The method of reflective equilibrium focuses on the relationship between principles and judgments. Principles are relatively general rules for comprehending the area of enquiry. Judgments are our intuitions or commitments, ‘at all levels of generality’ (Rawls 1975: 8), regarding the subject matter. The basic idea of reflective equilibrium is to bring principles and judgments into accord. This can be achieved by revising the principles and/or the judgments. -/- I first look at normative political judgments (Section 2) before considering the role (...) of principles, arguments, devices of representation and background theory in wide reflective equilibrium (Section 3). I then consider two of the main challenges to the method (Section 4), and show how to use it to deliberate about substantive political principles (Section 5). I conclude with an extended example of the method in action (Section 6). (shrink)

The assertion that an experiment by Afshar et al. demonstrates violation of Bohr’s Principle of Complementarity is based on the faulty assumption that which-way information in a double-slit interference experiment can be retroactively determined from a future measurement.

Discrimination, understood as differential treatment of individuals on the basis of their respective group memberships, is widely considered to be morally wrong. This moral judgment is backed in many jurisdictions with the passage of equality of opportunity legislation, which aims to ensure that racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, sexual-orientation, disability and other groups are not subjected to discrimination. This chapter explores the conceptual underpinnings of discrimination and equality of opportunity using the tools of analytical moral and political philosophy.

Luck egalitarianism is a family of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that aim to counteract the distributive effects of luck. This article explains luck egalitarianism's main ideas, and the debates that have accompanied its rise to prominence. There are two main parts to the discussion. The first part sets out three key moves in the influential early statements of Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen: the brute luck/option luck distinction, the specification of brute luck in everyday or theoretical terms and the specification (...) of advantage as resources, welfare, or some combination of these. The second part covers three later developments: the democratic egalitarian critique of luck egalitarianism, the luck egalitarian acceptance of pluralism, and luck egalitarian doubts about the significance of the brute luck/option luck distinction. (shrink)

This paper considers issues raised by Elizabeth Anderson’s recent critique of the position she terms ‘luck egalitarianism’. It is maintained that luck egalitarianism, once clarified and elaborated in certain regards, remains the strongest egalitarian stance. Anderson’s arguments that luck egalitarians abandon both the negligent and prudent dependent caretakers fails to account for the moderate positions open to luck egalitarians and overemphasizes their commitment to unregulated market choices. The claim that luck egalitarianism insults citizens by redistributing on the grounds of paternalistic (...) beliefs, pity and envy, and by making intrusive and stigmatizing judgments of responsibility, fails accurately to characterize the luck egalitarian’s rationale for redistribution and relies upon luck egalitarians being insensitive to the danger of stigmatization. The luck egalitarian position is reinforced by the fact that Anderson’s favoured conception of equality, ‘democratic equality’, is counterintuitively indifferent to all unchosen inequalities, including intergenerational inequalities, once bare social minima are met. (shrink)

Revista IT & C este o publicație trimestrială din domeniile tehnologiei informației și comunicații, și domenii conexe de studiu și practică. -/- Cuprins: -/- EDITORIAL / EDITORIAL -/- Tools Used in AI Development – The Turing Test Instrumente utilizate în dezvoltarea IA – Testul Turing -/- TEHNOLOGIA INFORMAȚIEI / INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY -/- Trends in the Evolution of Artificial Intelligence – Intelligent Agents Tendințe în evoluția inteligenței artificiale – Agenți inteligenți -/- TELECOMUNICAȚII / TELECOMMUNICATIONS -/- Security in 5G Telecommunications Networks with (...) 5G Core Securitatea în rețelele de telecomunicații 5G cu 5G Core -/- PROGRAMARE / PROGRAMMING -/- Alignment, Explainability and Confinement as Goals of Artificial Intelligence Alinierea, explicabilitatea și confinarea ca obiective ale inteligenței artificiale -/- SECURITATE CIBERNETICĂ / CYBER SECURITY -/- Threats of Artificial Intelligence for Cybersecurity Amenințări ale inteligenței artificiale pentru securitatea cibernetică -/- ISSN 2821-8469 ISSN-L 2821-8469, DOI: 10.58679/IT23696. (shrink)

