This article introduces the concept of inversion as a rhetorical-political strategy used to redescribe climate concerns from being sacrificed in favour of profitability to seeing that profitability necessitates climate concerns. Drawing on discourse theory and rhetorical analysis, the article analyses discursive struggles in the dominant discourse of fossil-fuel growth in Norway, from 2013 to 2019. By inverting the image of fossil-fuel dependency from growth and success to loss and stagnation in the Norwegian public discourse on fossil fuels and climate risk, (...) those who challenge the hegemonic pro-fossil fuel-investments system pave the way for an alternative description of an ideal welfare state. As such, inversion, as a practice and rhetorical-political strategy may help us understand the strategic manoeuvring of the environmental movements as counter-hegemonic forces. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes’s most important recommendations for a sovereign reader concerned the governing of opinion. Due to the spread of false doctrines and their powerful champions, Hobbes was afraid that subjects would have opinions contrary to the maintenance of peace. His solution comprehended a combination of civic education and censorship. This text explains how Hobbes justifies his recommendations from the perspective of individual deliberation. It argues that Hobbes conceived censoring circulating doctrines as a way of keeping subjects’ minds like clean paper, (...) ready for the sovereign to imprint civil doctrine in them through teaching, thereby increasing the chances of influencing subjects’ (free) deliberation, and thus of producing obedience. (shrink)

This essay, published originally in 2002, is reprinted in “Contextualism—The Next Generation: Symposium on the Future of a Methodology,” because of its impact on the thinking that informs and has led to this new symposium. Burke's argument is that the term context has become “an intellectual slogan or shibboleth” and that “there is a price to pay” for its “more and more frequent use... in a number of disciplines—among them, anthropology, archaeology, art history, geography, intellectual history, law, linguistics, literary criticism, (...) philosophy, politics, psychology, sociology, and theology.” A brief history of the uses of the term and its cognates in these disciplines is provided, along with an examination of “recent interest in the phenomenology of recontextualism or ‘reframing,’” which “depends on agency, creativity, and the power to adapt” and which, indeed, almost defines what is meant by “originality, innovation, invention, or creativity.” The essay concludes that context ought to be used mainly in the plural to indicate that no topic is properly interpretable in any single framework. (shrink)

The coronavirus pandemic and climate crisis have highlighted the power of governments in relation to people and the societies in which they live. This article looks at two sociological approaches that together capture the core features of the relationship between sovereignty, society and individual safety. Sociologists of human rights point to the importance of sovereignty for the enforcement of human rights and draw on the work of Arendt, who argues all rights are lost to those who find themselves outside the (...) protection of the state. Wickham’s Hobbesian sociology adds an important social dimension to these ideas. He adopts Hobbes’ argument that sovereignty secures both society and the protection of people. The article recovers additional ideas in Hobbes’ theory of rights that further link these two approaches. For Hobbes, governments hold a responsibility to protect their citizens’ right to survive. The article discusses the relevance of these ideas to the coronavirus pandemic and climate crisis. It argues sociology is well-placed to explore ways in which the continued exercise of sovereign power in relation to society and human survival is shaping humanity’s response to these global crises. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Spinoza’s political theory gives us a model for how he might have approached a treatise on moral education. Indeed, his account of the method and aims of politics resembles Renaissance humanist rhetorical approaches to pedagogy – particularly, the work of sixteenth century Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives – so strongly that it is hardly an exaggeration conclude that, for him, politics is education writ large. For Spinoza and for Vives, the governor-or-instructor must study the (...) prevailing character, or ingenium, of the subject and adopt means that promote the cognitive and emotional development of the subject, which can be accomplished only to the extent that subjects willingly participate in their own governance-or-instruction. Spinoza joins this rhetorical procedure to a Hobbesian scientific approach to studying ingenia, resulting in a political method that is part science, part art. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of coercive theories of meaning, that is, theories (or criteria) of meaning designed to do down ones opponents by representing their views as meaningless or unintelligible. Many philosophers from Hobbes through Berkeley and Hume to the pragmatists, the logical positivists and (above all) Wittgenstein have devised such theories and criteria in order to discredit their opponents. I argue 1) that such theories and criteria are morally obnoxious, a) because they smack of the totalitarian linguistic tactics (...) of the Party in Orwell’s 1984 and b) because they dehumanize the opposition by portraying them as mere spouters of gibberish; 2) that they are profoundly illiberal since if true, they would undermine Mill’s arguments for free speech; 3) that such theories are prone to self-contradiction, pragmatic and otherwise; 4) that they often turn against their creators including what they were meant to exclude and excluding what they were meant to include; 5) that such theories are susceptible to a modus tollens pioneered by Richard Price in his Review Concerning the Principle Questions of Morals(1758); and 6) that such theories are prima facie false since they fail to ‘predict’ the data that is it their business to explain (or, in the case of criteria, fail to capture the concept that they allegedly represent). The butcher’s bill is quite considerable: some of Hobbes, a fair bit of Locke, half of Berkeley, large chunks of Hume, Russell's Theory of Types, verificationism in its positivist and Dummettian variants, much of pragmatism and most of Wittgenstein - all these have to be sacrificed if we are to save our souls as philosophic liberals. (shrink)

