Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire's role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. After all, we seem to desire things under the guise of the good. Which understanding of desire is more accurate? Is the guise (...) of the good even right to assume? Should we adopt an alternative picture that emphasizes desire's deontic nature? What do neuroscientific studies suggest? -/- Essays in the first section of the volume are devoted to these questions, and to the puzzle of desire's essence. In the second part of the volume, essays investigate some implications that the various conceptions of desire have on a number of fundamental issues. For example, why are inconsistent desires problematic? What is desire's role in practical deliberation? How do we know what we want? -/- This volume will contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on a neglected, albeit crucial, dimension of the mind. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a revival of a theory of conscious emotions as analogous in important ways to perceptual experiences. In the standard versions of this view emotions are construed as, potentially, perceptual disclosures of values. The model has been widely debated and criticized. In this paper I reconstruct an early, qualified version of the perceptual model to be found in the classical phenomenological approaches of Scheler and Sartre. After outlining this version of the theory, I examine its (...) prospects against objections prominent in the current debate. (shrink)

Desires matter. How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act: to desire a state is to positively evaluate it or to be disposed to act to realize it. This Ph.D. Dissertation examines these conceptions of desire and proposes a deontic alternative inspired by Meinong. On this view, desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be or, if one prefers, (...) as what should be. Desire involves a deontic manner of representing: a norm of the ought-to-be type features in desire’s intentional mode, as opposed to content. The dissertation is structured in three parts. In order to defend this conception, I formulate three main desiderata for a promising theory of the intentionality of desire in the introduction (§0). The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should conform to our desires. The second concerns the death of desire principle, i.e. the intuition that one cannot desire what one represents as actual. The last pertains to desire’s role in psychological explanations, i.e. the intuition that desires can explain some mental states and be explained by other mental states. The first part examines the main conceptions of desire in light of these desiderata. I argue that the classical pictures of desire do not adequately meet our desiderata. The first chapter is devoted to the evaluative conception (§1), while the second examines the motivational approach (§2). Following these criticisms, I then present the deontic view of desire (§3). In the second part, I defend this conception with the help of three arguments. The main idea is that appealing to norms of the ought-to-be type can satisfy our chief desiderata: the world should conform to norms (world-to-mind direction of fit, §4), norms are grounded on values and in turn ground obligations (explanation, §5), and norms are about non-actual states of affairs (death of desire principle, §6). In the last part, I develop the deontic view to draw a cartography of the various types of desire. Some desires are correct, while others are inappropriate. This distinction is explained by the deontic conception, as it matches that between states of affairs that ought to obtain and states that should not obtain (§7). Two study cases are examined: caprice and the impermissibility of desire aggregation. Intuitively, hopes, wishes, or urges are types of desire. The next chapter presents a typology inspired by the deontic view and the type of norms there are (§8). The last chapter discusses the main objections to the deontic approach (§9). In conclusion, I show the relevance of the deontic view for several debates in philosophy of mind and ethics. Desires are crucial because they are the ‘eye’ of what should be. (shrink)

How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be. Three lines of criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should (...) conform to our desires. The second concerns the “death of desire” principle, i.e. the intuition that one cannot desire what one represents as actual. The last pertains to desire’s role in psychological explanations, i.e. the intuition that desires can explain motivations and be explained by evaluations. Following these criticisms, three positive arguments in favor of the deontic conception are sketched. (shrink)

Following Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Wang Yangming, this paper investigates the phenomenology of values and moral emotions in Max Scheler and the Confucian learning of heart, especially Wang Yangming. Part I illustrates the meaning of moral emotions in Confucianism and introduces Wang Yangming’s idea of pure knowing . Part II introduces Max Scheler’s idea of a priori value and feeling in order to explain how pure knowing could be both immanent and transcendental, both subjective and objective. Part III explores the (...) phenomena of value and feeling in Confucianism and Wang Yangming, giving a Schelerian interpretation of Wang Yangming’s teaching of four verses. Similar to Max Scheler, Confucian learning of heart affirms the intentional structure between hierarchy of values on the one hand and loving, preferring, and feeling of values on the other hand. This paper intends to clarify the basic structure of Wang Yangming’s thought; therefore, analyses on detailed moral emotions will be left to .. (shrink)

