Is there a choice in sexual orientation? [Wilkerson, William S. : “Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In: Journal of Social Philosophy 40. No. 1, p. 97–116] argues that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by choice. [Díaz-León, Esa : “Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice”; In: Journal of Social Ontology] critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still lack a good argument (...) for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orientation. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if interpretation were not necessary to constitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element to constitute what we call sexual orientation. However, I conclude that even if we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orientation, it does not follow that there is a choice involved. (shrink)

In this note, my aim is to point out a phenomenon that has not received much attention; a phenomenon that, in my opinion, should not be overlooked in the professional practice of philosophy, especially within feminist efforts for social justice. I am referring to the way in which being a non-native speaker of English interacts with the practice of philosophy.1 There is evidence that non-native speakers are often perceived in prejudiced ways. Such prejudiced perception causes harm and, more importantly, constitutes (...) wrongdoing. As in other cases of prejudiced perception and biased behavior, it would be pretentious and misguided to expect philosophers and the philosophy profession to be free from this vice. There are good reasons to think that this prejudiced perception is bad not only for the persons who are perceived in such a way, but also for the profession, for it might make us miss important things that could improve philosophy in general. I claim we should be more sensitive to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and for the sake of doing better philosophy. (shrink)

In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural (...) explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms. (shrink)

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

La pedagogía es un tema crucial en el pensamiento de Rancière y juega un rol principal en su obra El maestro ignorante, texto que el presente escrito analiza y cuestiona. Su propuesta emancipadora establece como punto de partida una igualdad de inteligencias que en este escrito hemos denominado «isonousía», y según nuestra hipótesis, esta igualdad lleva aparejada una desigualdad de las voluntades (anisothelema). En consecuencia, la propuesta de Rancière no altera en absoluto “el orden explicador” que denuncia, pues el maestro (...) emancipador ya no tiene que corregir la ignorancia, pero sí la pereza; no ha de impartir un conocimiento superior, pero sí imponer una voluntad superior. (shrink)

Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also (...) affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to give the main lines of a theological accounting for the fullness of knowledge in Christ from the time of his conception. We follow the doctrine of St. Thomas and take into account some objections which are relatively modern. The paper is intended as a systematic articulation that is faithful to the Tradition and the doctrine of the Church and also concerned with faithfully interpreting the whole biblical narrative in our preaching. In particular, we (...) have in mind Gilles Mongeau’s question: “If from the beginning [Jesus] has all knowledge, how could he learn, which is such a fundamental part of a genuinely human existence?” We try to connect the issue of the knowledge of Christ with the reasons for the Incarnation. First, we show that our theological accounting finds support in the Magisterium and in the Bible. Secondly, we try to articulate systematically the reasons for affirming the fullness of human knowledge in Christ and the progression in his acquired knowledge. (shrink)

Here the point of departure of Being and Time is criticized, i.e. the priority of Dasein in the determination of the meaning of being. An overview of Heidegger’s doctrine is offered, his concern for intentionality is acknowledged, then it takes place a critique of his starting point, and finally a Thomistic alternative account of intentionality is proposed.

Arthur C. Danto did not live to witness the proliferation of AI in artistic creation. However, his philosophy of art offers key ideas about art that can provide an interesting perspective on artwork generated by artificial intelligence (AI). In this article, I analyze how his ideas about contemporary art, intention, interpretation, and authorship could be applied to the ongoing debate about AI and artistic creation. At the same time, it is also interesting to consider whether the incorporation of AI into (...) artistic creation marks a new chapter in the narrative, which seems to have reached its end, or if it represents a significant rupture with past artistic traditions. (shrink)

What is the distinction between understanding and forming a concept? In my view, for Aquinas, intelligere (the act of understanding) and dicere (the forming of a verbum or mental word) are not two different acts, but simply two different aspects of the same act of understanding. In the following, I will explore more in depth what this distinction means for Aquinas. Firstly, I will give a mostly doctrinal or systematic overview of the issue and, secondly, I will support my claims (...) with relevant textual evidence, taken exclusively from Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. This study, as an appendix, is part of “The Influence of Kant in Transcendental Thomism: Rahner, Lonergan and Von Balthasar” (forthcoming). In my view, Lonergan’s way of distinguishing intelligere and dicere is different from St. Thomas’ way. In the body of my book, I focus on Lonergan’s reasons to distinguish these notions in his own particular way, whereas this study focuses on St. Thomas’ doctrine. It is my hope that the following lines will foster an understanding of St. Thomas’ epistemology and of its application to Trinitarian theology. (shrink)

