Under the lig ht of Being and Nothingness’s the o re t ical body – Sartre’s master piece –, it is intended to discuss the essential source of human reality as “n i h i l a t i o n” and ontological lack, as well as manifestations and cons e q u e nces from this primordial human passion to be transformed to coagulated transcendence, to be transformed in Being In-itself-For-itself: to be consciousness and, at the same t i (...) me, to be a complete and finished Being, with infinite de nsity and witho u t fissures. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Podemos ver na ausência de luz, e ouvir na ausência de som? Em seu livro Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008), Roy Sorensen defende que sim, que podemos ver a escuridão na ausência de luz, e ouvir o silêncio na ausência de som. Neste artigo, defendo que (...) na escuridão nada vemos, no silêncio nada ouvimos, e que experienciar a ausência de luz e som é uma questão afetiva, e não perceptual. (shrink)

Limitless is a movie (released in 2011) as well as a novel (published in 2001) about a tormented author who (plagued by a writer’s block) becomes an early user of an experimental designer drug. The wonder drug makes him highly productive overnight and even allows him to make a fortune on the stock market. At the height of his career, however, the detrimental side-effects become increasingly noticeable. In this article, Limitless is analysed from two perspectives. First of all, building on (...) the views of the French novelist Emile Zola, the novel is seen as the report of a closely monitored experiment. Subsequently, building on the phenomenology of Ludwig Binswanger, I will show how the cognitive enhancement drug not only boosts the protagonist’s information processing capacities, but also modifies his experience of space and time, his sense of spatiality, his way of being-in-the-world. On the basis of these (complementary) analyses I will indicate how genres of the imagination (such as movies and novels) may play a significant role in assessing the societal implications of emerging technological developments such as neuro-enhancement, especially during the preparatory or anticipatory stage. (shrink)

If film immortalises the ephemeral and presentifies the past, this is especially true of home movies, whose content is not the result of a narrative composition or an invention of fiction, but the product of fragments of reality. These three categories – fiction, documentary, and the home movie – have been analysed by Jean-Pierre Meunier and Vivian Sobchack, with an emphasis on the effect that each film mode can have on the spectator, eliciting a particular emotional and cognitive response. But (...) these authors’ models depend entirely on the spectator’s experience to identify each mode, with the home movie being limited to footage in which we can recognise our own families. Nevertheless, a stranger’s home movie can elicit an act of recognition through an intersubjectivity that arises from the footage. On this basis, this article proposes a reading of the home movie as a reliquary of memory, where content and medium intersect to give rise to the particular experience associated with this film mode. (shrink)

By drawing on Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy of ontological relationality, this article explores what it means to be a ‘we’ in breast cancer. What are the characteristics—the extent and diversity—of couples’ relationally lived experiences of bodily changes in breast cancer? Through analyzing duo interviews with diagnosed women and their partners, four ways of sharing an embodied life are identified. While ‘being different together’, partners have different, albeit connected kinds of experiences of breast cancer. While ‘being there for you’, partners take care (...) of each other in mutually dependent ways. While ‘being reconnected to you’, partners relate to each other through intimacy and sexuality. While ‘being like you’, partners synchronize their embodied daily lives to one another, sometimes up to the point that the self cannot be distinguished from the other anymore. These ways reveal that being a ‘we’ involves complex affective, bodily encounters in which the many fault lines that both separate partners into individual selves and join them together as a unity are continuously reshaped and negotiated. Being a ‘we’ may be understood as something we have to do. Therefore, in being true to the legacy of Nancy, we argue at the end of this article for a sensible praxis of sharing a life and body, particularly in breast cancer. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to approach the way in which, in Being and Nothingness, Sartre thinks of conflict as the original way of encountering the other. Conflict is presented as the fundamental ontological dimension of intersubjective relationships. In this sense, the subjectivation-objectification dialectic does not correspond to a political or historical event, but these events are consequences of the ontological structure of human reality.

