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Inattentional amnesia

Journal of Mental Imagery 29 (3-4):71-94 (1999)

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  1. Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects.Chaz Firestone & Brian Scholl - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-72.
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  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  • Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
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  • Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
    Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
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  • Why visual attention and awareness are different.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
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  • Attention and perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):263-270.
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
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  • Towards a true neural stance on consciousness.Victor Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
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  • Unconscious Perception Reconsidered.Ian Phillips - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):471-514.
    Most contemporary theorists regard the traditional thesis that perception is essentially conscious as just another armchair edict to be abandoned in the wake of empirical discovery. Here I reconsider this dramatic departure from tradition. My aim is not to recapture our prelapsarian confidence that perception is inevitably conscious (though much I say might be recruited to that cause). Instead, I want to problematize the now ubiquitous belief in unconscious perception. The paper divides into two parts. Part One is more purely (...)
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  • Change Detection.Ronald A. Rensink - 2002 - Annual Review of Psychology 53 (1):245-277.
    Five aspects of visual change detection are reviewed. The first concerns the concept of change itself, in particular the ways it differs from the related notions of motion and difference. The second involves the various methodological approaches that have been developed to study change detection; it is shown that under a variety of conditions observers are often unable to see large changes directly in their field of view. Next, it is argued that this “change blindness” indicates that focused attention is (...)
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  • Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 247--273.
    This chapter argues that attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, which plays an essential functional role in making information accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. The main line of argument can be stated quite simply. Attention is what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. But what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action is a distinctive mode of consciousness. Therefore, (...)
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  • Threefoldness.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):163-182.
    Theories of picture perception aim to understand our perceptual relation to both the picture surface and the depicted object. I argue that we should talk about not two, but three entities when understanding picture perception: the picture surface, the three dimensional object the picture surface visually encodes and the three dimensional depicted object. As and can come apart, we get a more complex picture of picture perception than normally assumed and one where the notion of twofoldness, which has played an (...)
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  • Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness.N. Block - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1-2):197--219.
    Dehaene and Naccache, Dennett and Jack and Shallice “see convergence coming from many different quarters on a version of the neuronal global workspace model†(Dennett, p. 1). (Boldface references are to papers in this volume.) On the contrary, even within this volume, there are commitments to very different perspectives on consciousness. And these differing perspectives are based on tacit differences in philosophical starting places that should be made explicit.  Indeed, it is not clear that different uses of “consciousness†and (...)
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  • Seeing, sensing, and scrutinizing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Vision Research 40:1469-1487.
    Large changes in a scene often become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, image flicker, movie cut, or other such disturbance. It is argued here that this _change blindness_ can serve as a useful tool to explore various aspects of vision. This argument centers around the proposal that focused attention is needed for the explicit perception of change. Given this, the study of change perception can provide a useful way to determine the nature of visual attention, and (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Change Blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. pp. 76--81.
    Large changes that occur in clear view of an observer can become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, blink, or other such disturbance. This change blindness is consistent with the proposal that focused visual attention is necessary to see change, with a change becoming difficult to notice whenever conditions prevent attention from being automatically drawn to it. -/- It is shown here how the phenomenon of change blindness can provide new results on the nature of visual attention, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Perception without awareness.Fred Dretske - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 147--180.
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  • Separate neural definitions of visual consciousness and visual attention: A case for phenomenal awareness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2004 - Neural Networks 17 (5):861-872.
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  • Perception is not all-purpose.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):4069-4080.
    I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action and one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s perceptual (...)
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  • What you see is what you set: Sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness.Steven B. Most, Brian J. Scholl, Erin R. Clifford & Daniel J. Simons - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (1):217-242.
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  • Attention.Christopher Mole - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Segmentation, attention and phenomenal visual objects.Jon Driver, Greg Davis, Charlotte Russell, Massimo Turatto & Elliot Freeman - 2001 - Cognition 80 (1-2):61-95.
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  • The role of perceptual load in inattentional blindness.Ula Cartwright-Finch & Nilli Lavie - 2007 - Cognition 102 (3):321-340.
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  • Change blindness.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
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  • Gorillas in the missed (but not the unseen): Reevaluating the evidence for attention being necessary for consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):299-316.