This text involves the concept of intersubjectivity in Buber, Husserl, and Waldenfels. For these authors, the other has an important place in the constitution of ourselves. Buber presents an innateness of the You, whereby it fosters in us a longing for relation, bringing the directness of love, which implies acts of responsibility toward the other. Husserl affirms that the transcendental subjectivity is a transcendental intersubjectivity implicit in the intentional constitution of the Ego. Waldenfels precludes an idea of the innateness and (...) of the implication in order to explore the event of what happens between us in its integrity. Therefore, Waldenfels conceives the opening of the personality as a latent process. The event of what happens can divert the course of our determination, bringing new possibilities to the personality itself. Now, the meaning is shared, and not endowed by the transcendental Ego as the only thing responsible for meaning. We share meaning because we originally have the experience of the other, of the world, and of ourselves. In Waldenfels, we respond to the others’ and the world’s demands, which occur as original events, instead of responding to them as innate demands, coming from us. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the nature of feminine bodily comportment described by Iris Marion Young in ‘Throwing Like a Girl.’ According to Young, the style of movement of women, who undergo patriarchal oppression, reveals their existential status as a socio-historically oppressed group. Her claim is that patriarchal oppression acts upon women’s bodily functions, thus causing feminine motility to exhibit an inhibited intentionality, an ambiguous transcendence and a discontinuous unity. In this paper I take issue with these three modalities of (...) feminine comportment. Firstly, I resort to Max Scheler’s phenomenological description of the different stages leading to motor action to show that the bodily functionality of oppressed women is intact when considered from the motor-intentional perspective. Secondly, I advocate, via Scheler’s phenomenology, a different mode through which to interpret the bodily expressivity of oppressed women. My claim is that feminine motility expresses the negative impact that sexism has upon the oppressed women’s emotional pre-theoretical and pre-non-motor level. My thesis is that patriarchal society negatively influences, and thereby compromises, the constitution of women’s axiological apparatus by inhibiting their preferences of values. Finally, I argue that the axiological apparatus of oppressive men is likewise compromised, and hence needs to be re-educated as much as that of the oppressed women. The main aim of this paper is to suggest a correct reading of the hampered motility of oppressed women, which keeps into consideration the phenomenon of ‘oppression’ in its entirety, and which can thus lead to adequate axiological therapies. (shrink)

The topic of this study is a notion of empathy that is common in philosophy and in the behavioral sciences. It is here referred to as ‘the notion of empathy as emotional sharing’, and it is characterized in terms of three ideas. If a person, S, has empathy with respect to an emotion of another person, O, then (i) S experiences an emotion that is similar to an emotion that O is currently having, (ii) S’s emotion is caused, in a (...) particular way, by the state of O or by S’s entertaining an idea of the state or situation of O, and (iii) S experiences this emotion in a way that does not entail that S is in the corresponding emotional state. The aim of the study is to clarify this notion of empathy by clarifying these three ideas and by tracing the history of their development in philosophy. -/- The study consists of two parts. Part one contains a short and selective account of the history in Western philosophy of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing. In chapter 2 Spinoza’s theory of imitation of affects and Hume’s theory of sympathy are presented. It is argued that these theories only exemplify the second idea characteristic of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing. Chapter 3 contains presentations of Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy, and Schopenhauer’s theory of compassion. These theories are shown to exemplify the second and the third idea. In chapter 4 there are presentations of Edith Stein’s description of Einfühlung, and Max Scheler’s account of empathy and fellow-feeling. It is shown that these accounts contain explicit specifications of the third idea, and it is argued that they also exemplify the second idea. -/- In part two, the three ideas are further clarified and the notion of empathy as emotional sharing is defined. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the main contemporary philosophical analyses of empathy. Three different views are distinguished: one that construes empathetic emotions as emotional states, one that construes them as imagined emotions, and one that construes them as off-line emotions. The first two views are criticized and rejected. The third is accepted and further developed in chapter 6, which contains a general analysis of the emotions. A distinction is made between two ways of experiencing an emotion, and it is argued that it is possible to have the affective experience characteristic of a particular kind of emotional state without being in that kind of state. In chapter 7, a definition of ‘empathy’ is proposed. This definition contains specifications of the three ideas characteristic of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing, and it shows both how the empathizer’s emotion resembles the emotion of the empathee, and how this emotion is caused and experienced. (shrink)

