- Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.details
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Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance.David Kinney & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):35-57.details
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Don’t Stop Believing (Hold onto That Warm Fuzzy Feeling).Edward J. R. Elliott & Jessica Isserow - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):4-37.details
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(1 other version)Maximal Cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):141-162.details
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Probabilistic stability, agm revision operators and maximum entropy.Krzysztof Mierzewski - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-38.details
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(1 other version)Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories.Seamus Bradley - 2018 - Theoria 85 (1):18-30.details
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Morality Under Risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2019 - Dissertation, details
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Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Exploitative informing.David Thorstad - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
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Deference Principles for Imprecise Credences.Giacomo Molinari - manuscriptdetails
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Normative uncertainty and information value.Riley Harris - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Adelaidedetails
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Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Unspecific Evidence and Normative Theories of Decision.Rhys Borchert - forthcoming - Episteme:1-23.details
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People in Suitcases.Kacper Kowalczyk - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (1-2):3-30.details
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Confidence in Beliefs and Rational Decision Making.Brian Hill - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (2):223-258.details
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A Gentle Approach to Imprecise Probabilities.Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - In Thomas Augustin, Fabio Gagliardi Cozman & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Reflections on the Foundations of Probability and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Teddy Seidenfeld. Springer. pp. 37-67.details
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Credal imprecision and the value of evidence.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):684-721.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.Jürgen Landes - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-7.details
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Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.details
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Don’t Look Now.Bernhard Salow & Arif Ahmed - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):327-350.details
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The Principle of Total Evidence: Justification and Political Significance.Gerhard Schurz - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-16.details
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