My goal here is to assess whether Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical conception of a descriptive philosophy is in accordance with his philosophical practice. I argue that Wittgenstein doesn’t really limit himself to description when he criticizes Moore’s use of the verb “to know”. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues that Moore’s claims of knowledge are at odds with the everyday use of the verb “to know”, because, among other things, they don’t allow the possibility of justification. That is, Wittgenstein considers that proper, everyday (...) claims of knowledge require the possibility of justification. What I try to show is that this idea cannot be derived from the mere observation and description of knowledge claims in ordinary language. I conclude that Wittgenstein’s treatment of the verb “to know” constitutes an inconsistency between his metaphilosophical posture and his philosophical practice. (shrink)

El objetivo de este pequeño trabajo es ayudar a comprender la necesidad de la composición real en el ser participado. Lo hacemos sirviéndonos de una parte de la magnífica obra del p. Fabro, La noción metafísica de participación. En la primera parte de nuestro trabajo nos serviremos de algunos de los textos de Santo Tomás que reportaba el p. Fabro, los que más nos ayuden a comprender la demostración. En la segunda, y al mismo efecto, estudiaremos el silogismo del p. (...) Fabro, con el cual dicho autor trataba de condensar la demostración de la composición real en todo ser participado. (shrink)

While Hegel’s influence on Arthur Danto has been examined in relation to specific parts of his thought, an overall analysis of said influence is still wanting. In this article, I analyze the presence of Hegelian influence in Danto’s complete thought from three perspectives: (1) Danto’s acceptance of Hegelian assumptions when it comes to the conception of history, narrative realism and historical progress, which allows him to combine timeless essentialism with historicism, (2) the cognitive aspect of art and the conception of (...) art as an embodied symbol, as well as the historical quality of said embodiment, and (3) the assumption that art’s trajectory coincides with the Hegelian prophecy that art will give way to philosophy, on which Danto’s “end of art” thesis is based. This examination not only illuminates the interrelation between the different parts of Dantian philosophy, but also reveals its systematic character. (shrink)

Why I thought it useful to offer an explanation of Hegel’s doctrine on the Incarnation was so that the reader may be empowered to identify Hegel’s influence in modern accounts of this mystery. Even if, in my view, Hegel’s interpretation of revealed religion differs greatly from Catholic Doctrine, it is not surprising to find the presence of some of his concepts in modern theology. In truth, what matters is not the theologian’s self-identification as Hegelian or as non-Hegelian, but whether or (...) not the theologian adopts Hegel’s concepts. This paper offers an explanation of the internal dynamism of Hegelian concepts and their relation to Christian doctrine in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This research may help to show in what way it is possible to explain Christian religious doctrine with a philosophy other than the Thomistic one and how, at least in Hegel’s case, religious doctrine is changed and reduced to an erroneous philosophical content. Also, an attempt is made to show the internal “coherence” of this Hegelian re-reading of Christianity so that theologians may become more cautious about accepting an explanation of Christian doctrine simply because the Christian language is preserved in that explanation. (shrink)

This article discusses the category of foreigner in the context of academia. In the first part I explore this category and its philosophical significance. A quick look at the literature reveals that this category needs more attention in analyses of dimensions of privilege and disadvantage. Foreignness has peculiarities that demarcate it from other categories of identity, and it intersects with them in complicated ways. Devoting more attention to it would enable addressing issues affecting foreigners in academia that go commonly unnoticed. (...) In the second part of the article I argue that current efforts to make academia a more inclusive environment should address the disadvantages that many foreign academics face. I focus on two senses of foreigner: working and living in a country that is not your country of origin, and being a nonnative speaker of the language in which you work. (shrink)

Given the importance of the principle of causality for the demonstration of God’s existence, this paper attempts to justify the evidence and necessity of the principle of causality, by following Fr. Fabro’s Thomistic defense—based on the notion of participation—but adding a particular emphasis on the notion of “being which is not per se,” this latter as an explanatory notion of the notion of “being which is by participation.” The introductory remarks touch upon two misunderstandings regarding the notion of participation employed (...) as a subject of the principle of causality: the first, considering “participated being” as a synonym of “received being,” and the second, the confusion, regarding the notion of being by participation, between its notional dependence on the notion of being as a whole and its real dependence on the real intensive Being. Then, in the first point, the defense of the principle of causality is distinguished from other related problems, like the particular applications of this principle. In the second and main point, we try to justify the necessity of being caused in the being which is experienced as being by participation, as follows: 1) that which is something by participation is not this something per se; 2) now, that which is not per se, either is not or is per aliud, 3) Therefore, that which is something by participation is per aliud. In the third and last point, we endeavor to justify the Thomism of our defense and of our emphasis on this notion of “being which is not per se” by considering two texts of St. Thomas. (shrink)

