This paper focuses on Schopenhauer’s On the Will in Nature (1836), a book which is generally underestimated by scholars interested in Schopenhauer’sphilosophy. This essay analyses its genesis in Schopenhauer’s manuscripts, examines its role in Schopenhauer’s thought and its relationship with The World asWill and Representation, and locates its content and meaning with reference to the philosophical and scientific context. Aim of the article is a better understanding of Schopenhauer’s treatise, and such a scope is pursued by accurate insight of its (...) central theme: the notion of Bestätigung, that is the scientific corroboration of the philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

A obra de Dilthey desempenha um papel fundamental para a filosofia contemporânea, na medida em que Dilthey distingue duas esferas por meio das quais temos acesso ao todo da realidade: a experiência objetiva ( die Erfahrung ) e a vivência ( das Erlebnis ). É esta distinçáo que possibilita a Dilthey, em oposiçáo às ciências da natureza, conceber as condições de evidência e validade das ciências do espírito. Ainda que náo nomeada com estes termos, esta distinçáo vai estar na base (...) dos textos de muitos autores do final do século XIX e do século XX. Conquanto Dilthey elabore sua teoria no decorrer de uma vasta obra, nosso objetivo é reconstruir a distinçáo que ele estabelece a partir do modo como ele reinterpreta o princípio de razáo suficiente, conforme formulado por Leibniz e Wolff. Também procuramos mostrar, a seguir, como esta reinterpretaçáo permite a Dilthey opor, à esfera dos conhecimentos teóricos circunscrita por Kant, a esfera dos conhecimentos relativos à vivência. Assim, o argumento principal aqui exposto estabelece um vínculo entre o modo como Dilthey reinterpreta o princípio de razáo suficiente e o modo como reconstrói cientificamente a fundamentaçáo das ciências do espírito, concebendo-as a partir de uma relaçáo específica entre evidência e validade. (shrink)

Este texto pretende discutir, do ponto de vista kantiano, o que pode ser ensinado e o que pode ser aprendido em Filosofia. Seu objetivo é construir os argumentos hipotéticos de Kant em face do método estruturalista de leitura de textos filosóficos. Para circunscrever este tema, aparentemente muito amplo, tomaremos como fio condutor um célebre texto de aula de I. Kant, publicado por G. B. Jäsche sob o título Manual dos Cursos de Lógica Geral. Kant ministrou este curso por mais de (...) quarenta anos, até o término de suas atividades docentes em 1797, e nele apresenta considerações bastante fecundas e atuais sobre o ensino da História da Filosofia e sobre a formação do filósofo. A partir da distinção entre conhecimento histórico e conhecimento racional, e da distinção entre o conceito de filosofia na escola e o conceito de filosofia no mundo (AK 9:24), procuraremos apresentar as contribuições kantianas que podem ainda ser consideradas pertinentes para se discutir o modo de ensinar Filosofia e a formação do filósofo. (shrink)

Psiche sets up a close-knit comparison between the psychology of Plato's Republic and Freud's psychoanalysis. Convergences and divergences are discussed in relation both to the Platonic conception of the oneiric emergence of repressed desires that prefigures the main path of Freud's subconscious, to the analysis of the psychopathologies related to these theoretical formulations and to the two diagnostic and therapeutic approaches adopted. Another crucial theme is the Platonic eros - the examination of which is also extended to the Symposium and (...) Phaedrus - taken up explicitly by Freud in relation to the concept of libido. Finally, the author also addresses the two themes - of, inter alia, a metapsychological nature - inherent to the moral dimension. -/- Psiche istituisce un confronto ravvicinato tra la psicologia della "Repubblica" di Platone e la psicoanalisi di Freud. Convergenze e divergenze vengono discusse in relazione sia alla concezione platonica dell'emersione onirica dei desideri repressi, che prefigura la via regia per l'inconscio di Freud, sia all'analisi delle psicopatologie correlate a tali impostazioni teoriche, sia ai due approcci diagnostici e terapeutici adottati. Altro tema cruciale è l'eros platonico - la cui disamina viene estesa anche al "Simposio" e al "Fedro" - ripreso esplicitamente da Freud in relazione al concetto di libido. L'autore affronta, infine, le due tematizzazioni, di natura metapsicologica e non solo, inerenti alla dimensione morale. (shrink)

Since the publication of Kitcher’s influential paper The Division of Cognitive Labor, some philosophers wondered about these two related issues: (1) which is the optimal distribution of cognitive efforts among rival methods within a scientific community?, and (2) whether and how can a community achieve such an optimal distribution? Though not committing to any specific answer to question (1), I claim that issue (2) does not depend exclusively on an invisible hand like mechanism, since both intra-scientific and extra-scientific institutions may (...) play a major role. Finally, I examine some practical difficulties of reallocating scientists from a method to another, which leads to stress the importance of well-planned training and recruitment. (shrink)