Revista IT & C este o publicație trimestrială din domeniile tehnologiei informației și comunicații, și domenii conexe de studiu și practică. -/- Cuprins: -/- EDITORIAL / EDITORIAL -/- Challenges and Limitations in the Use of Artificial Intelligence Provocări și limitări în utilizarea inteligenței artificiale -/- TEHNOLOGIA INFORMAȚIEI / INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY -/- Impact of Big Data Technology on Contemporary Society Impactul tehnologiei Big Data asupra societății contemporane -/- Methods, Techniques and Patterns of Advanced Persistent Threats – APT Lifecycle Metode, tehnici și (...) modele ale amenințărilor persistente avansate – Ciclul de viață al APT -/- TELECOMUNICAȚII / TELECOMMUNICATIONS -/- The Revolutionary Role of Blockchain Technology in Communication Rolul revoluționar al tehnologiei blockchain în comunicare -/- PROGRAMARE / PROGRAMMING -/- AI Algorithms Used in National Security Algoritmi IA utilizați în securitatea națională -/- SECURITATE CIBERNETICĂ / CYBER SECURITY -/- Cyber Security and Cyber Warfare Securitatea cibernetică și războiul cibernetic -/- Advanced Persistent Threats in Cyber Security Amenințările Persistente Avansate în securitatea cibernetică -/- ISSN 2821-8469 ISSN-L 2821-8469, DOI: 10.58679/IT15115. (shrink)

This article argues that, suitably modified, the method of reflective equilibrium is a plausible way of selecting moral principles. The appropriate conception of the method is wide and radical, admitting consideration of a full range of moral principles and arguments, and requiring the enquiring individual to consider others' views and undergo experiences that may offset any formative biases. The individual is not bound by his initial considered judgments, and may revise his view in any way whatsoever. It is appropriate to (...) describe the method as a balance between coherentism and fallibilist foundationalism. With these points in mind, various criticisms, including the claims that considered judgments are not initially credible and are shaped by prejudice, and that the method itself fails to determine principle selection, are challenged. (shrink)

There seems to be an inconsistency at the heart of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: a differentia is said both to presuppose its genus (in vii 12) and to be logically independent from it (in x 7). I argue that the relation of analogy resolves this inconsistency, restores the coherence of the concepts of differentia and species, and gives x 7 its rightful place in the development of the Metaphysics.

According to all-luck egalitarianism, the differential distributive effects of both brute luck, which defines the outcome of risks which are not deliberately taken, and option luck, which defines the outcome of deliberate gambles, are unjust. Exactly how to correct the effects of option luck is, however, a complex issue. This article argues that (a) option luck should be neutralized not just by correcting luck among gamblers, but among the community as a whole, because it would be unfair for gamblers as (...) a group to be disadvantaged relative to non-gamblers by bad option luck; (b) individuals should receive the warranted expected results of their gambles, except insofar as individuals blamelessly lacked the ability to ascertain which expectations were warranted; and (c) where societal resources are insufficient to deliver expected results to gamblers, gamblers should receive a lesser distributive share which is in proportion to the expected results. Where all-luck egalitarianism is understood in this way, it allows risk-takers to impose externalities on non-risk-takers, which seems counterintuitive. This may, however, be an advantage as it provides a luck egalitarian rationale for assisting ‘negligent victims’. (shrink)

The potential for scalable quantum computing depends on the viability of fault tolerance and quantum error correction, by which the entropy of environmental noise is removed during a quantum computation to maintain the physical reversibility of the computer’s logical qubits. However, the theory underlying quantum error correction applies a linguistic double standard to the words “noise” and “measurement” by treating environmental interactions during a quantum computation as inherently reversible, and environmental interactions at the end of a quantum computation as irreversible (...) measurements. Specifically, quantum error correction theory models noise as interactions that are uncorrelated or that result in correlations that decay in space and/or time, thus embedding no permanent information to the environment. I challenge this assumption both on logical grounds and by discussing a hypothetical quantum computer based on “position qubits.” The technological difficulties of producing a useful scalable position-qubit quantum computer parallel the overwhelming difficulties in performing a double-slit interference experiment on an object comprising a million to a billion fermions. (shrink)

Inteligența artificială a câștigat tracțiune în ultimii ani, facilitând luarea deciziilor inteligente și automate în cadrul scenariilor de implementare și a zonelor de aplicare. Deși este, fără îndoială, benefică, poate expune indivizii și organizațiile la riscuri noi și uneori imprevizibile, și poate deschide noi căi în metodele și tehnicile de atac, precum și crearea de noi provocări în materie de protecție a datelor. În acest sens, un element critic în peisajul amenințărilor este identificarea categoriilor de active pentru care pot fi (...) amenințări. (shrink)