Os problemas da lei e da autoridade marcaram fortemente o pensamento políticomedieval ocidental, e em especial o desenvolvimento da noção de soberania, ponto deconvergência dos grandes conflitos de jurisdição no período. O debate acerca dadistribuição das jurisdições constituiu um dos momentos importantes para a construção damoderna idéia de soberania. Na medida em que se tomava a lei como dada, o sentido daautoridade tinha necessariamente de ser vinculado à idéia de comissão: a autoridade eraum atributo daquele que podia fazer cumprir a (...) lei em nome do legislador divino. Outromomento relevante foi o da emergência do problema do poder legislativo, tal como entendidomodernamente. Jurisdição, a partir daí, passaria a incluir também o direito de criar ede impor as normas válidas para toda a comunidade por um legislador agora humano. Aospoucos, a vontade do príncipe, que não se limita mais pelo rigor da razão e da moralidade,passa a ser entendida como fonte criadora, transformadora e revogadora da lei. Mostrar aslinhas gerais deste percurso constitui o objetivo imediato deste artigo. (shrink)

The ideal of “freedom-as-omnipotence” pointed out by Daya Krishna in his interpretation of the Yogasūtra is undoubtedly present throughout the history of yoga. This ideal of omnipotence is also at the basis of the contemporary transhumanist program through the ideal of human perfection, and there are already transhumanist versions that defend the use of meditative techniques from India as complements to a program of human enhancement. In this essay I argue that transhumanism and bioliberalism seek to free us from biological (...) conditioning at the cost of making us more and more dependent on science and technology, presenting a sort of “derivative freedom” that many premodern yogas would never accept. Instead, contemporary yogas, which no longer contemplate the ideal of yogic powers, are much more amenable to the idea of human enhancement through external devices, partly because they have adopted diluted versions of the models of freedom advocated in premodern yogas. We are already witnessing the evolution of a trans-human yoga in which technological devices are incorporated into the practice and virtual practice communities are created, some even made up of avatar-practitioners, in which the human factor is progressively lost. (shrink)

El estudio de los grafitis de Antoni Tàpies que se lleva a cabo en este artículo pretende profundizar en un aspecto poco considerado de la obra del autor y, sin embargo, crucial para comprender el conjunto de su obra. Esta perspectiva permite destacar el interés del artista por superar la separación entre arte y vida, recontextualizándolo más allá de la corriente informalista en las que se le ha encasillado y acercándolo a los movimientos internacionales del arte de acción. Para explicar (...) esta recontextualización se examinará, en primer lugar, la aparición del muro en su obra, para poder ver, posteriormente, cómo surge el grafiti. Dentro del segundo apartado se diferenciarán dos etapas distintas que ayudan a ver cómo el desarrollo de los grafitis de Tàpies está en relación con las transformaciones acontecidas en el terreno del grafiti a nivel internacional. De este modo, el artículo pretende ampliar el marco interpretativo de la obra de Tàpies, que adquiere así una coherencia mayor y abre su obra a nuevos significados. (shrink)

According to a common view, conscious thoughts necessarily involve quasi-perceptual experiences, or mental images. This is alleged to be the case not only when one entertains conscious thoughts about perceptible things, but also when one thinks about more abstract things. In the case of conscious abstract propositional thoughts, the idea is that they occur in inner speech, which is taken to involve imagery (typically auditory) of words in a natural language. I argue that unsymbolized thinking and total aphantasia cast doubt (...) on this common view. Unsymbolized thinking is the experience of thoughts that does not involve imagery. Total aphantasia is the inability to produce mental images of all sensory modalities. I consider and reject the objection that these individuals are mistaken either because their thoughts do involve images, or because those thoughts are not conscious. Thus, unsymbolized thinking and aphantasia provide evidence that conscious thoughts can occur without imagery. (shrink)

St. Thomas Aquinas has always considered intelligence a potency higher than the will, absolutely speaking. That being said, and in my view, the existential primacy of the will in the act of freedom (particularly in choosing the existential end) is also indisputably Thomistic, as Cornelio Fabro has shown. This paper endeavors to explain Aquinas' doctrine on the absolute primacy of the intellect and thus show that these two primacies can be affirmed coherently, that is, the intellect’s absolute primacy and the (...) will’s existential primacy. Firstly, I will explain the reasoning St. Thomas Aquinas uses in the Summa to justify the absolute primacy of the intellect over the will. Secondly, I will explore some parallel texts, in order to shed light on my interpretation of the Summa and expand our view regarding this and related doctrinal points. Thirdly, I will offer a brief study of Fabro’s position, one in which his concerns regarding the intellect’s absolute primacy are taken into account and carefully considered. (shrink)

