Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by (...) wholly physical properties, e.g., geometrical structures of molecular aggregates (cells). In response, we argue that contrary to his expectations one cannot infer reductionist assumptions even from detailed biological explanations that invoke the molecular level, as interlevel causal reciprocity is essential to these explanations. Recent very detailed explanations that concern the structure and function of chromatin—the intricacies of supposedly basic molecular level—demonstrate this. They show that what seem to be basic physical parameters extend into a more general biological context, thus rendering elusive the concepts of the basic level and causal hierarchy postulated by the reductionists. In fact, relevant phenomena are defined across levels by entangled, extended parameters. Nor can the biological context be explained away by basic physical parameters defining molecular level shaped by evolution as a physical process. Reductionists claim otherwise only because they overlook the evolutionary significance of initial conditions best defined in terms of extended biological parameters. Perhaps the reductionist assumptions (as well as assumptions that postulate any particular levels as causally fundamental) cannot be inferred from biological explanations because biology aims at manipulating organisms rather than producing explanations that meet the coherence requirements of general ontological models. Or possibly the assumptions of an ontology not based on the concept of causal powers stratified across levels can be inferred from biological explanations. The incoherence of downward causation is inevitable, given reductionist assumptions, but an ontological alternative might avoid this. We outline desiderata for the treatment of levels and properties that realize interlevel causation in such an ontology. (shrink)

The essay examines the idea of ―biological space and time‖ found in Evan Thompson‘s Mind in Life and Gilles Deleuze‘s Difference and Repetition. Tracking down this ―new Transcendental Aesthetic‖ intersects new work done on panpsychism. Both Deleuze and Thompson can be fairly said to be biological panpsychists. That‘s what ―Mind in Life‖ means: mind and life are coextensive; life is a sufficient condition for mind. Deleuze is not just a biological panpsychist, however, so we‘ll have to confront full-fledged panpsychism. At (...) the end of the essay we‘ll be able to pose the question whether or not we can supplement Thompson‘s ―Mind in Life‖ position with a ―Mind in Process‖ position and if so, what that supplement means both for his work and for panpsychism. (shrink)

In this article I will suggest ways in which adding the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to the mix can complement and extend the 4EA approach to cognitive science. In the first part of the paper, I will show how the Deleuzean tripartite ontological difference (virtual/intensive/actual) can provide an explicit ontology for dynamical systems theory. The second part will take these ontological notions and apply them to three areas of concern to the 4EA approaches: (a) the Deleuzean concept of the virtual (...) will clarify the ontological status of perceptual capacity as sensorimotor skill; (b) the Deleuzean concept of “intensive individuation” will clarify the ontological status of the genesis of perceptually guided behavior; (c) the Deleuzean critique of confusing the actual and the virtual will enable us to intervene in the realism/idealism debate. These aspects will not be addressed sequentially but will be interwoven into an unfolding argument. (shrink)

As a significant extension of our previous calculus of logical differentials and moving logic, we propose here a mathematical diagram for specifying the emergence of novelty, through the construction of some “differentials” related to cohomological computations. Later we intend to examine how to use these “differentials” in the analysis of anticipation or evolution schemes. This proposal is given as a consequence of our comments on the Ehresmann–Vanbremeersch’s work on memory evolutive systems, from the two points of view which are characterization (...) of life and use of categorical modeling. It would not be possible to conceive of the “differentials” outside the frame of a MES. Furthermore, we hope that this diagram will be useful to exhibit the “emergence of sense” in discourses, and this idea is supported here by a brief examination of how a discourse could be seen as a living system. (shrink)

