The use of certain performance-enhancing drugs (PED) is banned in sport. I discuss critically standard justifications of the ban based on arguments from two widely used criteria: fairness and harms to health. I argue that these arguments on their own are inadequate, and only make sense within a normative understanding of athletic performance and the value of sport. In the discourse over PED, the distinction between “natural” and “artificial” performance has exerted significant impact. I examine whether the distinction makes sense (...) from a moral point of view. I propose an understanding of “natural” athletic performance by combining biological knowledge of training with an interpretation of the normative structure of sport. I conclude that this understanding can serve as moral justification of the PED ban and enable critical and analytically based line drawing between acceptable and nonacceptable performance-enhancing means in sport. (shrink)

This paper considers whether transgender women should be permitted to compete in female categories in sports. Trans* women are often criticized for competing in female categories because they are seen as having an unfair advantage. Specifically, they are seen as having high levels of testosterone that unfairly enhance their performance in comparison to cisgender competitors. In this paper, I argue that trans* women should be permitted to compete in female categories. I suggest that if we want to maintain the skill (...) thesis as a guiding principle of sports and allow trans* women to compete in female categories, then we need to take relevant genetic advantages into consideration by introducing a handicap system. I claim that a handicap system should consider both cisgender and transgender women’s effective testosterone levels. (shrink)

According to the Differences of Sex Development Regulations of the International Association of Athletics Federations, Caster Semenya and other athletes with heightened testosterone levels are considered non-eligible for middle distance running races in the women’s class. Based on an analysis of fair equality of opportunity in sport, I take a critical look at the Semenya case and at IAAF’s DSD Regulations. I distinguish between what I call stable and dynamic inequalities between athletes. Stable inequalities are those that athletes cannot impact (...) or control in any significant way such as inequalities in biological sex, body size and chronological age. Dynamic inequalities, such as inequalities in strength, speed and endurance, or in technical and tactical skills, can be impacted and to a certain extent controlled by athletes. If stable inequalities exert significant and systematic impact on performance, they provide a rationale for classification. If high testosterone level is an inborn, strong and systemic driver of performance development, inequalities in such levels can provide a rationale for classification. As is emphasised by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, this leads to a dilemma of rights: the right of Semenya to compete in sport according to her legal sex and gender identity, and the right of other athletes within the average female testosterone range to compete under fair conditions. I conclude with providing conditional support of the CAS decision in the Semenya case and of IAAF’s DSD Regulations. (shrink)

Zero-sum aspects of sport have generated a number of ethical concerns and a similar number of defenses or apologetics. The trick has been to find a middle position that neither overly gentrifies sport nor inappropriately emphasizes the significance of winning and losing. One such position would have us focus on the process of trying to win over the fact of having one. It would also ameliorate any harms associated with defeat by pointing out that benefits like achievement, excellence, and moral (...) development are available to winner and loser alike. Relying on the notion of ‘frame’ introduced by Polanyi, I argue that this approach underplays the poignant drama of sport (including the sting of defeat) and thus, seeks redemption at too high a cost. I argue for a version of red-blooded competition that is justified more by transcendence than mitigation, more by a willingness to play again tomorrow than civility during any single contest. I analyze sport in terms of its receptivity to such repetition and find that epistemological uncertainty, enhanced by the presence of chance in sport, renders repeat engagements both sensible and attractive. I conclude that sport verdicts, unlike outcomes in war, business, and love, do not settle things. Rather they invite both winner and loser alike to ‘play again tomorrow’. (shrink)

Sport occupies a significant role in modern society and has a wide following. In his Leftist Theories of Sport, Morgan examines what he considers to be a degradation of modern sport and the lack of proper critical theory to address this challenge. In the latter part of LTS, Morgan presents a reconstructed critical theory with ‘a liberal twist’ in terms of an analysis of what he sees as the internal ‘gratuitous’ logic of sport, and a call for critical deliberation in (...) sporting practice communities. I depart from Morgan’s ideas of the ‘gratuitous’ logic of sport which, I believe, has significant potential and operative force. I interpret the logic of sport as forms of self-imposed constraints at three levels: in the logic of the rules, in norms for fair play, and in a particular interpretation of sporting excellence as a form of human excellence. Using the practical case of performance-enhancing drugs, I demonstrate how this interpretation can exert operative power. I conclude by pointing to th... (shrink)