The following is a paper presented for the Course Rahner and Lonergan at the University of Toronto (Winter, 2014), revised and edited Winter, 2018. Our purpose is to defend the possibility of “perceptualism,” that is to say, the position maintaining that the intelligible content of consciousness is given in perception and not posited by the activity of the subject. Assisted by the insights of Cornelio Fabro, this defense contrasts perceptualism with Bernard Lonergan’s “critical realism”. This paper focuses on the notion (...) of experience, seemingly the basis of the opposition between perceptualism and critical realism. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to clarify, from a Thomistic point of view, the nature and method of metaphysics. I argue that metaphysics' object is created being, not God, even if God enters metaphysics as efficient cause of metaphysic's object. Also, that metaphysics is a science, insofar as a particular kind of coherent reasoning process, going from the many to understand a certain oneness, and then from that oneness to reinterpret the many. Moreover, that, in this particular process of reasoning, (...) doctrinal topics must follow a certain order. Thus, in particular, I argue that the distinction between essence and act of being in every creature cannot be argued before arguing the existence of God. I touch upon the notion of separation in metaphysics and I compare Aquinas' notion of resolution with Fabro's notion. (shrink)

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein formulates several criticisms against skepticism about our knowledge of the external world. My goal is to show that Wittgenstein does not here offer a convincing answer to the skeptical problem. First, I will present a strong version of the problem, understanding it as a paradoxical argument. In the second part, I will introduce and raise problems for two pragmatic responses against skepticism that appear in On Certainty. Finally, I will present some of Wittgenstein’s logical criticisms against (...) skepticism, which may initially be considered strong, because they seem to refute some skeptical assumptions. They concern Wittgenstein’s ideas that it is logically impossible to doubt and to be mistaken about Moorean propositions, and that these propositions don’t have a truth-value. But even these, I intend to show, do not really challenge skepticism, for they are not well grounded. (shrink)

The following is an interpretation of Aquinas’ agent intellect focusing on Summa Theologiae I, qq. 75-89, and proposing that the agent intellect is a metaphysical rather than a formal a priori of human understanding. A formal a priori is responsible for the intelligibility as content of the object of human understanding and is related to Kant’s epistemological views; whereas a metaphysical a priori is responsible for intelligibility as mode of being of this same object. We can find in Aquinas’ text (...) many indications that the agent intellect is not productive of the universal as content but is, rather, productive of the abstracted or intelligible mode of being of the universal nature. This is because for Aquinas the universal nature, which is the object of human understanding, is present in the things themselves but with a different mode of being. Chapter 1 is intended to establish the fact which requires for Aquinas an agent intellect, and provides two very important principles: one is that the object of human understanding (the universal nature) is present in the things themselves and, the other, that it is not in the things themselves with a mode of being which makes it available to the intellectual eye. These two principles lead us to the main point of Chapter 2, namely the distinction between the intelligible object and its intelligible mode of being. Now, because knowing is receptive of the intelligible object (Chapter 3), which is present in the things themselves (Chapter 1), the agent intellect is productive not of the object’s intelligible content, but of its abstracted or intelligible mode of being (Chapter 4). (shrink)

I address the question of whether differences in color terminology cause differences in color experience in speakers of different languages. If linguistic representations directly affect color experience, then this is a case of what I call the linguistic penetrability of perception, which is a particular case of cognitive penetrability. I start with some general considerations about cognitive penetration and its alleged occurrence in the memory color effect. I then apply similar considerations to the interpretation of empirical studies of color perception (...) in speakers of different languages. I argue that findings such as differences in categorical perception in speakers of different languages do not show that language affects color experience. They therefore do not support the claim that color experience is linguistically penetrable. But even if we grant that color experience is different in speakers of different languages, I argue that this might still not be a case of linguistic penetration. Finally, I consider some epistemological consequences of the assumption that speakers of different languages have different color experiences. (shrink)

Raquel Cascales and Luis Echarte focus on the development of practical wisdom and what they call ‘seeing with the heart’ for science students by means of reading science fiction literature. They argue that literature can bring the student into contact with the reality of moral life as moral dilemmas are made concrete by the characters and circumstances in a novel. They provide an analysis of how Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World can be read in the classroom and show how (...) the novel invites students to think about the role of science in society, the evolutionary paradigm, advances in genetic and psychological manipulation, as well as questions concerning human emotions,suffering, and friendship. (shrink)

