This book promotes the research of present-day women working in ancient and medieval philosophy, with more than 60 women having contributed in some way to the volume in a fruitful collaboration. It contains 22 papers organized into ten distinct parts spanning the sixth century BCE to the fifteenth century CE. Each part has the same structure: it features, first, a paper which sets up the discussion, and then, one or two responses that open new perspectives and engage in further reflections. (...) Our authors’ contributions address pivotal moments and players in the history of philosophy: women philosophers in antiquity, Cleobulina of Rhodes, Plato, Lucretius, Bardaisan of Edessa, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Porphyry, Peter Abelard, Robert Kilwardby, William Ockham, John Buridan, and Isotta Nogarola. The result is a thought-provoking collection of papers that will be of interest to historians of philosophy from all horizons. Far from being an isolated effort, this book is a contribution to the ever-growing number of initiatives which endeavour to showcase the work of women in philosophy. (shrink)

Dans ces « Prolégomènes à une philosophie des catastrophes », on avance qu'une réflexion philosophique sur ces phénomènes doit s’obliger à travailler dans une extension maximum (en abordant la question du point de vue métaphysique, ontologique, épistémologique, esthétique, éthique et politique) et en explorant toutes les ressources que nous offre la pensée comme outil cognitif (décrire, comprendre, expliquer), émotionnel (sentir et ressentir, éprouver), prédictif (prévoir, imaginer) et normatif (juger, décider). Penser les catastrophes au pluriel, c’est aussi se rendre compte qu’historiquement, (...) le monde n’en finit pas de finir dans l’esprit des hommes et que cette possibilité de la fin a suscité en eux des réflexions d’une grande variété (de l’effroi le plus glaçant à l’enthousiasme le plus ardent) qui valent la peine d’être analysées chacune pour elle-même. (shrink)

Greco-Roman meteorology will be described in four overlapping developments. In the archaic period, astro-meteorological calendars were written down, and one appears in Hesiod’s Works and Days; such calendars or almanacs originated thousands of years earlier in Mesopotamia. In the second development, also in the archaic period, the pioneers of prose writing began writing speculative naturalistic explanations of meteorological phenomena: Anaximander, followed by Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and others. When Aristotle in the fourth century BCE mentions the ‘inquiry that all our predecessors have (...) been calling meteorology’ (338a26), he is referring to these writers. In the third development, the first two enterprises were combined: empirical data collection about meteorological phenomena began to be married to naturalistic theoretical explanation. This innovation was prompted by Democritus and synthesised in its most influential form by Aristotle. At this point more sophisticated techniques of both short-term weather forecasting and long-term speculation about global climate change were also developed. In the fourth development, the wider implications of the naturalistic explanation of meteorological phenomena were contested. The views of ‘meteorologists’ had been controversial since the archaic period because they were perceived, and sometimes intended, to displace the divine prerogatives and undermine traditional religion. These controversies intensified throughout the classical and Hellenistic periods. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the ontology and epistemology of time in Lucretius’ De rerum natura. It uses the physiology of perception as well as epistemology to shed new light on the metaphysics. It presents an exegesis-based interpretation of the nature of time and of its perception, both arguing for and refining this interpretation by showing its explanatory power. The paper shows that Lucretius represents the perception of time or sensus temporis as a distinct sensory faculty, reconstructs how it emerges and operates, (...) and relates it to his account of perception more generally. The sense of time in turn is seen to explain aspects of related faculties, including thought and sight, and cases of apparent simultaneity. The paper thus contributes to, among other things, our understanding of the speed of perception and Lucretius’ account of the nature of time itself — arguing that Lucretius represents time as both continuous (not atomic) and real, as well as something perceived. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the nature of Deleuze’s commitment to an affirmative naturalism that is based on certain Epicurean principles and insights. The essay is divided into two main parts. In the first part I bring to light some of the key features of Lucretius’s great poem on the nature of things, and I do so with the aid of Bergson and his reading of the teaching as fundamentally melancholic. In the second part I switch my attention to Deleuze (...) and show how he links together physics and ethics as a way of providing an emancipatory and affirmative philosophy of life and one that aims to defeat sadness. In the conclusion I return to the question of melancholy and indicate how the problem might be best negotiated. (shrink)