    The idea that attention is necessary for consciousness (the “Necessity Thesis”) is frequently advocated by philosophers and psychologists alike. Experiments involving inattentional and change blindness are thought to support the Necessity Thesis, but they do so only if subjects failing to notice the target stimulus are also not conscious of it. This article uses commonsense phenomenological observations supplemented with empirical data to argue that some subjects failing to notice the target stimulus nonetheless experience its color. Since subjects not noticing the (...)
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  • When is perception conscious?Jesse J. Prinz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 310--332.
    Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious. Indeed, it was widely believed that all mental states are conscious, so the problem of explaining consciousness collapses into the problem of explaining mentality. But things have changed. Most people now believe that a lot goes on unconsciously. Indeed, some people believe that mental states that are not perceptual in nature are never conscious. That’s a matter of controversy. Less controversial is the claim that perceptual states are conscious some (...)
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  • Representation of change: Separate electrophysiological markers of attention, awareness, and implicit processing.Diego Fernandez-Duque, Giordana Grossi, Ian Thornton & Helen Neville - 2003 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 15 (4):491-507.
    & Awareness of change within a visual scene only occurs in subjects were aware of, replicated those attentional effects, but the presence of focused attention. When two versions of a.
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  • Perception of ensemble statistics requires attention.Molly Jackson-Nielsen, Michael A. Cohen & Michael A. Pitts - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:149-160.
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  • Consciousness, the self and bodily location.David M. Rosenthal - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):270-276.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  • The cognitive and neural correlates of “tactile consciousness”: A multisensory perspective.Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):370-407.
    People’s awareness of tactile stimuli has been investigated in far less detail than their awareness of stimuli in other sensory modalities. In an attempt to fill this gap, we provide an overview of studies that are pertinent to the topic of tactile consciousness. We discuss the results of research that has investigated phenomena such as “change blindness”, phantom limb sensations, and numerosity judgments in tactile perception, together with the results obtained from the study of patients affected by deficits that can (...)
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  • Change blindness and priming: When it does and does not occur.Michael E. Silverman & Arien Mack - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):409-422.
    In a series of three experiments, we explored the nature of implicit representations in change blindness . Using 3 × 3 letter arrays, we asked subjects to locate changes in paired arrays separated by 80 ms ISIs, in which one, two or three letters of a row in the second array changed. In one testing version, a tone followed the second array, signaling a row for partial report . In the other version, no PR was required. After Ss reported whether (...)
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  • (1 other version)Visual attention.Marvin Chun & Jeremy Wolfe - 2001 - In E. Bruce Goldstein (ed.), Blackwell Handbook of Perception. Blackwell. pp. 2--335.
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  • What we see: Inattention and the capture of attention by meaning.Arien Mack, Zissis Pappas, Michael E. Silverman & Robin Gay - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):488-506.
    Attention is necessary for the conscious perception of any object. Objects not attended to are not seen. What is it that captures attention when we are engaged in some attention-absorbing task? Earlier research has shown that there are only a very few stimuli which have this power and therefore are reliably detected under these conditions . The two most reliable are the observer’s own name and a happy face icon which seem to capture attention by virtue of their meaning. Three (...)
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  • Nothing compares 2 views: Change blindness results from failures to compare retained information.Steve Mitroff, Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin - 2004 - Perception and Psychophysics 66 (8):1268-1281.
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  • The role of attention in subitizing.Henry Railo, Mika Koivisto, Antti Revonsuo & Minna M. Hannula - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):82-104.
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  • (2 other versions)Change blindness: Implications for the nature of visual attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. pp. 16-20.
    In the not-too-distant past, vision was often said to involve three levels of processing: a low level concerned with descriptions of the geometric and photometric properties of the image, a high level concerned with abstract knowledge of the physical and semantic properties of the world, and a middle level concerned with anything not handled by the other two. The negative definition of mid-level vision contained in this description reflected a rather large gap in our understanding of visual processing: How could (...)
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  • High-Fidelity Visual Long-Term Memory within an Unattended Blink of an Eye.Christof Kuhbandner, Elizabeth A. Rosas-Corona & Philipp Spachtholz - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • When good observers go bad: Change blindness, inattentional blindness, and visual experience.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6 (9).
    Several studies (e.g., Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser & Becklen, 1975) have found that observers attending to a particular object or event often fail to report the presence of unexpected items. This has been interpreted as inattentional blindness (IB), a failure to see unattended items (Mack & Rock, 1998). Meanwhile, other studies (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons, 1996) have found that observers often fail to report the presence of large changes in (...)