Some of Wilber’s “holoarchies” are gradations of being, which he views as truth itself; however, being is delusion, and its gradations are gradations of delusion. Wilber’s supposedly universal ontogenetic holoarchy contradicts all Buddhist Paths, whereas his view of phylogeny contradicts Buddhist Tantra and Dzogchen, which claim delusion/being increase throughout the aeon to finally achieve reductio ad absurdum. Wilber presents spiritual healing as ascent; Grof and Washburn represent it as descent—yet they are all equally off the mark. Phenomenologically speaking, the Dzogchen (...) Path is “descending,” but not in Washburn’s or Grof’s sense—and “transpersonal” is not a synonym of “sanity.” A synthesis of Wilber, Grof, Washburn, Jung, Laing, Cooper and non-transpersonal authors in the framework of Wisdom traditions is imperative. (shrink)

These remarks take up the reflexive problematics of Being and Nothingness and related texts from a metalogical perspective. A mutually illuminating translation is posited between, on the one hand, Sartre’s theory of pure reflection, the linchpin of the works of Sartre’s early period and the site of their greatest difficulties, and, on the other hand, the quasi-formalism of diagonalization, the engine of the classical theorems of Cantor, Gödel, Tarski, Turing, etc. Surprisingly, the dialectic of mathematical logic from its inception through (...) the discovery of the diagonal theorems can be recognized as a particularly clear instance of the drama of reflection according to Sartre, especially in the positing and overcoming of its proper value-ideal, viz. the synthesis of consistency and completeness. Conversely, this translation solves a number of systematic problems about pure reflection’s relations to accessory reflection, phenomenological reflection, pre-reflective self-consciousness, conversion, and value. Negative foundations, the metaphysical position emerging from this translation between existential philosophy and metalogic, concurs by different paths with Badiou’s Being and Event in rejecting both ontotheological foundationalisms and constructivist antifoundationalisms. (shrink)

La Zarathoustra de Nietzsche, de son propre aveu l’opus magnum de Nietzsche a toujours été appréhendé sous l’angle de ses contenus et de ses thématiques : volonté de puissance, surhumain, éternel retour. Le vitalisme de Nietzsche, illustré par ces trois enseignements centraux de Zarathoustra, a rarement été recherché dans la forme et les caractéristiques précises d’un discours qui se voulait pourtant novateur et que l’on pouvait supposer — à l’opposé du discours neutre et reproducteur de la tradition philosophique — chercher (...) à être lui-même « vital ». Pour les mêmes raisons, comment a-t-on pu négliger à ce point l’impact communicationnel qu’un tel discours se devait de produire sur ses lecteurs, à l’image du discours prosélyte que Zarathoustra adresse sans cesse à ses auditoires ? Si Zarathoustra est une apologie du vouloir exacerbé sous toutes ses formes, ne fallait-il pas justement qu’il fût un appel à vouloir, un manifeste plutôt qu’un traité. C’est ce renouveau qu’apporte le discours nietzschéen dans le discours philosophique séculaire, c’est sa fonction appellative que nous entendons analyser ici à l’aide d’une panoplie d’outils linguistiques allant de la morphosyntaxe aux modèles actantiels, mais toujours dans l’objectif de replacer ces caractéristiques dans une perspective philosophique.Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, the philosophical work that the philosopher regarded as his magnum opus, has always been approached through its contents and themes : the will to power, the Übermensch, Overman, eternal recurrence. Nietzsche’s “vitalism,” as illustrated by Zarathustra’s three central teachings, has rarely been sought in the form and precise characteristics of a discourse that was intended to be innovative and could therefore itself be expected to be “vital,” . Allowing this hypothesis, we must ask how interpreters could ignoreFor the same reasons, how could interpreters ignore to such an extent the communicative impact that such a discourse was intended to produce on its readers, following in its way the proselytizing discourse that Zarathustra restlessly addressed to his audiences ? If Zarathustra represents the apologia of an exacerbated will in all its forms, is it not logical to regard Nietzsche’s work as an appeal intended to strengthen that will ; as a manifesto rather than a treatise ? It is thus the renewal that Nietzsche’s discourse brings to traditional philosophical discourse andthe appellative function it fulfills that we will analyse here, using a variety of linguistic tools ranging from morphosyntax to actantial models. Our aim will invariably be to set these features in a philosophical perspective and framework. (shrink)