Ancient philosophical theories of soul are in many respects sensitive to ways of speaking and thinking about the soul psuchê] that are not specifically philosophical or theoretical. We therefore begin with what the word ‘soul’ meant to speakers of Classical Greek, and what it would have been natural to think about and associate with the soul. We then turn to various Presocratic thinkers, and to the philosophical theories that are our primary concern, those of Plato (first in the Phaedo, then (...) in the Republic), Aristotle (in the De Anima or On the Soul ), Epicurus, and the Stoics. These are by far the most carefully worked out theories of soul in ancient philosophy. Later theoretical developments — for instance, in the writings of Plotinus and other Platonists, as well as the Church Fathers — are best studied against the background of the classical theories, from which, in large part, they derive. (shrink)

Death is often characterised within naturalism as being ‘nothing to us’ and we are urged to think of ‘nothing less than of death’. In his lectures on Spinoza, Deleuze says ‘thinking of death is the most base thing’. Thinkers such as Lucretius, Nietzsche and Spinoza, have clear perspectives on the need to avoid thinking about death. They share in the belief that meditation on death only leads to fear and sadness. These affirmationists, that is, philosophers whose writings aim at affirming (...) life, therefore denounce death as unimportant to philosophy. Deleuze also presents a philosophy that seems affirmationist, in keeping with the tradition of those whose ideas he interprets and incorporates into his own philosophy. And yet, death - in the form of the death drive - is a key concept in Deleuze’s work Difference and Repetition. This thesis asks the question: Does Deleuze present a concept of death that affirms life? The concept of death is rarely explored in Deleuze studies, and yet it plays an important role in his philosophy. This thesis seeks to contribute to this research, by delineating and examining Deleuze’s concept of death in Difference and Repetition. The description of death provided by Deleuze is compared with the concepts of death in the works of two affirmationists, Lucretius and Spinoza. Hegel’s concept of death is then explored to determine whether Deleuze succeeds in avoiding the use of negation in death’s relation to the subject. The thesis then considers Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return. The result of his use of the eternal return leads to discussions around kenosis, transpantheism and immanence. It is decided that the naturalist process of demystification is taken by Deleuze to require the demystification of identity, giving primacy to immanence as a singular life. (shrink)

In his refutation of skepticism in book IV of De rerum natura, Lucretius uses argumentative methods typical of Epicurus: the περιτροπή is in many ways similar to that used by the philosopher in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, the same book where, in a passage dedicated to the criticism against determinists, can be found a reference to the criterion of the πρόληψις, that Lucretius exploits in his refutation. Moreover, Lucretius develops a strong demonstration concerning the irrefutability of αἴσθησις as a (...) criterion of truth, which finds significant points of contact with a large fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius and generally traced back to the Canon of Epicurus. The last argument used by the poet is a pragmatic one: for the skeptic it would be impossible to live. The argument is similar to the praxis-based argument used by Epicurus in the Περὶ φύσεως against the partisans of determinism. But the pragmatic argument goes back to a very ancient layer of anti-skeptical polemics, even prior to Epicurus and already present in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although later influences cannot be excluded, Lucretius appears to be a faithful witness of Epicurus. Probably in a lost section of the Περὶ φύσεως, the philosopher of Samos showed positions going against skeptical or proto-skeptical attitude, contemporary or earlier to the time of the philosopher, probably developed in a Democritean or a Socratic context. Epicurus’ ad hominem strategy is very close to that of the philosopher in the Principal Doctrines XXIII–XXV, and certainly follows Aristotle’ strategy in book Γ of Metaphysics against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction. In a similar way, Epicurus does not have one figure as the objective of his refutation but constructs a hypothetical dialectical opponent capable of embodying a series of philosophical tendencies judged by the founder of Kepos to be extremely dangerous not only for the correct exercise of thought but for the human being’s life itself. (shrink)

