Transhumanists exuberantly promise a posthuman future better than anything we can possibly imagine. But speculation about a perfect future is hardly new. It has longstanding mythological roots that betray a very human ambition—to free ourselves from what limits us. These connections shed light on how the transhumanist movement wins adherents and affects policy.

Human enhancement has emerged in recent years as a blossoming topic in applied ethics. With continuing advances in science and technology, people are beginning to realize that some of the basic parameters of the human condition might be changed in the future. One important way in which the human condition could be changed is through the enhancement of basic human capacities. If this becomes feasible within the lifespan of many people alive today, then it is important now to consider the (...) normative questions raised by such prospects. The answers to these questions might not only help us be better prepared when technology catches up with imagination, but they may be relevant to many decisions we make today, such as decisions about how much funding to give to various kinds of research. Enhancement is typically contraposed to therapy. In broad terms, therapy aims to fix something that has gone wrong, by curing specific diseases or injuries, while enhancement interventions aim to improve the state of an organism beyond its normal healthy state. However, the distinction between therapy and enhancement is problematic, for several reasons. First, we may note that the therapy-enhancement dichotomy does not map onto any corresponding dichotomy between standard-contemporary-medicine and medicineas-it-could-be-practised-in-the-future. Standard contemporary medicine includes many practices that do not aim to cure diseases or injuries. It includes, for example, preventive medicine, palliative care, obstetrics, sports medicine, plastic surgery, contraceptive devices, fertility treatments, cosmetic dental procedures, and much else. At the same time, many enhancement interventions occur outside of the medical framework. Office workers enhance their performance by drinking coffee. Make-up and grooming are used to enhance appearance. Exercise, meditation, fish oil, and St John’s Wort are used to enhance mood. Second, it is unclear how to classify interventions that reduce the probability of disease and death.. (shrink)

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 190-227, May 2022. There is a sense of fairness that is distinctive of markets. This is fairness among economic competitors, competitive fairness. We regularly make judgments of competitive fairness about market participants, public policies and institutions. However, it is not clear to what these judgments refer, or what moral significance they have. This paper offers a rational reconstruction of competitive fairness in terms of non-domination. It first identifies competitive fairness as a (...) distinctive claim, advanced within markets in turn characterized as antagonistic, instrumental and procedural. It distinguishes competitive fairness from a number of familiar ideals with which it might be confused: legitimate expectation, equality of opportunity, sporting fairness and economic efficiency. While many exponents likely assume competitive fairness can be explained in terms of one of these ideals, in each case there are significant objections to doing so. Instead, the paper argues that the most promising justification of competitive fairness is under the republican ideal of non-domination, which can reconstruct many of the intuitive judgments of competitive fairness that we make in particular cases. However, it concludes, this explanation makes it difficult for exponents to continue to emphasize competitive fairness, given diverse other risks of domination, and to other values, in markets. (shrink)

In enhancement ethics, evolutionary theory has been largely perceived as supporting liberal views on enhancement, where decisions to enhance are predominantly regulated by the principle of individual autonomy. In this paper I critique this perception in light of recent scientific developments. Cultural evolutionary theory suggests a picture where individual interests are entangled with community interests, and this undermines the applicability of the principle of autonomy. This is particularly relevant for enhancement ethics, given how – I argue – decisions to enhance (...) are often influenced by desires to increase social status. The “service view on enhancement”, based on principles of service and trust, is proposed as offering better guidance for the challenges of social living. (shrink)