According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we (...) will proceed as follows. First (Sect. 1), we will introduce the extended cognition thesis, exposing its anthropocentric bias. Then, we will show that humans and many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies. To do so, we will discuss a variety of case studies, including “intrabodily” cognitive extensions such as the spinal cord (Sect. 2), the widespread reliance on epistemic actions to solve cognitive tasks (Sect. 3) and cases of animal cognitive offloading (Sect. 4). We’ll then allay some worries our claim might raise (Sect. 5) to then conclude the paper (Sect. 6). (shrink)

Starting with Aristotle and moving on to Darwin, Marco Solinas outlines the basic steps from the birth, establishment and later rebirth of the traditional view of living beings, and its overturning by evolutionary revolution. The classic framework devised by Aristotle was still dominant in the 17th Century world of Galileo, Harvey and Ray, and remained hegemonic until the time of Lamarck and Cuvier in the 19th Century. Darwin's breakthrough thus takes on the dimensions of an abandonment of the traditional (...) finalistic theory. It was a transition exemplified in the morphological analysis of useless parts, such as the sightless eyes of moles, already discussed by Aristotle, which Darwin used as a crowbar to unhinge the systematic recourse to final causes. With many excerpts, a chronological sequence and an analytical approach, this book follows the course of the two conceptions that have shaped the destiny of life sciences in western culture. (shrink)

According to some critics, Aristotle’s elenctic defence (elenchos, elenchus) of the Law of Non-Contradiction (Metaphysics IV) would be ineffective because it viciously begs the question. After briefly recalling the elenctic refutation of the denier of the Law of Non-Contradiction, I will first focus on Filippo Costantini’s objection to the elenchus, which, in turn, is based on the dialetheic account of negation developed by Graham Priest. Then, I will argue that there is at least one reading of the elenchus that might (...) not be viciously question-begging. In doing so, I will leverage, reinterpret and adjust the distinction between two senses of epistemic dependence, offered by Noah Lemos and originally based on some thoughts about George Edward Moore’s ‘proof of an external world.’ The key point of my counter-objection to recover the elenchus is to use the distinction between a necessary-condition relation between propositions (p only if q) and a grounding relation between facts (the fact that an epistemic agent S believes that p is grounded in the fact that S believes that q), where p and q are the content of S’s beliefs. (shrink)

"Der Aufsatz zielt darauf, der Prozess der historischen Überlagerung, Substitution und Verbreitung des theoretischen Paradigmas der Depression gegenüber jenem der Melancholie darzustellen. Im ersten Teil wird versucht, einige der einschneidenden Eigenschaften der Thematisierungen der Melancholie in der Frühen Neuzeit anzugeben, auch im Verhältnis zum Geist des Kapitalismus. Nachdem eine Skizze der Entstehung der moderne Kategorie der Depression, geht es darum, den Verlauf nachzuzeichnen, der im 20. Jahrhundert zu ihrer Transformation in ein weitläufiges theoretisches Paradigma geführt hat, das schließlich jenes der (...) Melancholie ersetzt hat. Der zweite Teil stellt den Versuch dar, eine Zeitdiagnose umzureißen: An dieser Stelle ist die psychosoziale Bedeutung bestimmter sozioökonomischer und kultureller Mechanismen zu untersuchen, unter besonderem Hinweis auf das, was als »der neue Geist des Kapitalismus« bezeichnet worden ist, sowie auf neue Formen des Individualismus und ihre paradoxen Dynamiken. Abschließend wird eine Brücke geschlagen, zwischen der Geschichte der beiden bezeichneten Paradigmen und der zeitgenössischen psychosozialen Dynamiken, die mit dem als »depressive Epidemie« interpretierten Phänomen verbunden sind. -/- The essay aims to analyse the gradual historical process of the partial overlap, replacement and expansion of the theoretical paradigm of depression with respect to that of melancholy. The first part is devoted to analysing some of the central features of the multivalent thematizations of melancholy drawn up during modernity, also with relation to the spirit of capitalism (in its Weberian acceptation). This is followed by an overview of the birth of the modern category of depression, and the process that during the twentieth century led to its transformation into a theoretical and nosological paradigm which in the end replaced that of melancholy. The second part is the attempt to draw up a Zeitdiagnose: the aim is to assess the ‘depressive’ psychosocial impact exercised by particular socio-economic mechanisms and cultural trends, with particular reference to what has been defined as the ‘new spirit of capitalism’, as well as the new forms of individualism and their paradoxical dynamics. In conclusion, I will form a bridge between the history of the two aforesaid paradigms and the contemporary psychosocial dynamics correlated to the phenomenon today interpreted as a ‘depression epidemic’.". (shrink)