A promising recent approach for understanding complex phenomena is recognition of anticipatory behavior of living organisms and social organizations. The anticipatory, predictive action permits learning, novelty seeking, rich experiential existence. I argue that the established frameworks of anticipation, adaptation or learning imply overly passive roles of anticipatory agents, and that a fictionalist standpoint reflects the core of anticipatory behavior better than representational or future references. Cognizing beings enact not just their models of the world, but own make-believe existential agendas as (...) well. Anticipators embody plausible scripts of living, and effectively assume neo-Kantian or pragmatist perspectives of cognition and action. It is instructive to see that anticipatory behavior is not without mundane or loathsome deficiencies. Appreciation of ferally fictionalist anticipation suggests an equivalence of semiosis and anticipation. (shrink)

This presentation discusses a notion encountered across disciplines, and in different facets of human activity: autonomous activity. We engage it in an interdisciplinary way. We start by considering the reactions and behaviors of biological entities to biotechnological intervention. An attempt is made to characterize the degree of freedom of embryos & clones, which show openness to different outcomes when the epigenetic developmental landscape is factored in. We then consider the claim made in programming and artificial intelligence that automata could show (...) self-directed behavior as to the determination of their step-wise decisions on courses of action. This question remains largely open and calls for some important qualifications. We try to make sense of the presence of claims of freedom in agency, first in common sense, then by ascribing developmental plasticity in biology and biotechnology, and in the mapping of programmed systems in the presence of environmental cues and self-referenced circuits as well as environmental coupling. This is the occasion to recall attempts at working out a logical and methodological approach to the openness of concepts that are still to be found, and assess whether they can operate the structuring intelligibility of a yet undeveloped or underdeveloped field of study, where a “bisociation" and a unification of knowledge might be possible. (shrink)

Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...) IT is a deeply iconic-dependent process. We exemplify our approach by means of literature to dance IT and we explore some implications for the development of a general model of IT. (shrink)

In Deleuze, singularity replaces generality in the economy of thought. A Deleuzian singularity is an event, but the notion comprises the effectuation of the event into form. The triptych émission–distribution–répartition itself distributes the dimensions of the passage from form-giving event to topological morphology. The Deleuzian concept of intensity allows thinking both pre-individuality and the rhizomatic connection of singularities on the metaphysical surface of structure. Reflections upon the philosophy of differential calculus allow for a coherent scaffolding reaching from pre-individual intensity to (...) specific individuality, in the passage from transcendental genesis to empirical morphogenesis. But if singularity as event is intensive, singularity as determinant of morphology – and hence, of structural metastability – is not. Although the differential scaffolding covers both intensive difference and extensive equality, and so the two sides of the notion of singularity, the concept of intensity remains slightly displaced, rendering conceptually difficult not only the perception of intensity, but also the contemplation of individual duration, if viewed in the terms of genetic ‘indi-drama-different/ciation’. The essay concludes that it is art that may let us consciously contemplate our pre-individual differences. (shrink)

Animal camouflage is said to be a mode of being negative, implying a setback visibility. On the contrary, we try here to restore all its aesthetic positivity considering the singularity of extremely varied forms it produces. It soon becomes apparent that the camouflage forces us to question the privilege of individuality and traditional drawdown on singularity. The disruptive camouflage, especially, that crushes the individual formal unity provides the argument in favor of an individuation with the environment, and more with the (...) world: the animal camoufleur disappears under only an individual visibility; it appears on the contrary in all its pre-individual splendor when it involves with environment components to make them the most expressive. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as críticas de Martin Heidegger e de Gilbert Simondon à concepção corrente da técnica, referida por Heidegger como a “concepção instrumental e antropológica da técnica”. Trata-se de mostrar que as críticas desses pensadores, por mais diferentes que possam ser seus universos conceituais, seus objetivos e seus métodos, são ambas realizadas a partir de um processo de interpretação desconstrutiva dos conceitos de “instrumentalidade”, “alienação” e “hilemorfismo”, num conjunto crítico que a cada vez relaciona diretamente (...) crítica da técnica à crítica da filosofia. Nesse sentido, as análises são apresentadas a partir dos respectivos horizontes de reflexão filosófica de cada autor: no caso de Heidegger, o projeto de elaboração da ontologia fundamental e, posteriormente, o pensamento da história do ser e, no caso de Simondon, a questão da individuação. (shrink)