The specter of the ‘group mind’ or ‘collective subject’ plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality does not necessarily have to get (...) stuck with some collectivist super-agent. Rather, the specter of the group mind arises from a deep-seated ‘Cartesian’ preconception concerning intentionality, which we should try to overcome. (shrink)

This special issue focuses on the theoretical, empirical and practical integrations between embodied cognition theory and educational science. The key question is: Can EC constitute a new theoretical framework for educational science and practice? The papers of the special issue support the efforts of those interested in the role of EC in education and in the epistemological convergence of EC and educational science. They deal with a variety of relevant topics in education and offer a focus on the role of (...) the body and embodied experience in learning and educational settings. In conclusion, some further topics are suggested that will need to be investigated in the future, such as a critical evaluation of the possibility for an epistemological alliance between educational theory and embodied cognition, and the contribution that enactive cognition can provide to educational systems, organizations, institutions and policies. (shrink)

BackgroundPrevious empirical work among physicians has led us to propose that clinical practice is experienced by clinicians as an engagement-in-the-clinical-situation. In this study, we pursue our exploration of clinical practice ‘on its own terms’ by turning to the experience of patients.MethodsPhenomenological analysis of in-depth individual interviews with 8 patients.ResultsWe describe the patient experience as a set of three motifs: the shock on the realization of the illness, the chaos of the health care environment, and the anchor point provided by an (...) engaged physician. We draw on Heidegger’s notion of solicitude to show that patients are actively ascertaining the physician’s engagement in their care.ConclusionsThese findings lead us to question the classical “dual discourse” of medicine that offers a dichotomous account of clinical practice as the addition of care to cure, art to science, humanism to technique, and person to medical case. We found no such distinctions in our empirical investigation of clinical practice. Rather, in our synthesis, practice appears as a unitary experience. The physician’s solicitude for the patient entrains engagement in the clinical situation. Moreover, the solicitous, engaged physician constitutes an anchor point for the patient. (shrink)

The pair-bond model of human origin proposed by Lovejoy in his “Reexamining Human Origins in Light of Ardipithecus ramidus” combines fossil records with the unique sexual behavior of modern humans. This construct, however, seems to lack an emotionally important element. By connecting ovulatory crypsis with frontal copulation and face-to-face contact, the transition to the complexity and subtlety of human emotional life becomes more evident. Reproductive success and emotional representation are considered as two interacting levels in the phylogenetic scale. Thus, the (...) behavioral frame of sociobiology is extended to psychobiological phenomena and a bridge is built between natural sciences and philosophy. Light from both sides will be thrown on the origin of man, including his unique cultural history. (shrink)

Sartre’s account of the emotions presupposes a conception of human nature that is never fully articulated. The paper aims to render such conception explicit and to argue that frustration occupies a foundational place in Sartre’s picture of affective existence.

_Essays on Beauvoir’s influences, contemporary engagements, and legacy in the philosophical tradition._.

Freud's account of repression retains vestiges of the Cartesian model of the mind. Sartre's argument against Freud is essentially an objection to this Cartesian aspect, which Sartre's own theory of bad faith dispenses with.