"Patterns of psychoanalysis and theory of recognition. Axel Honneth’s intersubjective psyche". An overview of the several scopes and patterns used over time by Axel Honneth in his “theory of recognition” is presented. After a discussion of the use of object relations theory (especially with reference to D.W. Winnicott’s contributions) in Honneth’s 1992 book Struggle for Recognition, the theoretical revision of psychoanalysis in light of his theory of recognition is examined. Finally, Honneth’s suggestion of a new alliance between a renewed “critical (...) theory” and psychoanalysis, which concerns also the dimension of political psychology, is discussed. -/- Viene offerta una panoramica sui differenti usi e le diverse forme di psicoanalisi utilizzate da Axel Honneth in relazione alla sua “teoria del riconoscimento” nel corso del tempo. Dopo una discussione dell’uso della teoria delle relazioni oggettuali (soprattutto nella concezione di D.W. Winnicott) in Lotta per il riconoscimento, del 1992, si prende in esame la revisione della psicoanalisi operata in termini di teoria del riconoscimento. Infine viene discussa la proposta di una nuova alleanza tra una “teoria critica” rinnovata e la psicoanalisi, che contempla anche il versante della psicologia politica. (shrink)

The essay aims to offer a critical theory of psychosocial processes of regressive and depressive type. The Author starts by discussing the determining influence attributed to social suffering in the framework of the moral grammar of social struggle outlined by Axel Honneth, then he offers an analysis of the regressive reactions activate by disrespect experiences. The Author discusses some important points of Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history, in particularly Benjamin’s critique of traditional concept of progress, and the determining role attributed (...) to suffering; points that are translated and moved in the framework of the analysis of regressive processes. Lastly, the Author shows how a critical theory that aims to reactivate the emancipatory potential immanent in the social suffering today frustrated may find an incisive and productive approach in a critical analysis of regressions. -/- Il saggio mira ad offrire una teoria critica dei processi psicosociali di taglio regressivo e depressivo. L’autore muove dalla centralità attribuita alla sofferenza sociale nel quadro della grammatica morale delle lotte sociali delineato da Axel Honneth, concentrandosi poi sulle reazioni di carattere regressivo indotte dalle esperienze di spregio. Segue la ripresa di alcuni punti fondamentali della filosofia della storia di Walter Benjamin, in particolare della sua critica alla concezione tradizionale di progresso, e la sua peculiare valorizzazione della sofferenza; spunti tradotti e traslati nell’ambito dell’analisi dei processi regressivi. Infine, l’autore mostra come una teoria critica che voglia riattivare i potenziali emancipatori immanenti alla sofferenza sociale oggi frustrati possa trovare un approccio incisivo e fecondo in una analisi critica delle regressioni. (shrink)

"Introduzione" alla raccolta di articoli di Rahel Jaeggi "Forme di vita e capitalismo", curata e tradotta da Marco Solinas, e uscita per Rosenberg & Sellier nel 20016.

A partir du renvoi à la « maxime de Platon » insérée dans l’avant dernière page de la première édition de L’interprétation du rêve, l’auteur expose d’abord les convergences entre la conception du rêve de Platon présentée dans La République et les intuitions qui fondent l’édifice métapsychologique freudien. A la lumière des sources textuelles citées par Freud et de ses intérêts, l’auteur avance ensuite l’hypothèse selon laquelle Freud aurait non seulement omis de reconnaître la généalogie théorétique platonicienne de la « (...) via regia menant à la connaissance de l’inconscient », mais aussi utilisé le dialogue antique comme source d’inspiration tacite pour la composition de L’Interprétation du rêve. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present the copy principle from execution of the principle of separability for the purpose of elucidating the discussions conducted by Hume in understanding the composition of space and its implications for the sciences that operate with spatial constructions. The particular epistemic gain here is to do this within a model of empiricism. Given that there are several irregularities in the manner of analyzing a complex and extracting simple elements from it, as will be (...) demonstrated here, we seek to show that separating a complex considering its simple qualities and decomposing a complex to determine its simple quantities is completely different. Thus, we seek to show how Hume needed to recreate his own cognitive model, strongly based on noting our perceptions, to be able to use it to conceive the composition of space and the operations of geometry that must make reference to it. (shrink)

Discussione di "Alienazione", di Rahel Jaeggi, Roma: 2105.

