- The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):123-143.details
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The "Good" and the "Right" Revisited.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):499-519..details
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Rationality as a Virtue.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):319-338.details
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Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2643–2675.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.details
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Michael Bratman’s planning, time, and self-governance.J. David Velleman - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (9):913-925.details
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Can Reasons be Self-Undermining?Rob Van Someren Greve - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):411-414.details
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Shapelessness and predication supervenience: a limited defense of shapeless moral particularism.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):51-67.details
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Can the Canberrans’ Supervenience Argument Refute Shapeless Moral Particularism?Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):545-560.details
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The Guise of the Guise of the Bad.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):5-20.details
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Knowing the Good and Knowing What One is Doing.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):91-117.details
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Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.details
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Desires as additional reasons? The case of tie-breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.details
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Contractualism as Restricted Constructivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):571-579.details
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A Puzzle About Reasons and Rationality.Caj Strandberg - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):63-88.details
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The Normative, the Practical, and the Deliberatively Indispensable.Andrew Stewart - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-21.details
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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Reasons with rationalism after all.Michael Smith - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):521-530.details
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Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):209-229.details
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The Shmagency Question.Matthew Silverstein - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1127-1142.details
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Inescapability and Normativity.Matthew Silverstein - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (3):1-27.details
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What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.details
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What is morality?Kieran Setiya - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1113-1133.details
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Reasons and Causes.Kieran Setiya - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157.details
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Reply to Bratman and Smith.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):531-540.details
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Love and the Value of a Life.Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (3):251-280.details
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Broome on Reasons to Act.Kieran Setiya - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):204-210.details
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Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.details
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What ability can do.Ben Schwan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):703-723.details
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Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics 1 : Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):690-701.details
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Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue?Greg Scherkoske - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):185-215.details
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Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics 1.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):68-101.details
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On Korsgaard’s argument for Kant’s moral law.Amir Saemi - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):773-787.details
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Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state.Devlin Russell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):742-761.details
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Social and Justified Legal Normativity: Unlocking the Mystery of the Relationship.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (3):409-433.details
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A Disposition-Based Fraud Model: Theoretical Integration and Research Agenda.Vasant Raval - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 150 (3):741-763.details
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How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating.William Ratoff - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1245-1265.details
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A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1269-1292.details
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Autonomous Machines, Moral Judgment, and Acting for the Right Reasons.Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins & Bradley J. Strawser - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):851-872.details
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The Good, the Bad, and the Uncertain: Intentional Action under Normative Uncertainty.Fabienne Peter - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):57-70.details
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Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.details
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How we know what we intend.Sarah K. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.details
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Deviant Formal Causation.Sarah K. Paul - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.details
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Diachronic Incontinence is a Problem in Moral Philosophy.Sarah K. Paul - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):337-355.details
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Wrongfulness rewarded?: A normative paradox.David O’Brien & Ben Schwan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6897-6916.details
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The Subjective Authority of Intention.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):354-373.details
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