Purpose. Based on actualization of gender discursive features, the current piece aims to clarify and accentuate the manifestation of gender-philosophical ideas interaction: feminism in the framework of objectivism. The source material for the current article is a novel by Ayn Rand "Atlas Shrugged", which is a philosophical work on objectivism. Theoretical basis. The development of the gender discourse, in particular the discourse of feminism is researched from the retrospective angle. This piece is an attempt to underline peculiarities of female artistic (...) images representation in Rand’s work and the way Rand’s novel influenced the logical development of feminist discourse. Discourse of feminism is a rather peculiar notion for Objectivism, where the notion of gender is, theoretically, annihilated as far as gender is irrelevant for both personal and professional growth, however, practically, gender representation and actualization is ubiquitous in Rand’s philosophy. Originality. The distinctive features of gender discourse in Objectivism are highlighted in this piece; the results are based on the application of comparative analysis. It is argued that philosophy itself may well be perceived through a literary work of fiction, thus making artistic images prototypes of philosophy functionaries. Conclusion. "Atlas Shrugged" is not merely a literary fiction, but rather a philosophical treatise on Objectivism, which is a philosophy of individual struggle and achievement. The main female protagonist of "Atlas Shrugged", Dagny Taggart, is a staunch supporter of Objectivism. In Rand’s opinion Dagny Taggart is a prototype of a true woman of utopian American capitalist society, and it is her artistic image that was misinterpreted by supporters of feminist movement ideas and Dagny Taggart became an icon of feminism, whereas in reality Dagny’s discourse is rather a discourse of femininity, for Dagny despises everything that is connected with feminist ideas and practices, and, it is an error to weave her discourse into a much wider feminist discourse. (shrink)

In his book The Conscious Mind David Chalmers introduced a by now familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers, 1996, 4, 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means (...) of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem—also known as the problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995, 201)—is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee’, to ‘touch an ice cube’, to ‘look at a sunset’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it at all feel like anything? Chalmers’s distinction confronts us with a version of the so-called ‘explanatory gap’. On the one hand, we have certain cognitive functions, which can apparently be explained reductively, and on the other hand, we have a number of experiential qualities, which seem to resist this reductive explanation. We can establish that a certain function is accompanied by a certain experience, but we have no idea why that happens, and regardless of how closely we scrutinize the neural mechanisms we don’t seem to be getting any closer at an answer. In his book, Chalmers also distinguished two concepts of mind: a phenomenal concept and a psychological concept. The first captures the conscious aspect of mind: Mind is understood in terms of conscious experience. The second concept understands mind in functional terms as the causal or explanatory basis for behavior.. (shrink)

This paper offers a partial defence of the Epicurean claim that death is not bad for the one who dies. Unlike Epicurus and his present-day advocates, this defence relies not on a hedonistic or empiricist conception of value but on the concept of ‘existential’ value. Existential value is agent-relative value for which it is constitutive that it can be truly self-ascribed in the first person and present tense. From this definition, it follows that death (post-mortem non-existence), while perhaps bad in (...) some respects, cannot be an existential harm for the one who dies. This paper argues that existential goods are central to any explanation of why life appears good to us from a self-interested perspective, which means that death is not bad in the very respect in which life is most saliently good (from that perspective). A corresponding error theory shows why this truth is easily overlooked and explains why we tend to think that death is significantly worse than it really is. (shrink)

In this article I undertake an analysis of erotic sexual intercourse - commonly, and more accurately, designated as love-making - in the spirit of Durkheim's social analysis of religion. Thus, based on a phenomenological semiotic analysis of the peculiar things we do and feel in the course of making love, I propose, first, to uncover the implicit `logic' that generates and governs these distinctly sociable doings and sociable feelings. Second, I proceed to suggest that the sameself logic, albeit in an (...) attenuated version, also generates and governs the broad class of `social occasions proper', and that this homology calls for gathering erotic and social occasions under one and the same rubric, which I propose to call the `socio-erotic' (since the term `social' has been denatured through overuse). Third, I conclude with a discussion of how socio-erotic domains fit into a larger world structured and governed mainly by interest-driven and power-driven conflictual fields. (shrink)