The question of whether transgender athletes should be permitted to compete in accordance with their gender identity is an evolving debate. Most competitive sports have male and female categories. One of the primary challenges with this categorization system, however, is that some transgender athletes (and especially transgender women) may be prevented from competing in accordance with their gender identity. The reason for this restriction is because of the idea that transgender women have an unfair advantage over their cisgender counterparts; this (...) is seen as a problem since sports are typically guided a principle called ‘the skill thesis’, which suggests that sports are supposed to determine who is most skillful by maintaining a fair starting point. In this paper, I argue that if the skill thesis ought to be maintained and there continues to exist no conclusive evidence in support of unfair advantages possessed by trans women, then we may want to re-consider the gender binary in sport. Rather than having male/female categories, it may make more sense to categorize athletes based other sport-specific factors (e.g., height, weight, etc.). This may help to maintain the skill thesis while at the same time removing potentially unfair and discriminatory barriers against transgender athletes. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this essay, I review Suits’ classic description of games and cite three kinds of problems—mischaracterizations, omissions, and ambiguities. I build on previous criticisms by myself and others leveled at his definition. However, in contrast to much of this previous work, I will present what I hope is an improved description. The latter part of the essay is devoted to defending this alternate characterization. I conclude by arguing that my revisionist work paradoxically both supports and undermines the merits of Suits’ (...) anti-Wittgensteinian efforts to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for games. (shrink)

When sporting agents fail through wrongful or faulty behaviour, they should feel guilty; when they fail because of a deficiency in their abilities, they should feel shame. But sometimes we fail without being deficient and without being at fault. I illustrate this with two examples of players, Moacir Barbosa and Roberto Baggio, who failed in World Cup finals and cost their teams the greatest prize in sport. Although both players failed, I suggest that neither was at fault and neither was (...) deficient. I argue that we can fail through no fault of our own because our abilities are always fallible. This fallibility means that to succeed – to achieve sporting glory – we must run the risk of failure. The appropriate emotion to feel over such failures is agent-regret. Sporting agents and observers should not take up what I call the ‘critical position’: the idea that someone who fails must be deficient or must have been at fault. This allows for a softer, but also more accurate, attitude towards our own failures and the failures of others. I end by suggesting that the fallibility of our abilities is made clear through playing or watching sport, and this can illuminate life more broadly. (shrink)

My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I am especially interested in constitutive luck. As a foundation I draw from both Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel’s classic handling of moral luck, generally. Within the philosophy of sport are similar explorations of this nexus by Robert Simon and David Carr that also factor into the present work. My intent is to put a new lens in front of a puzzle drawn (...) from Torbjörn Tännsjö’s well-known article ‘Is Our Admiration of Sports Heroes Facistoid?’ Specifically, the idea that we might admire an athlete who excels without having worked hard for it. If we may call this puzzle ‘the talent problem,’ the questions driving the present work are as follows: what is the relationship between moral luck and the talent problem, and can this relationship provide a prescription for morally assessing the talent problem? The thesis that this exploratory work suggests that more complex games (and... (shrink)

The results of sport would not interest us if either they were necessitated or they were a matter of pure chance. And if either case were true, the playing of sport would seem to make no sense either. This poses a dilemma. But there is something between these two options, namely the dispositional modality. Sporting prowess can be understood as a disposition towards victory and sporting liabilities a disposition towards defeat. The sporting contest then pits these net prowesses against each (...) other. The stronger will tend to beat the weaker but no more than tend. This makes sense of the sporting contest in which the weaker knows they still can win. The stronger team can lose though they do not tend to do so. The dilemma is thus escaped. (shrink)

This paper explores three phenomena in sport that are connected to narratives of hope: underdogs, upsets, and overachievers. Each of these phenomena is complex. I seek not only to understand the intrinsic nature of these phenomena, but also to explain why they captivate the imagination. After exploring some partial explanations of their enduring appeal, I focus on how the drama associated with underdogs, upsets, and overachievers in sport illuminates the human condition and awakens our sense of possibility when the odds (...) are against us. (shrink)

Debates about the role of technology in sports officiating assume that technology would, _ceteris paribus_, improve accuracy over unassisted human officiating. While this is largely true, it also presents a false dilemma: that we can have accurately officiated sports or human officials, but not both. What this alleged dilemma ignores is that the criteria by which we measure accuracy are also up for revision. We _could_ have sports that are so defined as to be easily judged by human officials. A (...) case from the recent history of science provides an instructive example. I argue that _if_ we insist on human officials, we can still aim for maximal accuracy, though there will be tradeoffs. With compelling reasons to want accuracy in officiating, however, these tradeoffs effectively serve as a _reductio_ against the use of human officials unaided by technology. (shrink)