This paper proposes Gilbert Simondon’s ontogenetic theory of individuation as an overarching framework for multilevel semiosis. What renders this theory suitable for this role is the fact that it shares a significant part of its heritage with biosemiotics, which provides compatibility between them. Unlike many philosophers who have worked on individuation, Simondon envisages a general process of individuation that starts with a metastable preindividual. This process ultimately constitutes an axiomatisation of ontogenesis and manifests itself in three basic modes: physical, vital (...) and psycho-collective. In any of these modes a transductive operation is at work resolving the disparities of the preindividual whereby new structures emerge. Depending on the mode of individuation, the emerging structures can create new disparities that ask for further individuation. Simondon refers to such conversion of structure to operation and vice versa as allagmatics. He also extends his theory to scientific methodology establishing a healthy balance between reductionism and holism. His theory can be used to amend Peircean metaphysics to improve its compatibility with contemporary scientific discourse. (shrink)

This paper introduces Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming in a system theoretic framework and proposes an alternative ontological foundation to the study of systems and complex systems in particular. A brief critique of systems theory and the difficulties apparent in it is proposed as an introduction to the discussion. Following is an overview aimed at providing access to the ‘big picture’ of Deleuze’s revolutionary philosophical system with emphasis on a system theoretic approach and terminology. The major concepts of Deleuze’s ontology—difference, virtuality, (...) multiplicity, assemblages, quasi-causation, becoming, intensity and progressive determination are introduced and discussed. Deleuze’s work is a radical departure from the dogma of western philosophy that guides the foundations of science and systems theory. It replaces identity with difference and being with becoming; in other words, it provides systems theory with an ontological ground based on change, heterogeneity and the inexhaustible novelty-producing process that underlies all phenomena. The conceptual tools made available by this philosophy seem to capture the fundamental aspects of complexity and complex systems much better than the current conceptual system that is based on static transcendent ontological entities. (shrink)

"This book does nothing less than to set new standards in combining philosophical with political theology.

L'épuisement de la querelle du réalisme en physique, qui est la conséquence épistémologique de la divergence inexplicable entre mécanique quantique et physique relativiste, manifeste la nécessité d'un dépassement de l'opposition traditionnelle entre réalisme et antiréalisme. La Théorie de la Relativité d'Échelle de Laurent Nottale, dans la mesure où elle vise à réunifier microphysique et macrophysique grâce aux concepts d'espace-temps fractal et de dépendance d'échelle, opère le dépassement de cette opposition en postulant la valeur d'être des relations physiques. L'exigence d'un réalisme (...) des relations en physique confirme ainsi les intuitions de la philosophie de l'individuation de Gilbert Simondon, qui jugeait nécessaire d'accorder à la relation une valeur ontologique pour fonder la «synthèse grandiose de la relativité et des quanta ». (shrink)