The paper aims to investigate the link between self-shaping and intersubjectivity from a phenomenological perspective. This means that two main topics are here at stake. On the one hand, the paper purports to argue that tackling the link between self-shaping and intersubjectivity from a phenomenological perspective is a meaningful and sound approach. On the other hand, the paper purports to argue that such an analysis enables us to bring to light an inherent linkage that tethers the topic of intersubjectivity to (...) the sway that other persons hold over one’s process of self-shaping. This influence will be gradually investigated. Firstly, Husserl’s stance on other persons as “variations of my self” will allow us to understand why other persons might hold sway over one’s process of self-shaping and self-knowledge. Secondly, exemplariness will turn out to be the way through which other persons might hold sway over one’s process of self-shaping and self-knowledge: Scheler’s stance on exemplariness will be examined since he makes us treat the question of exemplariness from the standpoint of the process of the formation of individuality: exemplars hold sway over such a process. So, we will rely upon the Husserlian thesis and the Schelerian thesis to argue for a thesis that goes beyond Husserl’s and Scheler’s perspectives: others as exemplars shed light on the eidetic possibilities of myself and others could become exemplars for me since they are variations of myself; that is, they exemplify untaken possibilities of myself. We will argue that exemplariness is the key to the link between the issue of intersubjectivity and the process of self-shaping. (shrink)

I argue that Rawls’s political philosophy relies on a moral conception of the person which he inherits from Kant’s conception of the person, despite Rawls’s claim that he is doing political philosophy first. Scheler’s critique of Kant contains a critique of his concept of the person and I apply this critique to Rawls’s use of it as a founding part of his political philosophy. This is done not to argue against Rawls’s politics per se, but to argue, in the light (...) of Scheler’s phenomenology, that its theoretical foundations may be unsteady. I claim that Scheler’s concept of the person may be used either for a communitarian critique of Rawls or for a foundation to strengthen Rawls’s political conception of the person. (shrink)

This paper re-examines the egos of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler with reference to Friedrich Nietzsche and the psychologist, James Hillman, and in the process also confronts the ego in other of its many manifestations, misappropriations, and mystifications.The ego is a multi-headed enigma which defies phenomenological description, and only reaches the status of concept by virtue of the gropings of an epistemology which is not up to the task. The goal of this paper is twofold: firstly, to come to terms (...) with what is commonly spoken of as ego, and secondly, to devise a scheme which does justice to it as phenomenon. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based (...) accounts, and phenomenological fusion accounts. After identifying strengths and weaknesses of these approaches and summarizing the elements that a multifaceted theory of shared emotions requires, I turn to the work of the early phenomenologist Edith Stein to further advance an approach to shared emotions that combines the main strengths of Helm and Salmela’s concern-based accounts and Schmid’s phenomenological fusion account. According to this proposal, the sharedness of a shared emotion cannot be located in one element, but rather consists in a complex of interrelated features. (shrink)

Whereas empathy is most often looked upon as a virtue and essential skill in contemporary health care, the relationship to sympathy is more complicated. Empathic approaches that lead to emotional arousal on the part of the health care professional and strong feelings for the individual patient run the risk of becoming unprofessional in nature and having the effect of so-called compassion fatigue or burnout. In this paper I want to show that approaches to empathy in health care that attempt to (...) solve these problems by cutting empathy loose from sympathy—from empathic concern—are mistaken. Instead, I argue, a certain kind of sympathy, which I call professional concern, is a necessary ingredient in good health care. Feeling oneself into the experiences and situation of the patient cannot be pursued without caring for the patient in question if the empathy is going to be successful. Sympathy is not only a thing that empathy makes possible and more or less spontaneously provides a way for but is something that we find at work in connection to empathy itself. In the paper I try to show how empathy is a particular form of emotion in which I feel with, about, and for the other person in developing an interpretation of his predicament. The with and for aspects of the empathy process are typically infused by a sympathy for the person one is empathizing with. Sympathy can be modulated into other ways of feeling with and for the person in the empathy process, but these sympathy-replacement feelings nevertheless always display some form of motivating concern for the target. Such an understanding of empathy is of particular importance for health care and other professions dealing with suffering clients. (shrink)