According to a common reading of Thomas Hobbes, fear is the most philosophically important passion, responsible for the founding and sustaining of the commonwealth. I argue that this common reading is incorrect by focusing on the necessary and important role of hope in human action as well as in the founding and sustaining of the commonwealth. Life in the Hobbesian commonwealth, on the reading defended in this paper, is less fearful and more hopeful than scholars have noticed.

Contemporary philosophers often purport to ‘borrow’ or ‘refute’ claims made by past philosophers. In doing so they contravene a contextualist methodological prohibition once defended by Quentin Skinner in his seminal paper “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”. Skinner's methodology has been much debated by theorists of textual meaning and interpretation, and yet the precise nature of the logical path from his premises to his prohibitory conclusion remains elusive. This paper seeks to refute two of the most promising variants (...) of an argument for his methodological prohibition on ‘refutation’, one of which draws on his appeal to Wittgenstein's conception of ‘meaning as use’, and the other of which draws on his appeal to speech act theory. (shrink)

Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ and the ‘revisionist’ readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a (...) keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought. (shrink)

This work intends to demonstrate the existence of limits that hinder the absolute authority of the sovereign in Hobbes’s political theory. Particularly, I will try to identify the concept of honor as the paradigm of this limitation. The field of the manifestations of worth — it will be argued — operates within a logic that runs parallel to that of the State. Moreover, it engenders authorities with high degree of autonomy. To be sure, the sovereign power can intervene in this (...) field by means of persuasion and coercion, but it will never be able to erase the resistances and limitations imposed by signs of honor. (shrink)

I inquire into the issue of how to evaluate fear appeals. I propose modifications to Douglas Walton's position in Scare Tactics: Arguments that Appeal to Fear and Threats that will help improve assessment of fear appeals in complex argumentation such as political discourse. Walton has argued for attending to the underlying practical inference structure involved in fear appeals as well as the type of dialogue in which they occur. I propose, first, that theorists understand the practical reasoning not in terms (...) of an underlying inferential structure but rather as an account of how discourse strategies give fear appeals force; and, second, that theorists not deduce norms and standards from so-called dialogue types but rather explain how discourse strategies engage norms of argumentation that give fear appeals force. This approach generates a normative pragmatic theory of fear appeals that has more explanatory power than Walton's theory, because it explains how discourse strategies agents actually use engage norms of argumentation and are therefore compelling. I submit that compelling fear appeals are designed to show addressees risks to themselves of not carefully assessing the fearful circumstances and risks to the arguer of misjudging whether circumstances merit fear. (shrink)

El artículo pretende esclarecer el concepto de estado de naturaleza (state of nature) de Thomas Hobbes interpretándolo a la luz de su concepción de conocimiento, la cual lo vincula con la ‘nueva ciencia’ o la revolución científica. En consecuencia, el artículo ubica a Hobbes, mediante una reinterpretación de su teoría del conocimiento, en algunos problemas y tradiciones de la Revolución Científica, de donde se redefine su concepto de su estado de naturaleza en términos de causa íntegra. Esto, a su vez, (...) permite argumentar la necesidad del Estado, excluyendo el pesimismo antropológico que se atribuye clásicamente a Hobbes. (shrink)