The universality assumption (“U”) that quantum wave states only evolve by linear or unitary dynamics has led to a variety of paradoxes in the foundations of physics. U is not directly supported by empirical evidence but is rather an inference from data obtained from microscopic systems. The inference of U conflicts with empirical observations of macroscopic systems, giving rise to the century-old measurement problem and subjecting the inference of U to a higher standard of proof, the burden of which lies (...) with its proponents. This burden remains unmet because the intentional choice by scientists to perform interference experiments that only probe the microscopic realm disqualifies the resulting data from supporting an inference that wave states always evolve linearly in the macroscopic realm. Further, the nature of the physical world creates an asymptotic size limit above which interference experiments, and verification of U in the realm in which it causes the measurement problem, seem impossible for all practical purposes if nevertheless possible in principle. This apparent natural limit serves as evidence against an inference of U, providing a further hurdle to the proponent’s currently unmet burden of proof. The measurement problem should never have arisen because the inference of U is entirely unfounded, logically and empirically. (shrink)

A potentially new interpretation of quantum mechanics posits the state of the universe as a consistent set of facts that are instantiated in the correlations among entangled objects. A fact (or event) occurs exactly when the number or density of future possibilities decreases, and a quantum superposition exists if and only if the facts of the universe are consistent with the superposition. The interpretation sheds light on both in-principle and real-world predictability of the universe.

This articles proposes that theories and principles of distributive justice be considered substantively egalitarian iff they satisfy each of three conditions: (1) they consider the bare fact that a person is in certain circumstances to be a conclusive reason for placing another relevantly identically entitled person in the same circumstances, except where this conflicts with other similarly conclusive reasons arising from the circumstances of other persons; (2) they can be stated as 'equality of x for all persons', making no explicit (...) or implicit exclusion of persons or individuals and showing no greater concern and respect for some rather than others; and (3) they pursue equality in a dimension that is valuable to egalitarians. On this construal, prioritarianism and Dworkinian equality of resources, a view often identified as luck egalitarian, are not substantively egalitarian, but equality of opportunity, the standard form of luck egalitarianism, may be. (shrink)

Emissions grandfathering holds that a history of emissions strengthens an agent’s claim for future emission entitlements. Though grandfathering appears to have been influential in actual emission control frameworks, it is rarely taken seriously by philosophers. This article presents an argument for thinking this an oversight. The core of the argument is that members of countries with higher historical emissions are typically burdened with higher costs when transitioning to a given lower level of emissions. According to several appealing views in political (...) philosophy (utilitarianism, egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism) they are therefore entitled to greater resources, including emission entitlements, than those in similar positions but with lower emissions. This grandfathering may play an especially important role in allocating emission entitlements among rich countries. (shrink)

David Miller has objected to the cosmopolitan argument that it is arbitrary and hence unfair to treat individuals differently on account of things for which they are not responsible. Such a view seems to require, implausibly, that individuals be treated identically even where (unchosen) needs differ. The objection is, however, inapplicable where the focus of cosmopolitan concern is arbitrary disadvantage rather than arbitrary treatment. This 'unfair disadvantage argument' supports a form of global luck egalitarianism. Miller also objects that cosmopolitanism is (...) unable to accommodate special obligations generated by national membership. Cosmopolitanism can, however, accommodate many special obligations to compatriots. Those which it cannot accommodate are only morally compelling if we assume what the objection claims to prove - that cosmopolitanism is mistaken. Cosmopolitanism construed as global luck egalitarianism is therefore able to withstand both of Miller's objections, and has significant independent appeal on account of the unfair disadvantage argument. (shrink)

This article argues for an unconventional interpretation of Arthur O. Lovejoy’s distinctive approach to method in the history of ideas. It is maintained that the value of the central concept of the ‘unit-idea’ has been misunderstood by friends and foes alike. The commonality of unit-ideas at different times and places is often defined in terms of familial resemblance. But such an approach must necessarily define unit-ideas as being something other than the smallest conceptual unit. It is therefore in tension with (...) Lovejoy’s methodological prescription and, more importantly, disregards a potentially important aspect of intellectual history – the smaller conceptual units themselves. In response to this, an alternative interpretation of unit-ideas as ‘elemental’ – as the smallest identifiable conceptual components – is put forward. Unlike the familial resemblance approach, the elemental approach can provide a plausible explanation for changes in ideas. These are construed as being either the creation of new unit-ideas, the disappearance of existing ones, or alterations in the groups of unit-ideas that compose idea-complexes. The focus on the movement of unit-ideas and idea-complexes through history can also be sensitive to contextual issues, carefully distinguishing the different meanings that single words may have, in much the way that both Lovejoy and his influential critic Quentin Skinner suggest. (shrink)