The aim of this paper is to account for the (metaphorical) movement of the property of being present (or presentness) within the so-called Moving Spotlight Theory (MST). I will be leveraging the key argument by Emanuele Severino’s masterpiece, 'La Gloria' (2001), according to which it is impossible that a (maximal consistent) state of affairs begins to appear and lasts forever in our experience. After a brief overview of the MST’s main tenets (§1.1), I argue that Severino’s ontology might be interpreted (...) as a sort of MST (§1.2), following the hint by Federico Perelda (2017). Thereafter, I briefly recall Severino’s original argument in his own jargon, also proposing English lexical and conceptual translations of the main Italian phrases (§1.3). Then, I propose both a semi-formalization of Severino’s argument (§2.1) and a full formalization by means of temporal logic (§2.2). Finally, I assess all the three versions of the argument, concluding that my formalization might account for the movement of presentness in a non-metaphorical way (§2.3). (shrink)

Analisi della possibile influenza esercitata dalla lettura di Platone su Freud, e in particolare della teoria del sogno come via per conoscere dei desideri precedentemnte "repressi" esposta nella "Repubblica".

The essay aims to offer a critical theory of psychosocial processes of regressive and depressive type. The Author starts by discussing the determining influence attributed to social suffering in the framework of the moral grammar of social struggle outlined by Axel Honneth, then he offers an analysis of the regressive reactions activate by disrespect experiences. The Author discusses some important points of Walter Benjamin’s philosophy of history, in particularly Benjamin’s critique of traditional concept of progress, and the determining role attributed (...) to suffering; points that are translated and moved in the framework of the analysis of regressive processes. Lastly, the Author shows how a critical theory that aims to reactivate the emancipatory potential immanent in the social suffering today frustrated may find an incisive and productive approach in a critical analysis of regressions. -/- Il saggio mira ad offrire una teoria critica dei processi psicosociali di taglio regressivo e depressivo. L’autore muove dalla centralità attribuita alla sofferenza sociale nel quadro della grammatica morale delle lotte sociali delineato da Axel Honneth, concentrandosi poi sulle reazioni di carattere regressivo indotte dalle esperienze di spregio. Segue la ripresa di alcuni punti fondamentali della filosofia della storia di Walter Benjamin, in particolare della sua critica alla concezione tradizionale di progresso, e la sua peculiare valorizzazione della sofferenza; spunti tradotti e traslati nell’ambito dell’analisi dei processi regressivi. Infine, l’autore mostra come una teoria critica che voglia riattivare i potenziali emancipatori immanenti alla sofferenza sociale oggi frustrati possa trovare un approccio incisivo e fecondo in una analisi critica delle regressioni. (shrink)

This paper treats of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness or eudaimonia in five parts. In the first part, we argue that phenomenology of happiness is an important albeit relatively neglected area of research, and we show that Husserl engages in it. In the second part, we examine the relationship between phenomenological ethics and virtue ethics. In the third part, we identify and clarify essential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness, namely, the nature of the question concerning happiness and the possibility of (...) a phenomenological answer, the power of the will, the role of vocation, the place of obligation, the significance of habituation, the necessity of selfreflection and self-criticism, the importance of sociability and solidarity, the impact of chance and destiny, and the specter of regret. In the fourth part, we establish the inextricable linkage between Husserl’s metaethics and his metaphysics. In the fi ft h part, we provide a provisional exploration of his conception of the connection between happiness and blessedness. We acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, and our study has benefitted greatly from it, but we also suggest that our holistic approach critically clarifies his description of happiness, virtue, and blessedness by fully recognizing that his phenomenological metaethics is embedded in his phenomenological metaphysics. (shrink)

Starting with the reference to “Plato’s dictum” that Freud added in the second last page of the first edition of The Interpretation of Dreams, the author explains the convergences between the conception of dreams expounded by Plato in the Republic and Freud’s fundamental insights. The analysis of bibliographic sources used by Freud, and of his interests, allow than to suppose not only that Freud omitted to acknowledge the Plato’s theoretical genealogy of “the Via Regia to the unconscious”, but also the (...) possibility that the Republic constituted a tacit source of inspiration for the composition of The Interpretations of dreams. -/- Muovendo dal richiamo al «detto di Platone» inserito nella penultima pagina della prima edizione de "L’interpretazione dei sogni" di Freud (1899), vengono preliminarmente esposte le convergenze tra la concezione del sogno di Platone esposta ne "La Repubblica" e le intuizioni poste alla base dell’edificio freudiano. Alla luce delle fonti testuali citate e utilizzate da Freud, e dei suoi interessi, viene poi avanzata l’ipotesi che egli non soltanto abbia omesso di riconoscere la genealogia teoretica platonica della «via regia che porta alla conoscenza dell’inconscio» (p. 282), ma che l’antico dialogo abbia potuto rappresentare una fonte tacita di ispirazione per la composizione de "L’interpretazione dei sogni". (shrink)