Liberdade e poder são dois temas que se correlacionam ao longo da história da filosofia política moderna. Nos textos de Hobbes, a ideia da liberdade como ausência de impedimentos às ações ajuda-nos a pensar o dever de obediência ao poder soberano e as relações entre política e direito. Uma situação de vácuo jurídico, em que tudo é permitido, faz-se, contudo, impossível, de modo que a solução de Hobbes consiste em sustentar a ideia do direito natural como direito originário individual vinculado (...) à preservação da vida. Suas ideias do direito natural e da lei natural, que servem de fundamento ao dever de obediência ao soberano, amparam-se em princípios jurídicos, teológicos e biológicos. Tais princípios, entretanto, não dão conta da questão da extensão do poder soberano. Hobbes recorre à análise da linguagem. Sua teoria contratual afirma o princípio de preservação da vida na base da política e sustenta a ideia da criação e da manutenção do poder soberano no ato de linguagem implicado na estrutura representativa do pacto político. (shrink)

The paper explores satire not as a literary genre but as an idiom of political and moral reflection discussing the extent to which contexts of relative constraint or freedom of expression are adequate for its understanding. The argument deals with the satire of Early-Modern England, especially that of the Restoration and early eighteenth century, as for most of this time political authority was purposely oppressive, the satire produced was highly significant, and it allegedly is part of the beginnings of a (...) public sphere of open rational discourse. The paper outlines in turn: the significance of anonymity, differing understandings of humour, diverging satiric propensities, ritualised satire and taboo, and the distinction between constraint and restraint. It suggests that to locate satire between oppression and liberty lacks explanatory power and, in particular, that the very notion of a public sphere is of little historical value in discussing satire. If Habermas's concept is taken seriously it mythologises the early eighteenth century on scant evidence. If it is emptied of theoretical content, a healthy public sphere can be found in numerous places. The paper concludes by raising questions about how far the predominant roles of satire have changed since its 'golden age'. (shrink)

The present article inquires into the uses of Medea’s tragedy as a representation of political sedition in the XVII century, especially in Hobbes’ works who introduces the myth with few variations three times in his work. We are interested in the semantic shifts in the use of a tragedy that, for multiple reasons –to which we will later return– works as an epochal catalyzer of the political and moral dangers with which regicide is symbolically burdened. This constant role, identifiable in (...) the versions of Euripides, Seneca, and Corneille, combines differently -through history- the pairing of seduction and sedition that we try to reconstruct as a convergent element of the tragic vision of politics that runs through Hobbes work. Finally, we explore how classic tragedy is used by Bramhall in his debate with Hobbes, highlighting the connection between tragic and heretical readings of the philosopher. (shrink)

In the introduction to the Leviathan, Hobbes famously defends the anthropological point of departure of his theory of the state by invoking the Delphic injunction ‘Know thyself!’ of which he presents a peculiar reading thereafter. In this paper, I present a reading of the anthropology of the Leviathan that takes this move seriously. In appealing to Delphic injunction, Hobbes wanted to prompt a particular way of reading his anthropology for which it is crucial that the reader relate the presented anthropological (...) views to his self-conception. The anthropology of the Leviathan is thus a kind of manual for a certain kind of self-reflection by which the reader's self-knowledge is to be improved. Furthermore, I will argue that Hobbes' interpretation of the Delphic injunction illuminates several theoretical issues relevant to the epistemology of that kind of ‘self-knowledge’ that was demanded by the Delphic injunction. While Hobbes does not solve all the epistemological problems related with the ideal appealed to by this inscription, he does provide some interesting insights into some general requirements that any epistemological account of Socratic self-knowledge has to meet. (shrink)