William Paley ( Natural Theology , 1802) developed the argument-from-design. The complex structure of the human eye evinces that it was designed by an intelligent Creator. The argument is based on the irreducible complexity ("relation") of multiple interacting parts, all necessary for function. Paley adduces a wealth of biological examples leading to the same conclusion; his knowledge of the biology of his time was profound and extensive. Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species is an extended argument demonstrating that the "design" of (...) organisms can be explained by natural selection. Moreover, the dysfunctions, defects, waste, and cruelty that prevail in the living world are incompatible with a benevolent and omnipotent Creator. They come about by a process that incorporates chance and necessity, mutation and natural selection. In addition to science, there are other ways of knowing, such as art, literature, philosophy, and religion. Matters of value, meaning, and purpose transcend science. (shrink)

This paper is my best attempt to confute (Kantian) Modern Philosophy at its very core. This implies, of course, that in my view the principles of Critical Realism are Kantian. The basic arguments supporting Critical Realism are powerful: I have tried to show clearly their power, but also to expose clearly their putrid root. Section 3 on the principle of immanence offers the most important contribution in this undertaking. The arguments of critical realism studied in this paper are the following: (...) 1. The Notion of Experience 2. The Nature of Knowledge: Question and Inquiry 3. The Principle of Immanence 4. The Notion of Relation 5. Judgment as the Position of the Real. (shrink)

(From the Introduction) The topic I would like to present is “Scholasticism and Thomism” as found in Chapter 7 of Fabro’s "Brief Introduction to Thomism". My presentation, as both a summary and a partial commentary on some aspects of this work, may be helpful as we wait for the English translation of Fabro’s book. The title of this chapter says exactly what Fr. Fabro wants to do. He wants to relate Scholasticism and Aquinas in two senses: 1) from a historical (...) point of view, so that we may understand the origins, context and later fortune of the doctrine of St. Thomas, and 2) from a doctrinal point of view (and this is the most important) so that we may clearly distinguish St. Thomas’ doctrine from the rest of Scholasticism. This is very important because some people have tried to understand the Church’s invitation—or, rather, instruction—to study St. Thomas as simply a broad invitation to study Scholastic philosophy and theology. This is clearly not the case. The Church wants us to study the principles of Thomistic doctrine which, many times, are substantially different from other scholastic doctrines. (shrink)

Kant and Aquinas: who can doubt they are different? And however, there are some who equate Aquinas and Kant in doctrines in which they are actually opposed; some attribute to St. Thomas Aquinas approaches that are Kantian and by no means Thomistic. They make those mistakes by misinterpreting or misusing Aquinas’ texts. This paper intends to clarify a little bit the radical difference between the approaches of Aquinas and Kant to human knowledge. In my view, we need first of all (...) to understand the problem of the universals, which is the basic problem of human understanding and, in a sense, the only problem of philosophy. Second, we need to understand the stance of both philosophers in front of this same problem. Only then will we be able to see what and how radical is the difference between Aquinas and Kant. (shrink)

In this paper I critically address some ideas presented in Patrick Duffley’s book Linguistic Meaning Meets Linguistic Form. Duffley adopts the semiological principle that linguistic signs have stable meanings. I argue that this principle leads Duffley to an artificial description of the meaning of the preposition for, in attempting to avoid the charge of polysemy. Another issue is that the principle is not consistently followed throughout the book, such as in Duffley’s analysis of the meaning of start, or in his (...) acceptance of words with encyclopedic meanings. I also point out that the proposed meaning of start and the view that the meaning of some words is encyclopedic have problems of their own. (shrink)

Both the itihāsa-s of the Mahābhārata and the Platonic philosophical ‘epode’ are often used to persuade in conditions where emotion threatens to incapacitate the person for argumentative discourse. Narrative reason has its own conditions of success and failure, opening up a discursive arena in which all kinds of utterances are welcome. Emphasizing the psychagogic function of the ‘once-upon-a-time’ reason, it is worth asking who the real protagonist of the story is and whether the story has a duty or a dharma (...) of its own to fulfill. Dharma and all the dilemmas it brings along with it constitute one of the fundamental problems that make up the whole Mahābhārata. In this essay I wonder about the dharma of the Mahābhārata itself—a literary work which gives itself the name ‘triumph’ (jaya)—and the cultural mission it fulfills in the lives of those who hear it, read it, study it, and share it with others. (shrink)