Discussions of where the costs of climate change adaptation and mitigation should fall often focus on the 'polluter pays principle' or the 'ability to pay principle'. Simon Caney has recently defended a 'hybrid view', which includes versions of both of these principles. This article argues that Caney's view succeeds in overcoming several shortfalls of both principles, but is nevertheless subject to three important objections: first, it does not distinguish between those emissions which are hard to avoid and those which are (...) easy to avoid; second, its only partial reference to all-things-considered justice means it cannot provide a full account even of climate justice; and third, it assigns to the poor very limited duties to meet climate change costs, even where they have created those costs, which may incentivise them to increase emissions. An alternative pluralistic account which avoids these objections is presented. (shrink)

Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider (...) and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston. (shrink)

Revista Cunoașterea Științifică este o publicație trimestrială din domeniile științei și filosofiei, și domenii conexe de studiu și practică. -/- Cuprins: -/- EDITORIAL / EDITORIAL -/- Nicolae SFETCU From Primitive Instincts to Advanced Cognition: The Evolution of Human Intelligence De la instinctele primitive la cunoașterea avansată: evoluția inteligenței umane -/- ȘTIINȚE NATURALE / NATURAL SCIENCE -/- Nicolae SFETCU Discovery of Astatine by Horia Hulubei Descoperirea astatinului de Horia Hulubei -/- Lucian Ștefan COZMA, Cosmin Vasile ȚENU, Daniela Georgiana GOLEA The Romteleghid (...) project between legend and historical reality Proiectul Romteleghid între legendă și realitate istorică -/- Lucian Ștefan COZMA, Daniela Georgiana GOLEA, Cosmin Vasile ȚENU Inexpensive and environmentally friendly fuel blend for catalytic combustion in power boilers and internal combustion engines – a solution for Europe Amestec de combustibil ieftin și ecologic destinat arderii catalitice în cazanele termoenergetice și motoarele de ardere internă, o soluție pentru Europa -/- ȘTIINȚE SOCIALE / SOCIAL SCIENCE Mădălina MIRON Putinjugend: The Pro-Kremlin Youth Movement Nashi Putinjugend: Mișcarea de tineret pro-Kremlin Nashi -/- Alexandru Ș. BOLOGA and Ana-Maria GRĂMESCU Tropaeum Augusti (France) and Tropaeum Traiani (Romania): A Comparative Study Tropaeum Augusti (Franța) și Tropaeum Traiani (România): Un studiu comparativ -/- Mark C. LUKÁCS Innovative Advertising Campaigns for Cultural Institutions: Exploring Public-Private Partnership Opportunities and Framework Campanii de publicitate inovatoare pentru instituții culturale: Explorarea oportunităților și cadrului de parteneriat public-privat -/- ȘTIINȚE FORMALE / FORMAL SCIENCE -/- Valentin IONESCU In a Universe where space and time are discrete, the maximum possible speed is finite. Lorentz contraction in a discrete universe Într-un Univers în care spațiul și timpul sunt discrete, viteza maximă posibilă este finită. Contracția Lorentz și dilatarea timpului într-un univers discret -/- FILOSOFIE / PHILOSOPHY -/- Dumitru MAZÎLU The subsequent development of the term canon in the early Christian centuries Dezvoltarea subsecventă a termenului de canon în primele secole creștine -/- ISSN 2821-8086 ISSN-L 2821-8086, DOI: 10.58679/CS67492. (shrink)