The most plausible line of anti-doping argumentation starts with the fact that performance enhancing substances are harmful and put at considerable risk the health and the life of those who indulge in the overwhelming promises these substances hold. From a liberal point of view, however, this is not a strong reason neither to morally reject doping altogether, nor to put a blanket ban on it; on the contrary, allowing adult, competent and informed athletes to have access to performance enhancement drugs (...) is often showcased as a liberty-related right of noninterference. In this article I will first discuss doping from the liberal point of view, especially in the light of the harm principle as it was introduced by Mill and elaborated by his successors, most notably by Joel Feinberg. Then I will examine whether – and to what degree – one’s decision to receive performance enhancement drugs would mean to use humanity in one’s own person only as a means, which would be self-defeating in the light of Kantian ethics. From this I will move one step backwards to what I consider as the core question concerning the ethics of doping, the one that is logically prior to any other in my view, and concerns the consistency of the thesis that doping may be compatible with sport. I will argue that there is an inherent logical antinomy between doing sport and using performance enhancement drugs, one that presents any argumentation in favor of doping as essentially self-contradictory. (shrink)

This article discusses substances/techniques that target the brain in order to enhance sports performance (known as “neurodoping”). It considers whether neurodoping in mind sports, such as chess, is unethical and whether it should be a crime. Rather than focusing on widely discussed objections against doping based on harm/risk to health, this article focuses specifically on the objection that neurodoping, even if safe, would undermine the “spirit of sport”. Firstly, it briefly explains why chess can be considered a sport. Secondly, it (...) outlines some possible substances/methods that could be used in order to enhance chess performance and justifies the article’s focus on one potential form of neurodoping in particular – “mental stamina enhancement”. Thirdly, this article casts doubt on certain arguments that mental stamina enhancement would be unethical and contrary to the spirit of sport (as defined by WADA). This article stresses the importance of distinguishing the ethical argument that doping violates the “spirit of sport” from the definitional objection that once doping becomes routine in a certain “sport”, it would not count as a sport anymore. The fourth section discusses the definitional objection and argues that mental stamina enhancement in chess might disqualify chess from being a “sport” (according to traditional, rather than revisionist definitions of sport). Yet, it argues that this definitional objection does not provide strong enough grounds to justify the state or sports authorities imposing severe penalties (such as criminalisation or life-long suspensions from competing) for non-harmful neurodoping. The fifth section of the article argues that criminalising non-harmful neurodoping would be disproportionate. (shrink)

This article argues that performance enhancing drugs ought to be allowed across all elite sporting competitions for athletes over the age of 16 so long as consuming them does not pose a significant risk to their health. I begin with a brief explanation of the current state of PED use in professional sports before assessing the prospect of allowing PEDs by three widely accepted measures of ethical merit: well-being, autonomy, and justice. I end with a critique of the World Anti-Doping (...) Agency's criteria for banning PEDs, concluding that allowing athletes to use PEDs is a superior alternative to the current prohibitive approach. (shrink)

One frequently used argument in the discussion on human enhancement is that enhancement is a form of cheating. This argument is well-known in relation to doping in sports, but recently it has also been used with regard to cognitive enhancement in the context of education and exams. This paper analyses the enhancement-is-cheating argument by comparing sports and education, and by evaluating how the argument can be interpreted in both contexts. If cheating is understood as breaking the rules in order to (...) gain an unfair advantage over others, it can be argued that some enhancements are a form of cheating. This problem of cheating is, however, relatively easy to remedy by either changing the rules, or by instituting controls and sanctions. This does not, therefore, constitute a categorical objection to enhancement. A further analysis of the intuitions behind the enhancement-is-cheating argument, however, shows that if sports and education are understood as “practices”, with their own internal goods and standards of excellence, some potential problems of enhancement can be articulated. These concern the internal goods and standards of excellence that are characteristic of specific practices. Seen from this perspective, the important question is how enhancement technologies might be embedded in specific practices—or how they might corrode them. (shrink)