Abstract. This paper argues that the “Argument from Moral Peer Disagreement” fails to make a case for widespread moral skepticism. The main reason for this is that the argument rests on a too strong assumption about the normative significance of peer disagreement (and higher-order evidence more generally). In order to demonstrate this, I distinguish two competing ways in which one might explain higher-order defeat. According to what I call the “Objective Defeat Explanation” it is the mere possession of higher-order evidence (...) that explains defeat. I argue that this type of explanation is problematic and that it at best collapses into another explanation I call the “Subjective Defeat Explanation”. According to this explanation, it is coming to believe that one’s belief fails to be rational that explains defeat. Then I go on to argue that the Subjective Defeat Explanation is able to provide a straightforward explanation of higher-order defeat but that it entails that peer disagreement (and higher-order evidence more generally) only contingently gives rise to defeat, and importantly, that the condition it is contingent upon is very often not satisfied when it comes to moral peer disagreement specifically. As a result, it appears that moral knowledge is seldom threatened by moral peer disagreement. (shrink)

AI-based technologies are increasingly pervasive in a number of contexts. Our affective and emotional life makes no exception. In this article, we analyze one way in which AI-based technologies can affect them. In particular, our investigation will focus on affective artificial agents, namely AI-powered software or robotic agents designed to interact with us in affectively salient ways. We build upon the existing literature on affective artifacts with the aim of providing an original analysis of affective artificial agents and their distinctive (...) features. We argue that, unlike comparatively low-tech affective artifacts, affective artificial agents display a specific form of agency, which prevents them from being perceived by their users as extensions of their selves. In addition to this, we claim that their functioning crucially depends on the simulation of human-like emotion-driven behavior and requires a distinctive form of transparency—we call it emotional transparency—that might give rise to ethical and normative tensions. (shrink)

The paper presents a critique of Marcuse’s theory of “false needs”. It aims to clear the theoretical ground necessary to sketch out an immanent critique of the socio-economical dynamics that dictate the exhausting, and oft endless postponement of the satisfaction of a multiplicity of mass needs and desires. The paper focuses its attention on some paradoxes produced by Marcuse’s theory, correlated in particular with the critique of the wellbeing of the masses, and with the manipulative superpower ascribed to ideology. These (...) paradoxes are interpreted as expressions of a radical distance between critic and the social reality and of a paternalistic drift, which can both be overcome by the introduction of a immanent critique. -/- Il contributo presenta una critica della teoria dei “falsi bisogni” di Marcuse. Tale critica è volta a liberare lo spazio teorico necessario per impostare una critica immanente delle dinamiche socio-economiche che impongono un estenuante e spesso infinito differimento della soddisfazione di una molteplicità di desideri e bisogni di massa. Ci si sofferma su alcuni paradossi generati dalla teoria di Marcuse, correlati in particolare alla critica rivolta al benessere raggiunto dalle masse, ed allo strapotere manipolatorio attribuito all’ideologia. Tali paradossi vengono interpretati come espressione di un radicale distacco tra il critico e la realtà sociale, e di una sua deriva paternalistica, che possono essere superati attraverso l’adozione di una critica di tipo immanente. (shrink)

In che cosa crede chi pratica la meditazione buddhista? Dare una risposta univoca e coerente è assai difficile; il Buddhismo infatti si concretizza in una molteplicità di scuole e dottrine caratterizzate da complesse logiche e metafisiche. Ci sono tuttavia delle indicazioni minimali che fungono da denominator comune per chi si accosta alla meditazione. Esse riguardano soprattutto l’assenza di punti di vista determinati, l’esperienza del tempo e la relazione di dipendenza reciproca di ogni cosa con ogni altra. Utilizzando gli strumenti della (...) filosofia analitica, questo libro propone una interpretazione dei princìpi basilari che guidano la meditazione buddhista, facendo leva sulle potenzialità del senso comune, inteso non semplicemente come l’opinione generica della maggioranza – troppo spesso già infarcita di presupposti metafisici discutibili - bensì come insieme di credenze che tutti noi possediamo, ma di cui non sempre siamo consapevoli. (shrink)