(Tesis de Licencia en Filosofía. Moderador Alessandro Salucci, OP. Angelicum, Roma, Febrero 2006) -/- El problema causal está íntimamente ligado y nos lleva necesariamente al problema del ser, finito e infinito. Por tanto, no es un problema más en la filosofía. En la larga discusión que se planteó en el último período escolástico (fines del s. XIX y primera mitad del s. XX) las líneas de solución más originales las ha dado el p. Cornelio Fabro -/- Por lo tanto, nos (...) proponemos investigar su propuesta de solución. El p. Fabro defendía la necesidad de la dependencia causal a través de la noción de participación. Nuestro objetivo es por tanto hacer un análisis crítico de la postura del p. Fabro acerca de la dependencia causal como exigencia del ser participado, a través del estudio de algunas de sus obras más importantes al respecto. Buscamos respondernos por qué para el p. Fabro el ser participado exige una causa, y valorar sus argumentos. -/- Como hemos dicho, para nuestro trabajo nos valdremos ante todo del estudio de algunas de las obras más importantes del p. Cornelio Fabro con respecto a la causalidad. Nos referimos en concreto a tres de ellas: la primera, el artículo La difesa critica del principio di causa, donde el autor expone de un modo preciso la noción de participación como el fundamento de la justificación crítica del principio de causalidad. Las otras dos obras son La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secondo San Tommaso d’Aquino, donde la noción de participación es puesta al centro de la metafísica tomista, como clave de bóveda de las tesis más características de la doctrina del Angélico; y Partecipazione e Causalità, obra en la cual el autor rescata el esse tomista original como fundamento de una metafísica de la causalidad. -/- Este estudio nos ha llevado a destacar la importancia de la noción de “ser que no es por sí” como noción esencialmente relacionada a la noción de participación y por otro lado cuasi necesaria para hacer el pasaje a la causa. (shrink)

Did we get Aquinas’ Epistemology right? St. Thomas is often interpreted according to Kantian principles, particularly in Transcendental Thomism. When this happens, it can appear as though Aquinas, too—along with Kant—had made the “turn to the subject”; as if Aquinas were no longer the Aristotelian “believer” who thinks nature is what it is but, instead, the Kantian “thinker” who holds that nature is what we think of it; as if St. Thomas, like Kant, had concluded that nature is intelligible not (...) only when we think of it, but because we think of it. After much struggle with this problem, the challenge seemed obvious to me: to show the radical difference between Aquinas and Kant. Kant had reasons to make his turn, his Copernican revolution. Could I explain those reasons, could I pinpoint the problem leading Kant to think in those terms? Could I show Aquinas facing the same problem and clearly taking a different direction in his proposed solution? That is what I have tried to do in this book. This book provides an interpretation of Aquinas’ agent intellect focusing on Summa Theologiae I, qq. 75-89, and proposing that the agent intellect is a metaphysical rather than a formal a priori of human understanding. A formal a priori is responsible for the intelligibility as content of the object of human understanding and is related to Kant’s epistemological views, whereas a metaphysical a priori is responsible for intelligibility as mode of being of this same object. We can find in Aquinas’ text many indications that the agent intellect is not productive of the intelligible object but is, rather, productive of the abstracted or intelligible mode of being of this object. This is because for Aquinas the universal as nature, which is the object of human understanding, is present in the things themselves but with a different mode of being. In this four-chapter book, Chapter 1 is intended to establish the fact which requires for Aquinas an agent intellect, and provides two very important principles: one is that the object of human understanding (the universal as nature) is present in the things themselves and, the other, that it is not in the things themselves with a mode of being which makes it available to the intellectual eye. These two principles lead us to the main point of Chapter 2, namely the distinction between the intelligible object and its intelligible mode of being. Now, because knowing is receptive of the intelligible object (Chapter 3), which is present in the things themselves (Chapter 1), the agent intellect is productive not of the object’s intelligible content, but of its abstracted or intelligible mode of being (Chapter 4). (shrink)

The striking title The End of Art managed to draw attention to the philosophical work of Arthur Danto. However, the lack of a systematic development which could support this thesis made him face harsh criticism. However, strong foundations for his statements can be deduced from his writings. In this paper, I analyse how to understand the thesis of the ‘end of art’. It should be approached not as a monolitical notion but as a complex concept that combines three different senses: (...) 1) the ‘end of art’ in the Hegelian sense: the conversion of art into philosophy, 2) the ‘end of art’ in the historiographical sense: as the end to the narratives of the history of art, and 3) the ‘end of art’ as the beginning of a new period in history, where Danto’s philosophy of art would be fully valid. (shrink)

This research intends to show a Kantian influence in Transcendental Thomism, particularly in Rahner, Lonergan and Von Balthasar. What is meant by a Kantian influence is a certain attitude regarding the problem of the universals, an attitude which is radically different from St. Thomas’. In my previous work (The Radical Difference between Aquinas and Kant: Human Understanding and the Agent Intellect in Aquinas [Chillum: IVE Press, 2021], the radical difference between St. Thomas and Kant was shown. In this present research, (...) what is argued is that Rahner, Lonergan and Von Balthasar follow Kant, not St. Thomas, with regard to the analysis of human understanding. From each Transcendental Thomist author mentioned above, I have taken one sample text, one most significant work where each author’s epistemology can be explored. Thus, I have selected Rahner’s Spirit in the World, Lonergan’s Verbum articles and Von Balthasar’s Theologic I. (shrink)