There is increasing interest in using neuro-stimulation devices to achieve an ergogenic effect in elite athletes. Although the World Anti-Doping Authority does not currently prohibit neuro-stimulation techniques, a number of researchers have called on WADA to consider its position on this issue. Focusing on trans-cranial direct current stimulation as a case study of an imminent so-called ‘neuro-doping’ intervention, we argue that the emerging evidence suggests that tDCS may meet WADA’s own criteria for a method’s inclusion on its list of prohibited (...) substances and methods. We begin by surveying WADA’s general approach to doping, and highlight important limitations to the current evidence base regarding the performance-enhancing effect of pharmacological doping substances. We then review the current evidence base for the safety and efficacy of tDCS, and argue that despite significant shortcomings, there may be sufficient evidence for WADA to consider prohibiting tDCS, in light of the comparable flaws in the evidence base for pharmacological doping substances. In the second half of the paper, we argue that the question of whether WADA ought to ban tDCS turns significantly on the question of whether it is compatible with the ‘spirit of sport’ criterion. We critique some of the previously published positions on this, and advocate our own sport-specific and application-specific approach. Despite these arguments, we finally conclude by suggesting that tDCS ought to be monitored rather than prohibited due to compelling non-ideal considerations. (shrink)

I present a corrective to the formalist and conventionalist down-playing of physical actions in the understanding of the value of sport. I give a necessarily brief account of the Causal Theory of Action (CTA) and its implications for the normativity of actions. I show that the CTA has limitations, particularly in the case of failed or incomplete actions, and I show that failed or incomplete actions are constitutive of sport. This allows me to open up the space for another model, (...) drawn from Aristotle, for failed or incomplete actions, conceived of as ‘doables.’ This avoids some of the problems of the CTA. I explain the importance of difficult but doable actions, at which athletes often fail, and suggest that this establishes pro tanto value. Finally, I claim that this account of the actions that are constitutive of sport deepens our understanding of the value of sport as a whole. (shrink)

Some philosophers and theologians have argued against the idea of Human Enhancement, saying that human beings should not play God. A closer look, however, might reveal that the question of who is playing Whom is far from being so clear-cut. This chapter will address the idea of human enhancement from the standpoint of theistic theology, arguing that human enhancement and theistic theology may not be so very incompatible, after all.

Ethical debate surrounding human enhancement, especially by biotechnological means, has burgeoned since the turn of the century. Issues discussed include whether specific types of enhancement are permissible or even obligatory, whether they are likely to produce a net good for individuals and for society, and whether there is something intrinsically wrong in playing God with human nature. We characterize the main camps on the issue, identifying three main positions: permissive, restrictive and conservative positions. We present the major sub-debates and lines (...) of argument from each camp. The review also gives a flavor of the general approach of key writers in the literature such as Julian Savulescu, Nick Bostrom, Michael Sandel, and Leon Kass. (shrink)

Current anti-doping in competitive sports is advocated for reasons of fair-play and concern for the athlete's health. With the inception of the World Anti Doping Agency (WADA), anti-doping effort has been considerably intensified. Resources invested in anti-doping are rising steeply and increasingly involve public funding. Most of the effort concerns elite athletes with much less impact on amateur sports and the general public.