A life form and its environment constitute an essential unit, a microcosm. This microcosm is sustained by a privileged dialectic relationship in which the embedded agent- an entity endowed with a particular physical architecture- and its specific environment, coupled, mutually influence each other. Identical principles rule both the basic forms of semiotic organisation and the upper forms. When we distinguish these two levels of semiotic structuring we are distinguishing the semiotic relations that involve a stimulus-response relationship, which is dyadic in (...) nature, from those that involve a more complex relationship where the capacity of symbolically encoding allows organisms to go beyond the immediacy of sensory awareness. However in all instances of semiotic structuring, there is the presence of a living system that evolves in an environment individuating and assigning a value to typical environmental features. Acknowledging this fact is crucial: the inquiry into how elemental life forms interact with their environments leads to the identification of the fundamental role played by the physical architecture of the agent and sheds light on the semiotic process that is common to all life forms, ultimately highlighting the very nature of meaning and reality. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of objectivism vs constructivism in two areas,biology and cognitive science, which areintermediate between the natural sciences suchas physics (where objectivism is dominant) andthe human and social sciences (whereconstructivism is widespread). The issues inbiology and in cognitive science are intimatelyrelated; in each of these twin areas, the objectivism vs constructivism issue isinterestingly and rather evenly balanced; as aresult, this issue engenders two contrastingparadigms, each of which has substantialspecific scientific content. The neo-Darwinianparadigm in biology is closely resonant (...) withthe classical cognitivist paradigm in cognitivescience, and both of them are intrinsicallyobjectivist. The organismic paradigm inbiology, based on the concept of autopoiesis,is consonant with the paradigm of enaction incognitive science; the latter paradigms are bothprofoundly constructivist.In cognitive science, the objectivism vsconstructivism issue is internal to thescientific field itself and reflexivity isinescapable. At this level, strong ontologicalobjectivism is self-contradictory and thereforeuntenable. Radical constructivism isself-coherent; but it also rehabilitatesa weak form of objectivism as a pragmaticallyviable alternative. In conclusion, there is aneven-handed reciprocity between objectivistand constructivist perspectives. Finally, thearticle examines the consequences of thisconclusion for fields other than cognitivescience: biology; physics and the naturalsciences; and the human and social sciences. (shrink)

Summary Based on Clausius’ phrasing of a “transformational content” and the resulting 2nd law of thermodynamics, I demonstrated that Gilbert Simondon’s On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects is historically situated at the threshold of understanding open systems thermodynamics and the related concepts of balance. Furthermore, I showed that Gestalt theory, as represented by Wolfgang Köhler, at least reproduced, if not partially anticipated or even prepared this development of 20th century thinking. Finally, I gave some short examples of how (...) Simondon applied the figure/ground distinction to human perception, memory, and a general theory of becoming and I introduced his proposal to analyse “the grounds” just as thoroughly as the laws of figuration. (shrink)

Over and above differences in terminology and cultural background, we try to show that the quantum physicist, David Bohm, and poststructuralist philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, shared a common aim in thought: to replace the classical image of reality, which is still dominant in our time, with a metaphysics finally in agreement with the concepts and results of relativity, quantum mechanics andcontemporary biology. For these two thinkers, the world of things that are well individuated in space and time, and ordered according to (...) mechanical relations of cause and effect, are nothing but the momentary expression of an “undivided wholeness in flowing movement” that constitutes its true ontological ground. By means of this new metaphysics, the world of daily experience and classical science appears as the explicit manifestation or development of implicate order that undivided wholeness contains virtually in itself at deeper and deeper levels of envelopment and imbrication. The explicit world is the result of a process of repetition, deceleration and temporal stabilization, triggered by the interaction of our measuring instruments – technical devices, sensory organs and motors, a priori forms and categories of the understanding – with moving wholeness, the thinking and observing subject of which represents a momentary and partial reflection rather than a solitaryand autonomous fragment. By criticizing the classical image of thecorrespondence/adequation of being and thought, Bohm and Deleuzeshow that the thought seeking to grasp this wholeness in flowingmovement inevitably interacts with it – by modifying, recreating andaccomplishing it in one direction rather than another. Thought thusresembles a dance that tries to harmonize with the universal flux thatgenerates and carries it away in a single movement with matter. **************************************************************************************************** ***********************Para além das diferenças de terminologia e de background cultural, tenta-se aqui mostrar que o físico quântico David Bohm e o filósofo pós-estruturalista Gilles Deleuze tiverem um objetivo comum de pensamento: substituir a imagem clássica da realidade, ainda dominante em nossa época, por uma metafísica finalmente de acordo com os conceitos e resultados da relatividade, da mecânica quântica e da biologia contemporânea. Para estes dois pensadores, o mundo das coisas bem individuadas no espaço e no tempo, e ordenadas conforme as relações mecânicas de causa e efeito, não é nada outro que a expressão momentânea de uma “Totalidade indivisa em devir” que constitui seu verdadeiro fundamento ontológico. Pelo meio desta nova metafisica, o mundo da experiência cotidiana e da ciência clássica aparece como a manifestação explicita ou desenvolvida da ordem implícita que a totalidade indivisa contém virtualmente nela mesma em níveis de envolvimento e de imbricação sempre mais profundos. O mundo explícito é o resultado de um processo de repetição, desaceleração e estabilização temporal, desencadeado pela interação de nossos instrumentos de medição -- aparelhos técnicos, órgãos sensoriais e motores, formas “a priori” e categorias do entendimento – com uma totalidade movente no qual o sujeito pensante e observante representa um reflexo momentâneo e parcial ao invés de um fragmento solitário e autônomo. Ao criticar a imagem clássica da correspondência/adequação entre o ser e o pensamento, Bohm e Deleuze mostram finalmente que o pensamento que intenta capturar esta Totalidade em devir interage inevitavelmente com ela, modificando-a, recriando-a e realizando-a em uma direção ao invés de outra. O pensamento se aparenta assim a uma dança que tenta se harmonizar com o flux universal que o gera e o leva em um movimento só com a matéria.Palavras-chave: Bohm; Deleuze; totalidade indivisa em devir; física quântica; pós-estruturalismo; ontologia. (shrink)