Los estudios recientes sobre Hobbes han puesto una gran atención en el uso de las imágenes. Permanece, sin embargo, una objeción seria y factible: se podría argumentar que Hobbes no relaciona su producción de imágenes, ni a su política, ni a su teoría de la percepción y que, por tanto, no tenemos razón para creer que sus imágenes son una aplicación de esta doctrina. El propósito de este trabajo es mostrar que Hobbes de hecho sí vincula — de un modo (...) implícito — la construcción de imágenes y su teoría psicológica al orden político. Primero, el artículo reconstruye la teoría hobbesiana de la percepción y sus implicaciones. Segundo, se muestra que el Leviathan establece encubiertamente el vínculo entre la teoría de las imágenes y las imágenes políticas, incluyendo, por consiguiente, las creadas por el propio Hobbes. Tercero, se muestra que el Leviatán de Hobbes rara vez descubre su rol como dispositivo para ver, para hacer que el lector vea imágenes que él considera necesarias. Finalmente, se discuten las consecuencias de este descubrimiento para nuestra comprensión de Hobbes y de la visualidad y las imágenes en el pensamiento político. (shrink)

In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas makes the claim that the unprecedented public use of critical reason was an essential constituent of the early modern European (bourgeois) public sphere (1991, 27-28, 105-6, and more generally 1-117). Narrating the history of the particular concept of critical reason that animated the public sphere, Habermas locates its origin in the practical reason (phronesis) of Aristotle but argues that Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas More had drastically transformed the concept when they substituted (...) for phronesis a practical reason based instead on techne (1973, 42, 50-51). Machiavelli's role was central in this transformation, for he "reduces the practical .. (shrink)

ABSTRACT For Victoria Kahn, Hobbes' argument that fear of violent death is “the passion to be reckoned upon” in explaining what inclines men to peace must be interpreted as a mimetic argument. However, Kahn then notes a paradox that makes Hobbes' thinking problematic: whereas love and the desires are appetites that produce an imitative effect, fear is different. Though also a passion, fear lacks that capacity to produce a mimetic effect or, therefore, to generate a contract. My hypothesis is that (...) resolving the dilemma presented in Kahn's interpretation of Hobbes requires a shift in attention from mimesis to rhetoric and, more specifically, to biological rhetoric as defined by Nancy Struever. This approach to Hobbes makes it possible to understand the rhetorical role of fear in generating and maintaining the social contract, and how the problem that Kahn signals—the impotence of fear in relation to mimesis—can be resolved. (shrink)

This paper offers an example of what may be called ‘an aesthetic history of legal and political thought’. Such a task engages in theorising historically the features of aesthetic traditions that enable and further normative inquiry, i.e. an exploration of the norms and values that might contribute to the good life and the common good. The three features offered in this paper as useful to identifying such aesthetic traditions are communality and interactivity, experimentalism, and exemplarity. The paper shows how each (...) of these features is present, in particular ways, in one specific aesthetic tradition, namely the declamatory tradition. Tracing the declamatory tradition back to Ancient Rome, and examining its influence in the English Renaissance, especially in Sir Thomas More’s response to Lucian’s declamatory thema, Tyrannicide, the paper argues that the particular ways in which declamatory practice combines the above three features enables those engaged in it to pursue normative inquiry. The paper argues that the integration of these three features is especially visible in one aspect of declamatory practice, namely the introduction and exchange of colores, i.e. changes in the narrative, introduced by declaimers and their audiences, which shed light on the possible motivation of a character, and thereby also invited shifts in affective allegiance and evaluative perspective. The paper argues that it is in large part through such introduction and exchange of colores that the declamatory tradition enables and furthers normative inquiry, and thus also offers a good reason for including the declamatory tradition in ‘an aesthetic history of legal and political thought’. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone contribuir al proyecto de atribuirle a Hobbes una teoríaautónoma de la política, la cual defiende la existencia de cuestiones políticas que nopueden ser subordinadas lógicamente a otras esferas como la moral o la religión. Segúnesta posición los conflictos políticos no pueden ser meramente atribuidos, por ejemplo, ala inmoralidad o irreligiosidad de los involucrados, sino que incluso personas completamentemorales y religiosas podrían llegar a verse envueltas en conflictos políticos.