Ob eine sportliche Leistung anerkannt wird, hängt maßgeblich davon ab, ob sie im Einklang mit Werten steht, die wir für wesentlich für den Sport halten. Die philosophischen Standardargumente gegen Doping im Sport behaupten eine Unvereinbarkeit von Doping mit Werten wie Fairness, Gesundheit oder Natürlichkeit. Ich möchte im Gegensatz zu diesen Argumenten eine grundsätzliche Unvereinbarkeit von Doping mit dem Wert eines nachhaltigen Umgangs einer Person mit sich selbst behaupten. Wer dopt, so meine These, folgt einem verabsolutierten Leistungsdenken, was aus ethischer Perspektive (...) kritisiert werden kann, wenn man den Wert der Nachhaltigkeit als ethischen Wert annimmt. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungOb eine sportliche Leistung anerkannt wird, hängt maßgeblich davon ab, ob sie im Einklang mit Werten steht, die wir für wesentlich für den Sport halten. Die philosophischen Standardargumente gegen Doping im Sport behaupten eine Unvereinbarkeit von Doping mit Werten wie Fairness, Gesundheit oder Natürlichkeit. Ich möchte im Gegensatz zu diesen Argumenten eine grundsätzliche Unvereinbarkeit von Doping mit dem Wert eines nachhaltigen Umgangs einer Person mit sich selbst behaupten. Wer dopt, so meine These, folgt einem verabsolutierten Leistungsdenken, was aus ethischer Perspektive (...) kritisiert werden kann, wenn man den Wert der Nachhaltigkeit als ethischen Wert annimmt. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Artikel untersucht die Frage, ob es sinnvoll ist, Doping im Sport unter ärztlicher Kontrolle freizugeben. Dazu werden die Auswirkungen einer Freigabe untersucht, die stets nur eine begrenzte Freigabe wäre, allein wegen der Risiken. Die unangenehmen Begleiterscheinungen der Dopingkontrollen würden nicht entfallen. Die Auswirkungen einer Freigabe von Doping im Wettkampfsport wären entweder unsinnig oder aber mit Nachteilen behaftet. Es ist nicht notwendig, die Frage zu klären, was die „Idee des Sportes“ ausmacht und ob sie verändert werden darf. Allein unter praktischen (...) Aspekten zeigt sich, dass dem Sport mit einer Freigabe des Dopings keine Vorteile, aber viele Nachteile erwachsen. (shrink)

Following the final of the 200 metres in the London Paralympics 2012, athlete Oscar Pistorius criticised the prosthetic leg (‘blade’) length of Alan Oliveira, a fellow athlete and eventual winner of the race, and accused the International Paralympic Committee of failing to implement fair stipulations. Pistorius’ contention directs attention toward an issue largely ignored in the sociological spectrum: the concept of fairness in the sporting arena. Drawing on the accounts of John Rawls (1971) and Amartya Sen (2009), specifically in terms (...) of considering justice as fairness, we deconstruct the principle of fairness in the Paralympics which is currently framed within scientific discourse determining the validity of both athletes and performance-enhancing technologies. By identifying how the Paralympics adopts a Rawlsian understanding of fairness, we explore the work of Sen to highlight its complexity in this context and the need to retreat from taken-for-granted assumptions informing current knowledge. (shrink)

Many find it intuitive that those who use enhancements like steroids and Adderall in Olympic weightlifting and education are due less praise than those who perform equally well without using these enhancements. Nonetheless, it is not easy to coherently explain why one might be justifiably due less praise for using these technologies to enhance one’s performance. Justifications for this intuition which rely on concerns regarding authenticity, cheating, or shifts in who is responsible for the performance face serious problems. Santoni de (...) Sio et al., however, have recently defended a justification for this intuition which avoids the problems competing justifications face; the nature-of-activities justification. This justification relies on a conceptual analysis of the nature of activities and does not require the defense of any particular ethical stance concerning the use of enhancements. Santoni de Sio et al. claim that the success of the nature-of-activities account requires distinguishing between practice-oriented activities and goal-directed activities. I, however, show that this distinction is both deeply problematic and unnecessary. After exposing the weaknesses of Santoni de Sio et al.’s original account, I defend a simpler and less problematic version of the nature-of-activities account. The revised account is capable of both justifying this intuition of less praise and allowing one to determine when enhancements should be deemed permissible, impermissible, or obligatory for a given activity. (shrink)

Current general restrictions on performance-enhancing drugs pose a collective action problem that cannot be solved and bring a variety of adverse consequences for sport. General prohibitions of PEDs are grounded in claims that they violate the integrity of sport. But there are decisive arguments against integrity of sport-based prohibitions of PEDs for elite sport. We defend a harm prevention approach to PED prohibition as an alternative. This position cannot support a general ban on PEDs, since it provides no basis for (...) prohibiting non-harmful PED use. We argue that a harm prevention approach to restricting PEDs is ethically justified, has better prospects of compliance, is consistent with respecting the integrity of sport, and holds at least a modest prospect of resolving the collective action problem around PED restriction. (shrink)

