The relevance of any logical analysis lies in its ability to solve paradoxes and trace conceptual troubles back; with this respect, the task of epistemic logic is to handle paradoxes in connection with the concept of knowledge. Epistemic logic is currently introduced as the logical analysis of crucial concepts within epistemology, namely: knowledge, belief, truth, and justification. An alternative approach will be advanced here in order to enlighten such a discourse, as centred upon the word assertion and displayed in terms (...) of utterance. Insofar as epistemic modalities express some attitudes, the intentionality of discourse will be emphasized within an illocutionary modal logic. Two large views will range over the whole study: declarative and epistemic sentences have one and the same logic (assertion logic); the plurality of languages games doesn’t entail any logical pluralism. -/- La valeur d'une analyse logique réside dans sa capacité à résoudre des paradoxes et à comprendre l'origine de nos problèmes conceptuels ; à ce titre, le rôle d'une logique épistémique est de traiter des paradoxes liés au concept de connaissance. On présente généralement la logique épistémique comme une analyse logique de concepts centraux en épistémologie : connaissance, croyance, vérité, justification. Une autre approche sera proposée ici en vue de clarifier ce genre de discours, centrée sur la notion d'assertion et décrite en termes d'énonciation. Parce que les modalités épistémiques expriment des attitudes, c'est l'intentionnalité du discours qui sera mise en valeur dans le cadre d'une logique modale illocutoire. Deux thèses transversales parcourront l'ensemble du travail : les énoncés déclaratifs et épistémiques partagent la même logique (logique assertorique) ; la pluralité des jeux de langages n'implique pas un pluralisme logique. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to survey and evaluate Searle’s account of metaphor (1979) in the light of Davidson’s arguments against the idea of metaphorical meaning, which appeared at roughly the same time. Since this paper is intended for a festschrift celebrating Searle’s respectable anniversary, I will mostly refrain from critical remarks and rather focus on the positive aspects of his account. I am going to show that Searle’s theory of metaphor is for the most part immune to (...) Davidson’s arguments. (shrink)

In this work I will analyze the debate between Pascal Engel and Richard Rorty about the relevance of the notion of truth to the characterization of assertion. I will point out the theoretic advantages of Rortian conversationalism’s refuse of the idea of truth as a norm of assertion. For that, first of all, I will make an analysis of Rortian deflationism. Then, I will make an reconstruction of Engel’s defense of the normativity of truth. Finally, I will establish that that (...) defense is overcome by conversationalism. During the discussion I will criticize some theoretical developments by Akeel Bilgrami, Harry Frankfurt and Huw Price which could be useful to Engel’s position. (shrink)

Moral dissensus may arise first because persons may disagree over the warrants licensing inferring an evaluative conclusion from premises asserting that properties alleged evaluatively relevant hold. This results in seeing different properties as evaluatively relevant. Secondly, such properties will frequently not be descriptive but interpretive, asserting some nomic connection. Persons may disagree over what evaluatively relevant properties hold in a given case. We explore the possibilities for argumentation to resolve these two types of disagreement.

Even given agreement on the totality of conditions that brought about an effect, there often is disagreement about the cause of the effect, for example, the disagreement about the cause of the Gulf oil spill. Different conditions’ being deemed responsible accounts for such disagreements. The defense of the act of deeming a condition responsible often depends on showing that the condition was the appropriate target of interference in order to have avoided the effect.

Words mean things, speakers mean things in using words, and these need not be the same. For example, if you say to someone who has just finished eating a super giant burrito at the Taqueria Guadalajara, “You are what you eat,” you probably do not mean that the person is a super giant burrito. So we need to distinguish the meaning of a linguistic expression – a word, phrase, or sentence – from what a person means in using it. To (...) simplify matters, let us pretend that an utterance is always of a sentence (and, for mnemonic purposes, let our imagined s peaker be a s he and h earer be a h e). (shrink)