Higher-order evidence appears to have the ability to defeat rational belief. It is not obvious, however, why exactly the defeat happens. In this paper, I consider two competing explanations of higher-order defeat: the “Objective Higher-Order Defeat Explanation” and the “Subjective Higher-Order Defat Explanation.” According to the former explanation, possessing sufficiently strong higher-order evidence to indicate that one’s belief about p fails to be rational is necessary and sufficient for defeating one’s belief about p. I argue that this type of explanation (...) is defective or at best collapses into the other type of explanation. According to the latter explanation, Believing that one’s belief about p fails to be rational (in response to higher-order evidence about p) is necessary and sufficient for defeating one’s belief about p. I argue that this type of explanation is better suited to explain higher-order defeat given that what one is rational to believe partly depends on the relations among one’s doxastic attitudes. Finally, I address an peculiar feature of the Subjective Higher-Order Defeat Explanation: higher-order defeat becomes contingent on one’s response to the higher-order evidence. (shrink)

A comemoração dos 150 anos de nascimento de Max Weber foi considerada uma data promissora para novos debates sobre o pensamento deste intelectual, cuja obra representa um dos fundamentos do pensamento social contemporâneo. Com a realização do Colóquio Max Weber: 150 anos, foi possível reunir diferentes pesquisadores que têm estudado o seu pensamento ou investigado temas weberianos no Brasil. Uma das características marcantes do evento é que ele foi multidisciplinar e teria de sê-lo, uma vez que a obra de Max (...) Weber percorre diferentes áreas do saber. Por isso participaram do colóquio filósofos, historiadores, sociólogos, cientistas políticos e antropólogos. Este livro é resultado das contribuições de diferentes especialistas que participaram daquele encontro, e tem por escopo apresentar as pesquisas recentes no campo da crítica weberiana. (shrink)

The essay concerns the reconstruction of the repression of desires, with reference to the analysis of their oneiric emersions expounded in the Republic, in comparison with Freud’s conception. Plato’s concept of suppression according to which specific desires are enslaved, so that they can find satisfaction usually only in dreams seems consistent with Freud’s concept of remotion; therefore both the condition of the suppressed desires and the intrapsychic place of their enslavement seem to be interpretable in the light of Freud’s concept (...) of the unconscious. -/- Das Thema des vorliegenden Beitrags ist die Rekonstruktion der Repression von Wünschen in Bezug auf die Analyse ihres Auftauchens im Traum, wie sie in der Politeia ausgeführt wird, im Vergleich mit der Konzeption bei Freud. Die besondere Form von Platonischer Unterdrückung – durch die bestimmte Wünsche in Sklaverei gehalten werden, so dass sie ihre Befriedigung normalerweise nur im Traum erreichen -, scheint mit dem Freudschen Konzept der Verdrängung vereinbar, insofern sowohl der Zustand der unterdrückten Wünsche als auch der intrapsychische Ort ihrer Versklavung unter Anwendung von Freuds Konzept des Unbewussten deutbar ist. (shrink)

The essay aims to analyse the gradual historical process of the partial overlap, replacement and expansion of the theoretical paradigm of depression with respect to that of melancholy. The first part is devoted to analysing some of the central features of the multivalent thematizations of melancholy drawn up during modernity, also with relation to the spirit of capitalism (in its Weberian acceptation). This is followed by an overview of the birth of the modern category of depression, and the process that (...) during the twentieth century led to its transformation into a theoretical and nosological paradigm which in the end replaced that of melancholy. The second part is the attempt to draw up a Zeitdiagnose: the aim is to assess the ‘depressive’ psychosocial impact exercised by particular socio-economic mechanisms and cultural trends, with particular reference to what has been defined as the ‘new spirit of capitalism’, as well as the new forms of individualism and their paradoxical dynamics. In conclusion, I will form a bridge between the history of the two aforesaid paradigms and the contemporary psychosocial dynamics correlated to the phenomenon today interpreted as a ‘depression epidemic’. Il saggio mira ad analizzare il graduale processo storico di parziale sovrapposizione, sostituzione ed ampliamento del paradigma teoretico della depressione rispetto a quello della melanconia. La prima parte è dedicata ad analizzare alcuni dei tratti nevralgici delle polivalenti tematizzazioni della malinconia avvenuti nel corso della modernità, anche in relazione allo spirito del capitalismo (nella sua accezione weberiana). Segue una panoramica sulla nascita della categoria moderna di depressione, e del processo che nel corso del XX secolo l’ha condotta alla sua trasformazione in un paradigma teoretico e nosologico che ha infine sostituito quello della melanconia. La seconda parte rappresenta il tentativo di elaborare una Zeitdiagnose: l’obiettivo è valutare l’impatto psicosociale di natura ‘depressiva’ esercitato da particolari meccanismi socioeconomici e tendenze culturali, con particolare riferimento a ciò che è stato definito il «nuovo spirito del capitalismo», nonché alle nuove forme dell’individualismo e alle loro dinamiche paradossali. In conclusione viene gettato un ponte tra la storia dei due suddetti paradigmi e le dinamiche psicosociali contemporanee correlate al fenomeno oggi interpretato quale «epidemia depressiva». (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to examine two important issues concerning the agency theory of causality: the charge of anthropomorphism and the relation of simultaneous causation. After a brief outline of the agency theory, sections 2–4 contain the refutation of the three main forms in which the charge of anthropomorphism is to be found in the literature. It will appear that it is necessary to distinguish between the subjective and the objective aspect of the concept of causation. This will (...) lead, in section 5, to contrast two kinds of anthropomorphism, one which has been rightly rejected by modern science and one which is fully compatible with the objective reality of the causal processes. Finally, section 6 will apply the preceding considerations to simultaneous causation. On the one hand, in a basic sense, there can be no simultaneous causal relations. On the other hand, simultaneous causation arises when we consider the natural change by abstracting from the agent and from her/his projects of interven.. (shrink)