In this paper I try to bring together two contexts in which the term “gene” is used. Perhaps this is overly hasty. But I’m trying to bring a term from an evolutionary context (“unexpressed genetic variation”) together with one from a developmental context (“constructed functional gene”).

Este artigo foi composto a partir da comunicação apresentada no Ciclo de conferências "Humanos e animais: os limites da humanidade", promovido pelo IEA/USP. Já bastante modificado desde então, o texto incorpora ainda comentários de interlocutores de diferentes áreas ou perspectivas de conhecimento, de modo a explicitar tanto as dificuldades quanto o caráter promissor de tais esforços interdisciplinares. No mesmo passo, as reflexões do artigo emergem do exame de uma bibliografia heterogênea, mas que, conforme o tratamento aqui despendido, converge para a (...) urgência contemporânea de se conceber e praticar um outro pacto entre os humanos modernos e os animais, sem o qual o próprio humanismo ver-se-á ameaçado. Para outro humanismo, outra natureza insiste em pedir passagem. This article was composed from a communication presented in the cycle of conferences "Humans and animals: the limits of humanity", promoted by IEA/USP. Amply modified since then, the text incorporates commentaries of interlocutors from different areas or perspectives of knowledge, so as making explicit both the difficulties and the promising character of such interdisciplinary efforts. In the same time, the reflections of the article emerge from the use of a heterogeneous bibliography, but that, in conformity with the treatment here used, converges to the contemporary urgency of conceiving and practicing another pact between modern humans and the animals. Without this pact humanism itself will be menaced. For other humanism, another nature insists in asking its place. (shrink)

In this paper I try to bring together two contexts in which the term “gene” is used. Perhaps this is overly hasty. But I‟m trying to bring a term from an evolutionary context (“unexpressed genetic variation”) together with one from a developmental context (“constructed functional gene”).

The paper asks how certain zones of technical practice or technologies come to matter as "the Technological", a way of construing political change in terms of technical innovation and invention. The social construction of technology (SCOT) established that things mediate social relations, and that social practices are constantly needed to maintain the workability of technologies. It also linked the production, representation and use of contemporary technologies to scientific knowledge. However, it did all this at a certain cost. To understand something (...) as socially constructed implies that it can be positioned on a pre-given social grid. Making this understanding stick risks affronting others with the claim that their position is not singular, only ordinary. It also runs the risk of not having purchase on those aspects of technological relationality that overflow the framing context of the social (Callon et al. 2002). Building on the ground prepared by SCOT and relying on the work of (Stengers 2000) and (Simondon 1964, 1989), the paper discusses how technologies could be understood as relational events within the contemporary political space. Developing an account of technologies centred on relationality, this paper outlines an epistemology and ontology of the anomalies of technological events, and suggests how excess could explain the Technological. (shrink)