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  • The attentional cost of inattentional blindness.Paola Bressan & Silvia Pizzighello - 2008 - Cognition 106 (1):370-383.
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  • What’s “inattentional” about inattentional blindness?Steven B. Most - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1102-1104.
    In a recent commentary, Memmert critiqued claims that attentional misdirection is directly analogous to inattentional blindness and cautioned against assuming too close a similarity between the two phenomena. One important difference highlighted in his analysis is that most lab-based inductions of IB rely on the taxing of attention through a demanding primary task, whereas attentional misdirection typically involves simply the orchestration of spatial attention. The present commentary argues that, rather than reflecting a complete dissociation between IB and attentional misdirection, this (...)
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  • Surprise capture and inattentional blindness.Gernot Horstmann & Ulrich Ansorge - 2016 - Cognition 157 (C):237-249.
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  • The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.
    Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle's suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential (...)
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  • Anger superiority effect for change detection and change blindness.Pessi Lyyra, Jari K. Hietanen & Piia Astikainen - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:1-12.
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  • Seeing Seeing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):68-78.
    This paper discusses several key issues concerning consciousness and human vision. A brief overview is presented of recent developments in this area, including issues that have been resolved and issues that remain unsettled. Based on this, three Hilbert questions are proposed. These involve three related sets of issues: the kinds of visual experience that exist, the kinds of visual attention that exist, and the ways that these relate to each other.
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  • The electrophysiological correlates of stimulus visibility and metacontrast masking.Henry Railo & Mika Koivisto - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):794-803.
    There are conflicting views concerning the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. Whereas one view considers a relatively late positive deflection as a primary correlate of consciousness, another model links consciousness with earlier negativity . The present experiment utilized metacontrast masking in investigating the electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness. The participants were presented with target-mask sequences in three stimulus onset asynchronies. The target stimuli were followed by either a metacontrast mask or a similar-looking, but ineffective pseudomask. The results showed that the (...)
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  • Internal vs. external information in visual perception.Ronald A. Rensink - 2002 - In Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Smart Graphics,. pp. 63-70.
    One of the more compelling beliefs about vision is that it is based on representations that are coherent and complete, with everything in the visual field described in great detail. However, changes made during a visual disturbance are found to be difficult to see, arguing against the idea that our brains contain a detailed, picture-like representation of the scene. Instead, it is argued here that a more dynamic, "just-in-time" representation is involved, one with deep similarities to the way that users (...)
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  • No Evidence of Narrowly Defined Cognitive Penetrability in Unambiguous Vision.Nikki A. Lammers, Edward H. de Haan & Yair Pinto - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Inattentional blindness: Perception or memory and what does it matter?Cathleen Moore - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    An extensive research program surrounding a phenomenon called inattentional blindness is reported by Mack and Rock in their book of the same name. The general conclusion that is drawn from the work is that no conscious perception can occur without attention. Because the bulk of the evidence surrounding inattentional blindness comes from memorial reports of displays, it is possible that inattentional blindness reflects a problem with memory, rather than a problem with perception. It is argued here that at least some (...)
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  • (1 other version)Visual Attention.Jeremy Wolfe - 2000 - In K.K. De Valois (ed.), Seeing. Academic Press. pp. 335-386.
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  • Awareness and Stimulus-Driven Spatial Attention as Independent Processes.Diane Baier, Florian Goller & Ulrich Ansorge - 2020 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 14.
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  • Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness?Antonios Kaldas - 2019 - Dissertation, Macquarie University
    Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this treatise, “Q.” We commonly have the experience of consciously paying attention to something, but is it possible to be conscious of something you are not attending to, or to attend to something of which you are not conscious? Where might we find examples of these? This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the (...)
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  • Automaticity: Componential, causal, and mechanistic explanations. Annual Review of Psychology, 67, 263-287.Agnes Moors - 2016 - Annual Review of Psychology 67:263-287.
    The review first discusses componential explanations of automaticity, which specify non/automaticity features (e.g., un/controlled, un/conscious, non/efficient, fast/slow) and their interrelations. Reframing these features as factors that influence processes (e.g., goals, attention, and time) broadens the range of factors that can be considered (e.g., adding stimulus intensity and representational quality). The evidence reviewed challenges the view of a perfect coherence among goals, attention, and consciousness, and supports the alternative view that (a) these and other factors influence the quality of representations in (...)
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