Revista Intelligence Info este o publicație trimestrială din domeniile intelligence, geopolitică și securitate, și domenii conexe de studiu și practică. -/- Cuprins: -/- EDITORIAL / EDITORIAL -/- Nicolae SFETCU The Role of Polanyi’s Tacit Knowledge in Intelligence Analysis Rolul cunoașterii tacite a lui Polanyi în analiza informațiilor -/- INTELLIGENCE / INTELLIGENCE -/- Tănase TIBERIU Principles, methods and means of intelligence activity in the Russian Federation and Israel Principii, metode și mijloace ale activității informative în Federația Rusă și Israel -/- Tănase (...) TIBERIU Considerations on intelligence and anticipation Considerații privind intelligence și anticiparea -/- ISTORIA / HISTORY -/- Tănase TIBERIU The continuity of the KGB in the 20th century – Descendants of the KGB Continuitatea KGB-lui în secolul XX –Urmașele KGB ului -/- Lucian Ștefan COZMA, Daniela Georgiana GOLEA The Real History of the Romteleghid Project: 1 – Geophysical Aggression Istoria reală a proiectului Romteleghid: 1 – Agresiunea geofizică -/- GEOPOLITICA / GEOPOLITICS -/- Emilian M. DOBRESCU Rare Earths in Other Countries Except China Pământuri rare în alte țări, cu excepția Chinei -/- SECURITATE / SECURITY -/- Nicolae SFETCU Advanced Cognitive Electronic Warfare: Enhancing Strategic Superiority Through Intelligent Systems Războiul electronic cognitiv avansat: sporirea superiorității strategice prin sisteme inteligente -/- ȘTIINȚA INFORMAȚIEI / INFORMATION SCIENCE -/- Nicolae SFETCU The Influence of Artificial Intelligence on Human Activity and Human Intelligence Influența inteligenței artificiale asupra activității umane și a inteligenței umane -/- ISSN 2821-8159 ISSN-L 2821-8159, DOI: 10.58679/II12575. (shrink)

The standard version of sufficientarianism maintains that providing people with enough, or as close to enough as is possible, is lexically prior to other distributive goals. This article argues that this is excessive – more than distributive justice allows – in four distinct ways. These concern the magnitude of advantage, the number of beneficiaries, responsibility and desert, and above-threshold distribution. Sufficientarians can respond by accepting that providing enough unconditionally is more than distributive justice allows, instead balancing sufficiency against other considerations.

Revista Cunoașterea Științifică este o publicație trimestrială din domeniile științei și filosofiei, și domenii conexe de studiu și practică. -/- Cuprins: -/- EDITORIAL / EDITORIAL -/- Nicolae SFETCU What is intelligence? Ce este inteligența? -/- ȘTIINȚE NATURALE / NATURAL SCIENCE -/- Nicolae SFETCU Epistemology of Loop Quantum Gravity in the Context of Canonical Quantum Gravity Epistemologia gravitației cuantice în buclă în contextul gravitației cuantice canonice -/- Valentin IONESCU Universal constants, vacuum energy and the growth of black holes over time in (...) the Cold Big Bang Model Constante universale, energia vidului și creșterea în timp a găurilor negre în Modelul Big Bangului Rece -/- ȘTIINȚE SOCIALE / SOCIAL SCIENCE -/- Nicolae SFETCU Challenges and Trends in Electronic Warfare – Asymmetric Warfare Provocări și tendințe în războiul electronic – Războiul asimetric -/- ȘTIINȚE FORMALE / FORMAL SCIENCE -/- Nicolae SFETCU Defending Against Cyber Attacks Through Machine Learning Apărarea împotriva atacurilor cibernetice prin învățarea automată -/- Dumitru MAZILU About some canonical and civil provisions regarding the current management of parish church assets Despre unele prevederi canonice și civile privind gestionarea actuala a bunurilor bisericești parohiale -/- Alina Mihaela FRĂTICĂ-DRAGOMIR (GUȘE) The Concept of Electronic Pensioner in Some Countries Versus Romania Conceptul de pensionar electronic în unele țări versus România -/- FILOSOFIE / PHILOSOPHY -/- Tănase TIBERIU, Ovidiu BOUREANU Intelligence as a Field of Knowledge Intelligence–ul ca domeniu al cunoașterii -/- ISSN 2821-8086 ISSN-L 2821-8086, DOI: 10.58679/CS58929. (shrink)

How do plurals and mass nouns refer? What kind of logic should be used in order to account for the truth-conditions of the sentences they appear in? For linguists, first-order predicate logic is adequate, provided it is supplemented by a notion of mereological sum for plurals and for mass nouns. On the contrary, according to some philosophers, new logics must be used, plural logic for plurals and mass logic for mass nouns. We survey these debates in this entry.