In this article, we critically discuss different versions of the fairness objection to the legalisation of neuro-doping. According to this objection, legalising neuro-doping will result in some enjoying an unfair advantage over others. Basically, we assess four versions. These focus on: 1) the unequal opportunities of winning for athletes who use neuro-doping and for those who do not; 2) the unfair advantages specifically for wealthy athletes; 3) the unfairness of athletic advantages not derived from athletes’ own training ; and 4) (...) the unfair health care costs imposed on everyone as a result of athletes’ use of neuro-doping. We conclude that none of these versions offer a convincing principled fairness-based objection to legalising neuro-doping. (shrink)

Why should we become posthuman? There is only one morally compelling answer to this question: because posthumanity will be a more beneficial state, better than present humanity. This is the Posthuman Beneficence Argument, the centerpiece of the liberal transhumanist defense of “directed evolution.” In this article, I examine PBA and find it deficient on a number of lethal counts. My argument focuses on the writings of transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has developed the most articulate defense of PBA and disclosed (...) its metaethical framework. I begin by locating PBA in the context of wider transhumanist claims for the desirability of posthumanity. I identify two crucial components: a model of deliberative rationality, requiring reasons to endorse claims; and the reasons themselves. I examine these two conditions, in turn, specifying the claims that they ask us to accept. Following Bostrom, I argue that there is a need for a foundationalist approach that assures us of some universality in the process of valuation. This is required to appropriately ground the moral continuity and appeal to universality that PBA demands. I examine the reasons why this approach ultimately fails, leaving posthumanity as an unintelligible concept with no moral force. I conclude by identifying a more mature approach to the debate on human enhancement, one that forfeits the grandiose but baseless claims too often found in transhumanist defenses of directed evolution. In short, posthumanity may be a good science fiction trope, but it has no normative force in the moral philosophy of human enhancement. (shrink)

The World Anti-Doping Agency sets out a detailed description of what its own conception of the “spirit of sport” as employed in the World Anti-Doping Code entails. However, controversies as to the significance and meaning to be ascribed to the term abound in the literature. In order to unravel the core of the debates and to move discussions forward, the authors aimed at reviewing understandings of the spirit of sport in the conceptual literature. The main databases were searched using relevant (...) keywords. After the inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied, eighteen publications were included in the review. The most striking result to emerge from the data is the multivalence of the concept of spirit of sport. Our thematic analysis generated the contestability of the spirit of sport as the predominant theme in the conceptual literature. There is a need for empirical research to generate data about perspectives on the spirit of sport from other stakeholders especially those of the athletes themselves. (shrink)

Because doping is becoming more and more of a problem in elite sports, anti-doping and prevention programs are receiving more attention. However, current doping prevention programs that primarily involve pedagogical education in youths have not been shown to be very effective. In sports philosophy there is a discourse about ethics and morality in sports in connection with doping. So far, however, the aspect of ethics has been neglected in anti-doping prevention programs. This article discusses a new approach to doping prevention (...) for young athletes and a way to improve conventional doping prevention by focusing on the process of decision-making. The article argues that ethical decision-making programs based on ethical training programs developed in business offer a large potential for prevention programs in sport. The article concludes with a presentation of training possibilities for ethical decision-making in connection with doping. (shrink)

This paper shows how critical realism can be used to integrate empirical data and philosophical analysis within ‘empirical bioethics’. The term empirical bioethics, whilst appearing oxymoronic, simply refers to an interdisciplinary approach to the resolution of practical ethical issues within the biological and life sciences, integrating social scientific, empirical data with philosophical analysis. It seeks to achieve a balanced form of ethical deliberation that is both logically rigorous and sensitive to context, to generate normative conclusions that are practically applicable to (...) the problem, challenge, or dilemma. Since it incorporates both philosophical and social scientific components, empirical bioethics is a field that is consistent with the use of critical realism as a research methodology. The integration of philosophical and social scientific approaches to ethics has been beset with difficulties, not least because of the irreducibly normative, rather than descriptive, nature of ethical analysis and the contested relation between fact and value. However, given that facts about states of affairs inform potential courses of action and their consequences, there is a need to overcome these difficulties and successfully integrate data with theory. Previous approaches have been formulated to overcome obstacles in combining philosophical and social scientific perspectives in bioethical analysis; however each has shortcomings. As a mature interdisciplinary approach critical realism is well suited to empirical bioethics, although it has hitherto not been widely used. Here I show how it can be applied to this kind of research and explain how it represents an improvement on previous approaches. (shrink)