Uno de los problemas centrales que el filósofo francés Bernard Stiegler ha abordado para sostener una constitución tecno- lógica de la humanidad, es la cuestión del origen del hombre. El asunto recae en preguntarse si es posible pensar quién es el hombre desde esta tesis, sin volver a la metafísica o la filosofía trascendental. Esta posición ha de estar enraizada en una ontología que aprehenda el componente causal a nivel relacional, dejando de lado las explicaciones en las cuales la causa (...) es substancialista. Para dar desarrollo a esta propuesta, este artículo se compone de dos partes generales: la primera está destinada a presentar hasta dónde sigue y en dónde se separa Stiegler de la concepción zoo-antropológica de André Leroi-Gourhan sobre el origen del hombre; para luego explicar las bases epistemológicas y ontológicas sobre las que Stiegler erige sus tesis tecno-ontológica de la humanidad; a saber: los fundamentos de la transducción simondoniana y la diferancia derridiana. (shrink)

Upon first reading, the beginning of Chapter 2 of Difference and Repetition, with its talk of ―contemplative souls‖ and ―larval subjects,‖ seems something of a bizarre biological panpsychism. Actually it does defend a sort of biological panpsychism, but by defining the kind of psyche Deleuze is talking about, I‘ll show here how we can remove the bizarreness from that concept. First, I will sketch Deleuze‘s treatment of ―larval subjects,‖ then show how Deleuze‘s discourse can be articulated with Evan Thompson‘s biologically (...) based intervention into cognitive science, the ―mind in life‖ or ―enaction‖ position. Then I will then show how each in turn fits with contemporary biological work on E. coli chemotaxis (movement in response to changes in environment). (shrink)

This article questions Balibar’s claim that Simondon’s concept of the transindividual does not fulfil all the requirements for a materialist ‘philosophical anthropology’. In fact, we demonstrate that Simondon’s philosophy of individuation, and notably his concept of the transindividual, can be, as it were, included in a genealogy of aleatory materialism. Simondon’s philosophy of individuation is indeed a philosophy of the transindividual insofar as it involves the constant revision of the different historical forms taken by social relations in the coevolution of (...) human beings and their techno-social and natural milieu. Simondon’s way of conceiving anthropogenesis as an open and ‘metastable’ field in which individuals and processes relate to each other maintaining their own knowledge in motion, marks, in our view, a materialist style of thinking. Against this background we analyse Simondon’s overcoming of the dichotomy between the individual and society through a ‘double rejection’, we sketch his theory of a ‘double source’ for social relations, and we explain in what sense, from his perspective, the transindividual ‘can be said in many ways’. (shrink)

This paper examines three exemplary theories of living organization with respect to their common feature of defining life in terms of metabolic closure: autopoiesis, (M, R) systems, and chemoton theory. Metabolic closure is broadly understood to denote the property of organized chemical systems that each component necessary for the maintenance of the system is produced from within the system itself, except for an input of energy. It is argued that two of the theories considered—autopoiesis and (M, R) systems—participate in a (...) hylomorphist pattern of thinking which separates the “form” of the living system from its “matter.” The analysis and critique of hylomorphism found in the work of the philosopher Gilbert Simondon is then applied to these two theories, and on the basis of this critique it is argued that the chemoton model offers a superior theory of minimal life which overcomes many of the problems associated with the other two. Throughout, the relationship between hylomorphism and the understanding of living things as machines is explored. The paper concludes by considering how hylomorphism as a background ontology for theories of life fundamentally influences the way life is defined. (shrink)

Bernard Stiegler is known as a leading philosopher of technics. He has developed an original interpretation of technics as an externalized epiphylogenetic memory that remembers in the p...