Ontology is the study of what there is, what kinds of things make up reality. Ontology seems to be a very difficult, rather speculative discipline. However, it is trivial to conclude that there are properties, propositions and numbers, starting from only necessarily true or analytic premises. This gives rise to a puzzle about how hard ontological questions are, and relates to a puzzle about how important they are. And it produces the ontologyobjectivity dilemma: either (certain) ontological questions can be trivially (...) answered using only uncontroversial premises, or the uncertainties of ontology are really a threat to the truth of basically everything we say or believe. The main aim of this dissertation is to resolve these puzzles and to shed some light on the discipline of ontology. I defend a view inspired by Carnap’s internal-external distinction about what there is, but one according to which both internal and external questions are fully factual and meaningful. In particular, I argue that the trivial arguments are valid, but they do not answer any ontological questions. Furthermore, I propose an account of the function of our talk about properties, propositions and natural numbers. According to this account our talk about them has no ontological presuppositions for its literal and objective truth. This avoids the ontology-objectivity dilemma, and solves the puzzles about ontology. To do this I look at quantification and noun phrases in general, and at their relation to ontology. I argue that quantifiers are semantically underspecified in a certain respect, and play two different roles in communication. I discuss the relation between syntactic form and information structure, the function of certain non-referential, non-quantificational noun phrases, the uses of bare number determiners, and how arithmetic truths are learned and taught. The more metaphysical issues discussed include: inexpressible properties, logicism about arithmetic, nominalism, Carnap’s view about ontology, the problem of universals, the relationship between ontology and objectivity, different projects within ontology, non-existent.... (shrink)

Disagreement over what exists is so fundamental that it tends to hinder or even to block dialogue among disputants. The various controversies between believers and atheists, or realists and nominalists, are only two kinds of examples. Interested in contributing to the intelligibility of the debate on ontology, in 1939 Willard van Orman Quine began a series of works which introduces the notion of ontological commitment and proposes an allegedly objective criterion to identify the exact conditions under which a theoretical discourse (...) signals an assumption of existence. I intend to present the concept of ontological commitment and the Quinean criterion, to expose and evaluate some of the many criticisms to which the criterion has subject and to situate it in the context of Quine’s philosophy. As a product of such analyses, I hope to contribute to the discussion on the application and relevance of the notion of ontological commitment. (shrink)

Manfred Eigen extended Erwin Schroedinger’s concept of “life is physics and chemistry” through the introduction of information theory and cybernetic systems theory into “life is physics and chemistry and information.” Based on this assumption, Eigen developed the concepts of quasispecies and hypercycles, which have been dominant in molecular biology and virology ever since. He insisted that the genetic code is not just used metaphorically: it represents a real natural language.However, the basics of scientific knowledge changed dramatically within the second half (...) of the 20th century.Unfortunately, Eigen ignored the results of the philosophy of science discourse on essential features of natural languages and codes: a natural language or code emerges from populations of living agents that communicate. This contribution will look at some of the highlights of this historical development and the results relevant for biological theories about life. (shrink)

El acto lingüístico como acto de hablar, decir y conocer es una actividad que realiza el sujeto desde lo profundo de su conciencia. Consiste en la síntesis cognoscitiva que realiza el hablante de su intuición y de lo que añade mediante su imaginación y su razón, convirtiéndola en palabras de una lengua. El acto lingüístico y, por tanto, el lenguaje, es la proyección hacia las cosas de lo que el sujeto realiza en su interior. Las cosas así tienen un grado (...) de realidad relativo, el que el sujeto les da proyectando su intención significativa hacia lo que le rodea, utilizando para ello las palabras de una lengua, creando así su verdad o su logos. Mi intención en este artículo es reflexionar sobre la realidad humana del acto lingüístico en cuanto que es la respuesta del sujeto que vive una situación dada. (shrink)

Este artículo defiende que las obligaciones sociales emergen de las normas de la racionalidad. A través de un análisis de los requisitos normativos de la racionalidad que gobiernan los compromisos individuales, se muestra que los agentes poseen autoridad racional para revaluar sus razones, modificar sus juicios prácticos y cambiar sus intenciones. De esta autoridad depende su autonomía racional: uno y el mismo sujeto puede obligarse a hacer algo, y revocar esta orden. Mediante un compromiso social, el deudor renuncia a su (...) autoridad y autonomía racionales en favor del acreedor, generando así una obligación en el deudor, un derecho en el acreedor, y una razón normativa relativa al deudor. (shrink)

En su discusión “Obras de ficción, formas de conciencia y literatura”, Josep Corbí formula una serie de críticas certeras a mis ideas sobre la distinción que he hecho entre ficción y no ficción en Relatar lo ocurrido como invención. En esta nota de respuesta expongo primero de forma sucinta el núcleo de esas ideas y después proporciono las que considero las razones más decisivas para adoptarlas, a pesar de las dificultades que señala Corbí.