I denne artikkelen drøfter jeg bruk av biomedisinsk teknologi i prestasjonsfremmende hensikt i konkurranseidrett. Mer presist utforsker jeg mulighetene for å skille mellom etisk akseptabel og etisk uakseptabel bruk. Jeg kritiserer WADAs normative grunnlag for å forby visse biomedisinske midler og metoder, og argumenterer for at eventuelle forbud må bygge på tydeligere verdisyn på idrett. Jeg undersøker to idealtypiske syn og deres teknologiske implikasjoner. Det smale synet er liberalt og avviser begrensninger i bruk av biomedisinske midler og metoder blant voksne (...) idrettsutøvere som dårlig begrunnet paternalisme. Det brede synet innebærer en mer restriktiv holdning og aksepterer en viss regulering av trening og prestasjonsutvikling også utenfor konkurransene. I en avsluttende del veier jeg det smale og det brede synet mot hverandre og reflekterer over hvilket syn som vil dominere framtidens idrett.Nøkkelord: etikk, idrett, biomedisinsk teknologi, dopingEnglish summary: The use of biomedical technology in sport: Are there any limits?In the article I examine the use of biomedical technology to enhance performance in competitive sport. More specifically I examine the possibilities for distinguishing between ethically acceptable and ethically unacceptable use of such technology. I criticize the World Antidoping Agency's normative criterion for banning certain technologies as it is vague and unclear. I argue that any ban by WADA has to build on a clear and operational normative view of sport. Two relevant ideal-typical views are examined together with their technological implications. The narrow view is liberal and rejects restrictions on the use of biomedical technology among professional athletes as unjustifiable paternalism. The wider view implies a more restrictive approach and accepts certain regulations of performance-enhancing means and methods outside of competitions. In the conclusion, I compare the narrow and the wider views and reflect upon their possible status in competitive sport in the future. (shrink)

Debate concerning human enhancement often revolves around the question of whether there is a common “nature” that all human beings share and which is unwarrantedly violated by enhancing one’s capabilities beyond the “species-typical” norm. I explicate Thomas Aquinas’s influential theory of human nature, noting certain key traits commonly shared among human beings that define each as a “person” who possesses inviolable moral status. Understanding the specific qualities that define the nature of human persons, which includes self-conscious awareness, capacity for intellective (...) thought, and volitional autonomy, informs the ethical assessment of various forms of enhancement. Some forms of cognitive and physical enhancement may be desirable from the perspective of what constitutes the “flourishing” of human persons in our fundamental nature; while other forms of enhancement, such as emotive or so-called “moral” enhancement, run the risk of detracting from human flourishing when evaluated from the virtue-theoretic perspective Aquinas promotes. (shrink)

The persistence of doping in professional sports—either by individuals on an isolated basis and by whole teams as part of a systematic doping programme—means that professional sport today is rarely if ever untainted. There are financial incentives in place that incentivise doping and there are data that show that doping is often a systematic, organised enterprise. The main question to be answered today in professional sports is whether doping’s repressive anti-doping policies do not have greater negative consequences for society. Whilst (...) some have suggested legitimising safe doping under medical control, in this paper, I argue that doing so will do little to prevent clandestine use of dangerous performance-enhancing substances, and suggest an alternative solution to lifting the ban on doping, i.e. starting from extending liability for doping in sport beyond athletes to those holding power and authority over athletes, to changing winning incentives for doping, to making sport sustainable in the longer time by devising ways of providing athletes with a steady income which is not linked to record breaking or sponsorships. (shrink)