The main goals of this paper are two. First, it articulates what kinds of knowing pure knowing is in its narrow sense pure knowing as the capacity of moral judgment; pure knowing as moral knowledge and standard. Besides, it analyses pure knowing’s different features through a phenomenological description. All these aspects of pure knowing are tied by moral feeling. Second, this paper addresses two sets of theoretical problems that have been raised in Confucian discourse with respect to pure knowing and (...) Heavenly principle, primarily those that render Wang’s notion of pure knowing to be static recognition toward particular moral issues, or immediate response, which reading cannot really admit the possibilities of extension, reflection, moral cultivation, and reform of institution; and those that understand pure knowing to be merely abstract without concrete content, such as merely being a metaphysical substance. When properly understood, that is, from the perspective of moral emotions, Wang Yangming’s account of pure knowing provides for the possibilities of enhancement and cultivation, while insisting that the content of pure knowing is always accessible to us. (shrink)

In the history of philosophy as well as in most recent discussions, empathy is held to be a key concept that enables a basic understanding of the other while at the same time acting as the foundation of our moral emotionality. In this paper I want to show why empathy is the wrong candidate for both of these tasks. If we understand empathy as projection, i.e. a process of imaginary self-transposition, we are bound to presuppose a fully established interpersonal sphere. (...) If we consider empathy as synonymous with compassion it is highly questionable if we ever reach the other person in his or her otherness. Max Scheler and other early phenomenologists offer very fruitful approaches to both problems without resorting to empathy. I will present some of their thoughts and focus especially on Scheler’s claim about the connection between the experience of the real other and the intentionality of compassion. (shrink)

Pedagogical activity, be it of parents or teachers, continuously requires us to meet children's and youngsters' deep ethical needs. In our daily relationships with them, recognition is one of the most frequent and essential ingredients of our educational activity. But, what does being recognized mean? When does this everyday practice become genuinely pedagogical?This phenomenological inquiry explores pedagogical recognition, an experience of an essentially ethical sense. Through our words, actions, decisions, etc., we offer children and young people effective learning experiences about (...) what is good and right in our human world. Moreover, genuine recognition allows us to discover the personal worth and uniqueness of every child and young person entrusted to us. Recognition deals with the very being of people revealed through their capabilities in action.In this experience, the educator plays the decisive role. Thanks to our pedagogical responsibility and influence, we have the power to recognize; a power that has been given to us by the child and that can be observed when the transformational effect of recognition occurs. Pedagogical authority is the foundation of recognition as well as educational intentionality. The pedagogical significance of this practice requires every educator to evaluate and to improve the ways of doing this effectively, especially by thinking carefully about every person's singularity and by developing awareness of our ethical personality and our embodied language. It may lead us to being recognition. (shrink)

Georges Gurvitch’s research paper summarises the Paris period of his scientific activity and introduces the results obtained during this period to the anglophone reader. Gurvich analyses the degrees of cohesion of various social groups and shows the relationship between group cohesion and the sociality (or sociability) of the individuals who make up these groups. The first Russian translation of this article, as well as its English-language original, are provided with the publisher’s notes, revealing the historical and ideological context of the (...) formation of Gurvitch’s theory of sociability and the circumstances of the emergence of this article. (shrink)

Although considered often outdated or useless, Plato’s views on affectivity in general and on emotions in particular offer a great deal of observations recurring in subsequent theories of emotions. Without putting forward a claim about the character of these similarities – either influential or purely anticipating or simply coincidental – some examples are provided to illustrate them. If examples referred to are relevant to the current discussion, then Plato’s views are wrongly taken as valid only for historical research, or worse, (...) neglected completely. They should rather be considered helpful in disentangling aporias inherent to the debate over affectivity. A paper discusses the issue of taxonomy of feelings as well as the place of affectivity within mental states in Plato's work. (shrink)

This research intends to develop the ethical implications of the concept of personality through the phenomenological approaches of Scheler and Waldenfels. For both philosophers, an ethics based on a moral formalism would be very pernicious to the concept of personality and even for ethics itself. For ethics, it would bring a kind of arbitrariness and for the person a sort of depersonalization. In order to advance a concept of ethics grounded on the values of a person, Scheler introduces the idea (...) of God’s love for us as intuitively given athwart the values of holiness itself. From this given intuition, Scheler will build up the idea of good in itself as a model, so that a person could form a good personality through an accurate rank of values. Waldenfels would say that even the personality grounded on such mystical experiences would have the consequence of a depersonalization of the person in his relation with the other, the world, and with himself. Waldenfels will find, through a genealogy of the constitution of order thresholds zones that will prevent a borrowed concept of personality only from an inside, or an outside. As an open process of what happen with us, the personality cannot be static, but latent as it is done responsively. (shrink)