RESUMEN Tal como el siglo XX fue aquel de la fenomenología, el siglo XXI se caracteriza por el auge de los realismos. Se podría pensar que este cambio marca un giro radical en la filosofía. No obstante, es de recordar que en 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre quiso construir, desde la fenomenología, un neorrealismo absoluto que pueda conservar cierto realismo dentro de la fenomenología. Mediante una lectura de El ser y la nada se propone mostrar que el neorrealismo absoluto impone superar la (...) dicotomía entre idealismo y realismo gracias a la transfenomenicidad de dos seres; y, además, desplazar la tarea descriptiva y constitutiva de la fenomenología hacia un trabajo de revelación. ABSTRACT If the twentieth century was that of phenomenology, the twenty-first is characterized by the rise of multiple realisms. Although one might think that this is a radical turn in contemporary philosophy, it should be remembered that, in 1943, Jean-Paul Sartre tried to establish an absolute neorealism which wanted to preserve a certain realism within phenomenology. Through a reading of Being and nothingness, the author shows that absolute neorealism enables the dichotomy between idealism and realism to be surpassed, thanks to the transphenomenality of two beings and, in addition, imposes a displacement of the descriptive and constitutive task of phenomenology towards a work of revelation. (shrink)

Can we really perceive absences, i.e., missing things? Sartre tells us that when he arrived late for his appointment at the café, he saw the absence of his friend Pierre. Is that really what he saw? Where was it, exactly? Why didn’t Sartre see the absence of other people who were not there? Why did other people who were there not see the absence of Pierre? The perception of absences gives rise to a host of conundrums and is constantly on (...) the verge of conceptual confusion. Here I focus on the need to be clear about four sorts of distinctions: (i) the difference between perceiving an absence and perceiving something that is absent; (ii) the difference between perceiving an absence and an absence of perceiving; (iii) the difference between perceiving an absence and perceiving something as an absence; and (iv) the difference between perceiving an absence and perceiving that something is absent. (shrink)

This paper offers a reading of Beauvoir’s Second Sex as a genealogy of ‘morality’: the patriarchal system of values that maintains a moral distinction between men and women. This value system construes many of women’s experiences under oppression as evidence of women’s immorality, obscuring the agential role of those who provoke such experiences. Beauvoir’s examination of the origin for this value system provides an important counterexample to the prevailing debate over whether genealogical method functions to debunk or to vindicate: while (...) the currently dominant moral system may have been historically necessary at certain stages in human development, Beauvoir nevertheless debunks it; only the value system itself now remains, without its precipitating needs. Thus, Beauvoir’s critique reveals what I call the moral unintelligibility of women’s experiences of oppression: women encounter difficulty in making sense of the harms wrought against them because the operative value system obscures them as harms in the first place, instead construing women themselves as immoral. Against the prevailing construction of moral blame and responsibility, Beauvoir’s solution is the political virtue of moral invention, a virtue epistemic as well as moral, collective as well as individual. (shrink)

The present paper is a practical supplement to an earlier theoretical work by the author, published in a preceding issue, on methodological foundations of the European philosophizing in the aspect of sophical synthesis. Building upon understanding of general philosophical methodologies and their ‘epochal’ implementations as presented there, the author makes use of a cross-cutting example, to show ‘zones of responsibility’ and onto-gnoseo-epistemological limits for every mentioned ‘way towards the thing.’ Six marker packages should be of special professional interest as proposed (...) by the author to identify methodological attitudes and ‘edge’ cases ranging from Antiquity to nowadays. Validity of each and all of these packages has been illustrated with proper textual material, i. e. fragments from essays by renowned European philosophers.In § 1, the naturalistic methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the proper vital aspect of sophical synthesis; its characteristic reliance on experience, fact, belief, opinion, and authority, and thereby on the rhetorical aspect of philosophizing, is explained.In § 2, the phenomenological methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the proper knowledge aspect of sophical synthesis; its characteristic reliance on knowledge and sense beyond any non-essential per se factual ways things are given, is explained.In § 3, the transcendental methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the synthesis of knowledge and life by means of knowledge in the aspect of logos of the logos per se; its characteristic reliance on sense being a sense in the making, and on fact as the bearer of a sense, with their integration in a common logical-conceptual thing structure, is explained.In § 4, the dialectic methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the synthesis of knowledge and life by means of knowledge in the aspect of logos of the eidos; its characteristic reliance on intelligent thing as a unit of sense and a product of senseful self-development wherein not only the thing is posited, but the entire otherness as defined by it as well, is explained.In § 5, the mythological methodological attitude is considered, as focused on the synthesis of knowledge and life in the aspect of their integral arrangement as vivid mind; its characteristic reliance on intelligent thing as a real and self-evident in its unicity live being, is explained.In § 6, the hermeneutical methodological attitude, as focused on the synthesis of knowledge and life in the aspect of its naming as an intelligent expression of thing for the other; its characteristic reliance on the name and text as a full expression of sense and a full knowledge of fact being revealed in the truth of thing, is explained. (shrink)