Critics of luck egalitarianism have claimed that, far from providing a justification for the public insurance functions of a welfare state as its proponents claim, the view objectionably abandons those who are deemed responsible for their dire straits. This article considers seven arguments that can be made in response to this ‘abandonment objection’. Four of these arguments are found wanting, with a recurrent problem being their reliance on a dubious sufficientarian or quasi-sufficientarian commitment to provide a threshold of goods unconditionally. (...) Three arguments succeed, showing that luck egalitarians have good reasons for assisting ‘negligent victims’ on account of changes that may occur in an individual between the time of their choice and their subsequent disadvantage, bad option luck, and doubts about free will and responsibility. Luck egalitarianism is therefore shown to offer strong support for public insurance. (shrink)

The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic (...) and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our under- standing of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world. (shrink)

Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the embodied organism, but an organism-plus-artifacts. In this paper, we provide a novel account of the implications of these views for learning, education, and assessment. We start by conceptualising how we learn to assemble extended cognitive systems by internalising cultural norms and practices. Having a better grip on how (...) extended cognitive systems are assembled, we focus on the question: If our cognition extends, how should we educate and assess such extended cognitive systems? We suggest various ways to minimize possible negative effects of extending one’s cognition and to efficiently find and organise (online) information by adopting a virtue epistemology approach. Educational and assessment implications are foregrounded, particularly in the case of Danish students’ use of the Internet during exams. (shrink)

O analiză cuprinzătoare a Amenințărilor Persistente Avansate (Advanced Persistent Threats, APT), inclusiv caracteristicile, originile, metodele, consecințele și strategiile de apărare ale acestora, cu accent pe detectarea acestor amenințări. Se explorează conceptul de amenințări persistente avansate în contextul securității cibernetice și al războiului cibernetic. APT reprezintă una dintre cele mai insidioase și provocatoare forme de amenințări cibernetice, caracterizate prin sofisticarea, persistența și natura lor țintită. Această carte analizează originile, caracteristicile și metodele folosite de actorii APT. De asemenea, explorează complexitățile asociate cu (...) detectarea APT, analizând tacticile evolutive folosite de actorii amenințărilor și a progreselor corespunzătoare în metodologiile de detectare. Cartea subliniază importanța abordării cu mai multe fațete, care integrează inovații tehnologice cu strategii proactive de apărare pentru a identifica în mod eficient și atenua APT. (shrink)

Istoria paralelă a evoluției inteligenței umane și a inteligenței artificiale este o călătorie fascinantă, evidențiind căile distincte, dar interconectate, ale evoluției biologice și inovației tehnologice. Această istorie poate fi văzută ca o serie de evoluții interconectate, fiecare progres în inteligența umană deschizând calea pentru următorul salt în inteligența artificială. Inteligența umană și inteligența artificială s-au împletit de mult timp, evoluând în traiectorii paralele de-a lungul istoriei. Pe măsură ce oamenii au căutat să înțeleagă și să reproducă inteligența, IA a apărut (...) ca un domeniu dedicat creării de sisteme capabile de sarcini care necesită în mod tradițional intelect uman. Această carte analizează rădăcinile evolutive ale inteligenței, explorează apariția inteligenței artificiale, analizează istoria paralelă a inteligenței umane și a inteligenței artificiale, urmărind dezvoltarea lor, interacțiunile și impactul profund pe care l-au avut una asupra celeilalte, și imaginează peisajele viitoare în care converg inteligența umană și cea artificială. Să explorăm această istorie, comparând reperele cheie și evoluțiile din ambele tărâmuri. (shrink)

The parallel history of the evolution of human intelligence and artificial intelligence is a fascinating journey, highlighting the distinct but interconnected paths of biological evolution and technological innovation. This history can be seen as a series of interconnected developments, each advance in human intelligence paving the way for the next leap in artificial intelligence. Human intelligence and artificial intelligence have long been intertwined, evolving in parallel trajectories throughout history. As humans have sought to understand and reproduce intelligence, AI has emerged (...) as a field dedicated to creating systems capable of tasks that traditionally require human intellect. This book examines the evolutionary roots of intelligence, explores the emergence of artificial intelligence, examines the parallel history of human intelligence and artificial intelligence, tracing their development, interactions, and profound impact they have had on each other, and envisions future landscapes where intelligence converges human and artificial. Let's explore this history, comparing key milestones and developments in both realms. (shrink)

Many political philosophers maintain that beneficiaries of injustice are under special obligations to assist victims of injustice. However, the examples favoured by those who endorse this view equally support an alternative luck egalitarian view, which holds that special obligations should be assigned to those with good brute luck. From this perspective the distinguishing features of the benefiting view are (1) its silence on the question of whether to allocate special obligations to assist the brute luck worse off to those who (...) are well off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice, and (2) its silence on the question of whether to allocate assistance to those who are badly off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice. In this new light, the benefiting view is harder to justify. (shrink)