There is a growing consensus in both academic and popular reflections on sport that if the accuracy of officiating can be improved by technology, then such assistance ought to be introduced. Indeed, apart from certain practical concerns about technologizing officiating there are few normative objections, and those that are voiced are often poorly articulated and quickly dismissed by critics. In this paper, we take up one of these objections – what is referred to as the loss of the human element (...) in sport – and try to provide a firmer foundation for the disquiet that some feel at the threat of its loss. Briefly, it is argued that the cost of trying to eliminate all error in officiating through technological means is an understanding of sport as a practice through which human beings can reconcile themselves with the fallibilities and contingencies of life, in a forum where such losses can safely be experienced. After considering both practical and normative counter-arguments against the implementatio... (shrink)

Mistaken judgments of fact by sporting officials – blown calls – are ubiquitous in sport and have altered the outcomes of games, championships, and even the record books. I argue that the effect these blown calls have on sports is deplorable, even unjust, and that given both the nature of sport in general and the social and economic importance of sports as they are played today, we ought to use technology to aid officials in making their judgments whenever doing so (...) would prove more effective than relying on unaided human perception. I then briefly address a number of objections to the increased use of technology in officiating. (shrink)

While talking about sports (and games) we use such expressions as ?random victory?, ?winning by accident?, ?skill against luck?, ?chance (fortune) favours the better player?, etc. Unfortunately, chance-related notions that occur in these expressions are not well defined?their meaning is vague and it is not clear whether they refer to one or many different phenomena. Because such phenomena play an important role in sport, from the viewpoint of the philosophy of sport it is necessary to give a systematic account of (...) this topic. Although the works of De Wachter, Simon, Dixon, Breivik and Loland contain many important insights, there is still a room for further research in this field. The author tries to establish a typology of phenomena that could generally be called ?chance-phenomena?, which however, should be precisely distinguished. As such the primary task is to present an analysis of several different kinds of chance in sports. In constructing this typology the author uses both the distinction between different kinds of games (performative vs. kinetic) as well as analysis of structure of a game (four constitutive elements: players, constitutive rules, material substrate of the game and the world of the game). The most important method used is phenomenological analysis, especially Ingarden-style analysis. These kinds of ?chance-phenomena? are: aleatoriness, chaos, irregularity, imprecision and arbitrariness. The paradigm cases of each kind of chance are discussed. The genesis and functions of the respective phenomena in sports and games are also shown, as well as their position in the structure of the game. Such analytic work should precede any solutions of the chance vs. skill problem, or other problems concerning chance in sport. As a test of usefulness of the provided distinctions, the author considers the veracity of the judgements expressed in such sentences as ?Fortune favours the better player? (shrink)

In this paper I defend an Irreconcilability Thesis, claiming that two commonly held views about athletic contests are in fact incompatible. The first view is that athletic contests are essentially...

ABSTRACT Meritocracy, in which success depends on ability and effort, is a desirable goal for sport, even if sport does not achieve this goal perfectly. However, even in a meritocracy whether athletes deserve praise is questionable, given that a determinant of success, genetic endowments, is beyond their control. From a hard determinist perspective, even the elements of athletes’ actions that appear to be within their control—their diligence in developing their skill and strategy and their good sportsmanship—are themselves a function of (...) other environmental and genetic factors for which they deserve no credit. However, a more plausible approach is the compatibilist view that enables us to combine moral evaluation of athletes’ actions with recognizing the causal influences on human behavior. In contrast with manipulation, which really does negate control over our actions, causation that operates via our rational agency is benign and perfectly consistent with our deserving praise for our achievements. (shrink)

This paper considers the concept of a good game in terms of its relation to the fair testing of relevant skills and their aesthetic values. As such, it will consider what makes football ‘the beautiful game’ and what part penalty shoot-outs play, or should play, within it. It begins by outlining and refuting Kretchmar’s proposal that games which end following the elapsing of a set amount of time, such as football, are structurally, morally and aesthetically inferior to games which end (...) following the attainment of a designated goal. Instead, it is suggested that the structural deficits of t-games are compensated by the fact that they allow for a fuller test of more valuable open skills than the closed skills that tend to define e-games, such as golf. Moreover, it is the rationing of time in t-games that provides an added aesthetic value that does not occur in e-games. Finally, it is concluded that although it may appear that the existence of the penalty shoot-out supports Kretchmar’s argu.. (shrink)