This essay attempts to assess whether the perceptual issues posed by the contemporary interface culture, and the constant attitude shift demanded by the new media between the “natural” and the “as if” modes, might be considered a significant challenge for phenomenological aesthetics as understood in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. To demonstrate how the use of a particular interface profoundly shapes the form and structure of an activity as well as enabling perception of a particular kind, the author does (...) not focus directly on the state-of-the-art smart interfaces, but describes the experience of cycling in a large city, with the interface in the form of the bicycle upgraded with an imagined ride simulator. While the former enables a very particular entrance into the world of perception, shaped by its moderate speed and detachment from the ground, the latter enables techno-shaped perception in the “as if” screenic mode. The experience described raises questions concerning the kinaesthetic, proprioceptive and motor features contributing to the cyclist’s mobile perception, as well as pointing to issues related to the reading of the city’s network as a particular spatial configuration generated by the cyclist’s realtime activity. This is the space-time-event-ridescape maintained and modified by the corporeal act of cycling. The spatiality of such a ride does not presume the notion of a space that contains the cyclist, but builds on notions of being-in-the-ridescape (as a kind of cityscape), in terms not only of full corporeal and mental engagement, but also of bodily literacy. The reading of the cityscape enabled by the combination of two interfaces, the bicycle and the ride simulator, is discussed in relation to de Certeau’s account of pedestrian (walking) experience in a big city, his distinction between strategies and tactics, and the notion that each cyclist contributes a novel story to ridetext, which is viewed not as an aesthetic object but as the production of puzzles for the rider to solve. The paper cocludes by questioning the capacity of phenomenology to accommodate the contemporary phenomenon of a “mixed” or “augmented reality” either in concept or in relation to the demands of the phenomenological reduction and the ends of the epoché. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 10, Edition 2, October 2010: 61-71. (shrink)

Este artigo busca compreender qual o estatuto que a ideia de fundamento recebe na filosofia de Sartre enquanto uma ontologia existencial, isto é, enquanto uma filosofia que compreende o homem em sua finitude. Para isso, procura realizar uma análise da presença da Metafísica, sobretudo em O Ser e o Nada, com relação ao problema metafísico desenvolvido na obra: o surgimento do nada no ser. Por fim, procura, por meio desta análise, compreender o estatuto da finitude na mesma obra.

The aim of this paper is to critique the individualistic ontological premises of ‘self-directed learning’, as it has been developed in humanist education literature in the tradition of Carl Rogers. The authors suggest instead that social-transformative education and its critical social ontology serve the emancipatory promise of education better while offering the possibility to tackle the collective challenges of our time. Beginning with an analysis of Rogers’ concepts of Self, Knowledge and Society, the authors aim to show that self-directed learning (...) fails to live up to its emancipatory promise. Instead, the paper picks up and develops on a debate in the early SDL literature between Rogers and Paulo Freire, suggesting that Freire’s ontological premises are incompatible with those of Rogers, yet better prepare students to identify and face social problems. The authors further develop this point through the cultural-historical analysis of speech of Lev Vygotsky, cementing a social understanding of the Self as the foundation of social-transformative education. The paper concludes on the implications of this analysis for educational practice. (shrink)

In this article it will be argued that it is a misapprehension to think that there is just one ‘state of affairs’ within an organization. Yet, many organizations seriously try to create the impression that there is indeed just one state of affairs. This certainly goes for hierarchically structured organizations. Therefore, various imbroglios and paradoxes arising in this way will here be briefly highlighted.