Au delà des différences de terminologie et de background culturel, on essaye ici de montrer que le physicien quantique David Bohm et le philosophe poststructuraliste Gilles Deleuze ont visé un but de pensée commun: remplacer l’image classique de la réalité, encore dominante à notre époque, par une métaphysique finalement en accord avec les concepts et les résultats de la relativité, de la mécanique quantique et de la biologie contemporaine. Pour ces deux penseurs, le monde des choses bien individuées dans l’espace (...) et le temps, et ordonnées selon des relations mécaniques de cause et d’effet, n’est rien d’autre que l’expression momentanée d’une “Totalité indivise en devenir” qui en constitue le véritable fondement ontologique. Par le moyen de cette nouvelle métaphysique, le monde de l’expérience quotidienne et de la science classique apparaît comme la manifestation explicite ou développée de l’ordre implicite que la totalité indivise contient virtuellement en elle à des niveaux d’enveloppement et d’imbrication toujours plus profonds. Le monde explicite est le résultat d’un processus de répétition, ralentissement et stabilisation temporelle, déclenché par l’interaction de nos instruments de mesure – appareils techniques, organes sensoriels et moteurs, formes a priori et catégories de l’entendement – avec une totalité mouvante dont le sujet pensant et observant représente un reflet momentané et partial plutôt qu’un fragment solitaire et autonome. En critiquant l’image classique de la correspondance/adéquation entre l’être et la pensée, Bohm et Deleuze montrent enfin que la pensée qui veut saisir cette Totalité en devenir interagit inévitablement avec elle, en la modifiant, en la recréant, en l’accomplissant dans une direction plutôt qu’une autre. La pensée ressemble ainsi à une danse qui essaye de s’harmoniser avec le flux universel qui l’engendre et l’emporte dans un seul mouvement avec la matière. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la Revue du MAUSS, 2011/2, n° 38, p. 339-348. Nous remercions Benjamin Fernandez et Alain Caillé de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. « Ce que nous vendons à Coca-cola, c'est du temps de cerveau disponible. » Patrick LELAY, ancien président de la chaîne privée française TF1 (2004). La pensée moderne, héritière des Lumières, avait accouché de la figure du sujet libre : une conscience de soi, substance stable et indivisible (Descartes), actrice du (...) langage et d'un (...) - 1. Comment penser le pouvoir dans le monde contemporain ? – Nouvel article. (shrink)

This is a translation of the original text, published on Multitudes, realized with the generous permission of the author. Being the transcription of a lecture we decided to maintain the evocative style, as well as the formula "CsO" where originally used.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - La Trobe University, 2012.

El filósofo francés Gilbert Simondon es conocido por su crítica a la forma como las perspectivas sustancialista e hilemórfica conciben la individuación. Para Simondon, la individuación no se piensa desde una plenitud alcanzada, sino desde un proceso en el que el individuo se está constituyendo individual y colectivamente. De este modo, muestra el desplazamiento de una teoría de la relación a una teoría de los procesos de individuación en la cual la ontología cede el paso a la ontogénesis. El presente (...) artículo quiere mostrar cómo el pensamiento de Simondon sobre la educación guarda una estrecha relación con la forma en que la individuación se presenta como proceso y no como resultado. Si la educación es relación, esta se da dentro de un proceso de individuación y no es el evento de un encuentro entre individuos ya constituidos. En el fondo, la escuela, como la individuación, es un campo de tensiones y potencialidades. Simondon es optimista en que una educación que mejore las condiciones de comunicación en el interior de los procesos educativos tendrá unos efectos restauradores en el entramado social, y podrá ser, por tanto, el eje articulador de una sociedad más solidaria y liberadora. (shrink)

Em 1973, Georges Canguilhem publica, na Encyclopédie Universalis, um extenso verbete histórico do conceito “Vida” na biologia e nas ciências da vida. A seguinte tradução do verbete é baseada na segunda edição, reimpressão publicada em 1989, nas páginas 546-553.