In Epicurean cosmology, material reconstitution, or palingenesis (παλιγγενεσία) is the necessary consequence of the infinity of time and the eternity of atoms. I examine Lucretius’ treatment of this phenomenon (DRN 3.843–864) and consider the extent to which his view enables us to develop an Epicurean response to the question: what makes a person at two different times one and the same person? I offer a reading of this passage in the light of modern accounts of persistence and identity, and what (...) Lucretius states in Books 3 and 4 about memory and the soul’s motions. Guided by the metaphysical implications of this analysis, I determine the type of relation which, according to Lucretius, holds between the mental and the physical. (shrink)

I argue for the interpretation of Anaximander's world as an unstable system. The inconsistency found by scholars in Theophrastus/Simplicius' text disappears when it is realized that the elemental forces of nature do not change into each other. They are in the Infinite in time as well as in space. To some extent preference is given to Aristotle's evidence over the doxographical vulgate habitually derived from Theophrastus, though of course the Theophrastean passage containing the verbatim quotation remains the primary witness.

This paper intends to offer a new supplement to a corrupt passage of the Epicurean inscription of Oenoanda. Smith, in the lacuna of Fr. 6, uses the phrasal term πρῶτα σώματα to indicate the atoms. The supplement is not satisfying as it is based solely on evidence drawn from non-Epicurean texts and Lucretius, who writes in Latin and is not always reliable for reconstructing the Epicurean terminology. In this article, I will try to demonstrate that πρῶτα σώματα is in fact (...) a peripatetic – and subsequently stoic – term indicating the elements in general, which has never been used by any Epicurean author for polemical reasons. Finally, I will propose an alternative supplement. (shrink)

> καὶ πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ > > ἐξ Ἅιδου λέγονται δή τινες εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν; > > Plato Republic 521c This study reconstructs Empedocles’ eschatology and cosmology, arguing that they presuppose one another. Part one surveys body and soul in Empedocles and argues that the transmigrating daimon is a long-lived compound made of the elements air and fire. Part two shows that Empedocles situates our current life in Hades, then considers the testimonies concerning different cosmic levels (...) in Empedocles and compares them with the afterlife schemes in Pindar’s Second Olympian Ode and Plato’s Phaedo myth. Part three offers a new edition of section d lines 5–10 of the Strasbourg papyrus of Empedocles that reinforces the connection between transmigration and different cosmic locations for souls. Part four reconstructs Empedocles’ cosmology, identifies three different levels or habitats of soul, and, more tentatively, suggests that Empedoclean “long-lived gods” are best understood as stars. (shrink)

De rerum natura displays a particular closeness to the Homeric epics on various levels: in language, in arguments, and in the selection of examples. This closeness clearly goes beyond similarities arising from the affinity as determined by genre. Further, a couple of passages are veritable translations from the Iliad resp. the Odyssey. There, the attitude towards the pretext becomes especially clear. It ranges from acknowledgement to rejection and in some instances is brought about through the use of allegory. This attitude (...) of criticism and affinity at the same time can be observed in two passages of De rerum natura that are prominent due to their position: the beginning and the end allude to the plot of the Iliad. This should be read as an indication that Lucretius understood his didactic poem as an invitation to read the Homeric epics philosophically. (shrink)

Some significant receptions of Epicurean philosophy take place in nineteenth century European thought. For Marx, writing in the 1840s, and in defiance of Hegel’s negative assessment, Epicurus is the ‘greatest representative of the Greek enlightenment’,1 whilst for Jean-Marie Guyau, writing in the 1870s, Epicurus is the original free spirit, ‘Still today it is the spirit of old Epicurus who, combined with new doctrines, works away at and undermines Christianity.’ 2 For Nietzsche, Epicurus is one of the greatest human beings to (...) have graced the earth and the inventor of ‘heroic-idyllic philosophizing’.3 Here my focus is on the reading of Epicureanism to be found in Bergson’s commentary on Lucretius’s remarkable poem, De Rerum Natura. For Bergson the task Lucretius sets himself is a ‘pioneering one’, one that will serve humanity, in particular making the Romans aware of previously unknown or misunderstood truths. In order to demonstrate these truths with precision it was necessary for Lucretius to be acquainted with Greek philosophy, and especially the teaching of Epicurus. (shrink)