To avoid teleological interpretations, it is important to make a distinction between functions and uses of consciousness, and to address questions concerning the consequences of consciousness. Assumptions about the phylogenetic distribution of consciousness are examined. It is concluded that there is some value in identifying consciousness an exclusively human attribute.

This commentary is divided into two parts. The first considers a possible role for Gray's predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory. It draws on the computational specifications of recognition outlined in Humphreys et al. to demonstrate how the logically necessary components of recognition tasks might be mapped onto the mechanism. The second part demonstrates how the mechanism outlined by Gray might be implicated in a form of imitative learning suitable for the acquisition of complex tasks.

People have little difficulty distinguishing effects they cause and those they do not. An important question is what underlies this sense of agency. A prevailing idea is that the sense of agency arises from a comparison between a predictive representation of the effect and the actual effect that occurs, with a clear match between the two producing a strong sense of agency. Although there is general agreement on this comparison process, one important theoretical issue that has yet to be fully (...) determined is whether these computations are consciously performed. Here, we studied this issue by requiring participants to perform a simple judgment of agency task under conditions of different concurrent working memory load. Working memory operations are known to tax conscious cognitive resources. We found that agency judgments were moderated by working memory load, with lower agency ratings being observed in the high load condition, suggesting that the sense of agency is dependent on the availability of conscious cognitive resources. An examination of the time-course of this load effect suggests that it is the construction of the mental representation of the predicted effect which is particularly dependent on said resources. (shrink)

The paper addresses the capabilities and limitations of extrafoveal processing during a categorical visual search. Previous research has established that a target could be identified from the very first or without any saccade, suggesting that extrafoveal perception is necessarily involved. However, the limits in complexity defining the processed information are still not clear. We performed four experiments with a gradual increase of stimuli complexity to determine the role of extrafoveal processing in searching for the categorically defined geometric shape. The series (...) of experiments demonstrated a significant role of extrafoveal processing while searching for simple two‐dimensional shapes and its gradual decrease in a condition with more complicated three‐dimensional shapes. The factors of objects’ spatial orientation and distractor homogeneity significantly influenced both reaction time and the number of saccades required to identify a categorically defined target. An analysis of the individual p‐value distributions revealed pronounced individual differences in using extrafoveal analysis and allowed examination of the performance of each particular participant. The condition with the forced prohibition of eye movements enabled us to investigate the efficacy of covert attention in the condition with complicated shapes. Our results indicate that both foveal and extrafoveal processing are simultaneously involved during a categorical search, and the specificity of their interaction is determined by the spatial orientation of objects, type of distractors, the prohibition to use overt attention, and individual characteristics of the participants. (shrink)

Choice modellers are frequently criticized for failing to provide accurate representations of the neuro-psychological substrates of decisions. Several authors maintain that recent neuro-psychological findings enable choice modellers to overcome this alleged shortcoming. Some advocate a realistic interpretation of neuro-psychological models of choice, according to which these models posit sub-personal entities with specific neuro-psychological counterparts and characterize those entities accurately. In this article, I articulate and defend three complementary arguments to demonstrate that, contrary to emerging consensus, even the best available neuro-psychological (...) models of choice cannot be justifiably given this realistic interpretation. Moreover, I explicate what challenges will continue to hamper neuro-psychological modellers’ attempts to substantiate a realistic interpretation of their models. In doing so, I draw on the literature on scientific modelling to advance the ongoing philosophical discussion concerning the ontological status of the sub-personal entities posited in distinct decision sciences, the resemblance relations that supposedly connect choice models and the neuro-psychological substrates of decisions, and what conditions these models must satisfy to be regarded as realistic representations of their target systems. (shrink)

In this letter, we argue that an economic perspective on the mind has played—and should continue to play—a central role in the development of cognitive science. Viewing cognition as the productive application of mental resources puts cognitive science and economics on a common conceptual footing, paving the way for closer collaboration between the two disciplines. This will enable cognitive scientists to more readily repurpose economic concepts and analytical tools for the study of mental phenomena, while at the same time, enriching (...) our understanding of the modern economy, which is increasingly driven by mental, rather than physical, production. (shrink)