A constitutive theory of representation must address two challenges. The content determination challenge requires specifying why a particular state has a given content. The job description challenge requires spelling out the explanatory role that representational notions play in that theory. Recently, Nicholas Shea has advanced *varitel semantics* as a hybrid approach to representation to answer those challenges, supplementing teleosemantics with non-historical features –namely, exploitable relations and robustness. In this paper, I critically assess the hybrid theory’s answers to both challenges, arguing (...) that their hybrid nature undermines their merits. In each case, I will show that it is hard to establish how the alleged complementariness of the hybrid account components works. I will conclude that internal problems beset Shea’s theory of representation. (shrink)

A large proportion of humankind today lives in avoidable poverty. This article examines whether affluent individuals and governments have moral duties to change this situation. It is maintained that an alternative to the familiar accounts of transdomestic distributive justice and personal ethics put forward by writers such as Peter Singer, John Rawls, and Thomas Pogge is required, since each of these accounts fails to reflect the full range of relevant considerations. A better account would give some weight to overall utility, (...) the condition of the worst off, and individual responsibility. This approach provides robust support to global poverty alleviation. (shrink)

Intuitively, collective nouns are pseudo-singular: a collection of things (a pair of people, a flock of birds, etc.) just is the things that make ‘it’ up. But certain facts about natural language seem to count against this view. In short, distributive predicates and numerals interact with collective nouns in ways that they seemingly shouldn’t if those nouns are pseudo-singular. We call this set of issues ‘the distribution problem’. To solve it, we propose a modification to cover-based semantics. On this semantics, (...) the interpretation of distributive predicates and numerals depends on a cover, where the choice of cover is strongly semantically constrained by the noun with which they interact. (shrink)

Political philosophers commonly tackle the issue of climate change by focusing on fundamental interests as a basis for human rights. This approach struggles, however, in cases where one set of fundamental interests requires one course of action, and another set of fundamental interests requires another course of action. This article advances an alternative response to climate change based on an account of global justice that gives weight to utilitarian, prioritarian, and luck egalitarian considerations. A practical application of this pluralistic account (...) is provided, which shows that it handles trade-offs between individuals’ interests in an appealing way, and that it supports an aggressive policy of climate change mitigation. This account provides a more plausible justification for rights against the harms of climate change. (shrink)

This article explores the Rawlsian goal of ensuring that distributions are not influenced by the morally arbitrary. It does so by bringing discussions of distributive justice into contact with the debate over moral luck initiated by Williams and Nagel. Rawls’ own justice as fairness appears to be incompatible with the arbitrariness commitment, as it creates some equalities arbitrarily. A major rival, Dworkin’s version of brute luck egalitarianism, aims to be continuous with ordinary ethics, and so is (a) sensitive to non-philosophical (...) beliefs about free will and responsibility, and (b) allows inequalities to arise on the basis of option luck. But Dworkin does not present convincing reasons in support of continuity, and there are compelling moral reasons for justice to be sensitive to the best philosophical account of free will and responsibility, as is proposed by the revised brute luck egalitarianism of Arneson and Cohen. While Dworkinian brute luck egalitarianism admits three sorts of morally arbitrary disadvantaging which correspond to three forms of moral luck (constitutive, circumstantial, and option luck), revised brute luck egalitarianism does not disadvantage on the basis of constitutive or circumstantial luck. But it is not as sensitive to responsibility as it needs to be to fully extinguish the influence of the morally arbitrary, for persons under it may exercise their responsibility equivalently yet end up with different outcomes on account of option luck. It is concluded that egalitarians should deny the existence of distributive luck, which is luck in the levels of advantage that individuals are due. (shrink)

Is suffering really bad? The late Derek Parfit argued that we all have reasons to want to avoid future agony and that suffering is in itself bad both for the one who suffers and impersonally. Nietzsche denied that suffering was intrinsically bad and that its value could even be impersonal. This paper has two aims. It argues against what I call ‘Realism about the Value of Suffering’ by drawing from a broadly Nietzschean debunking of our evaluative attitudes, showing that a (...) recently influential response to the debunking challenge (the appeal to phenomenal introspection) fails. It also argues that a Nietzschean approach is well suited to support the challenge and is bolstered by the empirical literature. As strangers to ourselves, we cannot know whether suffering is really intrinsically bad for us. (shrink)

It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is (...) empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality. (shrink)