El propósito del presente trabajo consiste en explicar por qué Hobbes adopta una perspectiva corporativista para dar cuenta de la dinámica social y política que opera al interior del Leviatán. En concreto, intentaremos demostrar cómo el ordenamiento de la sociedad política en sistemas conducidos por representantes le permite a Hobbes establecer ciertas pautas en el desenvolvimiento de los conflictos públicos, fundamentalmente, la asignación de responsabilidades. A su vez, como hipótesis subsidiaria, argüiremos que el rol de la teoría de la representación (...) es central en la medida en que Hobbes no pretende eliminar la disputa política como tal, sino tan sólo deshacerse de su modalidad irregular. (shrink)

How can citizens construct the political authority under which they will live? I argue that Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) answers this question concerning the constitutive power of political and normative agency by employing four dimensions of mimesis from the Greek and Roman traditions. And I argue that mimesis accounts for the know-how, or power/knowledge, the general ‘man’ draws upon in constructing the commonwealth. Hobbes revalues poetic mimesis through his stylistic decisions, including the invitation to the reader to read ‘himself’ in (...) the portrait of the general man depicted in the text. Hobbes aims for Leviathan to change the ethical dispositions of its readers, turning them from bad to good men as they witness the general man undergoing this ethical transformation in the transition from the state of nature to the civil state. He emphasizes the anthropological dimension of mimesis to explain political disorder since he argues that men assess the honor others attribute them by observing signs and gestures in others’ behavior. Hobbes employs the linguistic dimension of mimesis to describe how men acting as agents can build a normative consensus out of the state of nature. This article positions mimesis as a key term for understanding the intersection between aesthetics and politics before the term ‘aesthetics’ came into parlance. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes tells us that he wrote Leviathan to “absolve the divine laws” of the charge that they justify rebellion. This article interprets the argumentative strategy of the second half of Leviathan in light of this intention. Over the course of his three major political works, Hobbes develops a convergent argument to absolve God’s laws. This strategy of judicial rhetoric relies on using multiple independent claims in the hope that one’s audience finds at least one of them persuasive. This was (...) a risky strategy for Hobbes that angered his critics. The strategy also reveals something about what sort of philosopher Hobbes was and how we ought to approach his work. (shrink)

Peter Winch, in his political philosophy, wanted to rethink the concepts of political authority, legitimacy and political culture, with a starting point in Wittgensteinian ideas. This essay brings together Winch's thoughts on political authority. Developing insights from Wittgenstein's work on certainty, Winch emphasised the unstated background behind any normative stand concerning authority. Ideas of legitimacy and civil society are formed within historically specific political cultures. In the 1990s, Winch was increasingly inclined to emphasise disagreement, which was related to his developing (...) views on understanding, logic and reasoning. This development is traced, in part, on the basis of unpublished lecture notes. (shrink)

Šiame straipsnyje tiriami subtilūs Hobbes’o ir Kanto požiūrių į retoriką ir materializmą skirtumai, žvelgiant į juos platesniame politinės filosofijos kontekste. Nors abu šie filosofai buvo retorikos kritikai, tarp jų požiūrių išryškėja esminių skirtumų. Hobbes’as, būdamas monarchijos šalininkas, paveiktas Lukrecijaus, kritikavo retoriką iš materialistinės, antropologijos perspektyvos. Paradoksalu, tačiau jis pasitelkė retorines strategijas savo naujajame scientia civilis. Kantas, nors ir kritikuodamas tiek Lukrecijaus materializmą, tiek ir retoriką, į savo filosofijos perspektyvą integravo kai kuriuos suderinamus retorinius elementus, visų pirma susijusius su epikūrizmo tradicija. (...) Šiame straipsnyje tiriama, kaip du aptariamieji filosofai traktuoja paradiastole ir kokias pasekmes jų interpretacija turi jų politinei minčiai. Iškeliamas argumentas, kad abu mąstytojai, ieškodami racionalaus pamato politinei tvarkai, savąjį racionalumo sąvokos interpretavimą įtvirtina epikūrietiškame materializme, perkonfigūruodami retorinius elementus taip, kaip būtų patogu jų filosofijai. Straipsnyje išsiaiškinama, kad Kantas yra linkęs į respublikoniškas politines pažiūras; jis siekia kuo labiau padidinti piliečių autonomiją. Tai kategoriškai skiriasi nuo Hobbes’o orientacijos į monarchinę valdymo struktūrą. Šis tyrimas prisideda prie labiau niuansuoto suvokimo apie ankstyvąją Naujųjų laikų politinę mintį bei jos aktualumą šiuolaikinei respublikoniškai bei demokratinei teorijai. (shrink)

