- Transformative experience and the knowledge norms for action: Moss on Paul’s challenge to decision theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - In John Schwenkler & Enoch Lambert (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. Oxford University Press.details
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Don’t Look Now.Bernhard Salow & Arif Ahmed - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):327-350.details
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A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.details
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Can free evidence be bad? Value of informationfor the imprecise probabilist.Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):1-28.details
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Dilation, Disintegrations, and Delayed Decisions.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2015 - In Thomas Augistin, Serena Dora, Enrique Miranda & Erik Quaeghebeur (eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications (ISIPTA 2015). Aracne Editrice. pp. 227–236.details
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Should subjective probabilities be sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):277-289.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.details
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Rationalizing two-tiered choice functions through conditional choice.Jeffrey Helzner - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):929-951.details
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Unspecific Evidence and Normative Theories of Decision.Rhys Borchert - forthcoming - Episteme:1-23.details
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Pascal’s Wager and Decision-making with Imprecise Probabilities.André Neiva - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (3):1479-1508.details
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Proper scoring rules in epistemic decision theory.Maomei Wang - 2020 - Dissertation, Lingnan Universitydetails
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A Gentle Approach to Imprecise Probabilities.Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - In Thomas Augustin, Fabio Gagliardi Cozman & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Reflections on the Foundations of Probability and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Teddy Seidenfeld. Springer. pp. 37-67.details
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Credal imprecision and the value of evidence.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):684-721.details
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A Battle in the Statistics Wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13689-13748.details
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Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance.David Kinney & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):35-57.details
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Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction.Leah Henderson - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):513-529.details
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Uncertainty, equality, fraternity.Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9603-9619.details
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Sequential decision making with partially ordered preferences.Daniel Kikuti, Fabio Gagliardi Cozman & Ricardo Shirota Filho - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence 175 (7-8):1346-1365.details
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Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2735-2758.details
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(1 other version)Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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On Imprecise Bayesianism in the Face of an Increasingly Larger Outcome Space.Marc Fischer - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):367-379.details
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Tracking probabilistic truths: a logic for statistical learning.Alexandru Baltag, Soroush Rafiee Rad & Sonja Smets - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9041-9087.details
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Probability and time.Marco Zaffalon & Enrique Miranda - 2013 - Artificial Intelligence 198 (C):1-51.details
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