Abstract The specter of the ?group mind? or ?collective subject? plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality does not necessarily have to (...) get stuck with some collectivist super-agent. Rather, the specter of the group mind arises from a deep-seated ?Cartesian? preconception concerning intentionality, which we should try to overcome. *I am greatly indebted to Raimo Tuomela for his comments. Also, I wish to thank Michael Bratman, Fabienne Peter, Richard Raatzsch and Katrin Meyer. (shrink)

Idealism is the core of the Pratyabhijñã philosophy: the main goal of Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–950 AD) and of his commentator Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025 AD) is to establish that nothing exists outside of consciousness. In the course of their demonstration, these Śaiva philosophers endeavour to distinguish their idealism from that of a rival system, the Buddhist Vijñānavāda. This article aims at examining the concept of otherness (paratva) as it is presented in the Pratyabhijñā philosophy in contrast with that of (...) the Vijñānavādins’. Although, according to the Pratyabhijñā, the other subjects are not ultimately real since all subjects are nothing but limited manifestations of a single absolute subject, the fact that we are aware of their existence in the practical world has to be accounted for. The Vijñānavādins explain it by arguing the we infer the others’ existence. The Pratyabhijñā philosophers, while refuting their opponents’ reasoning as it is expounded in Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi, develop a particulary original analysis of our awareness of the others, stating that this awareness is neither a perception (pratyakṣa) nor an inference (anumāna), but rather a guess (ūha) in which we sense the others’ freedom (svātantrya). (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo tem por objetivo apontar uma relação entre a estética e a ética em Sartre, mostrando que a constituição ética do indivíduo não se distingue da sua constituição estética. Primeiramente, parte-se da crítica que Merle faz em seu artigo à psicanálise existencial e se evidencia como o encontro com a história e a postulação de uma teoria da personalização nas obras biográficas destituem tais críticas. Num segundo momento, legitimam-se as postulações anteriores, apontando-se como na obra Saint Genet Sartre (...) ratifica a constituição do gosto sobre a moral pelo processo de personalização. Por fim, será visto que toda ética tem um pressuposto transgressor, na medida em que o sujeito ético é também sujeito estético.: This article aims to point out a relation between aesthetics and ethics in Sartre, showing that the ethical constitution of the individual does not distinguish from his or her aesthetic constitution. First, we start from Merle’s criticism of existential psychoanalysis, and we show how such criticisms can be dismissed on the basis of the encounter with history and the postulation of a theory of personalization in biographical works. Second, we point out how Sartre, in his Saint Genet, ratifies the constitution of a taste regarding the moral by the process of personalization. Finally, we will see that all ethics have a transgressive presupposition insofar as the ethical subject is also an aesthetic subject. (shrink)

O artigo examina a concepção de consciência de Jean-Paul Sartre – especialmente a partir das distinções entre consciência posicional e consciência não posicional, e entre consciência irrefletida e consciência reflexiva – do ponto de vista de três teorias atuais, oriundas da filosofia da mente. Enquanto a abordagem de ordem superior é oposta à visão de Sartre, a perspectiva da intrinsicalidade ampla corresponde ao propósito dele de pensar a consciência como algo uno. Mas a opção mais promissora para elucidar a concepção (...) de Sartre é o modelo da integração através dos níveis, pois esse modelo pensa a unidade da consciência de forma não arbitrária e em termos de uma efetiva unidade. (shrink)

Sensory ecology is a discipline that focuses on how living creatures use information to survive, but not to live. By trans-defining the orthodox concept of sensory ecology, a serious heterodox question arises: how do organisms use their senses to live, i.e. to enjoy or suffer life? To respond to such a query the objective and emotional meaning of symbols must be revealed. Our program is distinct from both the neo-Darwinian and the classical ecological perspective because it does not focus on (...) survival values of phenotypes and their functions, but asks for the aesthetic effect of biological structures and their symbolism. Our message recognizes that sensing apart from having a survival value also has a beauty value. Thus, we offer a provoking and inspiring new view on the sensory relations of ‘living things’ and their surroundings, where the innovating power of feelings have more weight than the privative power of reason. (shrink)