Quentin Skinner has enduringly insisted that a past text cannot be ‘understood’ without the reader knowing something about its historical and linguistic context. But since the 1970s he has been attacked on this central point of all his work by authors maintaining that the text itself is the fundamental guide to the author’s intention, and that a separate study of the context cannot tell the historian anything that the text itself could not. Mark Bevir has spent much of the last (...) 20 years repeating a similar counter-argument. Although ‘study the linguistic context’ might be a useful heuristic maxim, Bevir says, it does not express a necessary or sufficient condition for understanding. But Skinner is right, and one of the figures he has consistently identified as a formative inspiration, R. G. Collingwood, has already (in his work of the 1930s) shown why. What Collingwood calls his ‘logic of question and answer’ explains why the historian cannot answer his characteristic ‘intention’ question about past texts without knowing the context of problems to which authors think they are offering solutions. The study of context is neither ‘prior’ (as Bevir incorrectly supposes) nor ‘separate’ (as Skinner inaccurately says), but it is, as Skinner maintains, nevertheless impossible to grasp an author’s intention without it. This ‘logic of question and answer’ also explains why, in history, dismissing the study of context is in fact a pre-judgement of evidence yet unseen. (shrink)

La siguiente propuesta de lectura es, en muchos sentidos, el resultado del encuentro con la obra de Norberto Bobbio. Este pensador italiano se dedicó a estudiar a los clásicos de la filosofía política y, entre ellos, especialmente a Thomas Hobbes, y fue. mostrando, de un modo cada vez más convincente, la presencia de la obra de: Hobbes en el desarrollo de la filosofía política moderna, hasta el punto de considerarla: como el gran modelo que reemplaza ala tradición aristotélica. Su tesis (...) es muy clara: ese modelo está formado por un con- junto de conceptos en cuya estructuración predomina la racionalidad; en ese modelo existe un doble y compatible camino intelectual: el de la fundamentación racional del Estado y el de la fundamentación de un Estado racional. Estas fórmulas han tenido mucho éxito en el campo de la historiografía, pero creemos que pueden modificarse sustantivamente si se muestra que el peso fundamental del pensamiento político de Hobbes recae no sólo en la razón sino también, y antes que nada, en la imaginación. Es precisamente el sentido básico de ese descubrimiento el que nos ha llevado, distanciados de Bobbio, a proponer el presente estudio. (shrink)

This essay aims to present, but not fully substantiate, a way of undermining the notion of ‘ultimate interpreter’ in the sense of ‘a limited, appointed or elected, institutional body.’ One effective way of such presentation is, as I argue, in terms of interpretation of Hobbes’s theory as a response to the problem of political ambiguity. Thus interpreted, Hobbes’s theory presses on us the choice between normative and non-normative view of language. If we endorse the former, the argument against ‘ultimate interpreter’ (...) seems to hold.However, one can to a degree blunt the argument’s razor by making the status of the body dependent fully on the body’s theoretical performance, so that practical finality of the body’s deliberations tracks their theoretical finality, not the other way around. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem como objetivo definir o significado de razão para Hobbes, com a finalidade de entender quais as consequências que a definição deste termo ocasiona para a teoria política do autor. Compreender a noção de razão e sua influência para a política significa depreender a noção de natureza humana posta pelo autor e sua necessária ligação com a construção de sua teoria política.