Most physics theories are deterministic, with the notable exception of quantum mechanics which, however, comes plagued by the so-called measurement problem. This state of affairs might well be due to the inability of standard mathematics to “speak” of indeterminism, its inability to present us a worldview in which new information is created as time passes. In such a case, scientific determinism would only be an illusion due to the timeless mathematical language scientists use. To investigate this possibility it is necessary (...) to develop an alternative mathematical language that is both powerful enough to allow scientists to compute predictions and compatible with indeterminism and the passage of time. We suggest that intuitionistic mathematics provides such a language and we illustrate it in simple terms. (shrink)

This article defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once (...) we unpack the internal relation between directed duties, moral status, and flourishing, relations can ground personhood and include nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Palliative care serves both as an integrated part of treatment and as a last effort to care for those we cannot cure. The extent to which palliative care should be provided and our reasons for doing so have been curiously overlooked in the debate about distributive justice in health and healthcare. We argue that one prominent approach, the Rawlsian approach developed by Norman Daniels, is unable to provide such reasons and such care. This is because of a central feature in (...) Daniels' account, namely that care should be provided to restore people's opportunities. Daniels' view is both unable to provide pain relief to those who need it as a supplement to treatment and, without justice-based reasons to provide palliative care to those whose opportunities cannot be restored. We conclude that this makes Daniels' framework much less attractive. (shrink)

In this article we argue that the social value of health research should be conceptualized as a function of both the expected benefits of the research and the priority that the beneficiaries deserve. People deserve greater priority the worse off they are. This conception of social value can be applied for at least two important purposes: in health research priority setting when research funders, policy-makers, or researchers decide between alternative research projects; and in evaluating the ethics of proposed research proposals (...) when research ethics committees assess whether the social value of the research is sufficient to justify the risks and burdens to research participants and others. In assessing how far a proposed research project will advance the interests of people who are more disadvantaged, research priority setters and RECs should examine the diseases that the research targets and the type of research. Just as certain diseases impose a greater burden on people who are more disadvantaged, so certain types of intervention and forms of research are more likely to benefit people who are more disadvantaged. We outline which populations are likely to be representative of the global worst off and identify what types of health research, and which disease categories, are priorities for these populations. (shrink)

A survey of the similarities and differences between BFO and DOLCE, and of the mutual interactions between Nicola Guarino and Barry Smith.

Dominant views about the nature of health and disease in bioethics and the philosophy of medicine have presumed the existence of a fixed, stable, individual organism as the bearer of health and disease states, and as such, the appropriate target of medical therapy and ethical concern. However, recent developments in microbial biology, neuroscience, the philosophy of cognitive science, and social and personality psychology (Ickes...

Even where an act appears to be responsible, and satisfies all the conditions for responsibility laid down by society, the response to it may be unjust where that appearance is false, and where those conditions are insufficient. This paper argues that those who want to place considerations of responsibility at the centre of distributive and criminal justice ought to take this concern seriously. The common strategy of relying on what Susan Hurley describes as a 'black box of responsibility' has the (...) advantage of not taking responsibility considerations to be irrelevant merely because some specific account of responsibility is mistaken. It can, furthermore, cope perfectly well with an absence of responsibility, even of the global sort implied by hard determinism and other strongly sceptical accounts. Problems for the black box view come in where responsibility is present, but in a form that is curtailed in one significant regard or another. The trick, then, is to open the box of responsibility just enough that its contents can be the basis for judgements of justice. I identify three 'moderately sceptical' forms of compatibilism that cannot ground judgements of justice, and are therefore expunged by the strongest 'grey box' view. (shrink)

Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as ``physically real" and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.

We present in this paper a novel ontological theory of events whose central tenet is the Aristotelian distinction between the object that changes and the actual subject of change, which is what we call an individual quality. While in the Kimian tradition events are individuated by a triple ⟨ o, P, t ⟩, where o is an object, P a property, and t an interval of time, for us the simplest events are qualitative changes, individuated by a triple ⟨ o, (...) q, t ⟩, where q is an individual quality inhering in o or in one of its parts. Detaching the individuation of events from the property they exemplify results in a fine-grained theory that keeps metaphysics and semantics clearly separate, and lies between the multiplicative and the unitarian approaches. We discuss then the way language refers to events, observing that, in most cases, event descriptions refer to complex, cognitively relevant clusters of co-occurring qualitative changes, which exhibit a synchronic structure depending on the way they are described. Contra Bennett, who famously argued that the semantics of event names ultimately depends on “local context and unprincipled intuitions”, we show how the lexicon provides systematic principles for individuating such clusters and classifying them into kinds. Finally, we address some open challenges in the semantics of locative and manner modifiers. (shrink)