El proyecto transhumanista de mejoramiento humano viene proponiendo ya desde hace tiempo una superación de los límites humanos que nos permita convertirnos en una nueva especie. A pesar de que dicha posibilidad es todavía lejana en la práctica, las hipótesis han invadido la ciencia ficción y están generando la imagen colectiva de lo que se considera posible o, incluso, deseable. Al mismo tiempo en la ciencia ficción esos desarrollos artificiales se llevan hasta sus últimos límites y se ponen en cuestión. (...) En el presente estudio se revisan las tensiones en relación con el posthumanismo que aparecen en la serie de ficción Westworld. En concreto, el artículo estudia cómo se desarrolla en ella el concepto de identidad, uno de los que más están cambiando en nuestra época. El análisis revela la necesidad de abordarlo desde un punto de vista complejo, en el que se dé una importancia especial a la vivencia personal, tanto desde el punto de vista corporal como psicológico para el despertar de la conciencia. A su vez, dichos elementos se mostrarán esenciales para comprender la propuesta de identidad narrativa que subyace en la serie. Por todo ello, los planteamientos de Westworld suponen una interesante reflexión sobre cómo se concibe la identidad hoy en día. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor has claimed to have a solution to the traditional problem of what comes first, thought or language. Compositionality, he says, will give us the answer, for at least one must be compositional, and if only one of them is, that is the one that has underived semantic content. He argues that natural languages are not compositional, and therefore that the content of language is derived from the content of thought. I will argue that the idea that language is (...) not compositional conflicts with his productivity and systematicity arguments for the existence of a language of thought. I will also show that Fodor’s solution to the problem fails, as his main argument is circular. Finally, I suggest that Fodor’s argument against the compositionality of language is not decisive, and that we can still attribute at least some degree of compositionality to language. (shrink)

Clearings of the Forest (Claros del Bosque, 1977), one of the most poetic and challenging works of María Zambrano’s thought, cannot be approached from a breathless paradigm. For the immersion in these clearings take us into the breathing of being that we contemplate alongside the more obvious physiological breathing, the breathing of life. In this work, Zambrano proposes a poetic and mystical phenomenology of the breathing of being through the breathing of its word. Thus, to recover contact with this inner (...) breathing could be to recover the lost chant of the word. This essay does not pretend to be a detailed analysis of Zambrano’s thought as a whole, nor of the vibrant mystery that her clearings reveal. The purpose is to uncover the fundamental role that breathing plays in this poetic-philosophical journey, along with other symbols such as light or love, with the question of what place this type of philosophical exercise occupies today in the classrooms of contemporary universities. (shrink)

El Romanticismo miró la Ilustración como una época que, al apostar por la racionalidad de manera casi exclusiva, rompió la unidad entre distintos ámbitos del saber. La conciencia de esa falta de unidad impulsa la reflexión de muchos intelectuales sobre cómo volver a alcanzarla, tarea que al principio los románticos hacen recaer en el arte. En concreto, el grupo de los Nazarenos, muy ligado al Athenäum, apostó por recuperar esta unidad, que pronto adquirió tintes políticos, mediante la “religión del arte”. (...) También otros autores idealistas, como Schelling, consideraron que el arte debía ocupar el lugar primordial en el sistema filosófico. Frente a ellos destaca la figura de Hegel, que rechazará cada vez con más fuerza la mistificación romántica del arte. Aunque, como se verá, en un inicio Hegel también habla de la “religión del arte”, en su obra de madurez distingue entre arte, religión y filosofía, dejando claro el lugar primordial que ocupa la racionalidad filosófica en su sistema. Revisando estas cuestiones desde la perspectiva más contemporánea, Inciarte considera que, a pesar de la rotundidad del pensamiento hegeliano, estas tensiones no pueden quedar resueltas desde un enfoque meramente reflexivo, sino que sólo encuentran una salida cuando se tratan en el nivel práctico de la vida. (shrink)

In his autobiography The Space within the Heart (1970), the writer Aubrey Menen shares the experiment in self-inquiry he conducted in the 1960s in the Piazza Farnese in Rome. Relying on the reading of two Upaniṣads, he decided to retreat to a room and not abandon the experiment until he had achieved the experience of his true self, the ātman. Employing only intellectual analysis, Menen distances himself, one by one, from all the narratives that make up his empirical identity. In (...) this essay, I propose to interpret his experiment from classical Sāṃkhya philosophy, reading it as a contemporary practice of tattva-abhyāsa that proceeds through a methodic disenchantment and entails a cognitive and emotional nakedness that might be interpreted as the nakedness of prakṛti. This case study raises questions about the application of Sāṃkhya philosophy in contexts other than renunciation and outside of any tradition, as well as on the role that emotions play in the process of the negation (pratiṣedha) of tattva-s, for the latter are not abstract entities, but shape our various empirical identities through emotional knots that the seeker will have to undo in the exercise of coming to affirm their identity as puruṣa. (shrink)