This paper focusses on two prima facie independent assumptions of a – broadly – “Heideggerian” approach to moods: One concerning an apparent methodological impact of moods for a fundamental-ontological enterprise and one concerning a presumed human tendency towards Verfallenheit or inauthenticity. It shows that the liaison of those two assumptions challenges theoretical claims according to which subjects are simply assailed by moods and passive with respect to being in a mood. To do so, it follows Heidegger’s reflections on the methodological (...) impact of moods before turning to Heidegger’s considerations about the fundamental disclosure of what he calls the “burden of existence” in anxiety, a burden which – according to Heidegger – we tend to evade most of the time. This paper suggests that the “evasive” character of this tendency is linked to Heidegger’s claim that anxiety latently structures being-in-the-world and that Heidegger’s brief allusion to a difference between the fact of attuned disclosure and conceding to a mood and to that which it discloses is his attempt to hint at what this ‘latency’ of anxiety might amount to. The focus, then, turns to Sartre, who not only shares Heidegger’s two assumptions but also emphasizes that if one wishes to make sense of such a structuring of life by a latent mood, a theory of moods should be saddled with a theory of la mauvaise foi, or self-deception in the broad sense. (shrink)

In his later works, Merleau-Ponty proposes the notion of ‘the flesh’ (la chair) as a new ‘element’, as he put it, in his ontological monism designed to overcome the legacy of Cartesian dualism with its bifurcation of all things into matter or spirit. Most Merleau-Ponty commentators recognise that Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’ is inspired by Edmund Husserl's conceptions of ‘lived body’ (Leib) and ‘vivacity’ or ‘liveliness’ (Leiblichkeit). But it is not always recognised that, for Merleau-Ponty, the constitution of the world (...) of perception, the problem of embodiment or incarnation, is at the very same time one with the problem of the experience of others in what Husserl called Einfühlung or Fremderfahung and indeed one with the problem of the constitution of the commonly shared world ‘for all’. As Merleau-Ponty put it in his late essay ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’ in Signs, ‘the problem of Einfühlung, like that of my incarnation, opens on the meditation of sensible being, or, if you prefer, it betakes itself there’. In other words, the problem of the apprehension of the other is part of the overall apprehension of the transcendent world. In this paper I want to meditate on the relations between embodiment, experience of others, and experience of the world in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. I will take particular note, as in the title of this presentation, of the claim made by Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible that ‘there is no brute world, only an elaborated world’ (il n'y a pas de monde brut, il n'y a qu'un monde élaboré). (shrink)

This essay explores the nature of being visible and its normative dimensions. In a first part, core traits of an anthropology of visibility are sketched, drawing mainly on Hans Blumenberg’s phenomenological studies. In a second part, human visibility is investigated regarding its implications for our self-understanding, for our relation to others, and for the publicness of our existence. Apart from Blumenberg, also Jean-Paul Sartre, Charles Taylor, Hannah Arendt are involved in this examination. In a third part, two ‘basic rights’ are (...) brought into focus: the right to be seen and the right to remain unseen. In addition to the philosophical exploration, texts by Ralph Ellison, Elena Ferrante and Dave Eggers are discussed as literary references. In a fourth part, a performance by Marina Abramovic that thematised the connection of visibility and recognition is introduced and analysed. (shrink)

O artigo tem como objetivo inicial apresentar, a partir de um panorama geral, alguns elementos centrais da concepção de moral no pensamento de Simone de Beauvoir, bem como suas articulações com outros conceitos pertinentes. A partir disso, pretende-se considerar determinadas apropriações e críticas de teóricas feministas recentes, buscando avaliar as possíveis contribuições do pensamento de Beauvoir à filosofia moral de viés feminista.