Talking about objects requires talking with objects, presenting objects in speech to identify a term's referent. I say This figure is a circle while handing you a ring. The ring is a prop, a perceptual object referenced by an extra-sentential event to identify the extension of a term, its director ('This figure'). Props operate in speech acts and their products, not in sentences. Intra-sentential objects we talk with are displays. Displayed objects needn't be words but must be like words, perceptually, (...) reproductively, and syntactically. Displays are presented by their syntactical position, as terms, with a term-like function. Semantically they are props. The O in FOD (This figure O is a circle) is a prop-like referent, not a term. The O in OD (O is a circle) may be that of FOD, but that display may have semantically and syntactically diverse directors, and without a specific one OD has no determinate sense Describing the display of quotations demands distinguishing displays from quotations. Quotations are repetitions of something said. Displays are perceptual objects, linguistic and non-linguistic, reproductions and originals, presented in sentences to identify a referent. Display markers are disambiguators that say: Read this as a prop. They may mark direct speech from indirect speech. Markers of quotation say: Someone said this. That historical claim is outside a sentence's propositional content. Those marks don't say: This is a display. They do make it true. Calling displays quotations muddies the study of speaking with speech. Calling both displays and intranyms quotations muddies the study of meaning and truth. Intranyms are terms, consisting of an expression flanked by lines, that denote that interior expression. Intranyms are created by stipulation to formalize a metalanguage. Formalization of a metalanguage replaces displays with intranyms. Formalized metalanguages lack the logical form and subject matter of our natural metalanguage. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to propose a framework for the structure of persuasive communica-tion based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model by Petty and Cacioppo, the Inference Anchoring Theory by Budzynska and Reed and the Interpersonal Argumentation Model by Budzynska. The ELM suggests that there are two routes to persuasion: central and peripheral. IAT assumes that com-munication acts generate their contents and inferences by means of illocutionary connections. The model of IP-argumentation provides the general representation of arguments in which (...) the proponent refers to com-munication acts of some participant of communication. The paper discusses where exactly means of the central and peripheral routes operate in the structure of persuasive communication and argumentation. (shrink)

Considering the short history of the feminist philosophy of language, Rae Langton’s article “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts” was highly influential as one of the first positive research programs in the movement. In that paper, Langton – using John L. Austin’s speech act theory – tries to interpret Catharine MacKinnon’s thesis: pornography is a speech that subordinates and silences women. Despite the importance of the subject, those unfamiliar with certain historical and contextual features of the topic would hardly understand it. (...) My paper aims to introduce some of the major accounts in this special area in the intersection of speech act theory and feminist philosophy. Rather than just reconstructing Langton’s arguments and the most common objections against it, I will take a more holistic approach, examining its surrounding literature as well. This article has six sections. In Section 1, I contrast the conservative and liberal arguments against pornography and sketch MacKinnon’s liberal critique. In Section 2, I give alternative interpretations of MacKinnon’s thesis, “pornography is harm.” In Section 3, I try to make sense of the prima facie implausible assumption that pornography is speech. In Section 4 and 5, I will analyze the Langtonian theories about subordination and silencing. Finally, in Section 6, I will mention the most challenging problems for Langton’s approach, considering the verbal nature or pornography, the limits of the protection of free speech, and the different positions on sexual consent. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits has been highly influential since the beginning of this century. It can be read as a systematic response to scepticism. One of the most important notions in this response is the notion of «evidence,» which will be the focus of the present paper. I attempt to show primarily two things. First, the notion of evidence invoked by Williamson does not address the sceptical worry: he stipulates an objective notion of evidence, but this begs the (...) question against his opponent. Second, his related thesis «Evidence equals Knowledge» does not sit well with his own content externalism: he promises to relate epistemology to philosophy of mind, but he fails to live up to this commitment in his crucial chapter on scepticism. Other minor problems concerning evidence will also be discussed in due course. (shrink)