Across two studies, one of which was pre-registered, we find that a simple questionnaire that measures intellectual virtue and vice predicts how many fake news articles and conspiracy theories participants accept. This effect holds even when controlling for multiple demographic predictors, including age, household income, sex, education, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, and news consumption. These results indicate that self-report is an adequate way to measure intellectual virtue and vice, which suggests that they are not fully immune to introspective awareness or (...) “stealthy” in the sense that Cassam (2015) argues. This is an important methodological result and may pave the way for future research on intellectual virtue and vice. (shrink)

The essay aims to analyse the gradual historical process of the partial overlap, replacement and expansion of the theoretical paradigm of depression with respect to that of melancholy. The first part is devoted to analysing some of the central features of the multivalent thematizations of melancholy drawn up during modernity, also with relation to the spirit of capitalism (in its Weberian acceptation). This is followed by an overview of the birth of the modern category of depression, and the process that (...) during the twentieth century led to its transformation into a theoretical and nosological paradigm which in the end replaced that of melancholy. The second part is the attempt to draw up a Zeitdiagnose: the aim is to assess the ‘depressive’ psychosocial impact exercised by particular socio-economic mechanisms and cultural trends, with particular reference to what has been defined as the ‘new spirit of capitalism’, as well as the new forms of individualism and their paradoxical dynamics. In conclusion, I will form a bridge between the history of the two aforesaid paradigms and the contemporary psychosocial dynamics correlated to the phenomenon today interpreted as a ‘depression epidemic’. Der Aufsatz zielt darauf, der Prozess der historischen Überlagerung, Substitution und Verbreitung des theoretischen Paradigmas der Depression gegenüber jenem der Melancholie darzustellen. Im ersten Teil wird versucht, einige der einschneidenden Eigenschaften der Thematisierungen der Melancholie in der Frühen Neuzeit anzugeben, auch im Verhältnis zum Geist des Kapitalismus. Nachdem eine Skizze der Entstehung der moderne Kategorie der Depression, geht es darum, den Verlauf nachzuzeichnen, der im 20. Jahrhundert zu ihrer Transformation in ein weitläufiges theoretisches Paradigma geführt hat, das schließlich jenes der Melancholie ersetzt hat. Der zweite Teil stellt den Versuch dar, eine Zeitdiagnose umzureißen: An dieser Stelle ist die psychosoziale Bedeutung bestimmter sozioökonomischer und kultureller Mechanismen zu untersuchen, unter besonderem Hinweis auf das, was als »der neue Geist des Kapitalismus« bezeichnet worden ist, sowie auf neue Formen des Individualismus und ihre paradoxen Dynamiken. Abschließend wird eine Brücke geschlagen, zwischen der Geschichte der beiden bezeichneten Paradigmen und der zeitgenössischen psychosozialen Dynamiken, die mit dem als »depressive Epidemie« interpretierten Phänomen verbunden sind. (shrink)