Two distinct forms of fairness in sport are regularly conflated, which produces confusion in important debates concerning the participation of transgender women in female sporting contests. The distinct forms of fairness arise in two distinct forms of sporting contest: the handicap contest and the championship contest. Handicap contests seek to ‘level the playing field’ by ensuring that all participants have an equal or ‘sporting’, chance of winning. Championship contests seek to find the person or team that is best at a (...) particular event – to find a champion. Each form of contest makes use of female categories, although for different reason. Arguments for and against the use of handicapping to ensure fairness in championship contests such as the Olympics conflate these forms of contest and their distinct accounts of fairness. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the inherent purpose of sports competitions. In ‘On Winning and Athletic Superiority’, Nicholas Dixon states that the central comparative purpose of an athletic contest is to determine which team or player is superior, or, synonymously, to provide an accurate measure of athletic superiority. Dixon identifies athletic skill as the standard of athletic superiority in competitive sport. However, I argue there are three separate standards of athletic superiority: the demonstration of (...) athletic skill, the achievement of prelusory goal using lusory means, and achievement of superior formal result. This stance responds to Dixon’s argument that failed athletic contests are contests that have not fulfilled the central purpose of competitive sport, because they have been undermined by refereeing errors, cheating, gamesmanship or bad luck. I argue that a failed athletic contest occurs when any of the three standards of athletic superiority conflict. (shrink)

Competitive quiz shows, and Jeopardy! in particular, occupy a unique place among TV game shows. The most successful Jeopardy! contestants—Ken Jennings, Brad Rutter, Frank Sparenberg, and so on—have appeared on late night talk shows, been given book contracts, and been interviewed by major newspapers. This sort of treatment is substantially different than, say, the treatment that the winners of The Price is Right or Deal or No Deal are afforded. The distinctive status of quiz shows is evidenced in other ways (...) as well; for instance, consider the widespread public outrage that accompanied the discovery of fixed quiz shows in the 1950s of the fact that, when IBM wanted to find a task to test the latest developments of artificial intelligence, they chose the game of Jeopardy. In this essay, I’ll take a look at Jeopardy! as an exemplar of a certain sort of game, and will suggest that part of what gives Jeopardy! its distinctive status is that it is a qualitatively good game—that is, it is a game that that fulfills just those functions a game is supposed to fulfill. I’ll begin by showing how Jeopardy! meets Bernard Suits’ (1967, 1988, 2005) definition of games, according to which games are characterized as activities that have certain sorts of rules and in which participants are required to have the right attitude toward these rules. Among other things, I’ll talk about the role played by some of Jeopardy’s distinctive rules (“remember to phrase your answer in the form of a question”) and about the possible differences a monetary reward makes to game players’ attitudes. I’ll then go on to talk about what distinguishes Jeopardy! from other, superficially similar sorts of games. I’ll concentrate on three factors in particular: (1) the fact that the skills required by Jeopardy! have value outside of the game, (2) the fact that observers in Jeopardy! can “play along” with the contestants on TV, and (3) the fact that success in the game is determined, to a very great extent, by the skills of the participant and not by other facts (such as luck). To close, I’ll talk more generally about the distinction between good games and not-so-good games, and will discuss why it is that good games are worth taking seriously. In this section, I’ll discuss some recent work on the value of games and sports, and will make some suggestions about how these accounts might be tailored to account for the specific virtues of a game like Jeopardy. (shrink)

This article discusses how technological official aids influence sporting competitions in terms of fairness and flow. It addresses the main arguments against technological official aids used to assist refereeing in binary referee situations. First, I argue that the criticism directed at the use of ball tracking devices (‘reconstructed track devices’) is mainly unjustified and that these devices provide the opportunity to make refereeing in certain types of sport fairer. In this regard, I also argue that empirical findings about referees’ decision-making (...) and potential biases must be considered when deciding how technological official aids influence the fairness of sporting competitions. Then I attempt to refute the argument that no situations are more decisive than others in sports with no fixed breaks, such as football. Finally, I scrutinise the argument that human fallibility in refereeing is somehow valuable in itself. Consequently, this article concludes that there are no convincing arguments against the use of technological official aids in binary referee situations. (shrink)