Durante los últimos decenios la utilidad se ha convertido en uno de los elementos más importantes de nuestra sociedad, hasta el punto de medir no sólo las cosas, sino a los seres humanos por su utilidad. No se trata de demostrar la utilidad de la cosas “inútiles”, sino de reivindicar que hay cosas que son valiosas por sí mismas. Esta es la perspectiva que me gustaría tratar en este artículo. Para ello, en primer lugar me detendré en explicar brevemente el (...) auge y expansión de la utilidad desde la modernidad hasta nuestros días, centrándome en una de sus vertientes contemporáneas: el transhumanismo. En segundo lugar, frente a esta corriente presentaré una defensa de lo inútil como aquello que nos caracteriza como humanos. Por último, me centraré en exponer cómo el arte nos enseña, por excelencia, a valorar lo inútil y, en este sentido, nos ayuda a comprender mejor al ser humano. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to present some advantages of the representational and computational theories of mind when compared to other views, especially behaviorism. The idea is that representational and computational theories allow us to conceive propositional attitudes in a way that preserves two essential features we take them to have in common sense psychological explanations: semantic evaluability and causal efficacy. Behaviorism reconceives mental states in a way that doesn’t preserve these essential features. In so doing, it makes a (...) mystery of the success of common sense psychology. I illustrate some of the difficulties that behaviorism faces by considering and criticizing Wittgenstein’s approach to linguistic understanding. The upshot is that representational and computational theories of mind do a better job at vindicating common sense psychology, and so are to be preferred when compared to behaviorism. (shrink)

Monográfico: Yoga: Historia, Filosofía y Prácticas. Aposta. Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 94 (2022) .

To get a comprehensive understanding of the core concept of “the end of art”, this book analyses the intellectual trajectory of Arthur Danto, highlighting his successive achievements in philosophy of action, philosophy of history and philosophy of art. If, as Danto says, everything is extensively associated with everything else, it is impossible to avoid putting the philosophy of art in relation with his whole philosophical system. -/- .

El yoga supramental nunca será un yoga mainstream, ni está diseñado para serlo. No puede subsumirse en una clase de hora y media, ni se presta a ser encerrado en una sala de yoga. Se trata de un compromiso existencial que requiere de toda una vida de dedicación. En estas páginas indago en la vida de su fundador, el yogui, poeta y filósofo Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950). Educado en Cambridge, activista político en pos de la independencia de India y nominado al (...) Premio Nobel de literatura y de la paz, Sri Aurobindo fue sobre todo un experimentador de las profundidades de la conciencia, cuyo yoga se inspira en la enseñanza de Sri Ramakrishna, tal y como algunos investigadores contemporáneos están reivindicando en nuestros días. En este texto enfatizo esa influencia de Sri Ramakrishna, bosquejo la sādhanā que propone el yoga supramental tal y como se refleja en la correspondencia que Sri Aurobindo mantuvo con sus discípulos, e indago en el papel que cumplen la emoción y el fuego anímico en un yoga que tiene como finalidad la espiritualización de la materia. (shrink)

In a recent work entitled You must change your life, Peter Sloterdijk explores the practising nature of philosophy and predicts the return of the “immunological”. There is currently a growing demand for anthropotechnics able to strengthen our immune-symbolic system (i.e. mental and physical methods that protect us against uncertainty, anguish, and death). The anthropotechnics that are being practiced worldwide, such as Yoga or Mindfulness, come originally from Indian philosophies and not from ancient Greek or Roman philosophy. Despite the work of (...) historians of philosophy such as Pierre Hadot, the spiritual exercises of ancient Greco-Roman philosophy continue to be studied as fossilized specimens inside university classrooms. This could be due to the pact of indifference, the tacit agreement that lies behind the functioning of contemporary Institutional Philosophy. Thanks to this pact there is no longer any possible contradiction between life and work, because there is, to begin with, no vital commitment to the genuine exercise of philosophy. We assume that philosophy is an exclusively rhetorical exercise and that the task of the professional philosopher is to publish as many papers as possible in prestigious journals that tend to privatize knowledge. Following a different daimon, this essay was conceived as an exercise in thinking outside the academic standards of professional philosophy. The resulting literary experiment has been intentionally kept as natural as possible, without disguising the crossroads of ideas, thinkers, doubts and new problems that arose spontaneously during the exercise. (shrink)