- Are monkeys nomothetic or idiographic?Linda Mealey - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):161-161.details
|
|
The fallibility of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.details
|
|
Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.details
|
|
Cross-Cultural Variations in Naïve Psychology among 2-year-olds: A Comparison of Children in the United Kingdom and Singapore.Ai Keow Lim, Joanne M. Williams, Dagmara Annaz & Katie R. Cebula - 2010 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 10 (3-4):221-251.details
|
|
Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.details
|
|
Pretending and believing: issues in the theory of ToMM.Alan M. Leslie - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):211-238.details
|
|
Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.details
|
|
False belief understanding goes to school: On the social-emotional consequences of coming early or late to a first theory of mind.Chris E. Lalonde & Michael J. Chandler - 1995 - Cognition and Emotion 9 (2-3):167-185.details
|
|
Self-attributions help constitute mental types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.details
|
|
Children's attributions of beliefs to humans and God: cross‐cultural evidence.Nicola Knight, Paulo Sousa, Justin L. Barrett & Scott Atran - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (1):117-126.details
|
|
Pragmatics, Cognitive Flexibility and Autism Spectrum Disorders.Mikhail Kissine - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (1):1-28.details
|
|
How do young children process beliefs about beliefs?: Evidence from response latency.Haruo Kikuno, Peter Mitchell & Fenja Ziegler - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (3):297–316.details
|
|
Common sense and adult theory of communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.details
|
|
“Good developmental sequence” and the paradoxes of children's skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.details
|
|
Gopnik's invention of intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.details
|
|
Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.details
|
|
Analogical Comparison Promotes Theory‐of‐Mind Development.Christian Hoyos, William S. Horton, Nina K. Simms & Dedre Gentner - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (9):e12891.details
|
|
Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.details
|
|
Understanding minds and selves.R. Peter Hobson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):132-132.details
|
|
Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
|
|
Imagination and imitation: Input, acid test, or alchemy?C. M. Heyes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):131-132.details
|
|
Solving the Puzzle about Early Belief‐Ascription.Katharina A. Helming, Brent Strickland & Pierre Jacob - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):438-469.details
|
|
Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
|
|
Being ostensive (reply to commentaries on “Expression unleashed”).Christophe Heintz & Thom Scott-Phillips - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e20.details
|
|
“How monkeys see the world.” Why monkeys?A. H. Harcourt - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):160-161.details
|
|
First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
|
|
How autistics see the world.Francesca Happé & Ulta Frith - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):159-160.details
|
|
Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
|
|
On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
|
|
In this best of all possible monkey worlds?Harold Gouzoules - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):158-159.details
|
|
Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
|
|
First person representations need a methodology based on simulation or theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.details
|
|
Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
|
|
Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.details
|
|
Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.Alison Gopnik & Henry M. Wellman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):145-71.details
|
|
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
|
|
Second person intentional relations and the evolution of social understanding.Juan Carlos Gomez - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-130.details
|
|
Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
|
|
Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.details
|
|
Perception theory and the attribution of mental states.Philip A. Glotzbach - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):157-158.details
|
|
Social and nonsocial intelligence in orangutans.Biruté Galdikas - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):156-157.details
|
|
Theory of society, yes, theory of mind, no.Hans G. Furth - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):155-156.details
|
|
Animal mentality: Canons to the right of them, canons to the left of them ….Aurelio J. Figueredo - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):154-155.details
|
|
Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
|
|
Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
|
|
Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129.details
|
|
Of monkeys, mechanisms and the modular mind.Lee Alan Dugatkin & Anne Barrett Clark - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):153-154.details
|
|
Young children's conceptions of knowledge.Rachel Dudley - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12494.details
|
|
Is the monkeys' world scientifically impenetrable?W. H. Dittrich - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):152-153.details
|
|
Surplusages audience effects and George John Romanes.Donald A. Dewsbury - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):152-152.details
|
|