Reports in the popular press suggest that smart drugs or “nootropics” such as methylphenidate, modafinil and piracetam are increasingly being used by the healthy to augment cognitive ability. Although current nootropics offer only modest improvements in cognitive performance, it appears likely that more effective compounds will be developed in the future and that their off-label use will increase. One sphere in which the use of these drugs may be commonplace is by healthy students within academia. This article reviews the ethical (...) and pragmatic implications of nootropic use in academia by drawing parallels with issues relevant to the drugs in sport debate. It is often argued that performance-enhancing drugs should be prohibited because they create an uneven playing field. However, this appears dubious given that “unfair” advantages are already ubiquitous and generally tolerated by society. There are concerns that widespread use will indirectly coerce non-users also to employ nootropics in order to remain competitive. However, to restrict the autonomy of all people for fear that it may influence the actions of some is untenable. The use of potentially harmful drugs for the purposes of enhancement rather than treatment is often seen as unjustified, and libertarian approaches generally champion the rights of the individual in deciding if these risks are acceptable. Finally, whether the prohibition of nootropics can be effectively enforced is doubtful. As nootropics use becomes widespread among students in the future, discussion of this issue will become more pressing in the years to come. (shrink)

The possibility of employing human enhancement interventions to aid in future space missions has been gaining attention lately. These possibilities have included one of the more controversial kinds of enhancements: biomedical moral enhancement. However, the discussion has thus far remained on a rather abstract level. In this paper we further this conversation by looking more closely at what type of interventions with what sort of effects we should expect when we are talking about biomedical moral enhancements. We suggest that a (...) more grounded way to picture moral enhancement, at least in the near term, is to envision a form of cognitive enhancement that also provides some moral benefits by heightening the enhanced person's capability for acting according to their own subjective moral code. While this concept of moral adherence enhancement also has relevance for the moral enhancement discussion more widely, in this paper we apply it specifically in the context of space missions. We argue that there are weighty reasons to consider making biomedical enhancements of the proposed kind a mandatory feature of early-phase long-distance space travel because these missions are high-stakes in nature and take place in an environment where the enhancement could be seen as conferring important advantages while negating many of the traditional arguments weighed against it. (shrink)

Anti-doping policy is one of the most important international sport policies. Yet its justification remains controversial. Good Sport: Why Our Games Matter – and How Doping Undermines Them, Oxford University Press 2018, by Thomas Murray provides a convincing and comprehensive exploration of ethical questions raised by biomedical enhancements in sport.

One of the most consequential advances in sciences and technology is the increasing generation of bodily enhancement products that enable a culture of, demand for, and acceptance of improving and modifying the human body (structure, function, abilities) beyond its species-typical boundaries. A lively discourse exists around the rights and wrongs of human genetic and other forms of enhancement. Many treat the species-typical human body as an obsolescent technology in need of serious improvements. This raises various questions. This paper addresses the (...) following questions: a) can one refuse the upgrade, b) who has access to the upgrade, c) is there a way to revert to the obsolescent state after the upgrade, and d) what is the impact of perceiving oneself as obsolescent. (shrink)

When should humans enhance themselves? We try to answer this question by engaging in a conceptual analysis of the nature of different activities. We think that cognitive enhancement is morally impermissible in some practice-oriented activities, such as some educational activities, when it is the case both that cognitive enhancement would negatively affect the point of those activities and that we have good reasons to value that point. We then argue that cognitive enhancement should be allowed in two groups of cases, (...) namely in practice-oriented activities, such as recreational activities on which little moral value or social import hangs, and in some prominently goal-directed activities, such as high-responsibility professions, the goal of which has significant moral or social value. Finally, we argue that the use of efficacious and relatively safe cognitive enhancers may even be obligatory in those high-responsibility professions under certain special circumstances. (shrink)