In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion has forcefully criticized both Donnellan's and Evans’ claims on the contingent a priori, and she has developed an “acquaintanceless” account of singular thoughts as an alternative view. Jeshion claims that one can fully grasp a singular thought expressed by a sentence including a proper name, even if its reference has been descriptively fixed and one’s access to the referent is “mediated” by that description. But she still wants to reject “semantic instrumentalism”, the view (...) that “there are no substantive conditions of any sort on having singular thought. We can freely generate singular thoughts at will by manipulating the apparatus of direct reference.” Her account of singular thoughts is a psychological one, rejecting any epistemic requirement. Having singular thoughts is for her a matter of deploying “mental files” or “dossiers” that play a significant role in the cognitive life of the individual. This paper elaborates on an alternative descriptivist-friendly view, which has important points of contact with Jeshion’s. It differs, particularly in that it is an epistemic view; it is only a broadly understood acquaintance view, as it will transpire, but this does not make it a mere terminological variation on Jeshion’s acquaintanceless one. To argue for it, the paper discusses some relevant aspects of the semantics of fictional discourse. (shrink)

In this thesis, I propose and defend a theory according to which committing oneself to knowing the proposition expressed counts as an assertion of that proposition. A consequence of this view is the knowledge account of assertion, according to which one asserts that p correctly only if one knows that p. In support of this approach, I offer a strategy of identifying an assertion’s “normative consequences”, types of act that normally take place as a result of one’s making an assertion (...) incorrectly. I outline two such phenomena: retraction and disavowal of knowledge. In continuation, I put the theory to test and critically examine four sets of objections against it, arguing that it can convincingly defuse them. Finally, I discuss two related issues: I maintain that by performing “aesthetic assertions” one also normally performs a non-assertoric speech act of recommendation, and argue for the possibility of “non-linguistic assertions”, whose content is expressed by gestures in appropriate contexts. (shrink)

Suppose you decide or promise to do something that you have evidence is difficult to do. Should you believe that you will do it? On the one hand, if you believe that you will do it, your belief goes against the evidence—since having evidence that it’s difficult to do it constitutes evidence that it is likely that you won’t do it. On the other hand, if you don’t believe that you will do it but instead believe, as your evidence suggests, (...) that it is likely that you will fail, your decision is not serious and your promise is not sincere. This problem—I call it the Epistemological Problem of Difficult Action—is a pressing philosophical problem that each of us faces. In this paper I consider several possible responses to it. I conclude that the right response is to say that we should believe against the evidence. Cases in which we decide or promise to do something that we have evidence is difficult to do are the best counterexamples to evidentialism. (shrink)

Imperative sentences like Dance! do not seem to represent the world. Recent modal analyses challenge this idea, but its intuitive and historical appeal remain strong. This paper presents three new challenges for a non-representational analysis, showing that the obstacles facing it are even steeper than previously appreciated. I will argue that the only way for the non-representationalist to meet these three challenges is to adopt a dynamic semantics. Such a dynamic semantics is proposed here: imperatives introduce preferences between alternatives. This (...) characterization of meaning focuses on what function a sentence serves in discourse, rather than what that sentence refers to (e.g., a state of the world). By representing the meaning of imperatives, connectives and declaratives in a common dynamic format, the challenges posed for non-representationalism are met. (shrink)

Šio straipsnio tikslas yra parodyti, kaip ir kodėl radikalios interpretacijos metodas gali išspręsti problemas, formuluojamas įvairių skeptinių scenarijų pavidalu. Pirmiausia radikalios interpretacijos metodas neleidžia dekartiško skeptinio scenarijaus, tiek tradicinės, tiek naujesnių versijų, laikyti filosofine problema, kuri remiasi sąmoningo ir nesąmoningo melo skirtumu. Straipsnyje argumentuojama už išplėstinę natūralizuotos epistemologijos versiją, įtraukiančią ir socialinius veiksnius. Konkrečiau, hipotezių apie žinojimą ir apgaulę komunikavimui visuomet galioja bent du apribojimai. Be to, straipsnyje aiškinama nuosaikaus eksternalizmo būtinybė dekartiškam ir hiumiškam skeptiniams scenarijams.