Part of the draw of athletics is its straightforwardness. There are nuances to competitions to make them more sporting contests, but at the end of a long jump competition whomever records the longest jump should win. Unfortunately, a recent rule-change at the highest level of the sport – the “Final 3” format – undermined this simplicity for the horizontal jumps and the throws for some of the 2020 and much of the 2021 seasons. While fortunately this rule was largely reverted (...) within days of the initial submission of this paper, it’s still valuable to critically evaluate why such a rule is problematic so as to better understand of the value of sporting competitions and give guidance on future rule changes, be they in athletics or other sports. To that end, we will be drawing from the literature on the purpose and value of competitions and coupling that with simulations based on data from actual top-tier long jump competitions to show that the Final 3 format makes for significantly worse competitions than the standard format. (shrink)

In this paper I sketch a possible answer to the question of what professional athletes deserve for their sporting activities. I take two different backgrounds into account. First, the content and meaning of desert is highly debated within political philosophy and many theorists are sceptical if it has any value for social justice. On the other hand sport is often understood as a meritocracy, in which all prizes or wins should be solely awarded based on merit. I will distinguish three (...) possible goods that can be deserved for doing professional sport – money, social status and appreciation – and show that athletes deserve them according to their achievements and that this justifies certain inequalities in their distribution. These legitimate disparities have nevertheless been embedded within a broader framework of social justice, which limits them based on a strong understanding of social equality. (shrink)

This paper argues that a proper evaluation of the notion of efficiency in business ethics requires that we separate efficiency qua human good from the originally value-neutral sense of the term. The adverse consequences of hyper-efficiency consist in paradoxically causing greater inefficiencies (‘perversity’) as well as a negative impact on the human capacities to pursue various forms of excellence (‘jeopardy’). In contrast to its negative consequences, the precious good of efficiency can be formulated in terms of Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential practice-institution (...) framework. The paper proposes that efficiency be defined in terms of the kind of success towards which it aims; while it never quite reaches the status of an internal good, efficiency fluctuates between being an external good proper and what we call a paradoxical good, with attributes of both internal and external goods. The archetype of a paradoxical good is the good of success qua victory in the domain of sports, which shares attributes of internal goods (since it is defined as a necessary and desirable goal by the practice itself) and external goods (since victory for one implies the defeat of another, a zero-sum logic). The paper fleshes out the consequences of this paradox in MacIntyre’s framework by proposing a three-stage model of success and efficiency for various practices. (shrink)

Jennings and Braun’s (2024) article “Beyond Suppressing Testosterone: A Categorical System to Achieve a ‘Level Playing Field’ in Sport” is a valuable contribution to the academic debate over the DS...

Leistungssportlerinnen, die in populären Sportarten erfolgreich sind, kommen in den Genuss hoher Einkommen und großen sozialen Ansehens. Gleichzeitig ist ihr Erfolg von Voraussetzungen abhängig, die zu einem signifikanten Teil von ihrem Genotyp bestimmt werden. Diesen Sportlern werden also durch gesellschaftliche Prozesse substantielle Vorteile aufgrund von Eigenschaften zuteil, auf deren Vorhandensein sie keinen Einfluss haben. Wir untersuchen, wie wir vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen mit diesem Phänomen umgehen sollten. Wir argumentieren, dass die konsistente Berücksichtigung von Intuitionen zur gerechten Güterverteilung an Wettkämpferinnen (...) eine deutliche Ausweitung des Einsatzes von Wettkampfklassen erfordert. Die bestehenden Ungleichverteilungen lassen sich nicht allein mit Verweis auf ein Recht auf Selbsteigentum rechtfertigen. Sie verursachen auch keine Verbesserungen der Lage von besonders schlecht gestellten Individuen im Wirkungsbereich des Leistungssports, auf die zugunsten ihres Weiterbestehens verwiesen werden könnte. Trotz des erheblichen Aufwandes und der deutlichen Veränderungen im Charakter des Leistungssports, die mit der vorgeschlagenen Differenzierung von Wettkampfklassen einhergingen, ist diese Maßnahme geboten. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we provide a normative analysis of the Women’s Tennis Association revised policy on maternity leave, which is regulated by its special ranking rule. To do so, we first explore how the revised policy functions when probed in relation to the nature of competitive sport. Then, we examine the revised policy through the lens of the literature on maternity discrimination. We argue that, when compared to its previous formulation, the revised special ranking rule is morally defensible because it (...) better protects female players’ interest in being able to combine their professional careers and their personal lives. However, we also identify several pronounced vulnerabilities and criticisms to the revised policy. (shrink)