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The structure of radical probabilism.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.details
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Comparative Expectations.Arthur Paul Pedersen - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):811-848.details
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Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.details
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Pain, paradox and polysemy.Michelle Liu - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):461-470.details
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Are scrutability conditionals rationally deniable?Jens Kipper & Zeynep Soysal - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):452-461.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Bayesian Convergence to the Truth and the Metaphysics of Possible Worlds.Simon M. Huttegger - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):587-601.details
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Is Strict Coherence Coherent?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):411-424.details
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Deliberation welcomes prediction.Alan Hájek - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):507-528.details
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More trouble for regular probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012details
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