In (1959), Carnap famously attacked Heidegger for having constructed an insane metaphysics based on a misconception of both the logical form and the semantics of ordinary language. In what follows, it will be argued that, once one appropriately (i.e., in a Russellian fashion) reads Heidegger’s famous sentence that should paradigmatically exemplify such a misconception, i.e., “the nothing nothings”, there is nothing either logically or semantically wrong with it. The real controversy as to how that sentence has to be evaluated—not as (...) to its meaning but as to its truth—lies at the metaphysico- ontological level. For in order for the sentence to be true one has to endorse an ontology of impossibilia and Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles. (shrink)

This thesis arises out of a critique of the way language is decontextualized and presented from a reductively linguistic viewpoint in foreign language instruction. In particular, it focuses on the weaknesses of the broad approach known as Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) and highlights the disparity between its theoretical assumptions and practical applications. With this in mind, the thesis identifies and explores three foundational premises that should be considered as part of an attempt to design a theoretically coherent framework for foreign (...) language instruction. By applying three sets of principles based on these premises, the thesis goes on to outline such a framework. After providing a background to the study, the first consideration is the nature of cultural and communicative performance. The study turns to sociological concepts regarding cultural organization and production, in order to better conceptualize how 'culture' can be understood in the context of foreign language learning. The second part of this area focuses on meaning and communication in order to undermine current treatments of 'language' in foreign language pedagogy. The second area of interest is that of learning and thus considers a number of theories of how people learn. The focus here is on learning-in-general rather than learning languages specifically. What emerges from this are a number of principles that should be borne in mind when creating conditions favorable to language learning. Finally, one largely overlooked area in foreign language learning and applied linguistics more broadly, is how the field of foreign language pedagogy constructs and legitimizes its practices, as well as suppresses its foundational theoretical assumptions in its activities (including research, methodology and teaching). A chapter is therefore devoted to this issue, and a set of principles is formulated in order to ensure that the design of any instructional framework is honest and ethical. Thus furnished with the triangulation of principles, an attempt is made to outline how a learner-focused, ethical pedagogical framework that stresses culture might look. This thesis is theoretical in nature and relies on arguments and positions from diverse and less commonly considered academic fields in foreign language instruction. Its main theoretical inspiration comes from concepts and claims generally considered 'poststructural' or 'postmodern'. However, there is no exclusive devotion to any particular author or theory. It is hoped that this thesis can make a genuine, if not controversial, contribution to the field of foreign language teaching by initiating a dialogue concerning the (lack of) philosophical and epistemological reflexivity in the field. (shrink)

Until now psychoanalytic literature has paid little attention to the psychoanalytic consulting room or the arrangement of couch and armchair and their likely effect on the psychoanalytic process. In this qualitative study, the answers of 20 former analysands reporting about their analyses in a guided interview were interpreted. It was found that room and psychoanalytic process interact very closely with one another. In the course of the analysis analysands define room implicitly in five different ways unaware of their doing so. (...) Room is defined as 1 the complete room in which the couch and armchair stand. Subjectively, the analysand is in the analyst’s room and is assigned a place on the couch for his own use. Analysis consists mainly on the analysand’s adapting to the analytic procedure. 2 the couch setting. Subjectively, the analysand is in his own room. Psychoanalysis consists mainly of regressive dyadic interactions between analysand and analyst. The analysand idealizes the room and is unaware of any irritating element. 3 the couch. Subjectively, the analysand is in his own room, concentrating on the confrontation with himself during the analytic work. The analyst accompanies the process mainly protectively by having the consulting room ready. 4 the complete room with all its details as the basis of the analysand’s own concept of a room. The analysand has an increasingly critical view of the consulting room, the analyst and all the details of the analytic process. He now becomes fully aware of all the elements belonging to room and process. He conceptualises his own idea of the perfect room. His often vehement criticism of all the elements of the room is central to the analytic work at this stage. 5 the complete consulting room including the couch setting. After the end of his analysis, the analysand returns to his old consulting room and discovers, mainly unconsciously, that his former consulting room has become foreign to him. He is no longer in his own room and soberly looks at an unattractive room in which he once experienced all the decisive periods of his life. The analysand goes through these five phases respectively. The process is not reversible. On account of the interaction stated between room perception and psychoanalytic process this room theory can serve as a means of efficacy research in order to evaluate the depth of the psychoanalytic process and the qualitative personality changes within it. (shrink)

In this paper, it is argued that a pragma-dialectical perspective on advisory health brochures can complement current research in the medical domain and vice versa. Advisory health brochures are characterized as a particular communicative activity type to show how this context influences the argumentative process. It is argued that the quality of argumentation in health communication needs more attention. Insights from behavioural theory and persuasion research may help to detect possibly fallacious manoeuvres.