Ce texte a déjà paru dans M.-J. Menozzi, F. Flipo & D. Pécaud Énergie et Société : sciences, gouvernances et usages, Aix-en-Provence, Edisud, 2009, p. 25-34. Pour lire ce texte, si vous êtes éclairé par une lumière artificielle ou que vous utilisez un ordinateur, vous avez recours à l'électricité. Le bâtiment dans lequel vous vous trouvez et l'éclairage ou l'ordinateur dont vous faites peut-être usage sont probablement reliés par des conducteurs électriques à une infrastructure municipale ou - Sciences de l'information (...) et de la communication – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Our experience is marked by the constant, and often imperceptible, presence of technological actors that, with their operational mechanisms, greatly influence the processes of construction of the worlds – both physical and imaginary – in which we live and, consequently, of ourselves. In the last decade, internet-based media have introduced a further level of mediation, constituted by the activity of profiling and the construction of filter bubbles, whose power reverberates offline. The context of the pandemic contagion we are experiencing has (...) drastically expanded the space for these actors, whose filtering mechanisms are often as pervasive as they are opaque. To overcome this problem, artistic practices and aesthetics can play a fundamental role. In this text we aim to see how, thanks to the works of some Italian artists who have built their careers by reflecting on the aesthetic aspects of the information society. (shrink)

This paper deals with the notion of physico-chemical distance between the living being and its environment, as the result of their separate evolution (see Solignac VI and VIII). Then, it attempts (in vain) to understand it in the theory of information.

The iconic and diagrammatic features of abduction, as expressed in Peirce’s works after 1890, allow one to re-read the Kantian concept of schema. By means of this new reading, it is possible to consider the dynamics between legality and creative acts, which, according to Emilio Garroni, keep cultures alive. This process can be analysed by a semiotic theory that could combine the features of Kant’s Aesthetic Judgment (as an answer to schema’s problems) and Peirce’s last theory of abduction. In this (...) way, it becomes possible to go beyond the simple subsumption, through Reflective Judgment, of sensible intuitions under a concept. Thus, creativity becomes the process, both mental and cultural, whereby a new regularity come from the background of the previous one as a result of the free play of our faculties (Musement), which sets links between universes of experience apparently very distant one from another. (shrink)

Straipsnyje analizuojamas žmogaus teisių paradoksas, atskleistas Hannah’os Arendt, Jacques’o Rancière’o ir Giorgio Agambeno darbuose. Žmogaus teisių konceptas veikia kaip biopolitinis aparatas, įdiegiantis žmogaus kaip gyvos būtybės ir žmogaus kaip politinio subjekto perskyrą. Ši gyvūniškumo ir žmogiškumo perskyra, atrandama pačiame žmoguje, rezonuoja su žmogiškumo ir gyvūniškumo klausimu filosofijoje. Klasikinė filosofija – nuo Aristotelio iki Heideggerio imtinai – postuluoja žmogaus ir gyvūno skirtingumą, o Agambenas ir Derrida teigia, kad žmogaus gyvūniškumas ir gyvūno humanizavimas yra tik dvi tos pačios problemos pusės. Toks klausimo (...) performulavimas leidžia pereiti prie Roberto Esposito filosofijos, kurioje teigiamas visų gyvų būtybių lygiavertiškumas bei pačios gyvybės imanentiškumas. Priešingai nei negatyvioji biopolitika, kuri siekė pajungti gyvybę normai ir įstatymui, Esposito nori sukurti teigiančiąją biopolitiką, kurioje norma laikoma imanentiška taisykle, leidžiančia gyvybei siekti maksimalios išraiškos. Nors atrodytų, jog tokia teorija turi mažai ką bendra su politiškumo konceptualizavimu, Esposito teigia, jog būtent ribos tarp zoē ir bios, tarp nuogos gyvybės ir politinės egzistencijos, panaikinimas ne tik nesumažina galimybių veikti politinėje plotmėje, bet, atvirkščiai, yra bet kokio bendro buvimo sąlyga. (shrink)