concatenation of valid arguments need not itself be valid. I specify which chains of valid arguments are those that do not preserve validity: those that pass the vague boundary between cases where the relevant concept applies and cases where that concept does not apply. I also develop various criticisms of this solution and show why they fail; basically, they all involve a petitio at some stage. I criticise the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Just what is vagueness?Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2012 - Ratio 25 (1):19-33.
    We argue that standard definitions of ‘vagueness’ prejudice the question of how best to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. In particular, the usual understanding of ‘vagueness’ in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth-value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach. According to this latter approach, borderline cases are inconsistent (i.e., glutty not gappy). We suggest that a definition of ‘vagueness’ should be general enough to accommodate any genuine contender in the debate over (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • (1 other version)Moore’s Paradox and Moral Motivation.Michael Cholbi - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.
    Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be traced (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The inclosure scheme and the solution to the paradoxes of self-reference.Jordi Valor Abad - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):183 - 202.
    All paradoxes of self-reference seem to share some structural features. Russell in 1908 and especially Priest nowadays have advanced structural descriptions that successfully identify necessary conditions for having a paradox of this kind. I examine in this paper Priest’s description of these paradoxes, the Inclosure Scheme (IS), and consider in what sense it may help us understand and solve the problems they pose. However, I also consider the limitations of this kind of structural descriptions and give arguments against Priest’s use (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Harmful Research and the Paradox of Credibility.Torsten Wilholt - 2023 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):193-209.
    This paper discusses how to deal with research that threatens to cause harm to society—in particular, whether and in what cases bans and moratoria are appropriate. First, it asks what normative resources philosophy of science may draw on to answer such questions. In an effort to presuppose only resources acknowledgeable across different comprehensive worldviews, it is claimed that the aim of credibility provides a good basis for normative reflection. A close analysis reveals an inner tension inherent in the pursuit of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Filosofía, matemática y paradojas: el caso de la paradoja Burali-Forti en la argumentación de Descartes sobre la existencia de Dios.Henry Sebastián Rangel-Quiñonez & Javier Orlando Aguirre-Román - 2016 - Cuestiones de Filosofía 2 (19):127-152.
    El presente escrito presenta las ventajas y desventajas de la formalización matemática como una herramienta para el análisis de argumentos complejos o difusos en la filosofía. De tal forma, aquí se encuentra un recorrido histórico de algunas consideraciones del papel de las matemáticas en la búsqueda del conocimiento. Posterior a ello, se muestra cómo por medio de la teoría de conjuntos y laabstracción matemática, es posible proponer una reinterpretación de algunos textos filosóficos. Para lograr este objetivo, se presenta, a manera (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Liar Paradox - A Case of Mistaken Truth Attribution.Jasper Doomen - 2023 - Axiomathes 33 (1):1-11.
    A semantic solution to the liar paradox (“This statement is not true”) is presented in this article. Since the liar paradox seems to evince a contradiction, the principle of non-contradiction is preliminarily discussed, in order to determine whether dismissing this principle may be reason enough to stop considering the liar paradox a problem. No conclusive outcome with respect to the value of this principle is aspired to here, so that the inquiry is not concluded at this point and the option (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Russell’s Paradox and Free Zig Zag Solutions.Ludovica Conti - 2020 - Foundations of Science 28 (1):185-203.
    I present the traditional debate about the so called explanation of Russell’s paradox and propose a new way to solve the contradiction that arises in Frege’s system. I briefly examine two alternative explanatory proposals—the Predicativist explanation and the Cantorian one—presupposed by almost all the proposed solutions of Russell’s Paradox. From the discussion about these proposals a controversial conclusion emerges. Then, I examine some particular zig zag solutions and I propose a third explanation, presupposed by them, in which I emphasise the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The paradox paradox.Stuart Brock & Joshua Glasgow - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-7.
    In this paper we argue that our conception of and intuitions about paradoxes are themselves paradoxical. Specifically, we argue that our commitment to the existence and nature of paradoxes is inconsistent with a norm of rationality—which is a paradox.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Deep Disagreement and the Virtues of Argumentative and Epistemic Incapacity.Jeremy Barris - 2018 - Informal Logic 38 (3):369-408.
    Fogelin’s Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement as allowing no rational resolution has been criticized from both argumentation theoretic and epistemological perspectives. These criticisms typically do not recognize how his point applies to the very argumentative resources on which they rely. Additionally, more extremely than Fogelin himself argues, the conditions of deep disagreement make each position literally unintelligible to the other, again disallowing rational resolution. In turn, however, this failure of sense is so extreme that it partly cancels its own meaning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (1 other version)Another Look at the Problem of the Unexpected Examination.Matthew H. Kramer - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (3):491-502.
    RÉSUMÉ: Les philosophes, au cours des cinquante dernières années, se sont efforcés de démontrer qu’un professeur peut, d’une manière cohérente et exacte, annoncer à ses étudiants qu’un examen surprise aura lieu lors d’une journée non spécifiée d’une période donnée, le problème étant qu’une telle annonce peut sembler s’annuler ellemême lorsqu’elle est soumise à une induction régressive. Deux grandes approches, l’une épistémique et l’autre logique, one été développées à ce propos. Le présent article adopte une approche logique, mais repose aussi d’une (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark