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No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion

In J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159 (2017)

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  1. Justifications and Excuses in Epistemology.Daniel Greco - forthcoming - Noûs.
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  • A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-11.
    Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: A is epistemically permitted to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and A’s apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above three theses are jointly inconsistent. The main upshot of the paper is this: even if the knowledge norm (...)
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  • Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Several studies have found a robust effect of truth on epistemic evaluation of belief, decision, action and assertion. Thus, truth has a significant effect on normative participant evaluations. Some theorists take this truth effect to motivate factive epistemic norms of belief, action, assertion etc. In contrast, I argue that the truth effect is best understood as an epistemic instance of the familiar and ubiquitous phenomenon of outcome bias. I support this diagnosis from three interrelating perspectives: (1) by epistemological theorizing, (2) (...)
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