In this paper, I argue that there is objectivity in the international human rights law, against which the justifiability of arguments can be determined and the universality vs. relativity of human rights debate could be taken a step further. I propose an optimising approach for treaty interpretation, point out that there is epistemic objectivity residing in this approach, and analyse China’s relativism arguments on Article 1 of the Convention against Torture to elaborate above points.

This chapter probes the connections between the metaphysics of meaning and the investigation of human communication. It first argues that contemporary philosophy of mind has inherited most of its metaphysical questions from Brentano's puzzling definition of intentionality. Then it examines how intentionality came to occupy the forefront of pragmatics in three steps. By investigating speech acts, Austin and ordinary language philosophers pioneered the study of intentional actions performed by uttering sentences of natural languages. Based on his novel concept of speaker's (...) meaning and his inferential view of human communication as a cooperative and rational activity, Grice developed a three-tiered model of the meaning of utterances: the linguistic meaning of the uttered sentence; the explicit truth-conditional content of the utterance; the implicit content conveyed by the utterance. Finally, the new emerging truth-conditional trend in pragmatics urges that not only the implicit content conveyed by an utterance but its explicit content as well depends on the speaker's communicative intention. (shrink)

Silence may traditionally have been golden, but how is it valued today? Can it survive the impact of a technology which can, and does, bring the apparently irresistible seductions of noise to the remotest parts of the world, and which invades the most reclusive aspects of our lives? And what place has silence in a culture such as ours which classifies it as "unproductive"? But what is silence anyway? Professor Taylor considers two ways in which, from the Romantic period onward, (...) silence has been conceived. One tradition equates silence with Truth itself; the other considers it the condition which enables Truth to become manifest. In contrast, today's technology brings about a devaluation of silence by making it easy to avoid. This has profound consequences for the conception of Thought which, until recently, has been characteristic of the Western intellectual tradition. The consequences of this change, and their implications for the teaching and study of literature and for university education in general, are then considered. (shrink)

My dissertation titled Two Models of Consensus is based on five arguments. 1. Consensus is asymmetrical. 2. Consensus is partial or limited unanimity. 3. Consensus and democracy do have a concomitant relation. 4. Consensus is not organic to political systems. 5. Consensus depends upon civil society, subsidiarity, and the dominant cultural paradigm of society. In the first chapter titled "Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of Civil Society" I argue that concept of civil society evolved under certain conditions in a (...) liberal democratic tradition such as shared social imaginaries. As an example of how diversity could lead to hypostatization of cultural differences, I exposit the concept of Indian caste system. In the second chapter, "Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural Identities", I compare the ideas of Hans Georg Gadamer and George Herbert Mead about self- interested action and mutual cooperative action. Gadamer and Mead emphasize intersubjective communication, I Thou relationships. I explain the importance of the I Thou relationship for a consensual activity. The third chapter, "Consensus in the Realm of Science", discusses the impact of science as the context of justification in advanced liberal democracies and its effect on consensus. Charles Sanders Peirces attempt to apply his scientific method to arrive at a consensus in the social sphere is also discussed in this chapter. In the fourth chapter, "Kwasi Wiredu The Akan Conception of Communitarian Consensus", I discuss Kwasi Wiredus emphasis on achieving a consensus on the basis of what is and not what ought to be, in the social realm. Wiredu differentiates between a government by consent and a government by consensus. I elaborate Wiredu's abakysis of the process of consensus that was in vogue in the Akan community of Ghana. In the final chapter, "Political Consensus - Intra-cultural and Extra-cultural," I argue that consensus is asymmetrical. It is imperative to compromise in social, political, economic, and religious beliefs on the basis of weak deontological and weak consequential approaches. Consensus necessitates a synthesis of different kinds of social actions such as purposive-instrumental, traditional, value-laden, and communicative action into what I call the Cooperative Action. Only such an action can speak across cultures and facilitate genuine cross-cultural interaction. (shrink)