The paper aims to single out and clarify some causal connections between theconcomitant growth of depressive phenomena, not only in the strict clinicalsense, and the establishment of the new capitalist model, which has taken place in Western countries from the early seventies until today. As well as onthe mechanism of labour market flexibility, the essay dwells in particular onthe paradoxical dynamics of the ethical and moral ideals of the newideological configuration. Finally, the paper will also use the category of hegemony (...) to offer some theoretical instruments directed at reactivating theemancipatory potentials frustrated by social suffering of a depressive and regressive nature. Il saggio mira a individuare e delucidare alcuni nessi causali tra il concomitante incremento dei fenomeni depressivi, non solo in senso strettamente clinico, e l’affermazione del nuovo modello capitalistico avvenuto nei paesi occidentali dai primi anni settanta ad oggi. Oltre che sul meccanismo della flessibilità del mercato del lavoro, si insiste in particolare sulle dinamiche paradossali delle istanze etiche e morali della nuova configurazione ideologica. Ricorrendo anche alla categoria di egemonia, vengono da ultimo approntati degli strumenti teorici finalizzati a riattivare i potenziali emancipativi frustrati nella sofferenza sociale di natura depressiva e regressiva. (shrink)

Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identifying all instances of cognition. They claim that the mark of the cognitive is needed to steer the development of cognitive science on the right path. Here, I argue that, at least at present, it cannot be provided. First (§2), I identify some of the factors motivating the search for a mark of the cognitive, each yielding a desideratum the mark is supposed (...) to satisfy (§2.1). I then (§2.2) highlight a number of tensions in the literature on the mark of the cognitive, suggesting they’re best resolved by distinguishing two distinct programs. The first program (§3) is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive capturing our everyday notion of cognition. I argue that such a program is bound to fail for a number of reasons: it is not clear whether such an everyday notion exists; and even if it existed, it would not be able to spell out individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for cognition; and even if it were able to spell them out, these conditions won’t satisfy the desiderata a mark of the cognitive should satisfy. The second program is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive spelling out a genuine scientific kind. But the current state of fragmentation of cognitive science, and the fact that it is splintered in a myriad of different research traditions, prevent us from identifying such a kind. And we have no reason to think that these various research traditions will converge, allowing us to identify a single mark. Or so, at least, I will argue in (§4). I then conclude the paper (§5) deflecting an intuitive objection, and exploring some of the consequences of the thesis I have defended. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...) unravel the phenomenological distinctions which, respectively, oppose phantasy to perception, on the one hand, and phantasy to other forms of the so-called “intuitive re-presentations”. Second, I introduce the difference between presentative and representative acts, arguing that this cannot help us to single out the defining feature of phantasy experiences. The third section draws again an important distinction between pure phantasy and neutrality modification, which allows me to finally determine an internal trait of phantasy experiences, which Husserl refers to as the “Ego-splitting”. In this way, I hope to contribute to a refined characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination. (shrink)

Structural representations are increasingly popular in philosophy of cognitive science. A key virtue they seemingly boast is that of meeting Ramsey's job description challenge. For this reason, structural representations appear tailored to play a clear representational role within cognitive architectures. Here, however, I claim that structural representations do not meet the job description challenge. This is because even our most demanding account of their functional profile is satisfied by at least some receptors, which paradigmatically fail the job description challenge. Hence, (...) the functional profile typically associated with structural representations does not identify representational posits. After a brief introduction, I present, in the second section of the paper, the job description challenge. I clarify why receptors fail to meet it and highlight why, as a result, they should not be considered representations. In the third section I introduce what I take to be the most demanding account of structural representations at our disposal, namely Gładziejewski's account. Provided the necessary background, I turn from exposition to criticism. In the first half of the fourth section, I equate the functional profile of structural representations and receptors. To do so, I show that some receptors boast, as a matter of fact, all the functional features associated with structural representations. Since receptors function merely as causal mediators, I conclude structural representations are mere causal mediators too. In the second half of the fourth section I make this conclusion intuitive with a toy example. I then conclude the paper, anticipating some objections my argument invites. (shrink)

Este texto pretende discutir, do ponto de vista kantiano, o que pode ser ensinado e o que pode ser aprendido em Filosofia. Seu objetivo é construir os argumentos hipotéticos de Kant em face do método estruturalista de leitura de textos filosóficos. Para circunscrever este tema, aparentemente muito amplo, tomaremos como fi o condutor um célebre texto de aula de I. Kant, publicado por G. B. Jäsche sob o título Manual dos Cursos de Lógica Geral. Kant ministrou este curso por mais (...) de quarenta anos, até o término de suas atividades docentes em 1797, e nele apresenta considerações bastante fecundas e atuais sobre o ensino da História da Filosofia e sobre a formação do filósofo. A partir da distinção entre conhecimento histórico e conhecimento racional, e da distinção entre o conceito de filosofia na escola e o conceito de filosofia no mundo (AK 9:24), procuraremos apresentar as contribuições kantianas que podem ainda ser consideradas pertinentes para se discutir o modo de ensinar Filosofia e a formação do filósofo. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)