The main hypothesis of the article is that there has been an attitude change in the field of pragmatics: the philosophical notion of intentionality has penetrated in a cognitive approach. The first aim is to argue for this attitude change via analyzing classical pragmatical writings (works of J. R. Searle and H. P. Grice) and the relevance- theoretical approach of D. Sperber and D. Wilson. The second aim is to argue for the legitimacy of the attitude change by presenting a (...) new direction of research within the field of cognitive pragmatics. The author summarizes Dan Sperber's metarepresentations-first hypo-thesis about the evolution of ostensive-inferential communication, identifies its implicit presuppositions and analyzes its implications for evolutionary psychology and other related disciplines. The conclusions are the following: (1) the philosophical notion of intentionality play an important role in cognitive pragmatics as well (i.e. it uses the Gricean concept of non-natural meaning, and the Searleian distinction of first- and second-order intentionality), (2) the attitude change has enriched the notion of intentionality, (3) this enrichment makes new research directions possible in the field of pragmatics. (shrink)

The paper aims to bring together and unify two traditions in studying dialogue as a game: dialogical logic introduced by Lorenzen ; and persuasion dialogue systems as specified by Prakken. We propose a system which allows the elimination of both informal and formal fallacies. To this end, we reconstruct dialogical logic in terms of speech acts as suggested in.

In this paper, I will determine the strategic function of the use of four variants of pragmatic argumentation in the context of advisory health brochures. I argue that each variant functions as a strategic manoeuvre that deals with potential countermoves: with variant I and II writers can address anticipated doubt with respect to the standpoint and with variants III and IV they can strategically erase potential criti-cism or possible alternatives to the proposed action.

So selbstverständlich es klingt, vom Geist, der Psyche oder auch der Seele eines Menschen zu reden, und so vertraut uns wissenschaftliche Disziplinen sind, die sich philosophisch oder empirisch damit beschäftigen, so schwer fällt es, ein einheitliches Merkmale dafür anzugeben, wann etwas ein psychisches Phänomen ist. Viele der potentiellen Merkmale decken eben nur einen Teil des Spektrums dessen ab, was wir gewöhnlich als psychisch bezeichnen würden, und sind damit bestenfalls hinreichende, aber sicher keine notwendigen Bedingungen des Psychischen. Im Mittelpunkt des folgenden (...) Artikels wird dagegen ein Merkmal stehen, von dem feststeht, daß es nicht hinreichend ist, von dem man aber vermuten kann, es sei zumindest notwendig: die Individualität psychischer Phänomene. Die Frage, mit der ich mich beschäftigen werde, ist, ob sich diese Vermutung mit Bezug auf eine Grnppe paradigmatisch psychischer Phänomene aufrecht erhalten läßt, die intentionalen Einstellungen. (shrink)

Th e contemporary right to freedom of thought together with all its further declinations into freedom of speech, religion, conscience and expression, had one of its earliest historical recognitions at the end of the Wars of Religion with the Edict of Nantes (1598). In several respects one can saythat the right to freedom of thought is virtually “co-original” with the endof the Wars of Religion. Following this thought further, one might think that human rights defi ne the boundaries of our (...) social coexistence and are inextricably connected to the “fact” of cultural pluralism. (shrink)

The first part of the article examines some recent studies on the early development of social norms that examine young children’s understanding of codified rule games. It is argued that the constitutive rules than define the games cannot be identified with social norms and therefore the studies provide limited evidence about socio-normative development. The second part reviews data on children’s play in natural settings that show that children do not understand norms as codified or rules of obligation, and that the (...) norms that guide social interaction are dynamic, situated, and heterogeneous. It is argued that normativity is intersubjective and negotiable and starts to develop in the first year, emerging as a practical skill that depends on participatory engagement. Three sources of compliance are discussed: emotional engagement, nonverbal agreement, and conversation. (shrink)

Two basic answers have been given to the question whether proper names have meaning, the negative by Mill and later developed by Kripke and the affirmative by Frege and later developed by Searle. My aim is to integrate the two apparently irreconcilable theories by distinguishing the two aspects of the issue. I claim that, roughly speaking, whereas Kripke’s No Sense View provides a good answer to the question, “How are proper names linked to their referents?”, Searle’s Sense View provides a (...) good account of the issue “What do we do when we use a proper name?”. Furthermore, I claim that the speakers attend to the referent of the proper name both in virtue of Kripkean chain of communication and in virtue of Searlian occasion-relative sense. Ordinarily, the chain of communication and the Searlian sense yield the same result, i.e. lead to the same referent. In cases of conflict, which are very rare, my intuition sides with the former against the latter. It would seem, therefore, that the only necessary and sufficient condition for a successful reference with a proper name is the existence of the Kripkean chain which links it with its referent. (shrink)